

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS
LEGISLATIVE, DIPLOMATIC
AND
POPULAR



POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS

JAMES G. BLAINE



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LEGISLATIVE, DIPLOMATIC, AND POPULAR

1850-1880

JAMES G. BLAINE.

EDWARD S. CONN.

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POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS

LEGISLATIVE, DIPLOMATIC, AND POPULAR

1856—1886

BY

JAMES G. BLAINE.

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THE Political Discussions included in this volume are taken from a large number of the same general character, extending through many years. The principle of selection for publication has been to present those that relate to political events of lasting importance; or those that touch upon practical questions still engaging in various degrees the attention of the American people.

The Diplomatic Correspondence refers only to those questions still in dispute, — questions which even upon a larger field than that of our own political contests may affect the future interests and influence of the United States.

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POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

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NOMINATION OF FRÉMONT FOR PRESIDENT.

[Speech delivered by Mr. Blaine at a Republican meeting in Litchfield, Maine, June 28, 1856.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — The Republican party is a new political organization. It is not yet two years old. Its first small meetings were held late in the summer of 1854, when the name was adopted, and the party organized on the one great principle of resisting the spread of slavery into the Territories of the United States. The new party had its origin in the deep and abiding conviction on the part of the opponents of slavery that the propagandists of the South cannot be trusted upon any adjustment or upon any agreement. Pressed hard by opposition, to-day, they will agree to a compromise; and, to-morrow, if they see opportunity for fresh aggression, they will disregard it and trample upon it. The two great compromises on the subject of slavery were that which established the geographical line of 36° 30' in the year 1820, known as the Missouri Compromise, and that which was enacted thirty years later and is known as the Compromise of 1850. At both junctures, the potent agency that wrought on behalf of the South was the fear that the Union might be dissolved. That was the threat of Southern leaders; it was the conclusive argument that induced Northern men to yield. But in 1854 the Missouri Compromise was repealed, and, with it, the Compromise of 1850 was put under foot. The division line (by which it was agreed that freedom should have sway north of it and slavery should permissively exist south of it) was destroyed, after thirty-four years of honorable observance on both sides.

The destruction of the Whig party was one of the immediate results of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, because the Northern Whigs were largely anti-slavery in feeling, and could not be held in co-operation with a party whose Southern members had broken faith in their zeal for the spread of slavery. A large number of Northern Democrats were equally resolved not to stand by their old party. These two great bodies, joining with the old Free-soil and Liberty party, are the elements that have coalesced and become unified within the ranks of the Republican party. I think it is not boastful to say that in the character of the men who lead this party and of the vast number who compose it, that in its growth, in its zeal, in its unselfish devotion to a single great issue, it is unprecedented, if not phenomenal. It has grown so rapidly that it is in the National field with full strength and with organization—courageous enough to enter the fight, with the conscience and the nerve to accept defeat and prepare for another battle. Its members are not to be put down by the cry of sectionalism, or frightened by the threat of disunion. Certainly no member of the Republican party underrates the value of the Union of the States, or would hesitate at any sacrifice to preserve it, except the sacrifice of honor, or the sacrifice of that freedom which the Union was established to preserve. But we do not contemplate the dissolution of the Union as a possibility; and certainly no sane man believes that a great body of States, bound together in mutual interest and cemented by a thousand ties, can be torn asunder so readily and so easily as the flippant threats of the Southern extremists would imply.

The Republican party, therefore, will march forward in the line of duty, and will try to engraft its principles upon the government of the country. They have no purpose to interfere with slavery in the States; they have no purpose to interfere with slavery anywhere, except to the extent that Thomas Jefferson and the Fathers of the Republic interfered with it when they excluded it from free territory. If, indirectly, that policy interferes with slavery in the States, we are not responsible. Certainly the great evil of slavery, wherever it exists, is not to be countenanced and upheld by subjecting other communities and other territory to a like curse. I have no doubt

that the great majority of the Republican party would interfere with slavery in the States, if they considered that they had the Constitutional right to do so; but they will not violate their oaths to observe the Constitution, and they will not strain their consciences to make that seem right which the plain letter of the law forbids. But they believe that their right to exclude slavery from the free Territories is just as clear as their inability to interfere with it in the States; and on that single point, great and far-reaching in its effects, we challenge the Democratic party of the South and of the North to a contest for the government of the country.

The first National Convention of the Republican party has lately been held in Philadelphia, and this Congressional District did me the honor to send me as one of its delegates to that remarkable assemblage. I am sure that I shall be expected by you, as my constituents, to make some report of what was said and done there, and especially what was done by the Maine delegation. The daily journals have given you the details of the proceedings, and I content myself with some general observations on the character of the Convention—its personal character, if I may use the phrase. In the various delegations that composed the Convention, in the sacred cause which it assembled to uphold, and in the work which it accomplished, it will fairly rank as one of the most significant and important political conventions ever held in the United States. A marked feature was the large proportion of young men among its members, and in the general tendency to select that class I can find the only cause for conferring upon me the distinction of membership in such a body.

It was scarcely to be expected that such an assemblage of men, many of them marked by individuality, and all of them possessing independence of thought and action, should, without some difference of view, reach a general unanimity of conclusion. The drift of events for some months before the Convention met was towards the nomination of Colonel Frémont for the Presidency, and I believe he received a unanimous vote of the delegates from every State in New England, except Maine. Among our delegates there was a friendly and sincere difference of view, which separated us into nearly equal

parts,—thirteen preferring Colonel Frémont, and eleven giving their votes on the first or informal ballot for Judge McLean of Ohio. I was one of the eleven. I did not act from any spirit of opposition to Colonel Frémont. My preference for Judge McLean was in large degree based upon admiration of his high character, but partly upon an inherited friendship for him, partly from a kinship of feeling with his conservatism, and partly, I suppose, because the Whig instincts which I share with the great majority of this district turned me towards one who had so long been among the trusted statesmen and soundest advisers of that party. But it would be unfair to say that Whig or anti-Whig traditions had much to do with the division, for the two most eminent members of our delegation, Ex-Governor Edward Kent and Ex-Governor Anson P. Morrill, the one formerly an earnest Whig and the other a radical Democrat, united in favor of nominating Judge McLean.

The sense of the Convention was, however, strongly in favor of taking Colonel Frémont, the first ballot showing 359 votes in his favor, to 196 votes for Judge McLean. The nomination was immediately declared to be unanimous, and was cheered as heartily by those who had supported Judge McLean as by those who had been the original advocates of Colonel Frémont's nomination. The Presidential candidate being thus selected from the Pacific coast, it was at once regarded as probable that the second place on the ticket would be given to an Atlantic State, though the Mississippi Valley contended for it. A concentration was rapidly formed upon Mr. Dayton, long eminent as a Senator from New Jersey, though on the first ballot, as you already know, he did not receive a majority,—a considerable number of votes being given to different candidates. The leading competitor, who received a hundred and ten votes, was Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, who, ten years ago, served a single term in Congress, and who has lately gained reputation beyond the lines of his own State by the ability with which he has reviewed Senator Douglas for his course in securing the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Some of the Illinois delegates gave pledges, privately, that if Lincoln were nominated for Vice-President the ticket would receive the electoral vote of Illinois,—thus defeating Douglas in his own State. But the

tendency towards an Eastern candidate was too strong to be arrested.

The three parties are now before the country with their candidates, and there is something remarkable in the political antecedents of the gentlemen on each ticket. Colonel Frémont, who is now adopted by the Republican party, which includes the old Abolitionists, the anti-slavery Democrats and the great majority of the Whigs of the North, is a native of South Carolina, reared in the doctrines of Calhoun, called to the civil service under President Jackson, appointed to the army by President Van Buren, and married to a daughter of Colonel Benton. With Southern birth and all these Democratic traditions and connections, it is one of those singular revolutions, not altogether infrequent in American political life, that makes him the candidate of the anti-slavery party of the North.

Mr. Buchanan, who is the Democratic candidate, was one of the most pronounced of the old Federalists, and has hitherto found his earlier record a stumbling-block to his political advancement. Since he joined the Democratic party he has continually striven to efface his record as a Federalist and especially the memory of his hostility to the Administration of Mr. Madison. He has offered among other disproofs, the fact that in the war of 1812 he joined a military company and marched to the relief of Baltimore when menaced by British invaders. The hostile force had left before he arrived. This attempt at establishing a military record was much impaired by a humorous interruption by Mr. Clay upon a certain occasion in the Senate, when he asked Mr. Buchanan whether in the war of 1812 the British had retired from Baltimore because he was advancing upon it, or whether he had advanced upon Baltimore because he knew the British had retired? — Mr. Breckinridge, his associate, comes from an old Whig family long resident in Kentucky, his father and grandfather both being supporters of Mr. Clay. So that the Democratic ticket really contains no candidate that was originally Democratic.

The American party, as the Know-Nothings now style themselves, have selected Mr. Fillmore, placed him upon a pro-slavery platform, and associated with him on the ticket A. J. Donelson of Tennessee, the adopted nephew of General Jackson and the

inheritor of his principles. Mr. Fillmore was originally an anti-slavery Whig, a member of the anti-masonic party, and entered Congress midway in General Jackson's administration, towards which he always held the position of an implacable opponent. Throughout his Congressional career he was distinguished by his continual resistance to the advances of the slave-power, being through all these years fully abreast with Mr. Seward, who at that time represented the party at home. When he succeeded to the Presidency, after General Taylor's death, six years ago, Mr. Fillmore went over to the South, favored the Compromise bills and approved the Fugitive-slave Law, the most cruel enactment that ever was placed upon the statute-book of the United States. It is this which has associated him with an old Southern Democrat closely identified with General Jackson, and has made him the candidate of the Southern men who cannot support Mr. Buchanan.

It is a singular combination that gives to each party in the contest a candidate whose early associations and whose early political views were in absolute conflict with the early views and associations of the men who are now supporting him. But the advantage which the Republican party has in this regard is that Colonel Frémont, in his early life, had no political record of any kind, but was engaged as an engineer, a soldier, a pioneer and an explorer until the opening of the great era which led to our acquisitions of territory from Mexico. He came from California as a senator six years ago, associated with one of the extremest Southern Democrats, — William M. Gwin, — but he came as the representative of a free State not yet infected by the presence of a slave, — a free State that broke the equality of representation in the Senate between North and South which the Southern Democrats, under Mr. Calhoun's lead, had demanded as the protection of the institution of Slavery. As long as the South could hold half of the Senate, no anti-slavery measure could be enacted. That spell was broken by the admission of California; and but for Frémont's relationship to Benton and the interest which the distinguished Missouri senator was thereby induced to take in the fate of California, the Golden State might not have been able to come in, without ruinous exactions and conditions imposed by the South. But for

the action of Colonel Benton the Democratic party would have been practically consolidated against the admission of California to the Union until a slave State could be organized to offset her influence on all questions affecting the interests of the South. His course will be adjudged as eminently wise and patriotic whatever motive may have originally inspired it. But it cost him his standing and influence in the Democratic party and ended his senatorial life. He served in the last Congress as representative from the St. Louis district, and soon found himself again in rank antagonism with his old party in its leading measure, — the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

Frémont was the herald, therefore, of a new political era in the nation; and without realizing it himself he became the embodiment of the Republican policy which declared that the National Territories shall be kept free from the curse of slavery. The battle between free institutions and slave institutions is now in actual progress in the Territory of Kansas, and will be fought there to the bitter end. Mr. Buchanan represents the pro-slavery side of that contest, Colonel Frémont represents the anti-slavery side, while Mr. Fillmore, evading a declaration on the question, is, so far as he has political strength, decisively and most effectively on the side of the South.

This is not the fight of the old Abolitionists, though being practical and sensible men those radical disciples of Freedom are joining heart and hand with the supporters of Frémont. As I have already intimated the Republican party is not pledged to the removal of slavery from the District of Columbia, nor to the destruction of the interstate slave-trade, nor even to the repeal of that most infamous statute, the Fugitive-slave Law. The party is pledged simply and only to the policy of prohibiting the existence of slavery in all the Territories of the United States. In fact, the platform adopted by the Philadelphia Convention is confined to the one issue of freedom for the Territories, with a resolution added favoring the construction of the Pacific Railroad and another favoring liberal appropriations for the improvement of rivers and harbors. The issue, therefore, could not be more direct or more specific. Rarely, indeed, has it happened, in the complicated character of political questions, that any party was ever able to enter upon a popular canvass.

with an issue so plain, so well defined, so difficult to evade and so certain to enlist intelligent popular interest.

The Republicans of Maine are resolved to join their brethren of other States in presenting the one great issue, separated from and unembarrassed by all other personal, political or moral considerations. The Democrats, who now hold the political power of the State for the first year since 1851-52, have repealed the Prohibitory Law and substituted a License Law. They have expected that such an issue thrown in the face of the Republicans, three-fourths of whom are Prohibitionists, might create division and confusion in their ranks at this time. The leading Prohibitionists, with Anson P. Morrill and Neal Dow at their head, are willing and in fact desirous of postponing the issue, so that we can have a clearly defined fight on National questions this year and a clean fight on Prohibition next year. The Democratic policy, therefore, though designed for distraction, will fail to discourage the Republican host, but will, rather, nerve it to the outlay of its full and combined strength.

The Republican State Convention, which meets in a few days, will settle all these issues, and then we shall march forward in solid column to the conquest of the State. The unanimous desire of the party is that Hannibal Hamlin shall be selected as our standard-bearer; and though Mr. Hamlin is reluctant to leave the Senate to become Governor, he must remember that the same power which can make him Governor can send him back to the Senate. Let us make the demand upon him unanimous and so imposing that he cannot decline our request. To that end let me urge that all the towns in Kennebec be represented at Portland with full delegations, on the 8th of next month. There is work to be done this year, and the old Whig county of Kennebec must do her full share. Maine will not lag behind in this contest for free territory, and the first duty in hand is to destroy the present Democratic supremacy in the State.

THE NATIONAL ISSUES OF 1860.

[Extract from a speech delivered by Mr. Blaine before a Republican mass meeting at Farmington, Maine, July 4, 1860, at which Honorable Israel Washburn, Republican candidate for Governor, formally opened the campaign.]

I SINCERELY thank you, Mr. Chairman and Republicans of Franklin County, for the honor you have conferred upon me by your invitation to join our distinguished candidate for Governor in formally opening the State and Presidential campaigns in Maine. We have had the great pleasure of hearing Mr. Washburn, and I am sure we all feel that in his eloquent and exhaustive speech on the leading National issue he has left little for other speakers to say. If his speech made one impression upon my mind stronger than any other, it was that we do a wrong to our State and to the Nation to withdraw him from Congress to make him Governor of the State, when his services in the House of Representatives had so fully ripened him for the closing battles of that conflict for free territory, in which, for the past ten years, he has borne so conspicuous and so honorable a part. But it is now too late to change, and we must content ourselves with the belief that if we lose a brilliant Representative in Congress we shall secure an equally brilliant Governor, and that Mr. Rice, who is nominated as his successor in the National field, will faithfully uphold the principles which Mr. Washburn's long career has so fitly illustrated.

It is interesting and important for us, at the initial point of the National campaign, to see how the events of four years have deepened and broadened the issue upon which the Republican party was organized, and how that party, growing and strengthening in all the States of the North, has enlarged the creed of principles which first constituted its political faith. The vote for Frémont, in 1856, though the party had been hastily

summoned and was imperfectly organized, was yet so large as to give a wholesome fright to the pro-slavery leaders of the South. Mr. Buchanan carried his own State by only two thousand votes in the October election, and if the majority had been two thousand the other way the coalition ticket of Frémont and Fillmore electors would probably have been chosen. In that event the election would have been thrown into the House of Representatives, and either Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Fillmore would have been chosen President through the same process that gave John Quincy Adams the Executive Chair in 1825. Though it might not have deprived the Democracy of the Chief Magistracy, it would have been more than equivalent to an ordinary defeat between parties. Even as it resulted, the gathered hosts of the free North so alarmed the leaders of Southern opinion that something was imperatively demanded to strengthen their position.

The Nation did not wait long to learn the policy and purpose of the pro-slavery leaders. The Republicans had already once gained control of the popular branch of Congress, and the Democracy were afraid that the same result might be repeated. That implied the possibility of defeat at the polls in a Presidential election; and with the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government against them, they feared for the fate of slavery. In this dilemma they had recourse to the National Judiciary to strengthen them in their position. So assured were they that a decision of great value to the pro-slavery interest was impending, that Mr. Buchanan ventured to refer to it in his Inaugural Address as "soon to be announced." People did not realize at the time the gross impropriety of this reference, but its full measure was seen when, not long after, the Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the Supreme Court. This decision, which primarily related to the freedom of a single man (whose name the case bears), was so broadened by the Court, in its *obiter dicta*, as to take in all existing political disputes on the slavery question. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 was declared to have been unconstitutional, and its flagitious repeal in 1854 was thus upheld as a patriotic duty on the part of Congress. As far as a judicial edict could do it, slavery was strengthened everywhere by that decision, the whole

National domain was opened to its ingress, and no power was left, either among the settlers in the Territories or in the Congress of the United States, to exclude it. The belief with many who are entitled to know, is that the "opinions" of the Court which take in matter beyond the record of the case, would never have been delivered had not the supposed political necessities of the South demanded this judicial declaration of the extreme doctrine of Mr. Calhoun.

The Southern men have found, however, that they reckoned without their host when they supposed that the people of the United States, on political questions of this character, would give up a contest that involves freedom for a continent, on the mere *sideway* opinions of five pro-slavery judges. The contest goes on; and it has been deepened by the atrocious efforts to compel Kansas to enter the Union under the fraudulent constitution made at Lecompton, against the will and the wish of her people. Neither the abuse of power by the President nor the perversion of justice by the Supreme Court can call a halt in this battle for free territory. It is destined to go forward; and the elements which the pro-slavery leaders have relied upon as settling it are but acting as incentives to greater energy and more determined purpose on the part of the freemen of the Northern States. The cry of "sectionalism," which is part of the campaign thunder of the Democratic party, has lost its force; for the people measure its meaning and are ready, in their own phrase, to unite in defense of freedom when Southern men combine in defense of slavery.

In the election of 1856 the opponents of the Democratic party were divided. I do not say that, even had they been united, they could have triumphed at that time. But this year, in the good Providence of God, the division comes in the Democratic party itself; and we can felicitate ourselves that the strife between Mr. Douglas and Mr. Breckinridge will in all probability give the election to the Republicans of the United States, and that Abraham Lincoln, if he lives, will be the next President. I do not in this contest reckon Mr. Bell of Tennessee (who, with Mr. Edward Everett for Vice-President, is running as the representative of the old Whig remnant) as of any special force. We have no occasion to discuss him or his

platform, and we can safely endure the little diversion which, through old Whig influences, he may make from the Republican standard in the North, in consideration of the additional confusion he will bring to the Democratic party in the South. It is in fact probable that upon the whole the Republicans will gain by the candidacy of Bell and Everett, because the majority of their Northern supporters, if the ticket were withdrawn, would cast their votes directly for Mr. Douglas.

Nor should we listen for a single moment to those Democrats who for the first time in their lives find themselves in a quarrel with the pro-slavery chieftains, and are asking popular support for Douglas as the leader of the real revolt against the dangerous element of the South. If there were no other argument against that course, its utter impracticability would be conclusive. If the Douglas men are in earnest and wish to smite the dangerous and aggressive element which is massing itself under the lead of Breckinridge for pro-slavery victory, or for disunion in the event of failure, they should unite in support of Mr. Lincoln. Either Mr. Lincoln will be chosen, or the election will be thrown into the House of Representatives; and no man who measures the working of political forces to-day can view that result with any feeling other than one of dread. Certainly no Northern man ought to cast his vote in a way that admits of the possibility of such a raffle for the Presidency as would sacrifice all principle and involve the danger that may be connected with a contest of that character.

If the Republicans of Maine need any further stimulus to rally for Lincoln with even more enthusiasm than they rallied for Frémont, four years ago, it will be found in the fact that our own distinguished fellow-citizen, Hannibal Hamlin, is the candidate for Vice-President. In these great National uprisings for freedom, it seems to be Mr. Hamlin's fortune to hold prominent place and wield prominent influence. It was his great victory as candidate for Governor four years ago, that gave impulse to the popular wave for Frémont, and it is his presence and his influence to-day which, with that of our distinguished candidate for Governor, will give increased volume and increased force to the voice of Maine in September.

There is another great step forward which the Republican

party has taken in its National platform of this year,—re-affirmed with special emphasis in the State platform of Maine. In 1856 the issue was entirely confined to resistance to the aggressions of slavery, but since that date the financial revolutions which have led to such distress in the country have turned men's minds to the fallacy and the failure of the free-trade policy which for the last fourteen years has been adopted and enforced by the Democratic party. The prosperity which was said to have been caused by the tariff of 1846 has received a rude shock, and three years ago a disastrous panic swept over the country leaving all business embarrassed, if not prostrate. For several years prior to that date, every man who believed in the policy of protection had been ridiculed and taunted and pointed to the indisputable proof of the advantage of free trade to be found in the generally prosperous condition of the country. The cry in favor of the tariff of 1846 was so boisterous that no opponent of it could even have a hearing. Those who still held firmly to the policy of protection and in the belief that the repeal of the tariff of 1842 was a great National blunder, were silenced, if not scorned, in the arena of popular discussion.

It was in vain that Protectionists attempted to prove that the period of prosperity under that tariff (from 1846 to 1856) was due to a series of what might be termed fortuitous circumstances—all involving good fortune to the United States and ill fortune to other nations.

—*First*, At the very moment of the enactment of the tariff of 1846, the war with Mexico broke out. The result was that more than one hundred thousand men were called from the pursuits of industry and enlisted in the ranks of our army, while other thousands, leaving their usual callings, were set to work on the production of war material. The first result was a deficiency in the supply of laborers and a large advance in wages. In the course of two years the Government paid out on account of the war, nearly one hundred and fifty millions of dollars, thus stimulating trade in almost every department.

—*Second*, Midway in the Mexican war (in 1847) a distressing famine occurred in Ireland, which, with short crops in other parts of Europe, created an unprecedented demand for American bread-stuffs. This, of course, raised the price of grain to

high figures, and carried large profit and ready money to the door of every farmer in the land.

— *Third*, The Mexican war had scarcely closed, the Irish famine had only been partially relieved, when (in 1848-49) tumults and revolutions occurred in nearly every European kingdom. The direct result was the disorganization of industry and the depression of trade all over the continent. Demand for our breadstuffs continued, and competition of European fabrics was so reduced that every form of industry in the United States was stimulated to fill the demands of the home market.

— *Fourth*, The convulsions of Europe were still in progress when another stimulus was added to our prosperity. Vast deposits of gold were found in California, and from 1849 onward, for several years, the trade of the country in all departments was quickened to a degree never before known. The demand for shipping to carry passengers to the land of gold, and supplies to sustain them, gave new life to our navigation interests and filled the ocean with clipper ships that had no rivals for speed or beauty. The rapid additions to our gold currency, immediately followed by an expansion of our paper currency, gave such an abundance of money as had never before been dreamed of. The inevitable result was a rapid rise of prices for labor and for all commodities, and speculation and money-making were the order of the day. Importations from Europe were enormously large, and in settling the balances we followed the theory of the Free-trade School, in regarding our gold as simply a commodity, to be shipped out of the country as freely as iron or lead or wheat or corn.

— *Fifth*, In 1854, before the craze of speculation had time to cool, another great event came to pass which still further increased our prosperity. It really seemed as if the whole world had conspired to have every accident and every calamity happen for our benefit. When our prosperity was already great and growing, the three leading nations of Europe — as nations were then ranked — Great Britain, Russia and France — rushed into a tremendous war which lasted until 1856. In its progress the Crimean struggle absorbed the energies of the nations engaged, removed to a large extent the mercantile marine of England and France from peaceful pursuits and gave still greater expan-

sion to our own navigation, stopped the flow of grain from Russia, and gave every opportunity for trade and commerce and great profit to the citizens of the United States.

But this singular combination of good fortune to us and ill fortune to others could not continue indefinitely. Prosperity built upon the calamities of other nations has a most insecure and undesirable foundation. The three great European powers made peace, the Baltic and the Black Sea were thrown open for the exportation of Russian bread-stuffs, English and French ships that had been engaged in war service were at once and everywhere competing at low prices for the freight of the world, shipments of gold from California began to decrease. The wheel of fortune had turned, and the consequence was that the portentous superstructure of credit, of speculation, which had been based upon what the gamblers would have termed our extraordinary run of luck, suddenly came to an end when the luck ceased. The panic of 1857 was the closing chapter in that extraordinary ten years in which the political economists of the Democratic party were constantly mistaking effect for cause, were constantly blinded to the actual condition of trade and to the real sources of our prosperity, were constantly teaching to the people of the United States spurious theories, were constantly deceiving themselves by fallacies, and were constantly drawing conclusions from false premises.

Notwithstanding all the gold received from California, it was found that we had not enough in the hour of panic to keep the banks, even of the National Metropolis, from immediate suspension. Enterprises all over the country were checked; labor was thrown into confusion and distress, and for the last three years men have been working for less remuneration than has been paid to honest toil at any period within the preceding quarter of a century. The policy of free trade, as embodied in the tariff of 1846, had, in ten years, caused such a large importation of foreign goods that, besides all our shipments of produce and all the earnings of our commercial marine, it drained us of four hundred millions of gold to make good the balance of trade against us. I mean four hundred millions of gold, *net*, over and above the amount which in the currents of trade was occasionally shipped to us from Europe. The bank-

ers of New York, the great majority of whom had sustained the free-trade policy, were among the first to ask extension on their obligations. They could pay in their own bills, but the specie which should have been in their vaults had been sold by them for shipment abroad, to make good the balance which their favorite tariff of 1846 had constantly accumulated against us in Europe.

These lessons, fellow-citizens, are serious, and the Republican National Convention has appreciated their meaning. That convention recalls us, in its platform, to the policy of adjusting our revenues so as to protect labor, encourage home manufactures, create a balance of trade in our favor, and keep our gold at home. While fighting against the admission of servile toil of the black man in the new Territories of the continent, Republicans will fight also for liberal wages to the toiling white men of the old States of the Union. This position is the logical sequence, the logical necessity of the Republican party. An anti-slavery party is by the irresistible force of its principles a protection party, for it is based upon the rights of labor for the white man and the black man alike.

I do not doubt, Mr. Chairman, that I dwell on this new plank in our Republican platform at greater length and with keener personal interest than would any of the gentlemen who are to follow me. I was a college-boy in my native State when the tariff of 1846 was enacted, and I can remember how profound and how angry was the agitation throughout Pennsylvania while the bill was pending, how bitter and intense was the popular indignation when it was finally passed. I say popular indignation, because the two parties were not divided on the question of Protection. The supporters of Mr. Polk in that State in the contest of 1844 cried as loudly for the tariff of '42 as did the supporters of Mr. Clay.

The peculiar bitterness in Pennsylvania, the acrimony, the sense of betrayal which they felt, came from the fact that the tariff of '46 was passed through the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-President, George M. Dallas, a distinguished Pennsylvanian, who had been associated with Mr. Polk on the Democratic ticket for the purpose of rallying the State against the overwhelming prestige of Mr. Clay as a Protectionist.

In the hour of trial Mr. Dallas failed his friends. Nor was Mr. Dallas the only man of Pennsylvania blood and birth who disappointed the expectation of his State. Mr. Buchanan was Secretary of State in Mr. Polk's Cabinet at the time, and though he had shown his belief in Protection by voting for the tariff of 1842, he exerted no influence from his high place to stay its repeal, but rather co-operated with the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker, another Pennsylvanian by birth, in his zealous work for the tariff of 1846. Three Pennsylvania Democrats, therefore, stand in different degrees responsible for the tariff of 1846, and that fact will prove of immense value to the Republicans in their pending struggle for political power in that State.

When Mr. Buchanan ran for President four years ago, the bubble of fancied prosperity from Free Trade had not burst, and he was enabled, though, as I have already said, by the closest of votes, to hold his State. But there has been a revolution—possibly it may be a revolution—of public sentiment on this question in Pennsylvania. A distinguished citizen of that State, whom I met at the Republican National Convention in May, told me that a very large proportion—I think he said two-thirds—of all the iron-establishments had gone through some form of insolvency or assignment under the tariff of 1846, especially within the last three years, when the Free-Traders went one step farther in the amendment to the tariff in 1857, just preceding the panic.

Let us then do our full duty in Maine on both questions that are included in the National platform. The larger, grander issue of freedom for the Territories, which concerns "the rights of human nature," is in perfect harmony with the industrial issue upon which I have dwelt. Both can stand together, and if they do not, both will fall together.

[The remainder and larger part of Mr. Blaine's speech was devoted to local and State issues, and especially to a review of the political record of Hon. Ephraim K. Smart, Democratic candidate for Governor of Maine.]

CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY.

[The subjoined resolutions were passed by the Senate of Maine, February 7, 1862, — *yeas* 24, *nays* 4. In the House of Representatives, on the 6th and 7th of March, they were vigorously opposed by Honorable A. P. Gould of Thomaston. At the conclusion of his speech, Mr. Blaine, who was Speaker of the House, replied to Mr. Gould — the House being in Committee of the Whole, Honorable William P. Frye of Lewiston in the chair. The resolutions were passed by the house — *yeas* 104, *nays* 26. Mr. Blaine's speech is given below.]

STATE OF MAINE.

RESOLVES RELATING TO NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

Resolved, That we cordially endorse the administration of Abraham Lincoln in the conduct of the war against the wicked and unnatural enemies of the republic, and that in all its measures calculated to crush this rebellion speedily and finally, the administration is entitled to and will receive the unwavering support of the loyal people of Maine.

Resolved, That it is the duty of Congress, by such means as will not jeopard the rights and safety of the loyal people of the South, to provide for the confiscation of estates real and personal of rebels, and for the forfeiture and liberation of every slave claimed by any person who shall continue in arms against the authority of the United States, or who shall in any manner aid and abet the present wicked and unjustifiable rebellion.

Resolved, That in this perilous crisis of the country it is the duty of Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional power to "raise and support armies," to provide by law for accepting the services of all able-bodied men of whatever status, and to employ these men in such manner as military necessity and the safety of the Republic may demand.

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent to the Senate and Representatives in Congress from this State, and that they be respectfully requested to use all honorable means to secure the passage of acts embodying their spirit and substance.

MR. CHAIRMAN, — I shall best make myself understood and perhaps most intelligibly respond to the argument of the gentleman from Thomaston, by discussing the question in its two phases: first, as to the power of Congress to adopt the measures proposed in the pending resolutions; second, as to the expediency of adopting them. At the very outset, I find be-

tween the gentleman from Thomaston and myself, a radical difference as to the "war power" of the Constitution,—its origin, its extent, and the authority which shall determine its action, direct its operation, and fix its limit. He contends that the war power of this Government is lodged wholly in the Executive, and in describing his almost endless authority he piled Ossa on Pelion until he had made the President, under the war power of the Constitution, perfectly despotic, with all prerogatives and privileges concentrated in his single person. Then with uplifted hands he reverently thanked God that Abraham Lincoln was not an ambitious villain to use this power, trample on the liberties of the nation, erect a throne for himself, and thus add another to the list of usurpers that have disfigured the world's history. That was precisely the line of the gentleman's logic —first stripping all the other departments of their proper and Constitutional power, heaping it all on the President, and then thanking God that the President does not rule as the caprices of tyranny might dictate! Could argumentative nonsense go farther?

I dissent from these conclusions of the gentleman. I read the Federal Constitution differently. I read in the most pregnant and suggestive section of that charter of free government that certain "powers" are declared to belong to Congress. I read therein that "Congress shall have power," among other large grants of authority, "to provide for the common defense;" that it shall have power "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;" that it shall have power "to raise and support armies," to "provide and maintain a navy," and to "make rules for the government of the land and naval forces;" and as though these powers were not sufficiently broad and general the section concludes in its eighteenth subdivision, by declaring that Congress shall have power "to make *all* laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and *all* other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof." Mark that — "in any department or officer thereof!"

Such are the large grants of war power made specifically to

Congress in the Federal Constitution; and to show that these grants were understood to be of indefinite extent, bounded and limited only by the law of necessity, I shall quote an authority which for three-quarters of a century has received the undivided respect of the nation—an authority which has been respected and accepted by all the most eminent Constitutional lawyers of our country, from Chief Justice Marshall, the greatest of our earlier jurists, to Daniel Webster, the greatest of all. I refer to the writings of Alexander Hamilton in the *Federalist*. In the twenty-third number of that valuable series of political papers, Mr. Hamilton discusses the very question at issue here to-day in reference to the power of the Government to defend and preserve “the public peace” against “internal convulsions” as well as “external attacks.” Speaking of the power to provide for the “common defense,” specifically declared in the Constitution itself, as I have above quoted, to be a “Congressional power,” Mr. Hamilton says,—

“The authorities essential to the care of the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation; because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no Constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances, and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense.

“This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it, and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal—the means ought to be proportioned to the end: the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.

... “And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted as a necessary consequence that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.”

The great respect due to the quotation I have just made comes in the first place from the eminent character of its author. It derives an enhanced force from the fact that Mr. Hamilton assisted in framing the Constitution, whose meaning

he was so clearly expounding; and, in the third place, it is of especial value from the circumstance that it was written pending the adoption of the Constitution, and as an inducement to the people to ratify it. It is to be noted, moreover, that Mr. Hamilton was the acknowledged leader of the Federal party of that day—a party accused, and perhaps justly, of wishing to vest all the power possible in the hands of the President; and yet this Prince of Federalists concedes, or rather I should say specifically asserts, that the principles on which any war shall be conducted, whether against “internal convulsion” or “external attack,” shall be determined by Congress. I beg you farther to observe, Mr. Chairman, that at the very time Mr. Hamilton was penning and publishing the words I have quoted, Patrick Henry, the leading spirit of the Republicans, who opposed the Federal Constitution, and who well-nigh succeeded in defeating the adoption of that instrument in Virginia, grounded his opposition chiefly on the fact that this large grant of power was made to Congress. He appealed with vehement warmth to the slave-holding interest, then as now so sensitive as to its presumed rights and dangers, warning them and bidding them remember that in certain contingencies and exigencies “Congress could under the war power of the Constitution, abolish slavery in all the States.” We thus have, Mr. Chairman, as contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution, the expressed opinions of the leading Federalist and a leading Republican of that era; both eminent, both honest, the one supporting, the other opposing, the new Constitution for precisely the same reasons. Assuredly this is an agreement of testimony as remarkable as it is conclusive.

At the origin of our government, Mr. Chairman, the people were jealous of their liberties; they gave power guardedly and grudgingly to their rulers; they were hostile above all things to what is termed the *one-man* power. You cannot but observe with what peculiar care they provided against the abuse of the “war power;” for after giving to Congress the power “to declare war” and “to raise and support armies,” they added in the Constitution these emphatic words,—“*but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years,*” precisely the period for which the Representatives

in the popular branch are chosen. Thus, sir, this power was not given to Congress simply, but in effect it was given to the House of Representatives; the people placing it where they could lay their hands directly upon it at every biennial election, and say "yes" or "no" to the principles or policy of any war. It is worthy of note that this popular control is secured in every part of the Constitution; for not only do the people in their primary capacity, by direct suffrage, elect their Representatives every two years, but in case of a vacancy happening, no power save that of the people themselves is able to fill it. If a vacancy happens in the Senate, the Governor of a State may appoint a successor till the Legislature meet; but if it occur "in the representation of any State," the Constitution simply declares that the executive authority of such State "shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancy"—leaving to the people directly the choice of the Representative. It is moreover declared in the Constitution, "that all bills for revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," thus giving again to popular control the power of the "purse" which is greater than the power of the "sword"—as without it the sword has "neither force nor edge." Talk, sir, as the gentleman from Thomaston has, for so many hours, about the war power being lodged exclusively in the President! The gentleman should know, eminent as he is esteemed to be in the knowledge of law, that without the assent of Congress there can be no war, and Congress can stop the war at any moment it chooses. Without the assent of Congress and the supply of money by Congress, the Quartermaster can give you no transportation; the Commissary cannot issue a ration; the Chief of Ordnance cannot furnish a cartridge; the Paymaster cannot give a private a single month's wages. As the House of Commons in England controls the aristocratic Chamber of Lords and holds in check the power of the Throne by having the exclusive right to originate "Supply Bills," so, sir, our House of Representatives, through the right to originate bills of revenue, causes the fresh and vigorous voice of the people to be heard against the longer-tenured power of Senators and the individual will of the Executive. In attempting thus to strip the Representative branch of its rightful prerogative and

of the thousand incidental powers derived from it and through it, the gentleman from Thomaston has aimed to curtail the franchise of the people and to surrender their rights to the judgment, and possibly to the caprices, of a single man.

I beg now, sir, to controvert another position of the gentleman from Thomaston — a position which he sought to fortify with great elaboration of argument. He has quoted the Treason clause of the Constitution, and has stoutly maintained that the armed rebels in the South have still the full right to the protection of property guaranteed therein, and that any confiscation of their property or estates by any other process than is there laid down would be unconstitutional. I am endeavoring to state the position of the gentleman with entire candor, as I desire to meet his argument throughout in that spirit. I maintain, sir, in opposition to this view, that we derive the right to confiscate the property and liberate the slaves of rebels from a totally different source. I maintain that to-day we are in a state of civil war — civil war, too, of the most gigantic proportions. And I think it will strike this House as a singular and significant confession of the unsoundness of the gentleman's argument, that to sustain his positions he had to deny that we are engaged in civil war at all. He stated, much to the amusement of the House, I think, that it was not a civil war because Jefferson Davis was not seeking to wrest the Presidential chair from Abraham Lincoln, but simply to carry off a portion of the Union in order to form a separate government. Pray, sir, is not Abraham Lincoln the rightful President of the whole country and of all the States, and is it not interfering as much with his Constitutional prerogative to dispute his authority in Georgia or Louisiana as it would be to dispute it in Maine or Illinois? Sir, what constitutes a civil war? That is settled by International Law; and I am but repeating a principle familiar to every school-boy when I read from Vattel the following pertinent declarations, which I venture to say never were and never will be disputed by any one except the gentleman from Thomaston: —

“When a party is formed in a State, which no longer obeys the sovereign, and is of strength sufficient to make head against him; or when in a republic the nation is divided into two opposite factions, and both sides takes

arms; this is called a civil war. . . . The sovereign indeed never fails to term rebels all subjects openly resisting him; but when these become of strength sufficient to oppose him, so that he finds himself compelled to make war regularly on them, he must be contented with the term civil war."

And as we are engaged in civil war, what is the result? Simply that the contest must be carried on as between foreign parties, and on that point I again quote Vattel:—

"Whenever a numerous party thinks it has a right to resist the sovereign, and finds itself able to declare that opinion sword in hand, the war is to be carried on between them in the same manner as between two different nations."

I need not say, sir, that we are proceeding precisely on that principle to-day. On what other ground do we send back thousands of traitors taken with arms in their hands, as exchanged prisoners, instead of indicting, trying and hanging them? On what other ground are we continually receiving and sending flags of truce? On what other ground did Howell Cobb come down only last week to Fortress Monroe and hold a parley with General Wool as to a systematic exchange of prisoners? On what other ground do we blockade the Southern ports? On what other ground did President Lincoln but a few days since order that the men taken from the Confederate privateers should be removed from Moyamensing Jail and treated as prisoners of war? This, sir, was the last as it was the greatest concession, and it leaves us to-day in the attitude of practically conceding, without formally granting, to the so-called Confederate States the same rights of war that we would accord to any belligerent power; and I understand the gentleman from Thomaston to approve this course? [Mr. Gould nodded assent.] And yet, Mr. Chairman, while conceding all these rights and immunities, the gentleman tells you that Congress shall not authorize the confiscation of the property or the liberation of the slaves of a single rebel except by "due process of law." In other words, the gentleman gives to traitors the protection of belligerents outside or independent of the Constitution, and of loyal citizens inside or under the Constitution, at one and the same time. He denies the right of our Government to proceed against them by virtue of any rights acquired from the belligerent character of parties, or indeed, to quote his

exact words, in any other mode than by "due process of law." The argument of the gentleman gives every advantage to the rebels and imposes every disability on the Federal Government, and in assuming this ground I charge the gentleman with having advocated the cause of the Confederacy just as effectually as though he had appeared here its avowed champion with a retainer in his pocket from the Government at Richmond. Sir, I am in favor of conducting this contest effectively and honorably; and I perceive and think I appreciate the policy which our Government, however reluctantly, has adopted in carrying on hostilities with the ordinary usages and principles of war. Indeed, after the rebellion assumed its colossal proportions it was quite impossible to do otherwise without encountering numberless and insuperable embarrassments. All that I ask, sir, is that we shall receive as good as we give, and that since we are forced to treat these rebels as public enemies and incur all the disadvantages resulting therefrom, we shall at least have the corresponding advantages that logically pertain to our position, and shall in consequence thereof exercise and enforce the rights of war against the so-called Confederates so long as the state of war continues.

In pursuance of the principles I have enunciated, I lay down the proposition as broadly as my language can express it, that every power and prerogative which the Federal Government would rightfully possess in war against England, France, Brazil, Mexico, or any other foreign power, it does this day possess against the so-called Confederate States. But the moment these war powers are carried to the destruction or forfeiture of the property of a rebel, the gentleman from Thomaston cries out that the Constitution of the United States is violated in the section where Congress is prohibited forfeiting property "except during the life of the person attainted" of treason. I tell the gentleman that the operation of that clause of the Constitution is one governing the civil tribunals of the land, where courts are in session, juries empaneled, precepts served, and the process of law unobstructed. If he contends that it is applicable to a condition of things wherein the civil power of the Government has ceased to be operative in eleven States, he must contend by parity of reasoning that every other provision

of the Constitution is equally operative, and that the state of belligerence does not supervene with its own well-defined and self-protective laws. If he takes this ground, and there is none other left him, I ask him, whence is derived the power to blockade the ports of the Rebel States? The Constitution of the United States says expressly that "no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another." And yet directly in the face of this inhibition, a blockade of the most rigorous character has been instituted by which Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans and all other Southern ports are cut off from commerce, while New York, Boston, Portland and all other loyal ports are left in the free and unrestricted enjoyment of trade. Whence is the power derived to do this? The gentleman does not answer. Is it an unconstitutional act because in apparent conflict with the letter of one section of that instrument? How can the gentleman justify the act other than by the war power of the Government blockading the ports of the so-called Confederate States, just as we blockaded the ports of Mexico when at war with that Republic?

If the argument of the gentleman from Thomaston were carried to its legitimate conclusion, Mr. Chairman, your Union armies could not shoot a single rebel nor imprison a single traitor, for the Constitution declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." To assume the ground of the gentleman from Thomaston with its legitimate sequences, is practically to give up the contest. For he tells you, and he certainly repeated it a score of times, that you cannot deprive these rebels of their property except "by due process of law," and at the same time he confesses that within the rebel territory it is impossible to serve any precept or enforce any verdict. At the same time he declares that we have not belligerent rights because the contest is not a civil war. Pray what kind of a war is it? The gentleman acknowledges that the rebels are traitors, and if so they must be engaged in some kind of war, because the Constitution declares that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them." It is therefore war on their side. It must also be war on ours, and if so, what kind of war?

Mr. GOULD rose and said that he would define it as domestic war. (Laughter.)

Mr. BLAINE (resuming). Domestic war! Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we shall learn something before this discussion is closed. Domestic war! I have heard of domestic woollens, domestic sheetings, and domestic felicity, but a "domestic war" is something entirely new under the sun. All the writers of international law that I have ever read, speak of two kinds of war, foreign and civil. Vattel will, I suppose, have a new edition with annotations by Gould, in which "domestic war" will be defined and illustrated as a contest not quite foreign, not quite civil, but one in which the rebellious party have at one and the same time all the rights of peaceful citizens and all the immunities of alien enemies — for that is precisely what the gentleman by his argument claims for the Southern secessionists.

But, sir, I have been digressing. The line of my argument was leading me to show the rights of war as defined and accorded by international law — having already demonstrated that whatever these rights may be we have them to-day as against the so-called Confederate States. I have briefly stated what these rights are in respect to the property of the enemy, as defined in books of European and American authority. I propose in addition to show what we as a nation have construed them to be in practice. I propose to show to the House that in the Mexican war our government through instructions issuing from the War Department, then presided over by one of the most eminent of American statesmen (the late Governor Marcy), sanctioned the very doctrines I have advocated. In a letter of instruction to General Taylor, Sept. 22, 1846, Governor Marcy laid down the principle that "an invading army has the unquestionable right to draw its supplies from the enemy without paying for them, to require contributions for its support and to make the enemy feel the weight of the war;" and General Taylor was accordingly instructed to proceed in the campaign on this principle. A few months later President Polk, in a letter to his Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker, maintained "the right of the conqueror to levy contributions on the enemy in their seaports, towns or provinces, and to apply the same to defray the expenses of the war." On this principle he

seized the Mexican Custom Houses, levied the duties and turned all the receipts into the coffers of the Union, and, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, March 31, 1847, Mr. Polk "claimed and exercised this as a belligerent right."

Against the Mexicans, sir, this was an indisputably proper exercise of the belligerent power. Viewed externally, other nations could do nothing else than acquiesce in it. But from an internal point of view, a very grave question arose in regard to it, and it was the same which divides the gentleman from Thomaston and myself in one branch of this discussion to-day. That question was whether the President had the right to direct this seizure of the Custom Houses and this collection of duties, or whether it was a matter belonging primarily and exclusively to Congress as the war-making power of the Government, entitled to "prescribe rules concerning captures on land and water." The subject was discussed with some warmth at the time in both branches of Congress, and though Mr. Polk's course was sustained by the partisan majority in both Senate and House, the weight of the argument was clearly against him — Mr. Webster demonstrating with his ponderous logic that the power did not belong to the President. The subject was of such importance as to call for notice and discussion in the late edition of Kent's Commentaries, where after minutely stating what President Polk had done, the learned commentator makes the following remarks: —

"All these rights of war undoubtedly belong to the conqueror or nation who holds foreign places and countries by conquest; but the exercise of those rights and powers, except those that temporarily arise from necessity, belong to that power in the government to which the prerogative of war is constitutionally confided. . . . These fiscal and commercial regulations, issued and enforced at the mere pleasure of a President, would seem to press strongly upon the Constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies, to lay and collect taxes, duties, and imports, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to declare war, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and concerning captures on land and water, and to define offenses against the law of nations. Though the Constitution vests the executive power in the President, and declares him to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, these powers must necessarily be subordinate to the legislative power in Congress. It would appear to me to be the policy or true construction of this simple and general grant of executive power to the President, not to suffer it to interfere with those specific powers of Congress which are more safely deposited in the legislative department, and that the powers thus assumed by the President do not belong to him, but to Congress."

I very much fear that the extensive law library of the gentleman from Thomaston is not graced with the latest edition of Kent, or he would hardly have ventured to lay down doctrines and principles which are so pointedly denied by the great Chancellor.

This construction, enunciated by Webster and Kent, I maintain, sir, is understood to be, and in his official papers is declared to be, the doctrine of President Lincoln, whom the gentleman has endeavored so ingeniously to misrepresent in his argument and to damage by his support. The gentleman stated that the President had reversed General Frémont's order of confiscation because of its inexpediency and tendency to "raise a great row." The simple fact of the record is, and that is all we have to appeal to, that the President stated in his letter to General Frémont, that "he thought it proper to adhere to and not transcend the law of Congress"—and as General Frémont's order did transcend the Confiscation Act of the extra session of Congress, he was directed that it be changed to conform to that Act. The meaning of this declaration of the President was that Congress and Congress only had the right to do that which General Frémont, in his proclamation, proposed to do; and this meaning was made still more distinctly manifest by the following declarations in the message of the President at the beginning of the present session of Congress. I quote:

"I have, in every case, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the Legislature.

"So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending I have adhered to the act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed."

General Halleck, who is no less a lawyer than a military chieftain, has deliberately expressed the opinion that he has no right to liberate a single negro, except as authorized to do so by the war power of Congress—thereby very clearly and closely following the admirable exposition of the Constitution as laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of *Brown vs. the United States*.

John Quincy Adams, whose name is respected wherever popular liberty has an advocate, formulated the following proposition on the floor of the House of Representatives :

“From the instant that your slave-holding States become the theatre of war, civil or foreign, from that instant the war powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of slavery, in every way in which it can be interfered with—from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the cession of the State burdened with slavery to a foreign power.

“If civil war come, if insurrection come, is this beleaguered Capital, is this besieged Government to see millions of its subjects in arms, and have no right to break the fetters which they are forging into swords? No! The war power of the Government can sweep this Institution into the Gulf.”

In a House full of able, brilliant Southern lawyers, Wise and Dromgoole and Rhett and Marshall among them, not one dared to dispute the proposition. Mark the extent to which Mr. Adams carries the war power of Congress—“even to the cession of the State burdened with slavery to a foreign power!”

There was one error, Mr. Chairman, which seemed to haunt the gentleman from Thomaston very persistently throughout his argument—and that was the alleged impossibility of bringing the war power to bear against the rebels without first conceding that they had actually carried their States out of the Union. He stated many times that if the rebel States are integral members of the Union, the contest with the rebels themselves cannot be carried on as a war, and conversely, to concede that it is war, is to concede that the States have actually seceded and set up a separate power. No statement could be more fallacious, as the gentleman himself will see by recurring to fundamental principles. The State cannot be compromised or destroyed by the wrongful acts of ever so large a majority of its people. The wrong-doers, by the very force of their numbers, may and do acquire certain immunities against individual punishment, as I have already shown, but they do not acquire the right to change the relations of the State. I maintain as stoutly as he does, that Virginia and Tennessee, and all the rest of the eleven, are to-day States in the Union, and that the Constitution and laws of the nation are operative within their borders. A rebellious force, however, having risen to such strength as to thwart the civil power and prevent the actual operation of the laws, it is the duty of the nation,

through the war power, to vindicate its authority, so that a Constitution which is operative may be actually operating, and laws which are in force may be really enforced. The gentleman's laborious effort, therefore, to demolish the theory of Senator Sumner in regard to the suicide of the Rebel States, has no pertinency whatever in this discussion. All the positions I have assumed, and all the arguments I have made use of to sustain these positions, have expressly negatived the theory of Mr. Sumner, and therefore I am not called upon to notice it further. I have merely to say in leaving this topic that the argument which maintains that the States must necessarily be out of the Union before a contest with their rebellious inhabitants could be conducted as a civil war, is nothing short of an Irish bull of the most grotesque description. If the States are not members of the Union they are a foreign power, and of course a contest with their people could not be a civil war. The very essence of a civil war consists in its being a strife between members properly subject to the same sovereign authority; and the dilemma herein suggested is the same which has driven the gentleman to deny, as he has done, that this contest is either a "foreign war" or a "civil war." He was compelled to manufacture a new kind of war—"domestic" he styled it—in order as he hoped, to escape the conclusions which some of his propositions led to. The gentleman setting out with radically erroneous premises could do nothing else than wander away from the landmarks of truth and sound logic—and there he continues to wander "in endless mazes lost."

In summing up these resolves, sir, I maintain that they propose nothing which may not be properly done under the Constitution of the United States. They are moderate resolutions—conservative in doctrine, and well guarded in expression. I believe that the adoption of their substance by Congress would be beneficial to the Union cause: I believe that such measures are especially dreaded by the rebels. I feel assured, sir, that a Confiscation Act would prove verily a terror unto evil-doers. I have said that the legislation demanded is entirely within the power of Congress without infringing the Constitution or rather in direct pursuance of the war power of that instrument as expounded by Hamilton and Henry, by Adams and Webster,

by Marshall and Kent. All that I have proposed and advocated will in no wise conflict with the Constitution, and I think the rebellion will be subdued without resorting to extra Constitutional measures. But lest the gentleman should infer that I shrink from the logical consequences of some propositions which I have laid down as ultimate steps, I tell him frankly that if the life of the nation seemed to demand the violation of the Constitution, I would violate it — and in taking this ground I am but repeating the expression of President Lincoln in his message, when he declared that “it were better to violate one provision than that all should perish.” I will give a higher and more venerable authority than President Lincoln, for the same doctrine. No less a personage than Thomas Jefferson wrote the following sentiments, in a letter to J. B. Colvin, from his retirement at Monticello, Sept. 22, 1810 :

“The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes occur which make it a duty in officers of high trust to assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless *one* of the high duties of a good citizen; but it is not the *highest*. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property, and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.”

This doctrine cuts right athwart and scatters to the four winds of heaven the whole argument of the gentleman. He sticks to forms: I contend for substance. He sacrifices the end to the means: I stand ready to use the means essential to the end. I uphold the doctrines of Jefferson and Lincoln: he assumes a ground which both of those statesmen have denounced and execrated.

I have been discussing these questions, Mr. Chairman, in no partisan spirit. I feel none. As a Republican, I have been among the foremost to welcome loyal Democrats to a hearty and generous co-operation in sustaining the measures necessary to vindicate the authority of the Union. I recognize the senator from Knox [Colonel Smart] whom I am glad to see among my auditors, as a cordial co-laborer in the good cause: my friend across the hall from Oldtown [Mr. Sewall] I cordially greet and

warmly welcome. I mention these gentlemen because they are this moment before me, and because they are types of many other loyal Democrats who hold the same good principles. The gentleman from Thomaston, by the doctrines he has advocated, has placed himself outside the pale, and until he recants his errors we cannot receive him into fellowship. I remember, and I do not quote it irreverently, the injunction to the Church to add to itself only "such as shall be saved."

I claim, Mr. Chairman, that in the whole history of partisan organizations not one can be found which has acted with the generosity and liberality that have characterized the Republicans since the outbreak of the rebellion. In the State of Ohio, sir, with sixty thousand partisan majority, the Republicans patriotically and most liberally gave the gubernatorial nomination last year to a lifelong Democrat—David Tod, who presided over the Convention that nominated Mr. Douglas for the Presidency—and they elected him by an overwhelming majority. With similar unselfishness they allowed one branch of the Legislature to fall under the control of those who were supposed to be loyal Democrats. And what is the result? To-day the Democrats in the branch of the Legislature controlled by them, oppose and may possibly defeat the re-election to the United States Senate of that most earnest, brave, and true man, Benjamin F. Wade. That is the return the Republicans are receiving for their lavish generosity towards political opponents.

In New York, sir, equal generosity was shown by the Republicans at the last election. They went so far even as to place their lifelong opponent, Daniel S. Dickinson, at the head of their State ticket, and gave the Democrats half of the remainder of the nominees, all of whom were triumphantly elected. In return, they have received nothing but reviling and abuse. I ask any gentleman to point out a single locality where, the Democrats having a clear majority, a Republican has received the slightest recognition. To-day we are invited by the gentleman from Thomaston patriotically to abandon our entire party organization. Magnanimous advice! Disinterested counsel! I say to the Republicans of this House, that while I am opposed to stirring up partisan feeling during this crisis in the affairs of the nation, yet we must look well to it that we sustain with

increased vigor the Administration of Abraham Lincoln, which we brought into power, and for whose acts we shall be held responsible. While, then, we will welcome to our political fire-side all who are disposed to co-operate with us, we will jealously guard against all these insidious attempts to disrupt that party organization, which is alone able to give to the Administration an efficient and permanent support. And when I urge this policy I am sure that I speak no less the sentiments of patriotic Republicans than of those loyal Democrats who intend to stand by the Administration to the end of this struggle with rebellion and treason.

I confess, Mr. Chairman, I distrust the sincerity and endurance of the gentleman from Thomaston as a supporter of Mr. Lincoln. He has been led to zealous expressions in favor of the President because he imagines there is to be a serious difference between the Executive policy and the Congressional policy in the conduct of the war. In that I am sure he will find himself in error. The President and Congress are both trying to follow the wisest course possible, and there will be no divergence in their ways when the discussion has closed. We have this very morning, sir, heard from the President in a communication of as great importance as any that has ever emanated from the Executive Mansion. I hold in my hand his message sent to Congress yesterday, in which he proposes compensation to the States that may agree to abolish slavery. I want to know from the gentleman from Thomaston if he supports the President in that policy?

Mr. GOULD. I understand the President's proposition to be to compensate all the slave-owners, loyal and disloyal alike, and in that view, as a peace measure, I might possibly go for it. I would not say that I would support it otherwise.

Mr. BLAINE. A most remarkable interpretation of the President's position, truly! The gentleman thinks that Abraham Lincoln is solemnly proposing to pay the rebels hard cash for their slaves, and thus to replenish their treasury, otherwise so nearly exhausted. A brilliant policy indeed! But this construction which the gentleman puts on the Message is in perfect keeping with the determination which he has steadily shown to put the estates and the slaves of rebels on the same foot-

ing and under the same protection as those of loyal men. If negroes are to be paid for, the gentleman is determined that the rebels shall have their full share of the cash. I think President Lincoln would be slightly surprised if any one should tell him that the country understood his proposition in that way; and yet, unless it does mean that, the gentleman from Thomaston says he will not support it—thus at the first practical test, deserting the President whom he has eulogized so highly.

I read, sir, in that message, something more than a great proposition for compensated emancipation. I read in it a declaration as plain as language can make, that whatever measures may be deemed necessary to crush out this rebellion speedily and effectually, will be unhesitatingly adopted. What else does the President mean when he says that "*all* indispensable means must be employed for the preservation of the Union," that "the war must continue" as long as resistance continues, without regard to the ruin which must attend it? What does the President mean by this language? Still more, what does he mean when he declares that "such measures as may obviously promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle must and will come"? I ask the gentleman what the President means by that, and he refuses to answer me. It means the adoption of precisely such measures as we are discussing here to-day, and these resolutions are but sustaining the already foreshadowed policy of the President, whenever the necessity for their enforcement arises, or whenever they may, in his own language, "promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle."

This mighty struggle, sir, will close with victory for the Union and for Constitutional Liberty. The triumphs at Mill Spring, at Roanoke, at Henry, and at Donelson, are but the earnest of the unbroken success which, under the vigorous counsels now controlling the army, are to attend the Union cause. It is not to be as it has been. In the past autumn and early winter our prospects seemed dark and dreary. We closed the year with those terrible disasters at Big Bethel, at Bull Run, at Ball's Bluff, unredeemed; and our national energies seemed paralyzed with inaction and with treason. The war was being conducted in a manner that never did and never will and never can achieve any thing but misfortune and disgrace. It was a

war of half measures, painfully parallel in policy with that which in England, under the temporizing expedients urged by such leaders as Essex and Manchester and Northumberland, had well-nigh sacrificed the popular cause in the contest with the first Charles — a policy which is thus described and denounced by that memorable historian and statesman of England whose untimely death, two years ago, was so deeply deplored on both sides of the Atlantic.

“If there be any truth established by the universal experience of nations, it is this: that to carry the spirit of peace into war, is a weak and cruel policy. The time of negotiation is the time for deliberation and delay. But when an extreme case calls for that remedy, which is in its own nature most violent, and which, in such cases, is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating and diluting. Languid war can do nothing which negotiation or submission will not do better; and to act on any other principle, is not to save blood and money, but to squander them.”

As an apposite illustration of the pregnant truth thus enunciated by Lord Macaulay, I close by quoting the well-known declaration of Edwin M. Stanton, “that the failure of General McClellan to attack Manassas in December last will cost this nation three hundred millions of dollars and thirty thousand precious lives.”

SPEECH OF MR. BLAINE ACCEPTING HIS FIRST
NOMINATION TO CONGRESS.

[Unanimously conferred upon him by a Republican Convention held at Waterville, Maine, July 8, 1862, Honorable Anson P. Morrill, the sitting Member, having previously declined a re-election.]

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION,— I am here to acknowledge with sincere thanks the honor which you have conferred upon me by selecting me as your candidate for Representative in the Thirty-eighth Congress. The unanimity of your action is to me one of its most embarrassing features, for it implies a confidence in my fitness for the position which I myself may well distrust. I can only pledge my best intentions and my most earnest efforts to serve this constituency faithfully and zealously, should the nomination this day made be ratified at the polls.

The Kennebec District—the name which this county has always given to the Congressional District in which it has been included at each decennial apportionment—has established a character at home and abroad which is difficult to live up to. The distinguished gentleman who now represents it (and whose voluntary retirement gives you this opportunity to place me under deep obligation by the bestowment of your confidence) has won great and important victories on hard-fought political fields, and, in connection with the present Vice-President of the United States, has done more than any other living man to overthrow the Democratic party of Maine. He retires from public life full of honors, and with the unstinted confidence and attachment of the Republicans of the entire State.

But long before Mr. Morrill's participation in political affairs, the old Kennebec District had won great prominence in Congress by the ability, the ripe culture, the superb talent for

debate exhibited by two gentlemen who represented it from 1825 to 1841 — Peleg Sprague and George Evans. I see before me gray-haired men whose political activity is stirred afresh by the memory of the contests they waged in this district under the leadership of those young men — for each was in his early thirties when called to lead the National Republican forces against the Democratic dynasty of Jackson and Van Buren.

Nor should I fail to name the able editor, the sincere friend, the judicious adviser, the upright man, Luther Severance, who after promoting the elections of Mr. Sprague and Mr. Evans with unsurpassed activity and zeal, was rewarded with succession to the seat to which they had given eminent distinction. If you will pardon the personal reference, I regarded it as the chief honor of my life, before you crowned me with your favor to-day, that I followed Luther Severance, *longo intervallo*, in the editorship of the *Kennebec Journal*, which he had founded and nurtured, and to which he had given character and prominence throughout the State. There have perhaps been more brilliant men in Maine than Luther Severance, but not one who ever enjoyed the public confidence in a higher degree or repaid that confidence more amply by an honorable and stainless life.

It is not wise for candidates to indulge in profuse promises. The Representative must be tested by his acts rather than by his professions. I deem it my duty, however, to say that if I am called to a seat in Congress, I shall go there with a determination to stand heartily and unreservedly by the Administration of Abraham Lincoln. In the success of that Administration, under the good Providence of God, rests, I solemnly believe, the fate of the American Union. If we cannot subdue the Rebellion through the agency of the Administration, there is no other power given under Heaven among men to which we can appeal. Hence I repeat, that I shall conceive it to be my duty, as your Representative, to be the unswerving adherent of the policy and measures which the President in his wisdom may adopt. The case is one, in the present exigency, where men loyal to the Union cannot divide. The President is Commander-in-Chief of our land and naval forces, and while he may be counseled he must not be opposed. It is well to recall the lesson of that adage which teaches that one bad general is

better than two good ones. Let us then discourage divisions and encourage harmony.

In this way alone, gentlemen, can we preserve that unity of action among the loyal people so essential to the maintenance of our Nationality. That unity once broken, we can have no well-founded hope of success. We hear a great deal of talk about the base of operations in the war; at one time on the Rappahannock River, at another on the York, and at still another on the James. But there is one base of operations stronger than all these, and that is on the united hearts and the united action of the loyal people in these States. That once destroyed, all other bases of operation are gone.

The great object with us all is to subdue the Rebellion — speedily, effectually, finally. In our march to that end we must crush all intervening obstacles. If slavery, or any other “institution,” stands in the way, it must be removed. Perish all things else, the National life must be saved. My individual convictions of what may be needful are perhaps in advance of those entertained by some, and less radical than those conscientiously held by others. Whether they are the one or the other, however, I do not wish to see an attempt made to carry them out until it can be done by an Administration sustained by the resistless energy of the loyal masses. I think myself those masses are rapidly adopting the idea that to smite the Rebellion its malignant cause must be smitten, and that to preserve the Union all agencies willing to work for its preservation must be freely and energetically used. That, I believe, is the conclusion which, in due time, the Nation will reach. Perhaps we are slow in coming to it, and it may be that we are even now receiving our severe chastisement for not more readily accepting the teachings of Providence. But it was the tenth plague which softened the heart of Pharaoh and caused him to let the oppressed go free. That plague was the sacrifice of the first-born in each household. With the sanguinary battle-fields of Virginia whose records of death we are just reading, I ask you in the language of another, “How far off are we from that day when our households will have paid that penalty to offended Heaven?”

CAN THE COUNTRY SUSTAIN THE EXPENSE OF THE WAR AND PAY THE DEBT WHICH IT WILL INVOLVE?

[Speech delivered by Mr. Blaine in the House of Representatives of the United States, April 21, 1864.]

MR. SPEAKER, — The question of most engrossing interest to the loyal people of the United States, to-day, is whether we are able to furnish the means of carrying on the war, and to sustain the load of debt which the close of hostilities will leave upon us. I propose to show by some simple facts and figures that we are abundantly equal to the great trial, and that in bearing it we are assuming far less responsibility, in proportion to wealth, population, and prospective development, than has been successfully assumed in the past by another great nation, and even by ourselves at the organization of the Government.

In estimating the debt with which we are to be encumbered, it is not wise, in my judgment, to adopt a too sanguine anticipation of the speedy close of the war. Many gentlemen, whose opinions the public are accustomed to respect, predict the entire suppression of the rebellion within the ensuing summer. For myself I cannot indulge in so pleasing a prospect. Whatever false reckonings we may have made in the past in regard to the shortness of the war, I have latterly been of those who believe that the leading conspirators of the South intend at all events to prolong the struggle until the approaching contest for the Presidency is ended. They have a hope — baseless enough, it seems to us — that in some way they are to be benefited by the result of that election, and hence they will hold out until it is decided, with a view, indeed, of affecting its decision. Let us not then deceive ourselves with regard to the

speedy reduction of the enormous expenditures to which we are now subjected. It is wiser for us to look soberly at facts as they are, and not beguile ourselves with rose-colored views of facts as we wish they might be. Let us make our calculations in regard to the national debt, therefore, on the assumption that the war will last until July, 1865, instead of closing in July, 1864, as has been so confidently assumed by many. Should it come to a termination earlier, our error will be the happiest feature in our entire calculation.

Heretofore the estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to the amount of the national debt at any given period have proved surprisingly accurate. The safest feature of his estimates is seen in the fact that he has in no instance understated the prospective amount of indebtedness, as actually ascertained when we reached the date to which the estimate was made. For instance, in December, 1862, Mr. Chase stated that the debt, July 1, 1863, would be \$1,122,297,403.24. When the time arrived, the debt amounted to \$1,098,793,181.37, or some twenty-four millions less than the Secretary had estimated. With fuller data for reckoning than when he made the calculation just referred to, the Secretary now estimates that if the war shall continue so long, at its current rate of cost, our debt in July, 1865, will reach the large sum of \$2,231,935,190.37. To this vast amount let us add \$150,000,000 to be incurred by refunding to the loyal States their war expenses, and \$150,000,000 more to cover unforeseen expenses in closing up the great contest, and you will have a grand total of *twenty-five hundred millions of dollars*, the annual interest and ultimate redemption of which must be provided for by the nation. Besides contracting this enormous debt, we shall have expended all the current receipts of the Treasury in conducting the war, amounting in the aggregate, for the four years, to more than five hundred millions, making thus a gross outlay of over three thousand millions as the cost of subduing the rebellion — an expenditure of *two millions* per day from the inception to the close of the contest.

Let us see how, by the experience of our own country in a former generation, as well as by the experience of another great people, we may hope to meet this burden with confidence and

courage — bearing it without oppression when it is heaviest, and coming in good season to its total discharge, or by attainment of superior strength making it so light as to be practically disregarded.

At the organization of our Government in 1789, the entire population, free and slave, was under four millions, scattered along the seaboard from the St. Croix to the St. Mary's, not fifty thousand in all living one hundred miles distant from the flow of the Atlantic tide. Facilities for intercommunication were greatly restricted, manufactures and the arts were in feeble infancy, agriculture was rude and not highly remunerative, because commerce, its handmaid, was languishing and waiting to be quickened to enterprise and vigor. The entire valuation of the thirteen States, according to the weight of authority, did not exceed six hundred millions of dollars — three hundred millions less than the valuation of Massachusetts to-day, and not one-half so great as that of Pennsylvania. Property at that time was ill adapted to bear taxation, profits were small, and to the political economist, measuring the condition and capacity of the country, it seemed utterly unable to carry a debt of any considerable magnitude. And yet our ancestors did not hesitate to assume the burden of ninety millions of dollars — more than one-seventh of all the property they owned. Mr. Jefferson, who was the most distrustful of all the statesmen of that day in regard to the ability of the nation to sustain the load, was yet willing to say that it could be easily borne if our annual increase of property could maintain an average of *five per cent* — then the most sanguine estimate which any one dared to place on the future growth of the country. Had we realized only the ratio of increase assumed by Mr. Jefferson, our wealth in 1860 would have been twenty-seven hundred millions instead of sixteen thousand millions. Upon Mr. Jefferson's assumed basis of increase, the debt would never have been oppressive; but with the rate of growth actually realized, the country paid the interest on the debt and accumulated a fund for its redemption with such ease that the people never felt they were taxed. I hope to show that our debt at the close of this war will be relatively lighter than the debt which our Revolutionary fathers thus assumed, and proceeded so early and so easily to discharge.

Look also at the case of Great Britain. At the close of her prolonged struggle with Napoleon in 1815, the national debt of that kingdom amounted to £861,000,000 sterling, or *forty-three hundred millions of dollars*; and for readier comparison I shall speak of her debt in dollars rather than in pounds. Her entire population at that time was less than twenty millions, and the valuation of her property for purposes of taxation was about nine thousand five hundred millions of dollars. She owed, indeed, nearly half of all she possessed. Her population was less than two-thirds of what ours is to-day. Her entire property was not three-fifths of what ours was according to the census of 1860, while her debt was *eighteen hundred millions of dollars* greater than ours will be in July, 1865. In contracting this debt she was compelled to sell her bonds at the most enormous sacrifice. From 1792 to 1815 her debt was increased three thousand millions of dollars; yet in exchange for this amount of bonds she received in money but \$1,730,000,000, thus submitting to a discount of \$1,270,000,000. In other words, England, during the twenty-three years of Continental war, only realized on an average for the whole period, \$100 in money in exchange for \$173 of her bonds. This, be it remembered, was the average for the whole time. As the contest waxed desperate, her sacrifices became desperate in proportion, and the money which enabled her to fight the decisive campaign of Waterloo was obtained by selling her bonds to the European bankers at less than fifty cents on the dollar. Compared with this our sacrifices on the national securities have thus far been light, not averaging, from the inception of the war to the present day, with all elements of expenditure fairly estimated, more than from twenty to twenty-five per cent, reckoning on the gold basis.

To meet their enormous debt, the British people had nothing but the commercial and industrial resources of the United Kingdom, whose whole area is not double that of the single State of Missouri. They had a population of but twenty millions, as already stated, subject to no increase from immigration, and growing in half a century no more than we have grown during the last decade. Yet on this restricted area, the enterprise and energy of the British people have increased their

property, until it is valued at *thirty-three thousand millions of dollars*; and in defiance of the large expenditure resulting from several costly wars since 1815, they have actually reduced their debt some three hundred millions of dollars. Their steady progress in wealth under their large debt is comprehended in the statement that the average property *per capita* in 1815 was less than five hundred dollars, and in 1861 was about eleven hundred dollars. In 1815 some twenty-five per centum of all the earnings and income of the people was absorbed in taxation, and in 1861 less than ten per centum was taken for the same object. In 1815 the proportion of taxes per head for the whole people exceeded seventeen dollars, and in 1861 it had fallen below ten dollars.

These brief details of British experience show how a great debt, without being absolutely reduced to any considerable extent, becomes relatively lighter by the increased capacity to bear it. The wealth *per capita* of the entire population in a period of forty-six years has more than doubled; the aggregate property of the realm has more than trebled; and all this on a fixed area of one hundred and twenty thousand square miles, and with a population increasing at the slow rate of only one per cent per annum. If such results can be wrought out by a kindred people, against such obstacles and hinderances, what may we not hope to accomplish under the auspicious circumstances of our own Nation!

In the light of the national experiences we have been glancing at, we may clearly read our own great future. It is not, indeed, a matter of surmise or speculative inquiry, but of well-founded and confident calculation — a calculation whose only error will be in falling short of results actually to be realized. The war closing in July, 1865, will leave us in this condition: a nation numbering some thirty-three millions of people, owning over sixteen thousand millions of property, and carrying a debt of twenty-five hundred millions of dollars. The proportion between debt and property will be just about the same that it was when the Union was formed, while the ratio of our advance and the largely enhanced productiveness of agricultural, manufacturing and commercial pursuits gives the present generation an advantage that renders the debt far less bur-

densome at the very outset. If the Revolutionary debt became in a very brief period so light as to be unnoticed, why may we not, with a vastly accelerated ratio of progress, assume a similar auspicious result with regard to the debt we are now contracting? Were our future advance in wealth and population to be no more rapid than Great Britain's has been since 1815, we should at the close of the present century have a population of forty-five million souls, and a property amounting to fifty thousand millions of dollars. Even upon this ratio of progress our entire debt would cease to be felt as a burden. But upon the increase of population and development of wealth to be so confidently anticipated, the debt would be so small, in comparison with the total resources of the nation, as to become absolutely inconsiderable.

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All that I have said has been based on the supposition of the debt remaining at a fixed sum, the country simply paying the interest. As a matter of fact, however, it is perfectly obvious that in the progress and prosperity of the future, one of our first acts will be to provide for the gradual but absolute redemption of the principal. That this will be consummated without oppressively adding to the annual burden of taxes may be inferred with certainty from a slight examination of our capacity to make increased payments proportioned to our increased amount of consolidated wealth. The time of redemption will depend wholly on the will of the tax-payers, but it is evident that the condition of the country may justify its being done as rapidly as Mr. Hamilton proposed to redeem the debt which he funded in 1790. The period assigned by him was thirty-five years, and so well based were his calculations, that the entire debt, augmented largely and unexpectedly as it was by the war of 1812, was paid in forty-four years from the date of funding; and in 1834 the United States found itself owing but thirty-seven thousand dollars.

To those who may be disposed to doubt the future progress of our country according to the ratio assumed, a few familiar considerations in respect to our resources may be recalled with advantage. We occupy a territory at least three million square miles in extent, within a fraction as large as the whole of

Europe. Our habitable and cultivable area is, indeed, larger than that of all Europe, to say nothing of the superior fertility and general productiveness of our soil. So vast is our extent, that, though we may glibly repeat its numerical measure, we find it most difficult to form any just conception of it. The State of Texas alone is equal in area to the Empire of France and the Kingdom of Portugal united; and yet these two monarchies support a population of forty millions, while Texas has but six hundred thousand inhabitants. Or, if we wish for a comparative measure nearer home, let me state that the area of Texas is greater than that of the six New England States, together with New York and New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Ohio and Indiana combined. California, the second State in size, is equal in extent to the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Belgium together. The land that is still in the hands of Government, not sold or even pre-empted, amounts to a thousand millions of acres—an extent of territory thirteen times as large as Great Britain, and equal in area to all the kingdoms of Europe, Russia and Turkey alone excepted. Mere territorial extent does not of course imply future greatness, though it is one requisite to it. In our case it is so vast an element that we may be pardoned for dwelling on it with emphasis and iteration.

Combined with this great expanse of territory we have facilities for the acquisition and consolidation of wealth—varied, magnificent, and immeasurable. Our agricultural resources, bounteous beyond estimate, are, by the application of mechanical skill and labor-saving machinery, receiving a development each decade, which a century in the past would have failed to secure, and which a century in the future will place beyond all present power of computation—giving us so far the lead in the production of those staple articles essential to life and civilization that we become the arbiter of the world's destiny without aiming at the world's empire. The single State of Illinois, cultivated to its capacity, can produce as large a crop of cereals as has ever been grown within the limits of the United States; while Texas, if peopled but half as densely as Maryland even, could give an annual return of cotton larger than the largest that has ever been grown in all the Southern

States combined. Our facilities for commerce and exchange, both domestic and foreign — who shall measure them? Our oceans, our vast inland seas, our marvelous flow of navigable streams, our canals, our network of railroads more than thirty thousand miles in extent, — *these* give us avenues of trade and channels of communication both natural and artificial, such as no other nation has ever enjoyed, and which tend to the production of wealth with a rapidity not to be measured by any standard of the past. The enormous field for manufacturing industry in all its complex and endless variety — with our raw material, our wonderful motive-power both by water and steam, our healthful climate, our cheap carriage, our home consumption, our foreign demand — foreshadows a traffic whose magnitude and whose profit cannot now be estimated! Our mines of gold and silver and iron and copper and lead and coal, with their untold and unimaginable wealth, spread over millions of acres of territory, in the valley, on the mountain side, along rivers, yielding already a rich harvest, are destined yet to increase a thousand-fold, until their every-day treasures,

“familiar grown,
Shall realize Orient’s fabled wealth.”

These are the great elements of material progress; and they comprehend the entire circle of human enterprise — Agriculture, Commerce, Manufactures, Mining. They assure to us an increase in property and population that will surpass the most sanguine deductions of our census tables, framed as those tables are upon the ratios and relations of our progress in the past. They give into our hands, under the blessing of Almighty God, the power to command our fate as a nation. They hold out to us the grandest future reserved for any people; and with this promise they teach us the lesson of patience, and render confidence and fortitude a duty. With such amplitude and affluence of resources, and with such a vast stake at issue, we should be unworthy of our lineage and our inheritance if we for one moment distrusted our ability to maintain ourselves a united people, with “one Country, one Constitution, one Destiny.”

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1864.—LINCOLN AGAINST McCLELLAN.

[Speech of Mr. Blaine at a Republican meeting in Augusta, Sept. 5, 1864.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — I think we shall all agree that the contest for the Presidency in which the American people are now engaged is marked by some extraordinary features.

The Republicans are advocating the re-election of Mr. Lincoln, who, with varying success, but with ceaseless devotion, has striven to subdue the enemies of the Union by military force, to which those enemies were, themselves, the first to appeal. The most malignant opponents of the President do not question his integrity, his earnestness, his zeal in the cause of the Union. They simply challenge the wisdom of his course.

The Democrats have nominated an unsuccessful General of the Union Army, and their National Convention has placed him on a platform declaring the war to be a failure and demanding "a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of all the States."

General McClellan is, I think, the only military man who ever ran for President of the United States on the explicit and declared basis of a capitulation. He runs as a military hero, and yet proposes to ground arms, withdraw our troops, acknowledge the war to be a failure, and see upon what terms of apologetic submission on the part of loyal men and Federal soldiers the rebels will agree to return to the Union as our masters.

I think the members of the Democratic National Convention that nominated General McClellan and placed him on this peace platform deserve to be forever marked among their countrymen

for lack of patriotism, for abandonment of the primal instinct of self-respect, for subordination of every manly impulse.

If, on this declared line of policy, the people of the United States elect General McClellan, we should apologize for the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, forget the glories of the Chattanooga campaign, express regret for the valued achievements of our Navy, recall Grant from the splendid campaign he is waging against Lee in Virginia, and rebuke Sherman for having driven back the enemy from Atlanta and conquered that stronghold by the decisive victory whose details we are just now reading in the daily journals.

We have sacrificed thousands of valuable lives, have spent money by the thousands of millions, are pressing the rebellion to its final retreat, are exhausting its last resources; and just when these Southern conspirators against the Union are in despair, the Democratic National Convention meets and, in the name of their great and once honored party, demands that the war shall cease, that our troops shall be withdrawn, and that the proud people of this Nation shall stand hat in hand and wait in humiliation and disgrace until the rebels prescribe the terms on which they will agree to govern us hereafter.

I certainly do not envy the feelings of General McClellan when he surveys the position into which personal chagrin and anger and disappointment have placed him. I do not desire to speak with harshness or personal disrespect concerning him. He gained one victory for the Union at Antietam, and let him have ample credit for that. His fault was that he could not and would not be loyal to those who, charged with the administration of the Federal Government, were his official superiors. He has been, from the beginning of his military career, disrespectful to Mr. Lincoln and apparently incapable of appreciating the great character, the simplicity, the earnestness, the determination, of that wonderful man. Towards Mr. Stanton, who speaks officially for the President, and who in ability as a war minister and in devotion to official duty has rarely been equaled in any country, General McClellan has been steadily, persistently and to the last degree insolent.

After his great army on the Peninsula (the most superb and formidable that was ever organized on this continent) had been

defeated by Lee and was lying at Harrison's Landing, General McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War: "*If I save this Army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this Army.*" It is an old maxim, fellow-citizens, that he only is fit to command who has proven himself ready to obey; and certainly, by that test, General McClellan has no claim to be called to the rulership of the Republic, to the great task of governing the people of United States. Suppose a Marshal of Napoleon had sent such a dispatch to the great Emperor—suppose one of the Generals of Frederick the Great had ventured to impute such conduct to that mighty commander—how long do you believe the author of such insubordination would have been allowed even to live? Can any one doubt that Mr. Lincoln would have been justified in instantly cashiering General McClellan, as the law authorized him to do, for this unparalleled insubordination?

That patient man, who is slow to anger and incapable of personal resentment, forgave General McClellan and held back the fiery wrath of Stanton, rather than run the risk of sowing factions in the army by meting out to McClellan his just and merited punishment. It requires an extraordinary degree of moral strength and self-control in a President of the United States to submit to such personal indignity as was attempted to be put upon Mr. Lincoln by General McClellan, without experiencing a certain sense of self-humiliation and without incurring a certain loss of self-respect on the part of his best friends. But incidents of this character prove how lofty is the nature of Mr. Lincoln and how he keeps himself free from the ordinary passions by which even great men are swayed beyond the confines of discretion. So far from losing dignity by not being forward to assert it he has constantly been more and more endowed with it. He has gained control over others by constantly maintaining it over himself and has established the highest standard of personal and official bearing by refraining from the pettiness of resentment and being too magnanimous to indulge in revenge.

Let us contemplate for a moment the probable consequences of the programme to which the Northern Democrats now invite us. Does any man doubt that, if the policy, of which

General McClellan is ready to stand as the representative, should triumph, the rebels would be able to establish their Confederacy? How, after grounding arms, humiliating the Union, ceasing to struggle, are you going to raise the war spirit again, in the event of the rebels refusing to come into the Union on any terms? This resolution of the Democratic Convention, it is true, declares that the war is to cease on "the basis of the Federal Union." Suppose the rebels say, that they prefer to have their Confederacy: how are you going to be able to resist them? You would practically have disbanded your military strength, while the courage and confidence of the enemy's forces would have been trebled by the prestige gained from the retreat and practical surrender of the Union Army.

If the rebels should insist upon their own separate Confederacy, does any man believe that the remaining States could continue to live in harmony and in union? Would not strifes and contentions, without number, at once spring up? The Border States would certainly be convulsed with a fierce contest as to which section they would adhere to; and, with the strong incentive of maintaining the institution of slavery, who doubts which way they would go? Would not the Pacific slope, in order to escape the dangers and embroilments which it could neither control nor avoid, naturally seek for independence — protected, as that section would be, on one side by a great chain of mountains and on the other by a broad ocean? The North-West, if it did not follow the example of secession, would demand such a reconstruction of the Government of the remaining States as would injuriously affect every interest of the East and North-East. In short, disunion upon the line of the revolted States would involve the speedy disintegration of the Federal Government. We should find ourselves launched on a sea of troubles, with no pilot capable of holding the helm and no chart to guide us on our perilous voyage.

But let us suppose that the rebels would agree, in response to this invitation of the Democratic National Convention, approved by popular vote, to return to their rightful allegiance. Would they not practically be in a position to demand and enforce their own terms? Would they not ask, and receive, such guaranties of slavery as would fasten that institution, for all

time, upon the United States, giving it free access to all the Territories and guarding it as a National institution at every point? If the North should present itself saddled and bridled, for the South booted and spurred, to mount, do you think they would ride mercifully? Would they not despise the craven spirit, the cringing cowardice, which impelled such action on the part of the loyal people? and would they not feel sure that having gone so far in the path of humiliation as the election of McClellan would imply, they could lay no burden upon our back which we would not bear, and exact no condition, however degrading, with which we would not comply?

It is difficult, I know, fellow-citizens, to speak of this issue with cool head, with measured words, in the language of argument. We are stirred too much with hot indignation to consider the rules of logic, to wait for the slow recital of facts, to ask you even to listen to any thing but angry denunciation of the Democratic position. Every man knows by instinct, without going through the process of demonstration, that the prosecution of the war is the only line of safety for the Union, and that, as Wellington said in his famous Peninsular campaign, "the prosecution of war is, after all, the process of exhaustion of the enemy." The Government of the Union is still strong, full of resources, of money, of men, of material, rich now in experience, with veterans in the ranks to the number of a million, with generals who have become great in the science of war from experience in the field. Our manufactures are prosperous, the oceans of the world are open to our commerce, our people have never even considered that the fate of the Government could be critical, they have never even approached the borders of despair.

How is it with the rebels? We know their situation almost as well as though we had daily bulletins from the centre of their government and from the headquarters of their armies. They are already greatly reduced; they daily grow weaker; their ports are blockaded; they can get no help from other nations; they cannot clothe their troops; they cannot supply shoes to the footsore soldiers who have marched and fought so well. We have cut the Confederacy in two, and practically detached the resources of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas from

the Richmond Government. Grant is in the heart of Virginia with a conquering host; while Sherman, with a triumphant army, is resting quietly in the centre of the cotton States, studying which way he may move with deadliest effects upon the resources of the Confederacy. Every thing portends success to our arms, and that speedily. Our only danger is in the rear, from the Democratic party, who are rushing to the defense of the Confederacy as though they desired, above all things, to interpose their strong arm to save it from being finally crushed and destroyed under the iron hoof of war.

I know it is a common saying at each quadrennial election that it is the most important one the people have ever been called upon to decide; but if this has been lightly said before, I think it may now be declared with absolute truth. We have all felt, and many of us have publicly said, that the rebels would strain the last nerve to sustain the Confederacy through the Presidential campaign, with the blind hope, which has now become visible and palpable by the action of the Democratic party, that something would happen to their advantage. They wait now, not upon the fortunes of war, but upon the decision at the ballot-boxes in the loyal States of the Union. They know that the election of McClellan will save them from the just consequences of their rebellion against the Union, and will practically make them arbiters of their own destiny, masters of the National situation. We know, and they know, that the re-election of Mr. Lincoln means a collapse of the rebel armies, the dispersion of their troops, the restoration of the National flag over all their territory, and the re-establishment of the Union, purified by war, relieved from the blot of slavery, and strengthened for all the future by the awful experience of these years of blood. Whatever doubt may attend the election in other States, I know that we can trust implicitly to the loyalty and the courage of Maine. Governor Seymour may try to confuse the issue in New York, the Knights of the Golden Circle will relax no effort in their determination to carry Indiana against the National Administration; but I believe their efforts will be in vain, for, after all, it is inconceivable that a majority of the citizens of these loyal States can be blinded to National pride, to a sense of their own interest,

to the degrading humiliation to which the Democratic National Convention has invited the country.

I do not deny, my fellow-citizens, that I covet the honor of a re-election to Congress. It is a matter of especial pride and ambition to be a member of the House of Representatives at this great epoch in the history of our country. But I should hang my head in shame and wish to be released from the mortification of sitting in Congress, if a majority of the members to be elected should approve the surrender of the proud position of the Nation which would be involved in the election of General McClellan. If there was a possibility of that National humiliation, I should ask to be excused even from being a witness, and should return to you, if re-elected, the credentials with which you would entrust me. But I have no fear of such a result. The National spirit is daily rising; the National pride is touched; the sense of National honor is awakened. The House of Representatives for which I am a candidate will, I am sure, contain a majority, a large majority, of men loyal to the Union, proud of the achievements of our armies, zealous in support of Mr. Lincoln's Administration.

On Monday next we have our duty to discharge in Maine, and the distinguished gentleman from the Keystone State [Judge William D. Kelley], who has already spoken from this platform, will carry back to his loyal constituency the news of a great triumph, to which he has in no small degree contributed by his arguments and his eloquence. Maine speaks among the first States, and her voice has an importance far beyond her numerical strength. Let each Republican voter feel, therefore, that the duty devolved upon him is something more than belongs to him as a citizen of Maine. Let him remember that he is to speak for the loyalty of the North, and that his voice can influence other men, to the utmost bounds of the Republic.

FUTILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO EQUALIZE GOLD, SILVER, AND PAPER MONEY BY LEGISLATION.

[Remarks of Mr. Blaine in the House of Representatives, Dec. 7, 1864.]

MR. SPEAKER, — I move to reconsider the vote whereby the House yesterday referred to the Committee of Ways and Means a bill introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Thaddeus Stevens], “to prevent gold and silver coin and bullion from being paid or exchanged for a greater value than their real current value, and for preventing any note or bill issued by the United States, and made lawful money and a legal tender, from being received for a smaller sum than is therein specified.” I believe, Mr. Speaker, that this bill has been productive of great mischief in the brief twenty-four hours that it has been allowed to float before the public mind as a measure seriously entertained by this House. I believe that still more mischief will ensue every day and every hour the House stands committed to such legislation, even by the motion of courtesy which refers the bill to a committee. The provisions of the bill are very extraordinary, and but for the respect I feel for the distinguished gentleman who introduced it, I should say they were absurd and monstrous. Let me read two or three of these provisions: —

“2. That a dollar note issued by the Government, declared lawful money and legal tender, is declared of equal value for all purposes as gold and silver coin of like denomination.

“3. That a contract made payable in coin may be payable in legal-tender United States notes, and that no difference in sale or value shall be allowed between them.

“5. That no person shall by any device, shift or contrivance receive or pay, or contract to receive or pay, any Treasury or other note issued by the United States for circulation as money, and declared legal tender, for less than their lawfully expressed value; and any offender, upon conviction, shall suffer imprisonment not exceeding six months, and a fine equal to the full amount of the sum specified in said note.

"6. That if any person shall, in the purchase or sale of gold or silver coin or bullion, agree to receive in payment notes of corporations or individuals at less than par value, he shall be deemed to have offended against the provisions of this act, and shall be punished accordingly."

I forbear to recite the remainder of the bill. I have read enough to show, that if it should become a law, the entire population on the Pacific coast would be liable to indictment and conviction for a criminal offense simply because they will persist in believing that in the present condition of our currency a gold dollar is worth more than a paper dollar. Not limiting the scope of the bill to the protection of Government currency, the gentleman from Pennsylvania still further proposes to punish, as for a misdemeanor, any one who shall agree to sell gold and receive in payment "notes of corporations or individuals at less than par value."

The whole bill, sir, aims at what is simply impossible. You cannot by a Congressional enactment make a coin dollar worth less than it is, or a paper dollar worth more than it is. I think we had experience enough in that direction with the famous gold bill at the last session. We passed that measure after a very severe pressure, and with great promises as to the wonders it would work in Wall Street. It continued on the statute-book for some twelve days—gold advancing at a rapid rate every day until its repeal was effected. The bill now under consideration has already had a most pernicious effect; and should it become a law, no man can measure the degree of its hurtful influence. It is for these reasons that I desire to have its reference reconsidered.

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In regard to the specific line of argument used by the chairman of Ways and Means to justify this extraordinary measure, let me say, Mr. Speaker, that I have read English history on this subject with different conclusions from those so confidently expressed by him. My impression is that the well-weighed judgment, the deliberate conclusion of the British people was and is, that such prohibitory statutes as the gentleman has cited have no favorable effect upon the price of gold. That they did not have a prejudicial and disastrous effect in England, is due to the existence of other powerful causes whose opera-

tion and effect were most beneficent. Those causes for the decline and continued low price of gold are found, sir, in the fact that the British Parliament raised by taxation half, and sometimes more than half, of the total amount annually expended in her fierce struggle with Napoleon, and British arms were at the same time crowned with a series of brilliant and decisive victories. Indeed, the gentleman from Pennsylvania himself, somewhat unconsciously perhaps, admits the whole force of my position on this point; for he states that eight years before the English people resumed specie payment (in 1823), the premium on gold had fallen to a mere nominal rate. I admit it, sir; and I ask the honorable gentleman, what brought it there? Unconsciously, as I have said, the gentleman named the precise date of the battle of Waterloo, and the British victory on that memorable field was the cause of gold ruling low in London in 1815. By the battle of Waterloo England's supremacy was established: she had broken and beaten all coalitions against her, and was confessedly mistress on land and sea. It was her strong military and naval position and her resolute system of finance that raised the value of her bonds and brought down the price of gold. It was not her prohibitory legislation at all: no intelligent minister of finance, no English historian worthy of credit, has ever stated that it was.

Let us, sir, imitate England in raising our credit by wise legislation here, and by continued victories in the field. If we could raise half of our expenses by taxation, and could add to our many triumphs on land and sea a Waterloo victory over the hosts of the rebellion, we should need no such legislation as the gentleman has proposed to keep down the price of gold. When we reach that happy period of final triumph, the gentleman's bill, if enacted, might prove harmless; but until then its manifest effect can only be injurious to the cause it seeks to serve.

[NOTE. — The bill was recalled from the Committee of Ways and Means, and laid on the table.]

NEW BASIS OF REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS.

[Remarks of Mr. Blaine in the House of Representatives, Jan. 8, 1866.]

MR. SPEAKER, — Since the beginning of the present session we have had several propositions to amend the Federal Constitution with respect to the basis of representation in Congress. These propositions have differed somewhat in phrase, but they all embrace substantially the one idea of making suffrage, instead of population, the basis of apportioning representatives; in other words, to give to the States in future a representation proportioned to their voters instead of their inhabitants.

The effect contemplated and intended by this change is perfectly well understood, and on all hands frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a large representation in this House, based on their colored population, so long as that population shall be denied political rights by the legislation of those States. The proposed amendment would simply say to those States, that so long as they refuse to enfranchise their black population, they shall have no representation based on their numbers; but admit them to civil and political rights, and they shall at once be counted to their advantage in the apportionment of representatives.

The direct object thus aimed at, as it respects the rebellious States, has been so generally approved that little thought seems to have been given to the incidental evils which the proposed Constitutional amendment would inflict on certain loyal States. As an abstract proposition no one will deny that population is the true basis of representation; for women, children, and other non-voting classes may have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those who actually deposit the ballot. Indeed, the very amendment we are discussing implies

that population is the true basis, inasmuch as the exclusion of the black people of the South from political rights has suggested this indirectly coercive mode of securing those rights to them. Were the negroes to be enfranchised throughout the South to-day, no one would insist on the adoption of this amendment; and yet if the amendment shall be incorporated in the Federal Constitution, its incidental evils will abide in the loyal States long after the direct evil which it aims to cure may have been eradicated in the Southern States.

If voters instead of population shall be made the basis of representation, certain results will follow, not fully appreciated perhaps by some who are now urgent for the change. I will confine my examination of these results to the free States. The ratio of voters to population varies widely in different sections, ranging from a minimum of *nineteen per cent* to a maximum of *fifty-eight per cent*; and the changes which this fact would work in the relative representation of certain States would be monstrous. For example, California has a population of 358,110, and Vermont 314,369, and each has three representatives on this floor to-day; but California cast 207,000 votes, in electing her three representatives, and Vermont cast 87,000. Assuming voters as the basis of apportionment, and allowing to Vermont three representatives, California would be entitled to eight. The great State of Ohio, with nearly seven times the population of California, would have but little more than two and a half times the number of representatives; and New York, with quite eleven times the population of California, would have in the new style of apportionment less than five times as many members of this House. California it may be said presents an extreme case, but no more so than will continually recur for the next century under the stimulus to the emigration of young voters from the older States to the inviting fields of the Mississippi valley and the Pacific slope.

There is no need, Mr. Speaker, of precipitating this evil of inequality among States, in order to cure the evil complained of. The Constitution may be amended so as to prevent the one evil without involving others of greater magnitude, and I venture to express the belief that the proposition submitted by

me this morning will, if adopted, secure the desired result. Let me briefly explain that proposition.

The Constitution of the United States, article one, section two, clause three, reads as follows to the first period:—

“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by (*adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.*)”

The portion which I have included in parentheses has become meaningless and nugatory by the adoption of the Constitutional amendment which abolishes the distinction between “free persons” and “all other persons,” and being thus a dead letter might as well be formally struck out. In its stead I propose to insert the words following included in parentheses, so that the clause as amended would read thus:—

“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by (taking the whole number of persons, except those to whom civil or political rights or privileges are denied or abridged by the Constitution or laws of any State on account of race or color.)”

This is a very simple and very direct way, it seems to me, of reaching the desired result without embarrassment to any other question or interest. It leaves population, as heretofore, the basis of representation, does not disturb in any manner the harmonious relations of the loyal States, and it conclusively deprives the Southern States of all representation in Congress on account of the colored population, so long as those States may choose to abridge or deny to that population the political rights and privileges accorded to others.

[NOTE.—Mr. Blaine’s brief speech was the first argument made in the Thirty-ninth Congress against the plan of basing representation on voters.]

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A BASIS OF RECONSTRUCTION.

[Speech of Mr. Blaine at a Republican mass meeting in Skowhegan, Maine, Aug. 29, 1866.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — The questions which seemed most pressing at the close of the war last year, and which for a time demanded the largest share of popular attention, related to the finances of the nation, to the adjustment of our currency, to the funding of our large public debt. These have since been overshadowed by the question of Reconstruction, or, rather, by the dispute which has ensued between the President and Congress as to the terms upon which the States lately in rebellion should be re-admitted to the right of representation in Congress, and to that full rehabilitation, as members of the Union, which for four years they struggled to be freed from.

At the outset it appeared as if the difference between the President and Congress, which rapidly ran into a decisive quarrel between the two, would prove a public calamity; but latterly it has seemed that this very divergence of views, this conflict of authority, will lead to a more radical and more lasting settlement of all the issues that grew out of the war, than would have been reached if the President and Congress had hastily agreed upon the terms for re-admitting the Southern States. Conflicts in the moral world and conflicts in the political world often result in great good; and I am enough of an optimist to believe that the present struggle, based, as we must presume it to be, on an honest difference of opinion between the Executive and Legislative departments, will lead to a broader affirmation of human rights, a more equitable adjustment of the relations of the two sections, a more effective guaranty of the liberties and

the rights of those who have so recently been emancipated from chattel slavery.

I think a great deal of valuable time and a great deal of useless effort have been expended in Congress upon abstract questions which really are of no value whatever in the final settlement of the grave problems now at issue. The *Congressional Globe* of the late session is laden down with discussions as to the exact present *status* of the late insurrectionary States, and the disputants have argued the question with all the zeal and all the ability of those ancient theologians who waxed warm over theses the very meaning of which is now forgotten, or, if remembered, makes no impression whatever upon the creeds of the Christian world. Two great theories have been maintained respecting these States. The first, which is the foundation of President Johnson's theory of Reconstruction, is that the States were never out of the Union, that they never ceased to be members of the Union, that their rights under the Constitution remain unimpaired. The second, which may be called the Congressional basis of Reconstruction, as many present it, is that these States, if not out of the Union, have at least by their own acts of secession and rebellion lost their *Statehood*, if they be not, indeed, reduced to the condition of Territories; and that it rests with Congress to determine whether they shall be re-admitted to representation in Senate and House, when they shall be re-admitted, and the terms upon which they shall be re-admitted.

I do not believe that the time is profitably spent which is given to debating these abstract questions, nor do I believe that, in the end, these theories affect, one way or the other, the actual legislation which has for the time become the basis of Reconstruction. The large majority of the members of Congress have taken no great part in these opposing speculative plans, but have rather agreed with the position taken by Mr. Lincoln in the last speech he ever made, in which he gave a faint foreshadowing of his own views of Reconstruction. Alluding to this very question as to whether the States were still in the Union, or had placed themselves outside of it, Mr. Lincoln declared that "it is not practically a material issue," and that any discussion of it could have "no other effect than the

mischievous one of dividing friends." In his own quaint way Mr. Lincoln defined what to him had "always seemed the exact status of the case." "We all agree," said he, "that the seceded States are out of their proper, practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the Government is to get them back into their proper, practical relation. I believe it is easier to do this without deciding, or even considering, whether these States have ever been out of the Union. The States finding themselves once more at home, it would seem immaterial to me to inquire whether they had ever been abroad."

Leaving out of sight all theories, therefore, Congress finally came to a decision which I think the overwhelming majority of voters in the loyal States will approve. We said, in effect, to these rebel States, that having withdrawn their representatives from Congress and fought for four years to destroy the very existence of the National Government, we intend now to impose certain conditions upon them before they shall be readmitted to representation in Senate and House. We said, in effect, to the Southern people, that we do not intend to be hard or exacting upon them: we do not intend to use the power that is in our hands to humiliate or degrade them. On the contrary, we intend to deal with them in a more magnanimous and generous manner than ever rebels were dealt with since civil government was established among men. We are willing to forget all that they have done: we cast out of our memories the lives that have been lost, the property that has been destroyed, the frightful distress that has been created, in consequence of their rebellion. It is better that it be all forgotten and in the bosom of the deep ocean buried. We do not deal with them in a spirit of revenge: we inflict nothing upon them for the past, beyond what is needful for the safety of the future, — for it is only to the future that we now look.

In the first place, we ask that they will agree to certain changes in the Constitution of the United States; and, to begin with, we want them to unite with us in broadening the citizenship of the Republic. The slaves recently emancipated by proclamation, and subsequently by Constitutional Amendment, have no civil status. They should be made citizens. We do not, by making them citizens, make them voters, — we do not,

in this Constitutional Amendment, attempt to force them upon Southern white men as equals at the ballot-box; but we do intend that they shall be admitted to citizenship, that they shall have the protection of the laws, that they shall not, any more than the rebels shall, be deprived of life; of liberty, of property, *without due process of law*, and that "they shall not be denied the equal protection of the law." And in making this extension of citizenship, we are not confining the breadth and scope of our efforts to the negro. It is for the white man as well. We intend to make citizenship National. Heretofore, a man has been a citizen of the United States because he was a citizen of some one of the States: now, we propose to reverse that, and make him a citizen of any State where he chooses to reside, by defining in advance his National citizenship — and our Amendment declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." This Amendment will prove a great beneficence to this generation, and to all who shall succeed us in the rights of American citizenship; and we ask the people of the revolted States to consent to this condition as an antecedent step to their re-admission to Congress with Senators and Representatives.

But that is not all we ask. The white people of the South have heretofore had, as we in the North have thought, an unfair advantage, in counting their property in the basis of representation against the flesh and blood of the North. They have always insisted that slaves were property, — as much as horses or mules or lands, — and they have been ready to fly into a passion and to commit violence against any one who disputed that proposition; and yet when our Federal Government was formed they insisted that three-fifths of all the persons that constituted this property should be included in the basis of representation in Congress. They have thus had an unfair advantage in every Congress that has assembled from the inauguration of George Washington to the outbreak of the Rebellion. The negroes are now free men, and instead of three-fifths entering into the basis of representation, the South will have the benefit of the whole mass, the entire five-fifths; and yet the Southern white men do not propose to allow a single one of these millions

of colored men to vote. This Constitutional Amendment which we are proposing does not command that the Southern States shall permit the colored man to vote. At what time they shall advance him to suffrage, in what manner they shall advance him to suffrage, this Constitutional Amendment leaves to their own discretion. It simply says that until they do clothe the colored man with the power to vote, they shall not include him in the basis of representation.

I ask you now, my fellow-citizens, if that proposition is not an absolutely fair and equitable one to the white men of the South? I have never met a supporter of Mr. Lincoln's Administration, even of those most conservative, who was not ready to declare that the system of Reconstruction thus proposed is not only just to the white population of the South, but generous? — In truth it consults the prejudices of the white population of the South even farther than is just to the colored men, all of whom were loyal to the Union, and many of whom fought for its preservation. A great many of our Northern people, a very large proportion, I know, of my own constituents in this Kennebec District, find fault with the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, for the very reason that it does not directly confer suffrage upon the colored man. Our recent Republican State Convention adopted a resolution unanimously declaring that all men, without regard to race, creed, or color, should be declared equal in civil and political rights; and I know that while I stand here urging the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, I am asking them, in the once derided language of Mr. Webster, to "conquer their prejudices" and take the Fourteenth Amendment precisely as it is submitted for ratification.

Proceeding to the next provision of the Constitutional Amendment, we say, in effect, to these Southern men that we do not intend to prosecute them or make any attempt to punish them. The war is over, and we shall not disturb the peace now reigning, by any "bloody assizes" in the South. A practical amnesty exists, and those who took part in the rebellion are free from all danger of the law. But, at the same time, we do not intend, if we can help it, that the men who had been members of Congress, who had served in State Legislatures, who

had been officers under the United States or any one of the States, and took a solemn personal oath to obey and defend the Constitution and then forswore themselves and rushed into the rebellion, shall come back to the councils of the Nation until two-thirds of Congress shall declare that they may have that privilege. As for the great mass of the Southern men who went into the war, they are perfectly free to hold any office to which they may be chosen,—just as free as Northern men,—so far as this Constitutional Amendment affects them. We aim the exclusion only at the class who are special, conscious offenders, and the aggregate of this class is as nothing compared with the whole number who engaged in the rebellion. Careful calculation shows that these disabilities for civil service will not affect more than fourteen thousand citizens in the entire South, out of the millions that were engaged in insurrection.

We have still a fourth condition to impose upon the Southern States. The war for the preservation of the Union cost a vast sum of money. It was advanced largely by our own people, but in part was borrowed in Europe. All citizens who loaned to the Government in the hour of its distress took an honorable and patriotic risk; all foreigners who loaned us money trusted to a National honor that has never been tarnished; and the faith of the Nation is pledged to the fair and strict repayment of both citizen and alien, on terms that are nominated in the bonds which each received. The loyal men who control Congress do not intend that this debt shall be left in such position that an adverse majority in the Senate and House may at any time withhold payment, or even threaten to do so; and therefore we bind up the rights of the public creditor in the organic law of the land, and declare that “the validity of the public debt shall never be questioned.” More than that, a large amount of this debt was incurred in the payment of pensions and bounties for soldiers, and we throw around that, also, the muniments of the Constitution, declaring that it stands out and beyond the power of a majority in both Houses to change.

We are not yet through with these conditions for the Southern States. One or two more still remain. The Government of the Confederate States, so called, issued bonds and incurred

a public debt, and the separate States that composed the Confederacy did the same,—all in support of the war against the Union. The people who advanced money on these bonds deserve to lose it. They deserve to lose it if they were citizens of the rebellious States: they still more deserve to lose it if, as aliens, honorably bound not to aid in destroying our National life, they invested their money in these securities whose value was based upon the hope and the expectation of overthrowing the American Union. We now bind it down by a Constitutional Amendment, that “no State of this Union,” or the United States, if that were possible to conceive, “shall ever pay any debt or obligation of any kind incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion.”

One step farther, still. It was necessary for the safety of the Union to destroy the institution of slavery, as a war measure, justified by the law of Nations,—an act made perfect by the amended organic law of the Republic. There may be some danger that, as years go by, the people of the South who were in rebellion, feeling the loss of their slaves and, perhaps, the poverty and hardship that resulted from that loss, will ask for some remuneration from the conquering Government. Aside from the injustice of the demand, the attempt to pay it might imperil the National debt, which is due by every obligation of honor, and therefore the Congress of the United States has deemed it wise to insert in the Constitution that “no claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave shall ever be paid by any State Government or by the National Government, but shall forever be held to be illegal and void.”

And then we asked, although it was, perhaps, implied without the asking, that Congress shall reserve to itself, as part of this Amendment to the organic law of the Republic, the power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” every one of its provisions.

These several provisions which I have thus somewhat elaborately detailed, constitute the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This could only be proposed to the States, as you well know, by two-thirds of each branch of Congress. As matter of fact, it received three-fourths in the Senate and even a larger proportion in the House,—the vote in the Senate being 33 *ayes* to 11 *noes*, and in the

House 120 *ayes* to 32 *noes*. It is now before the States of this Union for ratification or rejection, and the one important thing for the people of Maine to look to is the election of a Legislature which will ratify. All the loyal States, together, ratifying it will not embody it in the Constitution. The theory has been maintained by some of the more extreme men of the Republican party that three-fourths of the States required by the Constitution to ratify the Amendment, should under present circumstances properly mean three-fourths of the loyal States; but the general, and I think the wiser, conclusion of the party has been to adhere to the ratification of three-fourths of all the States of the Union as required by the letter of the Constitution. If we secure three-fourths of all the States the validity of the Amendment can never be questioned, but if we should attempt to proceed on the theory that three-fourths of the loyal States are all that are required, we might find great trouble in the future when the possible changes of political fortune should bring our opponents into power.

Discarding this theory and adhering to the old ways, the situation stands thus, viz.: the Southern States uniting with the Northern States in incorporating in the Constitution the provisions I have set before you, shall be re-admitted to all their former rights of representation in Congress, and shall be re-clothed with all the power of a State in the Union. I do not mean that Congress has given a specific pledge to that effect, but I do mean that such is the general understanding,—an understanding already made explicit and practical by the admission of Tennessee immediately after her ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Legislature of that State was in session when the Amendment was finally passed by Congress, and ratified it without delay. Immediately thereafter, Congress, by an overwhelming vote, larger, I believe, in both branches than that by which the Amendment itself was adopted, re-admitted Tennessee to all her ancient rights in the Union. It is needless, of course, to say that Congress stands ready to treat in the same manner any other Southern State which is ready to follow the example of Tennessee. It is not improbable, therefore, if wise councils prevail throughout the South, that the entire Union will be restored before the expiration

of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and Representatives will be admitted as soon as the new apportionment, consequent upon the new basis of representation, can be completed.

At the same time, it is only fair to state that if the more extreme of the Secession States shall refuse to accept the conditions now offered, Congress will not stand still and wait the processes of delay and postponement which certain Southern leaders think may wear out the patience of the North and carry this whole question into the Presidential election two years hence. A large proportion of the House of Representatives and of the Senate desired to make more stringent conditions than are contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Journals of both branches of Congress will show how many radical provisions were defeated, and if now, in turn, the more conservative provisions that are submitted shall be defeated in the South, the authors of the radical policy will gain great prestige and influence in the councils of the Nation. There are many men who believe that we do a wrong, not only to the colored man, but to the future of the country, by declining to exact suffrage for him as one of the conditions of Reconstruction. But the more moderate policy prevailed, and the question is left to the wisdom and sound judgment of the leading race in the South, with a penalty of decreased representation, which in my judgment will in time force the South to concede suffrage to the colored man. Perhaps a concession gained in that way may prove to be stronger and more securely fortified than a direct and absolute condition imposed by Congress.

But these are all speculations. The actual and practical duty before us is to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. The people of the North desire a complete restoration of the Union; commercial, financial and manufacturing interests demand it; our safety at home, our prestige abroad, demand it. The Democratic party and the South, which are in fact identical, misrepresent the actual condition of affairs when they declare that the Republicans are bent on keeping the Southern States out of the Union. We have given the best proof of our own sincerity, by already admitting one of them, and by laying down the moderate conditions upon which we propose to admit them all. But I beg you, I beg the Republicans of Maine, who constitute

the great majority of the entire people of our State, not to be driven into any surrender of the position which demands of the Southern States that they shall give us security for the future. Indemnity for the past we cannot exact from them: they cannot bring back the dead that sleep in honored graves, they cannot repay to us the thousands of millions of money that have been sacrificed in the war to retain them in the Union. But in the name of the sacred dead, and as a security for wasted treasure, we ask that these States shall be so bound by obligations of duty and of honor, that they cannot again disturb the integrity of the Union, or again subject the loyal States to costly sacrifice of blood and to the destruction of the National resources.

I am often asked, during my canvass of the District, what Congress will do if the Southern States refuse to accept this Fourteenth Amendment as a condition to their restoration to the Union. Of course, I am not in any sense empowered to answer that question: I can only give you my own opinion, and assure you of my own action. My judgment is that if the Southern States reject the Fourteenth Amendment and refuse to return to the Union subject to its conditions, they will be kept out until they accept what to them will be a still harsher condition, but what to our view in Maine would be the more just condition, — of accepting impartial manhood suffrage, without regard to creed, caste or color, as the basis of their re-admission to representation in Congress. I know that the Southern States are stimulated by leading Northern Democrats and by all the force of President Johnson's Administration, to resist and reject the invitation contained in the submission of the Fourteenth Amendment. They believe that a revolution in public opinion can be effected against the Republicans, that the more prolonged the exclusion of the States the more radical the revolt will be against the power of Congress, and that if the Southern States will stand out solidly against the Fourteenth Amendment they will soon be re-enforced by a sufficient number of Northern States to give them the control of Congress and the dictation of their own terms for re-entering the Union.

You can judge as well as I, fellow-citizens, as to the probability of these calculations of our opponents being fulfilled. But it is no time for us to tarry in speculation. Action, prompt and

decisive, is the demand of the hour. We can do much to prevent their fulfilment. We can influence the public opinion of Maine; we can send a united Republican delegation to Congress; we can give a large popular majority to our gallant candidate for Governor [General Chamberlain], who represents the aggregate Republican opinion of the State on all the issues involved. Let us not stop to think of what other States may do, but let us employ the few remaining days of this canvass, not merely in defeating the Democratic party, — for that result is already assured, — but in defeating it by so large and so overwhelming a vote as will emphasize the opinion of Maine and thereby influence the judgment of other States. Let us in this way give warning to the Southern States that if they reject the conditions now offered them, they will not be tendered a second time in the same form, and each time they are rejected they will probably have an additional exaction placed upon them, — not from revenge upon the citizens of those States, but because of the reason for stringent exaction which their defiant rejection of fair terms and their truculent disposition would demand as essential to a safe system of Reconstruction. I think, in the present crisis, it might be well for the leaders of public opinion in the South to refresh their minds with the moral contained in the ancient fable of the Sibylline Books.

SHALL THE LATE REBELS WIELD THE ENTIRE CIVIL POWER OF THE SOUTH?

[The Campaign of 1866 closed in November with the assured and general belief that the Southern States would not accept Reconstruction on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some of those States had already rejected it when Congress met in December. On that basis of fact Mr. Blaine delivered the following speech in the House on the 10th of December, 1866.]

MR. CHAIRMAN, — The popular elections of 1866 have decided that the lately rebellious States shall not be re-admitted to the privilege of representation in Congress on any less stringent condition than the adoption of the pending Constitutional Amendment. But those elections have not determined that the privilege of representation shall be given to those States as an immediate consequence of adopting the amendment. In that respect the decision of the loyal people has been rather negative than affirmative; expressive of the least that would be accepted rather than indicative of the most that might be demanded. Had the Southern States, after the adjournment of Congress, accepted the amendment promptly and in good faith, as a definitive basis of adjustment, the loyal States would have indorsed it as such, and the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress would have been largely engaged in perfecting the details for the full and complete representation of all the States on the new basis of apportionment.

The Southern States, however, have not accepted the amendment as a basis of adjustment, but have on the other hand vehemently opposed it; every one of them that has thus far acted on the question, with the exception of Tennessee, having defiantly rejected it. This absolute and obdurate refusal on the part of those States to accept the amendment as the condition of their regaining the privilege of representation, certainly

relieves Congress from whatever promise or obligation may have been originally implied in regard to admitting them to representation upon their adopting the amendment — this promise, or implication, or whatever you choose to term it, being, by universal understanding, conditioned on the Southern States accepting the amendment in good faith, as was significantly illustrated in the case of Tennessee.

But even if the Constitutional Amendment should be definitely accepted, South as well as North, as the condition on which the rebel States are to regain the privilege of Congressional representation, the actual enjoyment of that privilege would of necessity be postponed until the terms of the amendment could be complied with, and that would involve a somewhat uncertain period of time. I take it for granted, as I did when I voted for the Constitutional Amendment, and as I presume every other gentleman on this floor did, that we are not to be guilty of the supreme folly of declaring that the basis of representation is so unfair as to require correction by Constitutional Amendment, and then forthwith admit the Southern States to the House with their undue and inequitable share of representatives. If the Southern States are to be deprived of their undue share of representatives, based on their non-voting population, they should be deprived of them at once, and not be admitted, even temporarily, with the old apportionment, by which they would continue to exercise in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral Colleges the same weight of influence enjoyed by them before the rebellion.

The population of the States recently slave-holding, was by the census of 1860 only 12,240,000, of whom 8,039,000 were whites and 4,201,000 negroes. The population of the free States by the same census was 19,201,546, of whom only 237,000 were negroes. It would hardly be maintained by any one that the States lately slave-holding, taken as a whole, have done any thing more than hold good their population of 1860, while in the free States, despite the losses of the war, the ratio of increase has never been more rapid than since that year. It is speaking with moderation to say that the population of the free States is to-day 25,000,000.

Supposing the Constitutional Amendment to be adopted,

therefore, as the basis of re-admitting the Southern States to the privilege of representation, it would be a cruel mockery of the whole aim and intent of that amendment to usher those States upon this floor with the full number of representatives assigned them by the census of 1860, when three-fifths of their slaves and all their disfranchised free people of color were allowed them in fixing the basis of apportionment. Were they so admitted to-day, the aggregate number of representatives from the late slave States would be eighty-five, and from the free States one hundred and fifty-six — making a House of two hundred and forty-one in all. And yet if those two hundred and forty-one members were divided between the free and slave States on the basis of the representative population as directed by the Constitutional Amendment, the slave States would have but fifty-eight members, while the free States would have one hundred and eighty-three.

A corresponding change would be wrought in the Electoral Colleges. Were the Government to permit an election for President and Vice-President in 1868 on the basis assigned by the census of 1860, the late slave States would have 115 electoral votes, while the free States would have 198. But on the actual basis contemplated by the Constitutional Amendment the late slave States would have but 88, while the free States would have 225. On the old basis the free States would thus have a majority of 83, while on the basis of the Constitutional Amendment they would have a majority of 127; a net difference of 44 electoral votes in favor of the free States.

In view of these results, which are the plainest arithmetical deductions, it could not be expected that the free States, even if they were to adhere to the Constitutional Amendment as the ultimatum of adjustment, would consent to have the lately rebellious States admitted to representation here and to a participation in the Electoral Colleges until the relative and proper strength of the several States should be adjusted anew by a special census and by an apportionment made in pursuance thereof. It was in this belief and with these views that at the last session of Congress I framed a bill providing for a special enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States, which bill was on my motion referred to the Reconstruction Committee,

and has never been reported to the House by that Committee either favorably or adversely.

What then shall be done? The people, so far as I represent them, have plainly spoken in the late elections, and the interpretation of their voice is not difficult. They have pronounced with unmistakable emphasis in favor of the Constitutional Amendment with the superadded and indispensable prerequisite of manhood suffrage. The Constitutional Amendment with its definition of American citizenship, with its guaranty of the national obligations, and with its prohibition of the assumption of the rebel debt, is an invaluable addition to our organic law. We cannot surrender its provisions, and the rebel States cannot by their utmost resistance defeat its ultimate adoption. It is too late to deny or even to argue the right or power of the Government to impose upon those States conditions precedent to their resumption of the privilege of representation. The President set the example by exacting three highly important concessions from those States as *his* basis of reconstruction. Congress followed by imposing four other conditions as *its* basis of reconstruction. Now the people have spoken, demanding one additional condition as *their* basis of reconstruction, and that condition is the absolute equality of American citizens in civil and political rights without regard to caste, color, or creed.

The objection in the popular mind of the loyal States to the Constitutional Amendment as a basis of final adjustment, is not directed to what that amendment will effect, but to what it will not effect. Among the objects of prime importance which it will not effect is the absolute protection of the two classes in the South to whom the Government owes a special debt,—the loyal white men and the loyal black men. The amendment, if made the basis of final adjustment without further condition, leaves the rebel element of the South in possession of the local governments, free to persecute the Union men of all complexions in numberless ways, and to deprive them of all participation in civil affairs, provided they will submit to a curtailed representation in Congress as the penalty. The danger is that they would accept the infliction on themselves in order to secure the power of visiting the loyalists with a full measure of vengeance ; just as certain religious denominations in

England, at various times under the reign of the Stuarts, favored measures of proscription which bore with some hardship on themselves, because they were enabled thereby to punish some rival and hated sectaries with positive severity and cruelty.

Among the most solemn duties of a sovereign government is the protection of those citizens who, under great temptations and amid great perils, maintain their faith and their loyalty. The obligation of the Federal Government to protect the loyalists of the South is supreme, and they must take all needful means to provide that protection. The most needful is the gift of free suffrage, and that must be guaranteed. There is no protection you can extend to a man so effective and conclusive as the power to protect himself. And in assuring protection to the loyal citizen you assure permanency to the Government. The bestowal of suffrage is therefore not merely the discharge of a personal obligation toward those who are enfranchised, but it is the most far-sighted provision against social disorder, the surest guaranty for peace, prosperity, and public justice.

NATIONAL HONOR IN THE PAYMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

[Speech of Mr. Blaine in the House of Representatives Nov. 26, 1867, the House being in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.]

MR. CHAIRMAN, — Within the past few months, some erroneous and mischievous views have been put forward in regard to the nature of the public obligation imposed by the debt of the United States. Without stopping to notice the lesser lights of the new doctrine, and not caring to analyze the various forms of repudiation suggested from irresponsible sources throughout the country, I propose to review, as briefly as may be, the position contemporaneously assumed by two able and distinguished gentlemen — the one from the West, the other from the East — the one the late candidate of the Democratic party for the Vice-Presidency — [Mr. Pendleton of Ohio] — the other a prominent member of this House from one of the strongest Republican districts of the State of Massachusetts [General Butler].

The position of these gentlemen I understand to be simply this: *that the principal of the United States bonds, known as the five-twenties, may be fairly and legally paid in paper currency by the Government after the expiration of five years from the date of issue.*

A brief review of the origin of the five-twenty bonds will demonstrate, I think, that this position is in contravention of the honor and good faith of the National Government; that it is hostile to the spirit and the letter of the law; that it contemptuously ignores the common understanding between borrower and lender at the time the loan was negotiated; and that finally, even if such mode of payment were honorable and practicable, it would prove disastrous to the financial interests of the Government and the general prosperity of the country.

I crave the attention and the indulgence of the House while I recapitulate the essential facts in support of my assertion.

The issue of the five-twenty bonds was originally authorized by the act of Feb. 25, 1862, which provided for the large amount of \$500,000,000. It is this series which was successfully disposed of by Jay Cooke & Co. in 1863, and of which a great proportion was subsequently purchased by foreign capitalists. It will be borne in mind that up to that time in all the loan bills passed by Congress not one word had ever been said in regard to coin payment either of bond or coupon; and yet it will be equally borne in mind that coin payment, both of the principal and interest of the public debt, has been the invariable rule from the foundation of the Government. No instance to the contrary can be found in our history. In the pithy language of Nathaniel Macon, "our Government was a hard-money Government, founded by hard-money men, and its debts were hard-money debts."

It will be still further borne in mind that when the bill authorizing the original issue of five-twenties was under discussion in Congress no man of any party, either in the Senate or the House, ever intimated that those bonds were to be paid in any thing else than gold or silver. The issue of legal-tender notes of contemporaneous origin was regarded as a temporary expedient, forced upon us by the cruel necessities and demands of war, and it was universally conceded that the specie basis was to be resumed long before the bonds should mature for payment. And in order that the public creditor might have the amplest assurance *of the payment of both principal and interest in coin* it was specially enacted that all duties on imports should be paid in coin, and the amount thus raised was distinctly pledged, not only to the payment of the interest in coin, but to the formation of a sinking fund for the ultimate redemption of the principal in coin. This provision is so important that I quote it entire. After providing that the duties shall be paid in coin, the act devotes the amount so collected to the following specific purposes:—

"First, To the payment in coin of the interest on the bonds of the United States.

"Second, To the purchase or payment of one per cent of the entire debt

of the United States, to be made within each fiscal year after the first day of July, 1862, which is to be set apart as a sinking-fund, and the interest of which shall be in like manner applied to the purchase or payment of the public debt, as the Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time direct."

Much carping and criticism have been expended on the second clause of this provision, mainly by those who seem desirous of wresting and distorting its plain and obvious meaning. Brushing aside all fine-spun construction and cunning fallacy, it is manifest that the sinking-fund herein authorized was primarily to be formed from coin, and that it was only to be invested and re-invested in securities whose interest was equally pledged in coin; that this process was not to be confined to any specific number of years, but was limited only by the amount and the duration of the debt which was ultimately to be redeemed by the sinking-fund thus constituted. The sinking-fund was thus to receive an annual increment *in coin* amounting to the one-hundredth part of the entire debt of the Government; and this increment was to be invested only in securities which would yield *coin* interest for the further increment of the fund. It would be difficult to conceive how the language of an enactment could more distinctly recognize and provide for the ultimate coin payment of the entire bonded debt of the nation. Instead of the Government having the right at this late day to change its coin obligation into one of paper, it seems to me that the public creditors could with far more consistency allege that the Government had not kept faith with them by failing to provide the sinking-fund which was guaranteed at the outset as one of the special securities of the loan.

But the argument does not rest merely on the after-construction of a statute to prove that the principal of the fifties is payable in coin. The declarations in Congress when the measure was under consideration were numerous and specific. Indeed, no other possible mode of payment was even hinted at, and Mr. Stevens, then chairman of the Ways and Means, was emphatic and repeated in his assertions that the bonds were *redeemable in coin*. He stated this fact no less than three times in his speech of Feb. 6, 1862, giving it all the prominence and emphasis that iteration and reiteration could impart. He spoke of the "redemption in gold in twenty

years" as one of the special inducements for capitalists to invest, and he gave, in every form of words, the sanction of his influential position and great name, to the maintenance of the coin standard in the payment of the bonds.

It may astonish even the gentleman from Pennsylvania himself to be reminded that within less than three years from the date of these declarations he asserted on this floor—referring to the five-twenty bonds—that "*it is just as clear as any thing is clear that the interest is payable in gold, but the principal in lawful money.*" He made this startling statement in answer to a question addressed to him by my honorable friend from Ohio [Mr. Spalding], and the gentleman from Massachusetts has quoted it in his argument on this question as though it had been made when the five-twenty bill was originally introduced, and was to be taken as the authorized opinion of the Ways and Means Committee at that time. I have already shown that the gentleman from Pennsylvania was a firm advocate of coin payment, and that a considerable period had elapsed before he experienced his marvelous change of opinion on this question. But it is due to the gentleman from Pennsylvania to say that, late as he was in this declaration, he was in advance of other gentlemen who have since figured prominently as advocates of the doctrine. Should this scheme of repudiation ever succeed, it is but just to give the gentleman from Pennsylvania the honor of first proposing it. He announced it on this floor while yet the gentleman from Massachusetts was doing honorable service on the tented field, and while Mr. Pendleton was still adhering to those hard-money theories of which he was a conspicuous defender during his service in this House.

But I digress. I was stating that while the original five-twenty bill was pending the declaration that the bonds were redeemable in coin was constantly repeated. It was the ground assumed by every member of the Committee of Ways and Means, so far as the record shows, and it was likewise the ground taken by the Finance Committee of the Senate, Mr. Fessenden and other members being on record in many ways to that effect. While so many gentlemen in both branches of Congress were repeating that these bonds were redeemable in coin, it is a significant circumstance, as already intimated, that

no one ventured the opposite opinion. The universality of the understanding at that time is that which renders a different construction now so reprehensible. Mr. Pendleton was present in his seat during the whole discussion of the measure, and he was an active and frequent participant therein. Then was his time to have enunciated his scheme of greenback payment if he ever intended it in good faith. As a gentleman of candor, however, I am sure he will confess that he never dreamed of such an idea till long after the bonds were purchased by the people, and possibly not until some prospect of party advantage lured him to the adoption of a theory which is equally at war with the letter of the law and with sound principles of finance.

After the bill became a law Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, proceeded to place the loan formally on the market, and following the uniform previous practice of the Government, and especially adopting the language used by Mr. Stevens, and other gentlemen in both branches of Congress, he officially proclaimed through the loan agents of the Government that the five-twenty bonds were "*a six per cent loan, the interest and principal payable in coin.*" It was on this basis, with this understanding, with this public proclamation, that the people were asked to subscribe to the loan. They had the assurance of an unbroken practice on the part of the Government, rendered still more significant by the provision for a sinking-fund in coin; they had the general assurance of both branches of Congress, especially expressed through the appropriate channels of the chairman of Finance in the Senate and the chairman of Ways and Means in the House, and further and finally enforced by a distinct declaration to that effect by the public advertisement proposing the loan to the people, issued by the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury. If any thing could constitute an honorable contract between borrower and lender—between Government and people—then was it a contract that the five-twenty bonds should be redeemed in coin.

I have been thus minute, and possibly tedious, in regard to the facts attending the issue of the first series of five-twenties because in effect that established the rule for all subsequent issues. The principle laid down so clearly in the proposal for the first loan was steadily adhered to afterward. It is quite

true that the chairman of Ways and Means [Mr. Stevens], as I have already said, changed his ground on the question, but he failed to influence Congress, notwithstanding his parade of terrible figures showing the utter impossibility of ever paying coin interest, to say nothing of coin principal. The gentleman can recall his statistics with amusement, if not with advantage, from that grave of unfulfilled prophecies to which he, in common with the rest of us, have sent many baseless predictions.

The next loan bill passed by Congress was that of March 3, 1863, authorizing the borrowing of \$900,000,000. This is commonly known as the ten-forty act, and it contains the special provision that both principal and interest shall be payable in coin. But this provision was never inserted by way of discrimination against the five-twenties, implying that they were to be paid in paper currency. Its origin palpably discredits any such inference. It was moved as an amendment by Mr. Thomas of Massachusetts, and it was moved to meet and repel the first covert insinuation that any bond of the United States was redeemable in any thing else than coin. The chairman of Ways and Means, in apparent forgetfulness of his declaration the preceding year, had for the first time intimated that the principal of United States bonds was payable in paper money, and the amendment of Mr. Thomas, as the discussion reported in the *Globe* clearly discloses, was intended as a sharp protest against this heresy of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and as such it was adopted by the House by a majority so overwhelming that its opponents did not call for a division. During the discussion, Mr. Horton of Ohio, a distinguished member of the Ways and Means, and a gentleman of very high character in every respect, said: —

“I wish to state here that the Committee of Ways and Means, in framing this bill, never dreamed that these twenty-year bonds were to be payable in any thing other than coin until the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Stevens] told it yesterday upon the floor of the House.”

In this connection I desire the special attention of the House to one fact of conclusive import, and it is this: at the time this ten-forty loan bill was passed, March 3, 1863, only \$25,000,000 of the five-twenty loan, authorized the year before, had been

disposed of. It was in the succeeding summer and autumn of 1863, especially after the triumph of the Union arms at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, that those marvellous sales of \$500,000,000 were effected through the Government agency of Jay Cooke & Co. And yet the gentleman from Massachusetts would have us believe that the people subscribed for a loan of \$500,000,000 that was payable in five years in paper currency, when another loan, for a larger amount, to run forty years, expressly payable in coin, was already authorized and about to be put on the market. Such a conclusion cannot be reconciled even with the common sanity, to say nothing of the proverbial shrewdness, of those who invested their money in the five-twenty loan. Every one can see, sir, that not one dollar of the five-twenty loan could have been disposed of on the understanding that the bonds were redeemable in currency, while another loan for a longer period, possibly at the same rate of interest, for the bill so allowed, and absolutely redeemable in coin, was already authorized, and immediately to be offered to the public.

The next loan bill in the order of time was the act of March 3, 1864, which was merely supplementary to the ten-forty bill, whose history I have just reviewed. It covered the amount of \$200,000,000, and, like the bill to which it formed a supplement, it provided for both interest and principal to be paid in coin. Under this bill more than one hundred and seventy-five million dollars were negotiated, partly in ten-forties, and partly in five-twenties; by far the greater part in the former. But as some five-twenties were negotiated under it, the gentleman from Massachusetts, even on the line of logic which he has sought to travel, will be compelled to acknowledge that they were payable in coin, and hence, according to his theory, some of the five-twenties are redeemable in coin and some in paper—a distinction which has never yet been proclaimed, and the equity of which would hardly be apparent to the holders of the same description of bonds—identical in phrase, and differing only in the subordinate and immaterial circumstance of date.

The last loan bill to which I need specially refer is that of June 30, 1864, under the provisions of which the five-twenties bearing that date were issued. The seven-thirties, authorized by the same act, as well as by the subsequent acts of Jan. 28

and March 3, 1865, were convertible into five-twenties of the same tenor and description with those whose issue was directly authorized; so that in reviewing the history of the loan bill of June 30, 1864, I shall, in effect, close the narrative of Congressional proceedings in regard to five-twenty bonds. The history of that bill shall be brief. It was discussed in its various provisions very elaborately in both branches of Congress. As reported from the Ways and Means Committee it was worded like all previous bonds, promising to pay so many dollars to the holder, without specifying that they were to be any thing else than coin dollars, in which United States bonds had always been paid. Toward the close of the discussion Mr. Brooks of New York, then, as now, a member of this House, moved to insert an amendment providing especially that the bonds should be "*payable in coin.*" Mr. Brooks was answered by Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts, on behalf of the Ways and Means Committee, as follows:—

"The bill of last year, the \$900,000,000 bill, contained these words, but it was not deemed necessary or considered expedient to insert them in this bill. I will send to the desk and ask to have read, as a part of my reply to the gentleman from New York, a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury giving his views upon this point."

The Clerk read as follows from Secretary Chase's letter dated May 18, 1864:—

"It has been the constant usage of the Department to redeem all coupon and registered bonds, forming part of the funded or permanent debt of the United States, in coin, and this usage has not been deviated from during my administration of its affairs.

"The five-twenty sixes, payable twenty years from date, though redeemable after five years, are considered as belonging to the funded or permanent debt, and so also are the twenty years sixes, into which the three years seven-thirty notes are convertible. These bonds, therefore, according to the usage of the Government, are payable in coin."

Apparently satisfied with this statement, Mr. Brooks withdrew his amendment, regarding the point as conclusively settled I suppose, not only by the uniform practice of the Government, but by the special declaration of the Secretary of the Treasury, who immediately afterward proceeded on the basis of that letter to put the bonds on the market. Mr. Hooper stated the case well when he said it was "not deemed necessary or considered expedient" to insert coin payment in this bill; "not necessary," for the practice of the Government, and the assurances of the

Treasury Department in its advertisements in proposing for loans, conclusively settled the point; and not "considered expedient," because to specially insert coin payment in all the loan bills except that of Feb. 25, 1862, under which \$500,000,000 of five-twenties had been sold, might, in the end, by the *exclusio unius*, give some shadow of ground for the mischievous and groundless inference which is now sought to be drawn.

We thus find that the voice of Congress has been uniform and consistent in support of the principle of paying the bonded debt in coin. No vote in Congress, even implying the opposite theory, has ever been given; even the weighty influence and conceded ability of the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania failing to carry with him any support whatever when he made his surprising and unprecedented change on this question. But the public creditors did not rely solely on the declarations of leading men in Congress in regard to coin payment, nor did they rest wholly on the past practice and the good faith of the Government. They had, in addition to both these strong grounds of confidence and assurance, the more direct and explicit guaranty of the Treasury Department, the authorized agent of the Government, speaking *ex cathedra*, with the knowledge and assent of Congress.

I have already quoted Secretary Chase's significant declarations in his letters and his public proposals for loans, and I have now to quote one of his equally significant acts. At the close of 1862 the twenty year loan of 1842, amounting to nearly three million dollars, fell due. Nothing was said in that loan about coin payment, and thus a grand opportunity was afforded to test the theory of paper payment. Circumstances all conspired to favor such a policy if it could be honorably adopted. Gold was at a high premium, and the Government was passing through the darkest and most doubtful hours of the whole struggle. Could there have been even a decent pretext to pay the debt in paper currency the temptation was surely great enough to resort to it, if not fully to justify it. But in the face of all the adverse circumstances; with gold very high and daily rising; with expenses enormous and daily increasing; with resources already embarrassed and daily growing more so, and with a military situation rendered well-nigh desperate by

months of almost unbroken disaster, Secretary Chase decided that the faith of the Government demanded that its funded debt, falling due no matter when and owned by no matter whom, must be paid in coin. *And it was paid in coin*; and no voice but the voice of approval was raised in either branch of Congress. The course of Secretary Chase was not only honorable to himself and the country, but it was in the highest degree wise merely from the stand-point of worldly wisdom; for it created so profound a confidence in the good faith of our Government that it aided us incalculably in the negotiation of all our great loans for the war. When the Government paid its debt to the uttermost farthing at such a time capitalists at once argued that there never could come a crisis when any evasion of public obligation would be resorted to. It has been reserved for the gentleman from Massachusetts, and the gentleman from Ohio, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, to propose that our Government should adopt a policy in the sunshine and prosperity of peace which it scorned to resort to in the storms and adversities of war.

The course of Secretary Chase in guarantying coin payment on all bonds of the United States was followed by his successors, Secretary Fessenden and Secretary McCulloch. The words of Mr. Fessenden are entitled to great weight in the premises, for he had been chairman of Finance in the Senate during the passage of all the loan bills, had elaborately discussed them in turn, and had as largely as any single member in either branch of Congress, shaped their provisions. His views on the question at issue may be briefly presented by the following extract from his official report made to Congress in December, 1864:—

“Though forced to resort to the issue of paper for the time, the idea of a specie basis was not lost sight of, as the payment of interest on long loans in coin was amply secured. And though in several of the acts authorizing the issue of bonds at long periods payment of the principal at maturity in coin is not specifically provided, the omission, it is believed, was accidental, *as there could have been no intention to make a distinction between the different classes of securities in this regard.*”

It will be noted that this declaration of Mr. Fessenden, made in his official report, was at the very time of the negotiation of the five-twenties of 1864, and preceded the large sale of seven-thirties which were convertible into five-twenties. So that in

effect it was an additional guaranty of coin payment on the part of the Government, operating at once as the condition and the inducement of the loan.

It is well known that Secretary McCulloch entertains precisely the same opinions that were so freely expressed by Messrs. Chase and Fessenden, and he placed himself on record on the question by his letter to L. P. Morton & Co. of New York, wherein he says, under date of Nov. 15, 1866:—

“I regard, as did also my predecessors, all bonds of the United States as payable in coin. The bonds which have matured since the suspension of specie payments have been so paid, and I have no doubt that the same will be true with all others. This being, as I understand it to be, the established policy of the Government, the five-twenty bonds of 1862 will either be called in at the expiration of five years from their date and paid in coin, or be permitted to run until the Government is prepared to pay them in coin.”

In view of the uniform declarations of the Treasury Department, made through official reports, through public proposals for loans, and through personal letters of assurance, all guarantying coin payment of the five-twenty bonds, I submit that the Government is bound thereto even if there were no other obligation expressed or implied. These official and unofficial promulgations from the Treasury Department were made with the full knowledge of Congress, and without the slightest expression of dissent on the part of that body. Had Congress not believed or intended that the five-twenty bonds were to be paid in coin the Secretary should not have been allowed with its evident assent so to advertise; and for Congress, after this significant permission and warrant to step forward at this late day and declare itself not bound by the conditions published by the Secretary is simply to place the United States Government in the position of a man playing a “confidence game” in which the Treasury Department and Congress are the confederate knaves, and the whole mass of bondholders the unfortunate victims.

But now, Mr. Chairman, suppose, for the sake of argument, we admit that the Government may fairly and legally pay the five-twenty bonds in paper currency, what then? I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts to tell us, what then? It is easy, I know, to issue as many greenbacks as will pay the

maturing bonds, regardless of the effect upon the inflation of prices and the general derangement of business. Five hundred millions of the five-twenties are now payable, and according to the mode suggested all we have to do is to set the printing-presses in motion, and "so long as rags and lampblack hold out" we need have no embarrassment about paying our national debt. But the ugly question recurs, What are you going to do with the greenbacks thus put afloat? Five hundred millions this year, and eleven hundred millions more on this theory of payment by the year 1872, so that within the period of four or five years we would have added to our paper money the trifling inflation of \$1,600,000,000.

Payment of the five-twenty bonds in paper currency involves, therefore, a limitless issue of greenbacks, with attendant evils of great magnitude. The worst evil of the whole is the delusion which calls this a payment at all. It is no payment in any proper sense, for it neither gives the creditor what he is entitled to, nor does it release the debtor from subsequent responsibility. You may get rid of the five-twenty by issuing the greenback, but how will you get rid of the greenback except by paying coin? The only escape from ultimate payment of coin is to declare that as a nation we permanently and finally renounce all idea of ever attaining a specie standard; that we launch ourselves upon an ocean of paper money, without shore or sounding, with no rudder to guide us and no compass to steer by. This is precisely what is involved if we adopt this mischievous suggestion of "a new way to pay old debts." Our fate in attempting such a course may be easily read in the history of similar follies both in Europe and in our own country. Prostration of credit, financial disaster, wide-spread distress among all classes of the community, would form the closing scenes in our career of gratuitous folly and national dishonor. From such an abyss of sorrow and humiliation it would be a painful and toilsome effort to regain as sound a position in our finances as we are asked voluntarily to abandon to-day.

TAXATION OF UNITED STATES BONDS.

[Speech of Mr. Blaine in the House of Representatives, June 23, 1868, the House being in Committee of the Whole, Mr. Cullom of Illinois in the Chair.]

MR. CHAIRMAN, — The fact that the bonds of the United States are exempt from State and municipal taxation has created discontent among the people, — the belief prevailing quite generally that if this exemption could be removed the local burdens of the tax-payer would be immediately and essentially lightened. Many persons assert this belief from a spirit of mischievous demagogism, and many do so from sincere conviction. To the latter class I beg to submit some facts and suggestions which may modify if not entirely change their conclusions.

The total coin-bearing debt of the United States, the conversion of seven-thirties being now practically completed, amounts to a little more than twenty-one hundred million dollars; of this large amount, some two hundred millions draw but five per cent interest, a rate not sufficiently high in the present condition of the money market to provoke hostility or suggest the especial necessity of taxation. Indeed it may be safely said that there never has been any popular dissatisfaction with regard to the non-taxation of the five per cents, it being agreed by common consent that such a rate of interest was not unreasonable on a loan negotiated at such a time.

The agitation may, therefore, be regarded as substantially confined to the six per cent coin-bearing bonds, which amount to nineteen hundred millions of dollars. Many people honestly but thoughtlessly believe that if this class of bonds could be taxed by local authority the whole volume represented by them would at once be added to the lists of the assessor. It is my purpose to show that this conclusion is totally unfounded, and

that if the right of local taxation existed in its amplest extent, but a minor fraction of the bonds could by any possibility be subjected to larger local tax than they already pay.

The entire amount of these bonds, as I have stated, is nineteen hundred million dollars; and of this total, by the best and most careful estimates attainable, at least six hundred and fifty millions are now held in Europe. This amount could not, therefore, be reached by any system of local taxation, however searching. Deducting the amount thus held abroad, we find the amount held at home is reduced to twelve hundred and fifty million dollars.

But of this twelve hundred and fifty millions more than one-third, or to speak with accuracy, about four hundred and twenty-five millions, are held by the national banks, and no form of property in the United States pays so large a tax, both local and general, as these banks. The stock, the depositories, and the deposits which these four hundred and twenty-five millions of bonds represent pay full local tax at the highest rate, besides a national tax averaging about two and a half per cent. Were the power of local taxation made specific on the bonds held by the national banks, they could not yield a dollar more than is now realized. It thus follows that the twelve hundred and fifty millions of bonds in this country, presumptively escaping local taxation, must be reduced by the amount represented by the banks, and hence we find the aggregate falls to eight hundred and twenty-five millions.

The reduction, however, goes still farther, for it must be remembered that the savings banks have invested their deposits in these bonds to the amount of one hundred and seventy-five millions. In some States by local law the deposits of savings banks are exempt from taxation, as an incentive to thrift and economy. In other States, where these deposits are taxed, as in Connecticut, it has been held by judicial decision that the fact of their investment in United States bonds does not exempt them from taxation. Hence these one hundred and seventy-five millions, thus invested in savings-bank deposits, are either locally taxable, or, if exempt, it is by State law and not by virtue of the general exemption of the bonds. It thus follows that the eight hundred and twenty-five millions must be further

reduced by this sum of one hundred and seventy-five millions, leaving but six hundred and fifty millions not already included within the scope of local taxation.

But there is a still further reduction of thirty millions of bonds held by the life insurance companies on precisely the same terms as the deposits of savings banks — that is, either taxed locally, or, if exempt, deriving the exemption from the local law. The surplus earnings and reserves of these life insurance companies invested to the extent of thirty millions in United States bonds are as open to taxation when invested in that form as though they were held in State or railroad securities. Deducting these thirty millions we find the untaxed bonds reduced to six hundred and twenty millions.

There is still another large reduction; for the fire and marine insurance companies, the annuity and trust companies and other corporations which cannot readily be classed, hold in the aggregate over one hundred and twenty-five millions of bonds; and these are held on precisely the same basis as those held by the savings bank and the life insurance companies. These numerous corporations have their capital stock, their reserves and their surplus earnings invested in Government bonds to the extent named, and they are in this form as open to taxation and are actually taxed as much as though they were invested in any other form of security. Making the deduction of this one hundred and twenty-five millions we find remaining but four hundred and ninety-five millions of the six per cent gold-bearing bonds that are not already practically subjected to local taxation. Allowing for the possibility that one hundred millions of the five per cents are held instead of six per cents in all the channels of investment I have named, and it follows that at the outside figure there are to-day in the whole country less than six hundred millions of Government sixes, not fully subjected to the power of local taxation. And these six hundred millions are rapidly growing less as the various corporate institutions I have named continue to invest their funds in the bonds. These institutions desire a security that is of steady value, not liable to fluctuation, and at all times convertible into money; and hence they seek Government bonds in preference to any other form of investment. The high premium on the

bonds induces individuals to part with them, and hence they are readily transferred to corporate ownership, where they become in effect at once subject to local taxation and are no longer obnoxious to the charge of evading or escaping their just share of municipal burden. In the hands of individuals the bonds may be concealed, but in the possession of corporations concealment is necessarily impossible.

If these statistical statements needed any verification it would be supplied by an examination of the income returns recently made under oath and published in all the large cities of the country, disclosing the fact that the amount of bonds held by the wealthy men of the country has been continually growing less, just as they have been absorbed by foreign purchase and by corporate investment. The correctness of these income returns in reference to the investment in bonds will be accepted even by the incredulous and the uncharitable, when it is remembered that the interest of those making them was to exaggerate rather than depreciate the respective amounts of bonds held by them. Instead, then, of nineteen hundred millions of these bonds running free of taxation, it is clear that less than six hundred millions are open to that charge — less than one-third of the whole amount. The remainder, largely more than two-thirds of the whole, are either held abroad, where no local taxation can reach them, or they are held at home in such form as subjects them to local taxation.

Let us suppose that we were now in possession of the full power to tax by local authority these six hundred millions of bonds presumptively owned by individuals! Would we realize any thing from it? On its face the prospect might be fair and inviting, but in practice it would assuredly prove delusive and deceptive. The trouble would be that the holders of the bonds could not be found. No form of property is so easily concealed, none so readily transferred back and forth, none so difficult to trace to actual ownership. We have hundreds of millions of State bonds, city bonds, and railroad securities in this country, and yet every one knows that it is only an infinitesimal proportion of this vast investment that is ever represented on the books of assessors and tax-collectors. As a pertinent illustration, I might cite the case of the bonds of my

own State, of which there are over five millions in existence to-day, largely held as a favorite investment by the citizens of Maine. Of this whole sum I am safe in saying that scarcely a dollar is found on the lists of any assessor in the State.

The facility for concealing ownership in national bonds is far greater than in any other form of security, and the proportion in the hands of individuals that would escape the assessment of local taxes may be inferred with reasonable certainty from the analogies I have suggested, which are familiar to all who have given the least attention to the subject. Indeed, I venture to assert with confidence that if the power of local taxation of these bonds were fully accorded to-day, the tax-lists of our cities and towns would not be increased on an average one per cent. Many of those who to-day may be ambitious to parade their bonds when protected by what is deemed an offensive exemption, would suddenly have no bonds when the power of taxation applied to them. Indeed, the utter failure to realize any thing from this source, if the power to test it were granted, would in the end create more dissatisfaction than that exemption, which, in theory, is offensive, but in practice is absolutely of no consequence whatever.

But it may be asked, "Why are not the bonds taxed by national authority?" Granted, it will be urged, that the power of local taxation would be nugatory and valueless, "that affords all the stronger reason for taxing the bonds by direct Congressional enactment." In answer to this I have only to say that a tax levied directly upon the coupon is simply an abatement of interest, and that result can be reached in a better and more satisfactory and more honorable way. The determination manifested by this Congress and by the great Republican convention at Chicago to maintain the national faith, has already worked a large appreciation in the value of the bonds, and with the strengthening of our credit, which results from an honest policy, we shall speedily be able to fund our debt on a lower scale of interest, running down to five, four and a half, and ultimately to four per cent per annum. Should we proceed, however, in violation of good faith and of the uniform practice of civilized nations, to hold back part of the stipulated interest instead of effecting an honorable exchange of bonds to the mutual advan-

tage of the Government and the public creditor, we should only punish ourselves, produce calamitous results in the business world, and permanently injure our national fame.

To withhold one per cent of the interest under the plea of a national tax this year might be followed by withholding two per cent next year and three per cent the year ensuing. To enter upon such a policy would produce alarm at home and distrust abroad, for every man holding a bond would be forced to count his rate of interest not on what was stipulated in the contract, but on what might be the will and caprice of Congress in its annual withholding of a portion of the interest under the pretense of a tax. Under such a policy our bonds would be returned upon us from Europe with panic-like rapidity, and the drain upon our specie resources would produce an immediate and disastrous crisis in monetary circles. If even one-half of our bonds held in Europe were suddenly sent home it would drain us of two hundred and fifty millions of specie, and the financial distress throughout the land would be beyond the power of calculation or imagination. And yet that is the precise result involved if we should follow the policy advocated by those who urge us to tax the coupon and withhold one or two per cent of the interest. Let us reject such counsels, and adhere to the steady, straightforward course dictated alike by good policy and good faith. Let us never forget that in the language of the Chicago platform, "the best policy to diminish our burden of debt is to so improve our credit that capitalists will seek to loan us money at lower rates of interest than we now pay, and must continue to pay so long as repudiation, either partial or total, open or covert, is threatened or suspected."

GRANT AND SEYMOUR COMPARED.

[A speech delivered by Mr. Blaine at a Republican meeting in Augusta, Maine, July 11, 1868.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — If now, at the beginning of the National campaign, leaving out of sight for the moment all the political issues between the two parties, you were simply called upon to select an officer to execute the laws of the United States, and were, moreover, compelled to make your selection between the two men now most prominently before the public, which would you take, — General Grant, or Governor Seymour? I have put in the form of an hypothesis that which is indeed the actual condition of the case; because every citizen of the United States, whatever considerations may govern his vote, will really be compelled to choose between the two men I have named.

If I were empowered to answer for you, I should say that a man more highly gifted with the executive talent than Ulysses S. Grant could not be found within the limits of the United States. He is silent, prompt, punctual and decisive, with clear and quick judgment, without irritability of temper, with wonderful self-command. He is not under the sway of imagination, is not influenced by sentiment, sees things as a realist, precisely as they are. He is not moved by any consideration outside of the line of plain matter of duty. He has no partisan prejudices, has grown up without party attachment, and would administer the Government without the slightest danger of undue influence from party consideration. If to be a politician is, as many persons think, a disability for a President, you can certainly feel assured that General Grant has no touch or taint of that kind.

On the other hand, I should say of Horatio Seymour, that,

while an accomplished politician, he is markedly deficient in the executive talent. He is an irresolute, if not timid, man, who is disposed to balance public and partisan considerations so nicely that he rarely reaches an absolute conclusion, and certainly never reaches one in time for prompt action. In the struggle between the temptations of party obligation and of conscience, he is always in doubt, too often in danger. He is, at the same time, a man of unquestioned ability, apparently frank, and perhaps meaning to be so even when he fails in the moment of trial to maintain and exhibit that manly quality. He is personally a most amiable and agreeable gentleman; and his strong hold upon the Democratic party of New York, and thence upon the Democratic party of the Nation, is due to the charm of his manners as much as to his ability, which friend and foe acknowledge to be of a high order.

From these brief outlines and characteristics, if I have stated them correctly, it will be seen that in respect to executive ability there is no ground for comparison, but only for contrast, between the two men. The one is gifted in the highest degree with the quality we are discussing: the other is so deficient that we cannot in fairness speak of his possessing it at all. The one has shown his great powers of command in the most critical exigencies in which a man can be placed: the other was tried only once by a condition of affairs which demanded instant decision and promptness of action, and he failed. How long, if I may interpolate the question, do you suppose a blind, ignorant, unled mob could have held control of the American metropolis, if General Grant had been Governor of New York?

The contrast between General Grant and Governor Seymour grows more marked the longer we look at the record of each. In fact, it is a striking illustration of the good temper and good discipline of our people, and of the mutual respect of political parties, that we are so enlisted in the Presidential contest as to treat each candidate with the same courtesy in the arena of public discussion. Indeed, we seem to be in danger of forgetting that the Republican candidate is none other than the great commander of the Union armies which subdued the rebellion, and thereby restored the Union; and we seem equally

in danger of not remembering that the Democratic candidate is none other than that Governor of New York who was a stumbling-block to President Lincoln at the very crisis of the civil struggle, and who, when the rebels were pushed to the last point of resistance, joined in a National Convention of the Democratic party, and demanded that the war should cease and that the rebels should be invited to a conference, while their armies lay waiting the result. It certainly should stir the blood of men who were heartily loyal to the Government through the civil war, who rejoiced at every Union victory, and were cast down by every rebel success, to see the candidacy of General Grant opposed by the candidacy of Horatio Seymour, who, if not himself disloyal to the Government, excited disloyalty in others, and whose whole course, during the four years of strife, increased the burden placed upon the National Government, and inspired the Confederacy to greater vigor by the dissatisfaction with the war which his leadership created throughout the North.

To go a little farther into an analysis of the respective characters of these two men, let me say that Governor Seymour possesses a talent for political misrepresentation beyond that, I think, of any other public man in the United States. I do not mean misrepresentation of a broad and vulgar type, underlaid and overlaid with falsehood, but misrepresentation by inference, or by the suggestion of a fact which, while a fact, leaves an utterly misleading impression upon the mind of the hearer. I can, perhaps, better illustrate this habit of Governor Seymour's mind by an incident, than by merely abstract reference to it. On the 25th of June, a week or more preceding the late Democratic National Convention, Governor Seymour made a somewhat notable speech at a meeting of his partisans in Cooper Institute. In assailing the administration of the Government by Republicans, he made this statement—and I give it in his exact language, in order that I may not, myself, be in any degree subject to the same charge which I have brought against Mr. Seymour:—

“Since the war closed, in 1865, the Government has spent, in addition to its payments on the principal or interest of the public debt, more than one thousand millions of dollars. Of this sum there has been nearly eight hun-

dred millions spent on the army and the navy, and for military purposes. This is nearly one-third of the National debt. This was spent in time of peace."

The fact which Governor Seymour in this statement evidently sought to impress upon his hearers was, that in a time of profound peace the military and naval expenses of the Government, under Republican rule, were at the rate of some two hundred and seventy millions per annum. He did not in explicit terms say two hundred and seventy millions a year, but he said eight hundred millions for three years, as though the expenditure was spread over the whole period.

What now are the facts of the case? When the war closed in April, 1865,—and I stated these facts in the House of Representatives, only two days after Governor Seymour's speech,—the armies of the Union bore on their rolls the names of nearly a million of men, and our navy, in its widely extended duty of blockading three thousand miles of coast, had nearly five hundred vessels in service, with, of course, a great many thousand sailors on board. The immediate result of National victory on land and sea was the mustering out of these countless hosts of men. Many months of pay were due to more than half the army; the bounty, to which those who served during the war were entitled, was due to all, and must now be paid. The pay of the sailors was as much in arrears as the pay of the soldiers, and, besides, in settling, they were entitled to receive millions of prize money which they had honestly earned. The enormous amount required for these closing settlements was readily provided, because the Government had unlimited credit in its hour of victory. I visited the Treasury Department, in order to get the material to answer Governor Seymour, and I received an official statement showing that the disbursements on account of the army and navy for the one hundred and seventy-four days following General Grant's closing victory over Lee, amounted to six hundred and twenty-five millions of dollars. Thus it will be seen that more than three-fourths of the eight hundred millions of dollars of war and navy expenses, which Governor Seymour says have been paid by the Government within the last three years, were really disbursed in what might be called a lump sum at the close of hostilities,

when we settled with the soldiers and sailors, and paid them in ready cash for the service in which they had so honorably and so faithfully acquitted themselves.

Of this great sum of six hundred and twenty-five millions of dollars, ninety-five millions were paid from the current revenues of the Government, and the loyal people advanced five hundred and thirty millions by subscribing that amount to the *seventy-third* loan; and yet this transaction is deliberately misrepresented by Governor Seymour, in making it appear that the entire outlay was the ordinary disbursement for War and Navy in a time of peace. With the six hundred and twenty-five millions deducted, it will be seen that the expenses of War and of Navy, for these last three years, have been but one hundred and seventy-five millions, or a little more than fifty-eight millions per annum, for both branches of the National defense.

Thus reduced, Governor Seymour's figures approximate the truth, and they exhibit a careful economy on the part of the Government. Go back ten years, to Mr. Buchanan's Administration, and with an army far less than has been maintained for safety since the close of the war, with a navy not nearly so large as that now in commission, the two branches of the service cost forty millions of dollars. Taking the difference in the amount of force, and the fact that the expenditures of 1858 were in coin, while those of the present time are in paper, considerably depreciated, every candid man will see that the Government outlays for the past three years have been on a more economic scale than were maintained during the last Democratic Administration that was in power.

I have gone into this detail for the purpose, not merely of stopping an injurious mis-statement as to Government expenditure, but especially to illustrate the skillful way in which Governor Seymour conveys a charge that is inherently and intrinsically untrue. It was Prince Talleyrand, I think, who, in speaking of two distinguished European diplomatists, said that "the one lies, but never deceives; while the other deceives, but never lies." I think that if Governor Seymour should change his public relations from an accomplished politician to become, as I have no doubt he would, a most skillful diplomatist, he would be cousin-german to the second type referred to

by Talleyrand. I would match him against the whole school of diplomacy in Europe, for deceiving without actually stating a falsehood, — compounding with his conscience by accuracy of verbal statement, and charging whatever erroneous impression was created, not to his own lack of candor, but to the dullness and lack of information on the part of those who could so easily be made the victims of a polite misunderstanding.

Let me ask now, fellow-citizens, if it would not read very strangely in history, should this patriotic American people, on the occasion of the first Presidential election after they had escaped the danger of war and restored the integrity and strength of the Government, deny the highest honor of the Republic to the chief military leader who conquered the rebellion, and bestow it upon the man the aggregate of whose efforts and influence was steadily and heavily against the Administration charged with the maintenance of the Union? I think no one will deny, when the time comes that we may coolly look back upon the conduct of Governor Seymour while he was in the executive chair of New York, or upon his course as a leader of the Democratic party, taking active part in the National Convention of 1864, that his influence was hurtful to the Union cause. Mr. Lincoln thought so, and Mr. Stanton thought so, and all the leading generals in the field thought so. As Cromwell, in his agony, asked that the Lord might deliver him from Sir Harry Vane, so President Lincoln must have often cried, in his trouble, to be delivered from Horatio Seymour. The spirit of Mr. Seymour's action, even when the form was in compliance with patriotic duty, was such as to incite a spirit of resistance to the necessary policy of the National Administration.

The personal aspects of this contest are so striking, and withal so important, that I make no apology or explanation for putting the considerations which grow out of them in the forefront of the argument. The largest issue after all is that on one side General Grant is the candidate, and on the other Governor Seymour is the candidate. I do not recall any Presidential contest in which the personality of the two candidates entered so largely into the struggle, and embodied in fact so much of the actual issue at stake. All the questions that grow

out of the war, all the patriotic and inspiring issues, all the antagonisms and hatreds, are reproduced and represented in these two men; and I am sure that the contest will, in a very remarkable degree, proceed, not upon mere personal differences between the two, but on the public questions which these personal differences actually stand for.

There is another feature in the Democratic position which serves to give point and emphasis to the meaning of their platform. Ordinarily the nomination of a Vice-President is not of special significance, but the Democratic Convention this year have made their selection of that candidate full of meaning, bristling, indeed, with dangerous import. General Frank Blair, who has many things in his past record to commend him to patriotic favor, has drifted, with the Blair tendency, back into the Democratic party. It is impossible, or rather has been impossible, for any one of the Blairs — the father or either of the two sons — to be moderate on any political issue; and so, at this time, General Frank Blair, having been fully re-admitted to the Democratic ranks, signalizes his change by out-Heroding Herod, running ahead of the extremists of the South. He demands that the Reconstruction laws shall simply be overturned by violence. He does not propose to wait for their repeal by Congress, or for their unconstitutionality to be declared by the Supreme Court, but simply that the President shall declare all the Acts to be null and void, — I am quoting his own words, — and compel the army to dispossess the carpet-bag State governments, allow the white people to re-organize their own governments and elect senators and representatives. Mr. Blair has certainly made the largest bid for the support of Southern rebellion that any Democrat has yet offered. He proposes to revolutionize the Government by force, and put the rebels in power, — not because they are right, not because his proposition would be just or lawful, but simply because they are “white men.” Mr. Blair’s nomination is a fitting supplement and complement to Mr. Seymour’s candidacy. During the war, Blair was loyal and did gallant and valuable service in the field; while Mr. Seymour did his best, inside the lines of prudence, to embarrass the Government. In time of peace, I think it likely, if Mr. Seymour were let alone, that he would observe the law;

while Mr. Blair, having become fatigued with upholding Constitutional Government, proposes now to overthrow the law by violence. It would have been a better arrangement for the two men on the Democratic ticket to have acted together during the war. Certainly it would have been better for Seymour to have co-operated with Blair in time of war; and perhaps it might be better for Blair to co-operate with Seymour in time of peace. I have seen nothing in the menace of Governor Seymour's position that leads me to think he would attempt to overthrow the existing body of laws by violence; and yet the fact that Blair took this ground in advance of the Convention, secured his nomination, and will in many States, so far as Democratic votes can contribute, strengthen the ticket.

* The platform upon which Messrs. Seymour and Blair stand reads as if it were written by lineal descendants of Robespierre and Marat, and as if the country stood on the eve of a revolution, instead of at the close of a rebellion. In the judgment of the Convention which framed this indictment, every thing that exists in the Government at present is wrong, every law is unwise, every officer is corrupt, and the people who, according to general apprehension, are in a state of remarkable prosperity, are really suffering an intolerable series of burdens, and are ground down by every oppression. The Democrats are determined to tax the Government bonds, in order to impair the Government credit; they are determined that there shall be no coin payment of Government obligations, that everybody shall be amnestied, and practically that the late rebels shall take charge of the National Administration. The platform reads, indeed, as if it had been written by an intensely nervous man just recovering from an attack of *delirium tremens*.

The Republicans, according to this intoxicated platform, have nullified the right of trial by jury, destroyed the most sacred muniments of liberty, overthrown the freedom of speech and of the press, disregarded the rights of the people to be free from search and seizure, seized everybody's private papers, invaded the post-office and telegraph, converted the American capital into a Bastille, established a system of spies and official espionage to which no European Government would dare resort, abolished the right of appeal on Constitutional questions. The

crazy platform further declares that the corruption and extravagance of the Government have exceeded any thing in history, and have, by means of frauds and monopolies, nearly doubled the debt created by the war. It affirms that "under the repeated assaults of these wicked Republicans the pillars of Government are rocking on their bases; and in case" (here comes the most dreadful indictment of all) "they shall carry the election and make General Grant President, we will meet only as a subjected and conquered people, amid the ruins of liberty and the scattered fragments of the Constitution."

I am sure that it would be dignifying this tirade far too much to attempt to meet it with argument, or even with a denial. The best answer to it is to read it. Reading it, we can readily infer the character and aims of the men who are guilty of its stupendous folly. The platform will only serve for ridicule in the campaign, to be jeered and laughed at! But the real issue will come back to the point where it started: Do you not prefer Ulysses S. Grant to Horatio Seymour, as the next President of the United States? And do you not think that Schuyler Colfax is better to be trusted, as Vice-President, than the man who has talked so lightly, threatened so loudly, and behaved so absurdly as General Frank Blair?

MR. BURLINGAME AS AN ORATOR.

[Originally published by Mr. Blaine in the *Atlantic Monthly* of November, 1870.]

THOSE who were personally intimate or even casually acquainted with the late Mr. Burlingame, will remember his ease and fluency of speech in ordinary conversation. But writing was labor and weariness to him. It seemed impossible for him to establish a rapid transit between his brain and the end of his pen. What he prepared in the way of official communication was graceful, strong and effective, but it was generally, if not always, dictated while he walked back and forth phrasing aloud as though he were directly addressing an eager and interested listener.

Mr. Burlingame's public speeches, whether in the Legislative Chamber, on the American platform, or as Ambassador at the courts of the civilized world, were always prepared with elaboration and with minute attention to details. But not one word was ever written. He possessed the singular faculty of not only casting the general outline of his discourse, but of ordering the exact style of his diction, without resorting to the use of note or memorandum to aid his memory. His habit was to form in his mind a clear and accurate conception of the subject, to mark its natural divisions, analyze its connections and sequences, and then, with utmost care, to frame the sentences and paragraphs which should make up the speech. After silently and thoroughly digesting the whole subject, rhetorically as well as logically, he would repeat the entire oration aloud, over and over again. He used frequently to say "that no one could tell how a phrase or sentence would strike the ear of an audience until it was tested by actual hearing." In the same connection, he would add that he "very often changed and

corrected the structure of a whole paragraph on finding that the way he had *thought it out* was not the way that *sounded best*." Charles James Fox had no confidence in the effect upon the House of Commons of a speech that read well; and Mr. Burlingame seemed to have a similar intuition in regard to the requirements of both the popular and the Parliamentary ear.

With a speech thus prepared, Mr. Burlingame's delivery was exceedingly impressive. He spoke with the unerring correctness of one who had thoroughly studied his part, and yet with the absolute freshness and apparent spontaneity of a man who had sprung to his feet with the overflowing fullness of the subject and the uncontrollable impulse of the occasion. He had the remarkable gift of retaining this freshness and spontaneity, however frequently he repeated the speech. The precision of his repetition was among the noteworthy features of his oratory. In what is termed a campaign speech it is difficult for the best-filled mind and the readiest tongue to make more than one comprehensive and really valuable presentation of the pending issues. The questions to be discussed on successive days in one election are so entirely identical as to admit of but slight variation in the mode of treatment by the same speaker. The prince of campaign orators, Mr. Corwin of Ohio; was in the habit of saying "that a man who should attempt a fresh speech on every stump would never have any speech worth listening to." While, therefore, it is to be expected that a general similarity will of necessity pervade the speeches of any man who attempts to discuss the issues of a political campaign, it was peculiar to Mr. Burlingame to deliver day after day the same speech exactly, *verbatim et literatim et punctuatim*. He was wise in so doing. Any attempt to change the thread of his argument or to vary the felicitous illustrations of his rhetoric, would have deranged the entire framework of that which he had fitly compacted and joined together. He always kept in mind that he had a different audience every day, and that however hackneyed the speech might become to himself, it was fresh and new to each succeeding crowd of hearers. But, in fact, the speech did not become hackneyed to himself, for the moment he faced a sympathetic audience he partook of their temper, grew elated with their interest and forgot in the intensity of

to-day's magnetism that he was repeating the sayings of yesterday.

It was the magnetism of Mr. Burlingame that made him pre-eminently effective before an assemblage of the people. What precisely is meant by magnetism it might be difficult to define, but it is undoubtedly true that Mr. Burlingame possessed a great reserve of that subtle, forceful, overwhelming power which the word *magnetism* is used to signify. It was quite independent of his volition, not in any sense under his control, and not indeed dominant over others until it had made him all aglow with its fiery enthusiasm. *Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi.* Mr. Burlingame was not an actor; he never simulated a part, he never sought to stir his hearers with a passion or a sentiment with which he was not himself profoundly stirred in advance. Mr. Webster in his description of Samuel Dexter as an orator, says that "the earnestness of his conviction wrought conviction in others." The earnestness of Mr. Burlingame was similarly effective. What he believed he believed with such intensity, what he spoke he spoke with such fervor, that the unbidden impulse was "to believe and assent and be convinced,"—we again quote Mr. Webster,— "because it was gratifying and delightful to think and feel and believe in unison with him."

This power which Mr. Burlingame possessed was not dependent on speech, though of course it was greatly deepened and strengthened by it. Its influence was never more potential and commanding than at the capital of China, where, after seven years of brilliant success as American minister, he was selected by the Government to represent the Celestial Empire at all the courts of the earth. He did not understand the Chinese language, did not attempt to write it, never essayed to speak it; and yet, through the broken circuit of an interpreter, the current of his magnetism reached the mandarins of Peking as effectively as his living voice ever electrified a Boston audience in Faneuil Hall.

This is no small praise. Indeed, Mr. Burlingame's success at Peking will always remain the distinguishing feature of his remarkable career. The eminence he achieved, the influence he exerted, the reputation he acquired in China, are almost without

parallel. Prior to Mr. Burlingame, our country had been represented at the Chinese court by ministers of superior training and commanding talent. As far back as John Tyler's day we had Caleb Cushing, then in the early prime of an illustrious career. He went to China, rich in learning, a linguist of rare attainments, with diplomatic talent of the highest order, thoroughly versed in International Law, possessed of an acute intellect singularly fitted to cope with and control the mind of the Orient. A few years later, in Mr. Fillmore's Presidency, Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky was sent to represent us at Peking. Less eminent in culture than Mr. Cushing, he is scarcely the inferior of any man in natural ability. To the talent of the Marshalls, conspicuous and brilliant through four generations, he adds through his mother the blood and the brain of the Birneys. He went upon his mission when young, with military laurels won in the Mexican war, and with the further prestige of a distinguished career in Congress. Following Marshall, William B. Reed of Pennsylvania was sent thither by his devoted personal friend, President Buchanan. Mr. Reed has long been a leading member of the Philadelphia bar, and like Mr. Cushing is of generous culture outside the limits of his profession, in which he is regarded by those who know him best as among the most accomplished and most acute of American jurists.

Such were the men whom Mr. Burlingame succeeded in his diplomatic career. It is not stating the case too strongly to say that at no European court did we have superior ability during the service of the three gentlemen we have named. Yet the influence of these men, with all their conceded gifts and accomplishments, did not compare with the influence exerted by Mr. Burlingame. Indeed, it was the testimony of Sir Frederick Bruce, who was at Peking as the representative of England at the same time, that no foreign minister had ever gained such ascendancy in the councils of the Chinese as Mr. Burlingame. His selection, therefore, for the most important mission which China ever sent to Christian nations, was not matter of accident or fortune, but grew naturally from the exalted estimate placed upon his ability and fitness by the leading minds of the Peking Government. As an example of the influ-

ence which one man may attain over an alien race, whose civilization is widely different, whose religious belief is totally opposite, whose language he does not read or write or speak, Mr. Burlingame's career in China must always be regarded as extraordinary. It cannot be accounted for except by conceding to him a peculiar power over those with whom he came in contact; a power growing out of a mysterious gift, partly intellectual, partly spiritual, largely physical; a power whose laws are unknown, whose origin cannot be traced, whose limits cannot be assigned; a power which, for the want of a more comprehensive and significant term, recurring to our postulate, we designate as magnetism.

This, in fine, was his power as an orator. It was not so much what he said as his manner of saying it, that gave a peculiar charm and force to his words. Dependent upon this quality for success, he sometimes failed, for "lack of inspiration" as he termed it. The same speech would on one occasion carry his hearers to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and the triumph be repeated perhaps a score of times; yet on another occasion he would fail. He could not become *en rapport* with his audience, and the whole speech would prove the dreariest of drudgery to him. His success in 1856, as an advocate of Frémont, and again in 1860 as a supporter of Lincoln, was a leading feature in each of those memorable campaigns. In New England, in the Middle States, in the West, he was equally and widely popular. It is perhaps not extravagant to assert that, so far as public speaking contributed to Republican victory in the nation, no one bore a more conspicuous and influential part than Mr. Burlingame. Seven years' absence from American associations had not diminished his sway over American audiences. His addresses, when he passed through our country in 1868, at the head of the Chinese Embassy, were full of his old force and fire. Had he lived to realize his cherished purpose of once more participating in the public and political affairs of his native land, he would have taken and maintained a foremost position. But this final triumph was not reserved for him. His career closed suddenly, and, to mortal vision, prematurely. He died at the early age of forty-seven, lamented, honored, beloved, on three continents.

THE NOMINATION OF HORACE GREELEY AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

[Speech delivered by Mr. Blaine at Lincoln County (Me.) Republican Convention, July 27, 1872.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — In discussing the pending contest for the Presidency, I think it is becoming, at the outset, to tender our condolence to those disappointed and dissatisfied politicians who called the Liberal Republican Convention at Cincinnati for the express purpose of nominating Charles Francis Adams. In some way, not foreseen by the callers, delegates flocked to the Convention in numbers too large to be disciplined and led by Mr. Carl Schurz and his small band of political recusants and self-seekers; and the Adams programme, though carefully planned, utterly miscarried in the end. Gentlemen of independent views, of personal character, with homes in which they live, and with neighbors who respect them, took control of the Convention; and instead of nominating Mr. Adams, they chose a man who in almost every respect radically differs from him. I think, indeed, it would be difficult to find two men of New England birth who in temper and temperament, in mental quality, and in every characteristic that makes the difference between individuals, are so radically unlike as Horace Greeley and Charles Francis Adams. Perhaps I could not define the points of difference without falling into a line of criticism and analysis that would prove too personal for the amenities of public speech. Nor would it be to my purpose. I have dwelt on this phase of Mr. Greeley's nomination only to express my gratification with the fact that the original bolters from the Republican party, who called the Cincinnati Convention, feel far worse over the result of its deliberations than do

the Republicans who remain true to their party faith and allegiance. The Republican bolters who supported Mr. Adams met their discomfiture in May, and I feel quite sure that the friends of Mr. Greeley will meet theirs in November.

Far more important than the action of the Republican deserters at the May Convention is that of the National Democracy in this month of July. In fact, Mr. Greeley's nomination by the deserters sinks to insignificance, in view of the fact that against every sense of consistency and every suggestion of propriety, with the sacrifice of almost every principle the party ever professed, the Democracy of the Nation, with the South in the lead, have selected Horace Greeley as their candidate for the Presidency. The loyal man has been endorsed by the rebel, the patriot is embraced by the traitor, the Prohibitionist is approved by the party of lager beer and free rum, the Protectionist is accepted by the Free-Trader, the Abolitionist is welcomed by the whole body of ancient slaveholders. Whatever Horace Greeley has been for the past thirty years is precisely what the Democracy have not been : whatever he has professed is precisely what the Democracy have derided and denounced.

Since the action of the Democratic Convention, we can plainly see what before was matter of inference and conjecture ; viz., that the so-called Liberal Republican Convention was summoned in pursuance of an agreement previously made with Democratic leaders, and with the distinct understanding that the candidate of the Republican deserters should also become the candidate of the Democracy ; that party fealty, political principle, personal pledges, ancient prejudice, hoary tradition, boasted record, should all be subordinated by the Democracy, and a coalition should be formed simply on the basis of defeating General Grant, and taking charge of the Government with its power and its patronage.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the agreement thus secretly made between assumed leaders never contemplated that the Democracy should be subjected to such a test and such a strain as is applied to them by the nomination of Mr. Greeley. The Democratic leaders had made up their minds to support Mr. Charles Francis Adams, and never for a moment doubted his readiness to respond to all Democratic demands. They

knew that since the death of old John Adams, no member of his family had ever been steadfastly true to the organization or the principles of any political party; and they believed, therefore, with all sincerity, that the late Minister to England, who saw no opportunity for further promotion in the Republican party, would, according to the tradition of his blood and the example of his father, not hesitate to unite with the Democracy upon the distinct understanding that the Democracy should first unite on him.

Unwelcome as it was to the Democracy to substitute Mr. Greeley for Mr. Adams, difficult as it seemed for a time to complete the coalition on the basis of the former's candidacy, the old party, like many individuals engaged in a questionable transaction and somewhat startled by unexpected developments, found it, nevertheless, easier to go forward than to retreat, easier to put on a brazen face and a bold front than to acknowledge their inconsistency, their disingenuousness, their readiness to sacrifice lifelong principle for even a remote chance of the prestige of victory and the spoils of office.

To cement the coalition, to add the last drop of humiliation to the cup which is put to the lips of the Democracy, it was agreed by the National Convention of that party that the platform adopted by the Liberal Republican Convention at Cincinnati should be taken without dotting an *i* or crossing a *t*—with wry faces I doubt not, but with a loud-sounding declaration that they believed the principles announced by them to be “essential to just government.”

Gentlemen, this political combination is as bad as that described by John Randolph, when, with his vindictive bitterness, he denounced the union of the Puritan and the blackleg, and described it as equal in shame to the association of Blifil and Black George. It cannot succeed. It is a failure from the beginning. It is doomed to destruction from its birth. It is an unnatural alliance, which avenging fate will put asunder. You cannot unite Horace Greeley in sympathy with Jefferson Davis and Robert Toombs: you cannot bring him into political fellowship with the pirates who manned the Confederate cruisers, with the fiends in human shape who tortured Union soldiers at Andersonville, with the inhuman wretches who refused

quarter to negro soldiers taken prisoners in honorable warfare with arms in their hands.

Coalitions, gentlemen, are proverbially weak. They are weak precisely in proportion to the degree of antagonism which is to be allayed, precisely in proportion to the disagreements which are to be reconciled. As a political device coalitions are not new. They have been tried of old in England, and have ended always with defeat and sometimes with disgrace. In our Republican system of government, successful coalition is even more difficult than where aristocratic institutions restrain freedom of discussion and limit the sphere of independent action. But in the whole history of coalitions, successful or unsuccessful, abroad or at home, that which is now attempted is at once the most difficult and the — what shall I say? the most discreditable? I should think Mr. Greeley would every morning awake from sleep disturbed by unpleasant visions, and sigh heavily for the old patriotic associates among whom his life and his labor have been honored, and to whom, for all these years, he has been guide, philosopher and friend, fireside companion and trusted counselor!

An analysis of the Liberal Republican platform to which the Democratic National Convention pledged faith and fealty, will show how a great body of men who are ready to fight if their honor be challenged, will yet give pledge to uphold certain political principles, when in their hearts they mean no such thing, and when in fact their partisan word is to be taken as lightly and held to be as meaningless as the oath of an Alsatian dicer. In the Democratic National Convention there were many delegates who either actively or by instigation and approval have been depriving colored voters in the South of all their civil rights for the past four years, and who now glibly vote for a resolution declaring their determination "to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color or persuasion, religious and political." When they were declaring this monstrous falsehood they had to seal their ears against the cries of their victims, and might, if they had a shadow of conscience left, fear that the fate of their Scriptural prototypes would instantly be theirs.

To maintain and even exaggerate this ghastly farce, all the

old Confederate soldiers who figured so largely in the Southern delegations to the Convention, joined heartily in the Liberal Republican declaration of gratitude to "the heroism and sacrifices of the soldiers and sailors of the Republic." If the unities of time and place had been observed, it would have been more frank and more striking for the Confederate soldiers to render "*thanks to God for their defeat in the civil war.*" If they did not feel like doing that, how could they express their gratitude to their victors, and further declare that no act of theirs "shall ever detract from the justly earned fame of those victors or the full rewards of their patriotism"? This is all so absurd as to be amusing. No man has ever denied or questioned the bravery of the Confederate soldiery, but we never heard a degree of humility and resignation imputed to them that would entitle them to be considered kinsmen of Uriah Heep. Yet the Democratic platform so far overdoes the necessities of the situation as to degrade the proud spirit of the South, and to degrade it needlessly and untruthfully.

Then, again, the repudiating element that was really represented to a large extent in the Convention, was made to declare that "the public debt must be sacredly maintained, and we denounce repudiation in every form and guise." Not content with this wholesale affirmation of a faith that was not in them, the Convention, including the delegates who had been for years demanding that the public debt should be paid in irredeemable greenbacks, now declared that "a speedy return to specie is demanded alike by the highest considerations of commercial morality and honest government." The presumption is that in the Convention which made this affirmation with approximate unanimity, there was not, outside of New England and New York, a baker's dozen of delegates who believed it or who intended to support it in the forthcoming canvass throughout the country. The declaration was for the political market of the North-East, and was silently ignored or savagely repudiated by the Democracy of the South-West.

But while the Democracy seemed willing to make in their Convention any affirmation that was demanded of them, they finally struck a question on which the Liberal Republicans had been unable to agree. The supporters of Charles Francis

Adams were almost wholly Free-Traders, and if their plans had been successful, a Free-trade platform would have been sent to the Democratic Convention as the common ground of political faith and common basis of action. But the nomination of Mr. Greeley broke this plan. From his earliest participation in political affairs, even from his boyhood, when he warmly espoused the cause of Mr. Clay, it was known that Mr. Greeley was not only a Protectionist, but what the Free-Traders term a "crazy Protectionist." He could not, therefore, stand on the platform first designed for the Convention; and *per contra* the Free-Traders who designed that platform were, of course, unwilling to stand on a Protection platform. There was, in fact, a broad and radical difference between the men who had worked for Adams and the men who had succeeded in nominating Greeley. One represented the immovable body, the other the irresistible force, and it was idle therefore to impel the one against the other. Hence a compromise was agreed upon, and certainly a man must be blinded by charity or by lack of knowledge who is willing to call it an honest compromise. Here it is. Please weigh its words as I read it: "Recognizing that there are in our midst honest but irreconcilable differences of opinion with regard to the respective systems of Protection and Free Trade, we remit the discussion of the subject to the people in their Congressional districts, and the decision of Congress thereon, wholly free from Executive interference or dictation."

I have always noticed that the men who profess a standard of political faith very much higher than that of their neighbors, and assume the true and lofty air of the Pharisee, can always be expected to resort to some exceedingly dishonest practice or perform some very objectionable trick when temptation or assumed necessity demands it. When this particular trick is analyzed, we find this to be the resultant:—unable to agree on one of the leading issues before the people (I might say the leading issue, if its rank be determined by the number of voters personally interested in its settlement), the coalition agree that they will have no views whatever on the question! Engaged in a national campaign, asking that the supreme power of the nation be entrusted to their hands, they yet confess that on a question in which millions of people are interested they

have no views, and refuse to take any position. Do they intend, by this course, to cheat somebody? If so, who is to be cheated? Is Mr. Greeley, if made President, to cheat the Protectionists? or are the members of the coalition to watch each other, and see that neither shall cheat the other?—thus beginning their administration of the Government, if so grave a responsibility should be imposed upon them, with a greater degree of mutual distrust than either faction would feel towards their common political foe.

Fellow-citizens, it never was intended that the Government of the United States, or any other honorable Government on the face of the earth, should be administered in that insincere, ill-adjusted, self-contradictory mode! The precedents of our administration of the Government are all against it. Common sense is against it, and common honesty is against it. It is not direct, straightforward, and candid. It has trickery for its basis, and knavery for its spirit, and is only invented to permit Free-Traders, like Mr. Schurz, and Protectionists, like Mr. Greeley, to neglect the ponderous issues of the hour, and unite upon the common ground of mere personal hostility and petty spleen against General Grant.

The opponents of President Grant adopt the most unwise of policies when they seek to make personal warfare upon him, to cast opprobrium upon him, and to throw calumny and suspicion upon his good name. The strength of the President before the people is due, not alone to his brilliant military achievements, but to that vigor and directness of character, that rugged personal integrity, which in every relation of life have distinguished him. His opponents are especially unwise to challenge him on his strong side.

The result of the election will show that thousands of people in every loyal State, who perhaps differ from General Grant in certain views of public questions, will resent the imputations upon his character as a personal affront to themselves. The people of the United States feel profound gratitude to the President for his illustrious services to the Union during the war, and they will not hear him maligned and insulted by a *soi-disant* general like Carl Schurz, without hot resentment of the wrong, and without contempt for the man who failed with

the sword and tries to slander the great soldiers whom he could only envy, and not rival, during the war.

In thus sketching the origin and character of what is now popularly known as the "Greeley movement," I have dwelt somewhat on its personal aspects. In the wider and more important field of principles which are at stake, and measures which are in issue, the argument is even stronger in support of the Republican party. In fact, the Greeley party, in its composite character, presents no measure, except slander of the Grant Administration. The two Conventions that nominated Mr. Greeley have practically copied the Republican platform, except on the one important question of the tariff, where, as I have shown, they utterly declined to express an opinion either way. In truth, the Democratic party has been so thoroughly defeated on every point it has raised during the last ten years, or since the beginning of the war, that its leaders are unable to present a single question on which they can rally and unite their party.

It is really instructive as a matter of political history, aside from its pertinency as an argument in this campaign, to recall the disastrous defeats which the Democracy have met, as time after time they have assumed what they considered impregnable positions. After the election of Mr. Lincoln, and before his inauguration, the Democracy, North and South alike, declared the States to be sovereign, denied that they constituted a Nation, maintained that each State is a law unto itself and could not be coerced to remain in a Union from which it should choose to secede. That Democratic doctrine was trampled under foot on a hundred battle-fields, and died the death of the treason which it was well designed to protect.

The next issue on which the Northern Democracy were consolidated was that *the war was a failure*, and that the enemies of the Union could not be conquered by arms. They therefore demanded an armistice and a negotiation with rebels. This was the avowed position of the Democratic National Convention of 1864; and the echoes of the treasonous declaration had scarcely died away before the thunder of Sheridan's guns in the valley of Virginia pronounced it false. In a half-year only from the time the Democracy of the North had proclaimed

the impossibility of conquering the rebellion, the armies of the Confederacy were destroyed, and General Grant, whom the same Democrats are now loading with bitterest vituperation, was in possession of the parole of the last soldier that formed the army of Robert E. Lee. Thus again the Democratic party was put to open shame.

But I need not pursue these abortive efforts of the Democracy in detail. The mere recital of them will show how often and how humiliatingly they have been beaten on their selected ground. You know how ingloriously they failed in their opposition to the "Draft," and in their repeated declaration that a Conscription Law was unconstitutional — a position upheld for them by Judge Woodward, a Democratic judge of the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania; how glaringly unsuccessful was their hostility to the abolition of slavery! Still greater, if possible, was their folly in rejecting the military aid which colored men could bring to the Union Army! You remember how they struggled against the concession of the right of suffrage to the colored man; how they fought the Constitutional Amendments — Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth successively — fought them in Congress, in State Legislatures, and before popular assemblies; how they resisted the issuing of legal-tender money, even when the Government needed it as a means of supporting the army and carrying on the war; how, three years after the war had closed, they strove to injure our credit and blot the fair fame of the Nation by paying off the public debt in depreciated paper money!

On all these issues the Democracy have been beaten; not in the ordinary sense of defeat, but in a way that left a stain of dishonor on the party for having attempted each time to do something which if successful would have left a stain of dishonor on the country. On every question they have raised, the Republican party, by a patriotic instinct based on principle and guided by an enlightened public conscience, have been right, and being right have been triumphant.

The Republicans will make no attack on the personal character of Mr. Greeley, for they know nothing against him. He enjoyed Republican confidence and admiration in an extraordinary degree until he showed a willingness to become

identified with a party which, according to his own repeated declarations, has made an unpatriotic and mischievous record since 1860, and is unworthy to be trusted on a single question of interest and importance to the people of the United States. Let it be the only indictment against Mr. Greeley that he has consented to stand as the candidate and representative of that party!

The Republican party will assuredly triumph in this campaign — triumph first by virtue of their own merit and their own strength, and in part by virtue of the unwise folly of President Grant's personal enemies. The people will not stop to scan closely whether in the proposed annexation of San Domingo, or on some other measure, the President has been always and exactly right. The campaign has been carried by the opponents of the Republican party beyond the discussion of particular measures, and has become one in which the honor of private and public character is to be defended, in which the fame of the chief hero of our great civil war is to be vindicated against the secret designs of personal malice and the coarser blows of political rancor. The fame of a great man is part of the Nation's imperishable treasure, and the Nation will rebuke those who would attempt to sully it or to destroy it!

MR. BLAINE'S SEVENTH AND LAST NOMINATION AS REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE KENNEBEC DISTRICT.

[On the 20th of June, 1874, Mr. Blaine received from the Republican Convention of the Kennebec district his seventh unanimous nomination as representative in Congress. Mr. Blaine's response to the nomination is given below.]

GENTLEMEN, — Permit me to tender my profound acknowledgments to the Republicans of the Kennebec district for their continued manifestation of approval and regard. I have said, very frequently in private, sometimes in public—never, I trust, in a boastful or vain-glorious spirit—that I did not believe another Congressional District could be found in the United States superior to the one you empower me to represent, in all the elements of true patriotism; in public and private virtue; in general intelligence and culture, enforced through the common school, the academy and the college; in universal thrift and comfort without large individual wealth; in political conviction firm and steadfast beyond doubt or waver, and yet always tolerant towards those who think differently. Such a constituency confer honor upon any man whom they call to represent them in the National councils, and I beg to make known my grateful appreciation of the trust and confidence which they have so long and so generously reposed in me.

The resolutions to which you invite my attention are so generally acceptable to the people of the district that no issue will be made on the matters embraced in them. The currency question at one time threatening to divide parties, and, what would be far more serious, to divide sections, is in process of a happy adjustment, partly by wise and temperate enactment passed by a large majority in both branches of Congress and

approved by the President, but in a far greater degree by the operation of causes more powerful than any legislation can be. In these remarks I am, indeed, but repeating, in substance, the resolutions of your convention, and I gladly adopt as my own the leading declaration of the series that "it is the imperative duty of the National Government to return to specie payment as soon as wise statesmanship can safely reach that result."

But while our political opponents in Maine will not seriously contest any position taken by us, they have themselves chosen to raise another issue upon which we shall not be slow to differ from them. The Democratic State Convention, in renominating their candidate for Governor, adopted with suggestive unanimity the following resolution as the leading article in their revised political creed:—

"Resolved, That a Protective Tariff is a most unjust, unequal, oppressive and wasteful mode of raising the public revenues. It is one of the most pregnant and fruitful sources of the corruptions in administration. We therefore, the Democracy of Maine, in convention assembled, declare for Free Trade, and in favor of an unfettered and unrestricted commerce."

This advanced position, now formally taken by the Maine Democracy in their State Convention for the first time, receives additional point and meaning from the letter of their gubernatorial candidate. Mr. Titcomb in accepting the nomination specially approves this resolution, and intimates his endurance of the lowest form of revenue tariff, only "until we shall be educated up to the idea of equal, *direct*, and therefore moderate taxation for the support of Government, and until this idea shall be brought into *practical operation*." I have quoted Mr. Titcomb's own words, and it is evident that the startling dogma to which he commits himself is in harmony with more impressive movements to be made elsewhere in the same direction. It is first thrown out in Maine as *an experiment on public opinion*. If there were the slightest probability that the Democratic party, with this avowed policy, would come into power, the dangers ahead would be truly appalling; but as no such calamity impends, we may examine with coolness the absurdity of the proposition.

You will observe that the issue proposed is not the old and familiar one between those who advocate a tariff for protec-

tion and those who wish duties imposed only for revenue. That is an issue as old as the levying of imposts, and with occasional exceptions has been determined largely by latitude and longitude, or by the differing interests which change of section and varying forms of industry have developed. But the Maine Democracy assume that all tariffs are more or less protective, and hence they pronounce for "*Free Trade*," pure and simple, absolute and without qualification, or, to quote their own words, for "*an unfettered and unrestricted commerce*."

Without attempting to argue the question in its relation to the whole country, let us see how this new doctrine would affect Maine? The process would be simple, the results readily deduced, the effect blighting and disastrous to the last degree. For some years past, the Federal Government has been collecting a revenue of three hundred millions of dollars—to deal in round numbers—one-third from internal taxes, two-thirds from tariff duties. It is now proposed by the Maine Democracy to abolish all these duties, and have absolute "Free Trade" with an "unfettered and unrestricted commerce." In other words, the Maine Democracy propose to raise the two hundred millions of dollars in gold coin now obtained from tariff duties, by "direct taxation" or by a system of "excises" which might prove even more oppressive than direct taxation. If the tariff be abandoned there is no other mode open under the Constitution by which the money can be raised than the two named, and Mr. Titcomb declares for "*direct taxation*." If the money is to be secured by direct taxation, it will be found to be Maine's great misfortune that the Constitution requires the tax to be levied in proportion to population and not according to wealth. By the ninth census, Maine has about one-sixtieth of the total population of the United States, and her share of two hundred millions of direct taxation would be something over three and a quarter millions of dollars in gold coin—the single Congressional District, whose constituents I am addressing, would be called upon for seven hundred thousand dollars. The peculiar hardship of raising taxes in this way is made manifest by the simple fact that Maine would be compelled to pay nearly one-half as much as Massachusetts, while she has but one-seventh of the property of that highly

avored and prosperous Commonwealth. Properly to estimate the exhausting and oppressive nature of this enormous tax, you have but to consider that it would be three times as large as the present State tax, and would necessarily be levied in addition thereto.

But if against Mr. Titcomb's policy the direct tax were avoided, it would be necessary to have instead of it a system of excises as onerous and as odious as human ingenuity could devise. A heavy internal tax would inevitably be levied on all manufactures, and indeed upon all the products of the field and the forest, the shipyard and the quarry; and every form of industry would be burdened and borne down by the exactions of the tax-gatherer. These grievous hardships would be imposed on our own people, in order that foreign countries might have the benefit of our markets for their products, without duty and without tax. Our lumber interests, embarrassed and oppressed, would be compelled to compete with the untaxed products of the Canadian forest; our manufactures would pay taxes for the benefit of European fabrics; our ship-building would be destroyed by the taxation which would render it incapable of competing with Provincial bottoms, and under the magic spell of Democratic Free Trade our coasting and lake commerce, confined to our own people since the foundation of the government, would be thrown open to the whole world. Taxation in all forms is one of the burdens of civilization, and instead of ameliorating its severity and, if possible, securing from it such compensating advantages as wise legislation can provide, our Maine Democrats propose to make it to the last degree oppressive to our own people and beneficial only to the alien and the enemy.

To the people of Maine, at this very moment, these extravagant declarations of the Democratic party have a painful significance, for it is well known that the authorities of Canada are trying to negotiate with our Government a Reciprocity treaty, which, like its predecessor, maintains the reciprocity all on one side. The treaty of that name, which was terminated in 1866, was cruelly oppressive to the people of Maine, and inflicted upon our State, during the eleven years of its existence, a loss of fifty millions of dollars. It presented the anomaly of

giving to the Canadians the control in our own markets of certain leading articles, on terms far more favorable than our own people had ever enjoyed. The utmost stretch of the Divine command is to love our neighbor as ourselves, and I can certainly see nothing in personal duty or public policy which should lead us to prefer our Canadian neighbors to our own people.

The treaty of Reciprocity now proposed, is understood to include the admission of Canadian vessels to free American registry, and the full enjoyment of our coasting and lake trade. Thus the ship-building and commercial interests of the United States, just recovering from the terrible blows dealt by British-built cruisers during the war, are again to be struck down by giving advantages, hitherto undreamed of, to the ships of the very Power that inflicted the previous injury. The Democratic party of Maine have pledged themselves, in their State Convention, to the policy that includes this disastrous attack upon the interests of our State, and their candidate for Governor has fully committed himself to the extreme doctrine announced by the Convention.

The form of Reciprocity proposed by the Government of the Dominion of Canada lacks every element of the seductive title by which it is sought to commend it to our people. What is it? Simply this — that if the United States will agree to admit certain Canadian products, free of duty, Canada in turn will agree to admit certain American fabrics free of duty. But the class of men to be benefited, and the class to be injured, in the United States, are entirely distinct and separate, having nothing in common, either in locality, industry or investment. To compensate for the surrender of one interest by the advancement of another has no more element of reciprocal justice in it than for A to take a pair of horses from B, because C took possession of a yoke of oxen belonging to D. To illustrate: If the United States will agree to admit Canadian vessels to American registry and the coasting-trade, Canada will admit straw hats, mule harness and rat-traps free of duty. In this you will observe that Canada gets the full advantage both ways, while the United States, for a possible enlargement of petty trade, consents to subordinate and sacrifice an interest that represents our distinctive nationality, in all climes and upon all seas — an interest

that has given more and asked less of the Government than any other of similar magnitude ; an interest more essentially American, in the highest and best sense, than any other which falls under the Legislative power of the Government, and which to-day asks only to be left where the founders of the Republic placed it nearly a century ago.

Against the whole policy of adjusting revenue questions by the treaty-making power, I desire to enter on behalf of my constituents an emphatic protest. The Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the sole and exclusive right to originate Bills of Revenue, and this great power should be kept where it can be controlled by the direct and unbiassed vote of the people. It may well be that sundry articles of Canadian product should be admitted free, or with diminished duty : it may well be, also, that Canada would find it advantageous to admit certain articles from us free of duty. Let each country decide the question for itself, and avoid the "log-rolling" feature of a treaty, in which it will inevitably happen that certain interests will be sacrificed in order that others may be promoted. Let us simply place Canada on the same basis with other foreign countries, — taxing her products, or admitting them free, according to our own judgment of the interest of our own revenue, and the pursuits and needs of our own people — always bearing in mind, that in governmental as in family matters, "charity begins at home," and that "he who provideth not for those of his own house, is worse than an infidel."

MUNICIPAL DEBT IN THE UNITED STATES.

[An address delivered by James G. Blaine before the Northern Wisconsin Agricultural and Mechanical Association, at their annual fair held at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, Oct. 1, 1874.]

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN OF THE ASSOCIATION, — When I accepted your cordial invitation to be present to-day, it was with the distinct understanding that the formal address of the occasion should be delivered by another, and that any thing I might have to say would be secondary and subordinate. This arrangement was changed a short time since without consulting me; and if this large audience shall feel disappointed with the result, as I fear they may, they must not lay the charge at my door, but hold the officers of the Association responsible in such exemplary damages as a good Wisconsin sense of justice may impose.

I believe by modern usage an address before an agricultural society is expected to leave agriculture severely alone — on the very sound and sensible presumption that the audience have more knowledge on that subject than the speaker is likely to possess. In my own case, certainly, I am ready to admit the full force of such presumption; for although I was born and reared in an agricultural community in Western Pennsylvania, and have lived all the years of my maturer life in the best agricultural district of Maine, I do not claim such practical knowledge of the great art and science as would enable me to give one word of needed instruction to the assemblage which I have now the honor to address.

I shall, therefore, for the brief period that I may claim your attention, confine myself to a subject of interest to you as American citizens — and indeed, I may add, of especial importance to you as farmers, representing as you do so great

a proportion of the real property of the country, and standing as you do in the attitude of responsibility, both present and ultimate, which that relation to the property of the country implies and imposes.

I shall speak to you of our public debt — not mainly of what we understand as our national debt — but of all those forms of State and municipal obligation which involve direct taxation upon the people.

Public debt is one of the rapid out-growths of modern civilization. In its present form it was certainly unknown among the ancients, though Cicero says that the Roman Provinces in Asia were accustomed to borrow; and Livy, in a passage somewhat obscure, speaks of a loan once contracted by Rome to meet the expenses of the Punic wars. These exceptional references, however, only prove the rule that the use of credit was not one of the recognized resources of ancient nations. The large accumulation of treasure made by some powerful monarchs of the olden time is another proof that credit was not used, and that loss resulting from the idleness of money was not recognized or appreciated as it is by the keener calculations of modern times. Ptolemy Philadelphus had at one time in his treasury what would be equivalent to \$400,000,000 in our coin. The Roman Emperor, Tiberius, left 2,700,000,000 sesterces (\$110,000,000) to his successor, Caligula, who obligingly spent the whole of it in a single year. These sums, though they do not seem large in comparison with the aggregates of the national debts of to-day, yet represent in their purchasing power in that era a larger accumulation of actual money than the treasury of any nation has contained at one time since the dawn of Christianity. The first Napoleon, among modern rulers, imitated on a diminished scale this barbaric accumulation of treasure, nominally belonging to the State, but really subject to the individual will and caprice of the sovereign, and generally used for purposes which would not make a creditable appearance in official budgets or regular appropriation bills.

Nearly sixteen hundred years of the Christian era had passed before nations learned the art of borrowing as we now understand it. Holland and Spain had perhaps in the sixteenth century the first regularly organized national debt, though it is

claimed that the French *Rentes*, the national security still so well known and so popular among that people, originated as early as 1375, in the reign of Charles the Fifth. I am disposed to think, however, that it was, in a very irregular, shadowy, and irresponsible shape, running over only from year to year according to chance, and not existing as a stated loan with stipulated and regular allowance of interest.

Undoubtedly the debts of Holland and Spain, contracted largely in their wars with each other, the one attempting to inflict, and the other successfully resisting, a great tyranny, were the first that became regularly funded, with periodical payment of interest, the resources for which were derived from taxation. So sorely were these taxes felt at Amsterdam, as an accurate historian tells us, that it was a common saying, that whoever bought so much as a fish paid for it once to the seller, and six times to the State. In Spain at that time the receipts of the precious metals from her South-American colonies were so large that the debt was not so oppressive as the corresponding obligation in Holland.

Towards the close of the seventeenth century, England emerging from the struggle for Constitutional Liberty which forever dethroned the Stuarts, formally entered for the first time the list of National debtors. It was in 1694 that she borrowed the initial pound sterling of that debt which in one hundred and twenty years, at the close of her contest with Napoleon, reached the enormous aggregate of nine hundred and two million pounds (£902,000,000) — over four thousand five hundred millions of dollars (\$4,500,000,000) — constituting at that time a burden upon England as great as a debt of twelve thousand millions of dollars (\$12,000,000,000) would represent to-day. From the date of England's becoming a borrower, debt seemed to be a contagion among the nations — and though less than two centuries have elapsed since England's debt began, there is now scarcely a civilized country on the face of the globe whose people have not mortgaged the future for the benefit of the past and the present. The British dependencies in Asia and Australia and the "far off Isles of the sea" are heavily in debt to the bankers of the mother country; the civilized and semi-civilized governments that skirt the shores of the

Mediterranean are mortgaged to the money-lenders of Europe; the nations of South America without exception have all trodden the same weary road; while every European power from Russia to Portugal groans under the weight of its national obligations.

Mr. Dudley Baxter, who is a recognized authority on questions of this character, gives the aggregate populations of the borrowing nations of the world as in excess of six hundred million souls (600,000,000)—and the aggregate of national debts owed by them as equal to twenty thousand millions of dollars (\$20,000,000,000)—with an annual interest charge of more than eight hundred millions of dollars (\$800,000,000). It is a melancholy thought that this almost incalculable sum of money was borrowed and expended, not to promote the ends of peace, not to develop agriculture or the mechanic arts, not to build great highways for commerce and trade, not to improve harbors and the navigation of rivers, not to found institutions of learning or of charity or of mercy, not to elevate the standard of culture among the masses, not for any or all of these laudable objects, but for the waste, the cruelty, the untold agonies of war. The vast mass of this prodigious sum-total not only went for war, but for wars of ambition and conquest in which the fate of reigning dynasties was the stake, and not the well-being of the people or even the aggrandizement of the nation itself in the higher and better sense. In our own country we have had four wars—and with the exception of that with Mexico, they may certainly and fairly be called defensive on our part—for they were assuredly wars essential to our national existence and independence. But still this fact makes us no exception to the rest of the world, and war, however unavoidable in our case, was nevertheless the direct cause of our national burden. Our total national indebtedness to-day is twenty-one hundred and forty millions of dollars (\$2,140,000,000); and of this great sum sixty-four millions (\$64,000,000) given towards the construction of a railroad to the Pacific is all that was incurred for works of peace. The remainder was expended in the long and bloody and desolating struggle in which secession was resisted and destroyed, and in which we won the privilege of continuing to exist as the United States of America.

But in regard to the National debt, whatever vain regrets we may indulge over the loss of so much treasure and the fearful sacrifice of that which is beyond earthly price, we have this to console — that the war which gave rise to it was unavoidable, apparently forecast as part of the great experience of bitterness and of blood through which it was our destiny as a nation to pass, and that out of its sorrowful depths we have emerged a regenerated people, doing justice to a race long oppressed, educating ourselves to higher standards of liberty and of law, and having our feet henceforth shod with the preparation of the Gospel of Peace.

Leaving the consideration of our National debt as an obligation not within our discretion, except as to the best and most honorable means of reducing and discharging it, I invite your attention to those less observed, but even more burdensome forms of obligation contracted by States, counties, cities and smaller municipalities, and contracted oftentimes, I may add, with an extravagance and prodigality that seem to invite calamity. With the keen watchfulness of opposing political organizations in this country, with the sharp criticism by press and people of all that may be done or left undone by Congress, no oppressive increase of our National debt can be anticipated except under the exigency of war — and should that come, as in God's good Providence I trust it never may, no limit can be assigned to the additional burden that may be placed upon us. But the causes which lead to an increase of State debt and to so great an enlargement of municipal obligation are not so open to public observation, do not elicit the sharp controversy and discussion which always go so far to insure safety in the final result, and the consequence is that many communities, before they stop to consider, find themselves laboring under a burden of debt, which if not absolutely discouraging is certainly oppressive.

In reflecting on this subject you will observe at the very outset that our form of Government gives extraordinary opportunities for the use of public credit. We have first the General Government, which borrows on the faith of the Nation; next the State Government, which borrows on the faith of the State; next the county, which borrows on the faith of

the county; next the city or town, which borrows on the faith of the municipality. When this whole series of credits, four in number, are used as they often are, nay, used almost everywhere, the quadruplicate burden falls heavily on the shoulders of the people. The four taxes operate at last on the same man, and each piece of property in some way contributes its share towards satisfying the demand. I do not think there is any other nation in which the power to incur debt has been so extended as with us; in which the same communities may be made to assume public obligations in so many relations — and each one operating for the time in a somewhat independent sphere, the tendency of each is to enlarge, regardless of the dimensions and demands of the others. When the city is pledging its credit it seems to forget that a heavy debt is already upon the county of which it forms an integral part; the county freely incurs debt without apparently remembering that every estate in it is already encumbered by a direct tax to pay the interest on a debt of the State; and the State too often makes lavish use of its credit without pausing to reflect that every one of its citizens is already burdened by the tax which he is paying to liquidate the debt of the Nation. When in the end, Nation and State and county and city have each and all imposed their burdens, the citizen finds that while the tax is increased fourfold the property to meet it has not experienced a similar development and growth. Our power in this country to cumulate our burdens may certainly be regarded as peculiar to ourselves. I am aware that the large cities of Europe have debts of their own; so have the separate cantons of Switzerland; so have the departments of France for limited and specified purposes; so have the minor German states; but still it is true that our county, city, town and township facility for contracting debt is practically unknown among the nations of Europe. Our marvelous capacity in this regard is the one achievement of our Republican civilization of which I think we have the least occasion to be proud.

There are in the United States sixteen cities having each a population exceeding one hundred thousand (100,000), and an aggregate population of four and a half millions (4,500,000). Each is a city with special advantages which cannot be taken

from it; each in the language of the day has a large future; each has abundant wealth and still larger prospective resources. They include when taken collectively, the trade of Atlantic and Pacific, of Gulf and Lake coasts, besides all the great interior rivers of the continent and the converging traffic of thousands of miles of railway. Surely one would think that each might bide its time and patiently await its well-assured prosperity without being compelled to borrow largely, in some cases almost recklessly, of the future. And yet taking these sixteen cities together we find their municipal debts amount to three hundred and fifty millions of dollars (\$350,000,000), being eighty dollars *per capita* for their entire population, and presenting in the aggregate an amount which prior to our war experience would have been considered a large burden for the Nation. It would be a gross injustice, however, to leave the inference that the average debt of these cities is over twenty millions of dollars, for indeed a single city, the commercial metropolis of the nation, presents a debt of nearly one-third of the entire amount, while several of the cities on the list have debts of comparatively insignificant proportions.

The class of cities next in size to those referred to, those having each a population exceeding fifty thousand (50,000) and less than one hundred thousand (100,000) are twelve in number — having an aggregate population of about seven hundred and fifty thousand (750,000). Their total debt does not exceed thirty millions of dollars (\$30,000,000), which gives about forty dollars *per capita* for the whole list.

Taking the next class of cities, having each a population exceeding twenty thousand (20,000) and less than fifty thousand (50,000), I find there are in all some fifty-three (53) in the United States with a total population of something over a million and a half. Their total debt cannot be less, I think, than seventy-five millions of dollars (\$75,000,000), or fifty dollars *per capita*.

Interested as I have been in making these investigations, I included one more class within the scope of my inquiries, and took the cities and towns throughout the United States, having populations between ten and twenty thousand each, — a list which I found to include in all one hundred and five cities and

towns, whose aggregate population amounts to nearly fourteen hundred thousand (1,400,000), and whose aggregate debt is something over thirty-five millions (\$35,000,000), or about twenty-two dollars *per capita* for the whole.

Adding these four classes together, it presents a table of the cities and towns of the United States having over ten thousand (10,000) inhabitants each — of which there are in all one hundred and eighty-six (186) — with an aggregate population exceeding seven millions (7,000,000), and total municipal debt of about four hundred and ninety millions (\$490,000,000).

The towns having less than ten thousand inhabitants each, I have not been able to classify with the approximate accuracy of those I have given, but I feel well assured that the aggregate of their debts would reach eighty millions of dollars (\$80,000,000), — making the total municipal debt of the country about five hundred and seventy millions (\$570,000,000).

Added to these municipal debts proper, we find the county debts of the entire country amounting to about one hundred and eighty millions (\$180,000,000), and the State debts to about three hundred and ninety millions (\$390,000,000), — making a grand aggregate of eleven hundred and forty millions (\$1,140,000,000) of public debt of States, counties, cities, and towns.

This sum-total is nearly three hundred millions of dollars greater than that given in the census of 1870. The addition, however, has not been made within the four succeeding years, but a part is due, I think, to incomplete returns made to the census officials. I have been at some pains, by original investigation and inquiry, to ascertain the aggregates of State, county, and municipal indebtedness; and while I do not assume to give details, or vouch for absolute accuracy, I think the totals I have given may well be taken as approximately correct statements. The difficulty in attaining perfect exactness results from the imperfect manner in which statistics are gathered in the several States. I have found, indeed, very few States where the officers are authorized by law to keep a record of public debt, except the direct obligations of the State. In Massachusetts, where great attention is paid to accuracy of statistics, I have been enabled to obtain precise information, and the total amount

of State, county, and municipal debts, shows a grand total of ninety-seven and a half millions (\$97,500,000), subject to a sinking-fund deduction of eleven millions (\$11,000,000) — leaving eighty-six and a half millions (\$86,500,000) as the net debt of that State. A very large burden it would seem; and yet such is the wealth of Massachusetts that the entire debt does not constitute more than four per cent of its valuation, and probably not over two and a half per cent of its actual wealth.

The State debts in many instances, both in the former and the latter times, have been contracted without due caution, and as a natural consequence the money realized from borrowing has been oftentimes expended with an extravagance which would hardly be tolerated in the disbursement of moneys raised by current taxation. I do not desire to make my remark so sweeping as to include those States where loans have always been negotiated with care, and the receipts expended with economy. But I venture the assertion, based on careful scrutiny of the facts, that, taking the aggregate of State debts as they stand to-day, there has not been realized on the average fifty cents of permanent value for each dollar raised and expended. In some cases the improvidence has led to even worse results than this; and I think, taking the country as a whole, there is no form of public debt in which so much has been given and so little received as in the direct obligations of the States. I am glad, however, to be able to congratulate the citizens of this rich and prosperous Commonwealth, that their debt is very small, and is rapidly decreasing, and that in consequence thereof an inexpensive government and light taxation are their comforting prospects for the future. What is true of your State, is no less true of your sister States of this great section. The seven States of the North-West, with an aggregate population of more than *eleven millions* (11,000,000), and property worth over eight thousand millions of dollars (\$8,000,000,000) have a combined State debt of less than twenty-five millions (\$25,000,000). If these Commonwealths had exercised as prudent a care against county and municipal debt, they would present to-day the most flattering balance-sheet, I venture to say, of any civilized communities on the face of the globe.

In regard to the aggregate municipal debt of the country, it is not of course to be inferred that it could all have been wisely avoided. Credit, prudently used and safely guarded, is one of the great engines of modern civilization and advancement, and with municipal governments its use at times seems imperatively demanded. In many cases the public health has required that debt be contracted for supplies of pure water and for systems of drainage and sewerage, and occasionally for other forms of public improvement essential to the growth of the community. But in the main, I think our cities have been too ready to draw on the future, too ready to pledge the "lives and fortunes" of posterity to the payment of a debt which the generation incurring it is unable to discharge. Expensive municipal buildings, loan of credit to outside enterprises, not needed and often visionary, have led in some large cities to a growth of debt for which there is no corresponding return of pecuniary profit, and no adequate advantage in any form. These debts have in many cases been contracted carelessly and without due reflection. The old adage that what is "everybody's business is nobody's business" is nowhere more applicable than in the general administration of municipal affairs in our large cities. It is so easy to obtain Legislative authority to contract debts; it is so easy to sell a good city bond to the capitalist who highly prizes such forms of security; it is so easy to incur a debt to be taken care of by those who come after us, instead of levying a severe tax to be paid by ourselves; in short, it is so easy and alas so natural to have a smooth, pleasant time to-day, thinking little of the ills that may overtake us on the morrow. This ready, convenient, lazy method of shifting the burdens of to-day, has tended to precipitate on many of our most favored and promising cities a load of taxation, which hampers business, oppresses property, hinders accessions of population, and thus retards the very growth which the debt was contracted to stimulate.

Another evil results from the growth of municipal debt which I think has not been sufficiently observed. I mean the facility which such debts give to the capitalist for a safe and profitable investment of his surplus—thus saving him from the trouble, and depriving the community of the advantage, of his embarking in active business. Take for instance a promi-

ment and wealthy city — and I do not refer to any particular one — and this you will find to be its history and experience at one or more periods of its prosperous career. Its banks and other places of deposit are full to overflowing of money owned by its leading capitalists, waiting for an opportunity to invest. They are carefully examining into different branches of manufacture, into improvement of real estate by blocks of fine stores, into the outlook for a new railroad, into a project for a new line of steam-packets — all or any one of which would greatly contribute to the development and growth of the city in question. At the moment these capitalists are about to invest their money in some one of these channels of gain to themselves, and profit to the community, another set of gentlemen having great influence with the municipal officers, commit the city to some new scheme of improvement. From three to five millions of first-class seven per cent bonds are placed on the market — and our capitalists suddenly conclude that nothing presenting so little risk and so clean a margin of profit can be found in manufactures, or blocks of stores, or railway shares, or steam navigation companies, and they accordingly invest their odd millions in city bonds, and devote themselves thenceforth to the ennobling occupation of cutting coupons.

Though the foregoing purports to be a single case, it illustrates a practical truth worthy to be remembered, viz.: that too much of the surplus capital has been invited into bonds of this kind, and is thereby removed from active participation in the business projects of the country. These projects are thus left too largely to the control of men who have great enterprise, but who are hampered for lack of capital and are constantly encountering the evils of a too widely extended credit. It may be an extravagant assertion, and yet I had almost said, that if the hundreds of millions of capital that have been hidden away in the municipal bonds of the country had been, by the absence of such opportunities for investment, forced into business enterprises, the country would be so much the richer that a great number of the objects for which the municipal debts were contracted could have been accomplished by the mere process of taxation on the vastly superior amount of property that would have been thus created.

It is also a matter for serious consideration whether these large municipal loans have not had a prejudicial effect on the price of money, tending continually to create stringency in the money market and raise the rate of interest to the borrower and the business man. There is a loud outcry in all quarters against the high rates charged for money, and yet if States and great cities will flood the markets with their obligations at seven per cent and oftentimes at a higher rate of interest, how can any borrower on mere individual credit expect or hope to negotiate loans at the old-fashioned six per cent rate, which in so many sections of the country was formerly the rule. It will inevitably happen that the individual citizen will pay from one to four per cent higher for money than the prosperous city; and if the city absorbs the great surplus of capital by its tempting rates and perfect security, the individual is necessarily subjected to the squeezing process when he wants money on his own note, and he is then made to feel the double burden of paying increased taxes to support the city loan, the negotiation of which had already increased his burdens by raising the rate of interest on the money he was compelled to borrow in the prosecution of his private business.

If then we have not exercised sufficient care and circumspection in regard to incurring State, county and municipal debt in the past, what is the remedy? I answer, first and foremost, an awakened, active, well-balanced public judgment, which will suggest and enforce a wise caution and conservative course on this subject. I have no patent remedy to propose, and yet I venture to suggest that the Legislatures of many States have altogether too large a power to create debt without referring the subject to the people for their primary consideration. Perhaps I may entertain a pre-judgment on this particular phase of the question in favor of the stringent provision in the Constitution of my own State, where the Legislature has no power to incur a dollar's debt except for war purposes, under the pressure of actual danger, and where an amendment to the Constitution proposed by two-thirds of the Legislature and then submitted to a vote of the people, is a prerequisite for pledging the credit of the State for any other purpose whatever.

It might also be a wise and salutary provision to define in State Constitutions the precise ends for which municipal credit should be used, limiting those uses to proper and restricted objects, and forbidding in any event the creation of a debt beyond a specified percentage of the official valuation of the city or town. At the same time a judicious safeguard should be provided against the overlapping of county debts, so that while the town is guarding its credit with care it shall not be involved in the embarrassment caused by an extravagant extension of the credit of the county.

Finally, as a governing principle, it would be well to apply to all State, county and municipal debts, the wise precaution contained in that famous rule laid down by Mr. Jefferson as the basis of all sound National credit. I quote the words of the great philosophic statesman, as equally applicable to all possible forms of public obligation, and as affording a basis at once secure for the creditor and advantageous for the debtor:—

“Never borrow a dollar without laying a tax at the same instant, for paying the interest annually, and the principal within a given term; and consider that tax as pledged to the creditors on the public faith. On such a pledge as this, sacredly observed, a government may always command on a reasonable interest, all the lendable money of its citizens; whilst the necessity of an equivalent tax is a salutary warning to them and their constituents against oppression, bankruptcy, and its inevitable consequence, — revolution.”

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.

[A speech delivered by Mr. Blaine at a Republican meeting in Mechanics' Hall, Worcester, Massachusetts, Oct. 28, 1874.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — In every political campaign it is important to ascertain the dividing line between parties, to find out precisely what separates them, to determine whether the issue that separates them is worth fighting over. Is there any question at issue between the two parties to-day of sufficient moment to interest you as intelligent American citizens — any question of sufficient magnitude to decide your vote?

I think there is, and I think it is a question of far greater moment than the currency or the tariff, or anti-monopoly, or railroad or bank questions. It is a question which goes to the very root of all the political controversies of to-day; it is a question which lies at the foundation of American citizenship; it is a question of maintaining inviolate the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

The war has been over nearly ten years! What are the fruits of it? What do you point to as the result of it? You have half a million of graves filled with heroic dead: you have a larger number of heroic wounded still living. You have spent an immense sum of money; you have an immense volume of debt; you have heavy taxation. Are these to be called the imperishable fruits of the war? Alas, not! They are the sorrowful calamities of the war! The dead will be forgotten, the debt will be paid, taxes will be reduced, and the generations to come will read of these things as painful traditions. But the result of that war is imperishable — imperishable through the changes in the fundamental laws of your country.

I beg you all to remember that a change in the Constitution of the United States is a matter of great moment. It is exceedingly difficult to accomplish. It was purposely made difficult by the founders of the Government. Legislation goes by majorities: an Act of this year may be repealed the next—but the organic law cannot be changed so readily. Our fathers ordained that it should require two-thirds of the Senate and two-thirds of the House of Representatives of the United States to do even so much as propose to the people to amend the Constitution. And when proposed they made it a requirement that three-fourths of all the States should assent before any change should be ratified and become effective. In the progress of the civil conflict it became a settled conviction in the minds of all patriotic men, Republicans and Democrats alike, that if the war was to end victoriously for the Union a blow must be struck at slavery, first by the emancipation proclamation, then by an amendment to the Constitution; and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, perfected in 1864, made it impossible—in language originally applied to another country but applicable here—that a slave could breathe the air of the United States and live.

It was soon found that the mere fact of stripping the manacles of slavery from a man makes him only a freedman, not a freeman. It was also very soon found that although the Thirteenth Amendment referred primarily and only to the colored man, yet there was a cognate question of citizenship, of equal interest to the white man, and that if this Government was to abide and be strong that question must be settled. For up to that time, Mr. Chairman, there was nothing in the Constitution of the United States, there was nothing in our laws, there was nothing in the judicial decisions of the Government, that you could put your hands on and say, *this constitutes citizenship of the United States*. There was no standard—nothing that distinctively made you or me a citizen of the United States. In the Constitution it was written that “the citizens of each State shall enjoy the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States;” and the meaning of that ought to have been so clear that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein, and that the running man might read. It meant very

plainly that if I, a citizen of Maine, chose to come and cast my fortunes with the citizens of Massachusetts, I was entitled to all the privileges and immunities that you enjoy as citizens of Massachusetts, and, *vice versa*, if you chose to come to Maine you should have the same rights that we enjoy there.

As between Maine and Massachusetts, and as between Massachusetts and all the States westward to the Pacific, north of a certain line of latitude, this was an effectual guaranty, realized and not denied. But the moment you went south of a certain line of latitude, whether you were a colored man or a white man holding certain obnoxious opinions, your citizenship was not worth the paper on which your name was inscribed on the register of the hotel at which you were a guest. This was not a mere sentiment—it was not a fancied grievance. It was an outrageous discrimination, leading to bad feeling and bad blood and to grave wrong. Take an illustration in my own State, largely engaged in commerce. A ship would sail from Portland for Charleston, S.C., and among her crew there might be two or three colored men. When that ship reached Charleston those colored men were placed in prison, detained there while the ship was engaged in loading, and when the ship was ready to sail, if the captain would pay the expenses of incarceration, the men were released, or if he refused, they were sold into slavery for life to pay the expenses of the imprisonment. But if on the same day an English ship arrived at Charleston, with any number of colored sailors on board, the city authorities did not lay the weight of a finger upon their heads.

We thus helplessly witnessed the galling fact that the American flag, in an American port, was less a measure of personal protection than the British flag in an American port. This was a thing not to be endured. Massachusetts took it up. She sent an agent to South Carolina to test the question in the courts of law. The venerable Samuel Hoar of Concord, father of the distinguished gentleman who represents this district in Congress, was selected for the mission. The older portion of my audience will remember that he was driven out by a mob, and his life barely saved by some considerate people in Charleston, who seemed to appreciate the great and lasting disgrace that shedding his blood would bring upon that city.

Thus it stood after the Thirteenth Amendment was passed. The shackles of slavery were torn from these men, but was any thing conferred upon them that enabled them to defend their own freedom? In connection with this was there not something of interest to you and to me — white men? The Republican party thought so, and being a party of progress they determined to incorporate into the Constitution of the United States an amendment, that should define American citizenship, white and black, native and foreign born, in unmistakable terms, and for all time. That was the origin of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Let us look at the language of that amendment. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."

Mark you then: "all persons," no matter what their color, black or white, blonde or brunette — no matter where born, native or naturalized: The Constitution says, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens thereof, and of the States wherein they reside." That is the affirmative part of the amendment. But the negative is still more suggestive, for it contains a most weighty inhibition — let me read it. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States."

Mark you again, gentlemen, "privileges or immunities." Your right to vote; your right to your own creed; your right to your personal liberty — no State shall make any law to interfere with them: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, or liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." This is the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. And then these significant words are added, that "Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of this amendment by appropriate legislation."

Fellow-citizens, that amendment was passed in Congress by the Republican vote, with every Democratic vote opposed. It was passed in three-fourths of the State Legislatures, with every Republican vote in every Legislature in favor of it, and every

Democratic vote in every Legislature opposed to it, and to this hour there has never been in any convention of the Democratic party, National, State, county, or district, a single declaration so far as I have seen agreeing to abide by and enforce that amendment.

The sententious Democratic platform of New York, inspired by Mr. Tilden and written by Mr. Manton Marble, now quoted by Democrats everywhere, most significantly omits all approval of the Fourteenth Amendment. It simply professes obedience to the Constitution and laws. Yes; but do you consider the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to be parts of the Constitution? The great Democratic leader, Jeremiah Black, has answered you. He says those amendments should be put in process of gradual extinction, and the Democratic party must put them in process of gradual extinction.

The Republican party, empowered by Congress to legislate under those amendments, proceeded to do so, and they passed what has been derisively styled the "Kuklux law" by hot partisans. You have read in the Democratic papers a great deal of abuse heaped upon the Kuklux law. Pray, now, what is that law? Strip it of its legal verbiage, and it is simply this: that if any citizen of the United States shall receive an injury in his person or his property, and the local authority is unable or unwilling to protect and redress him, then it is the duty of the United States Government to step in and do it. So long as the State authority shall discharge its duty (as the State of Massachusetts, the State of Maine, and the great body of the States do), there is no necessity for invoking Federal interposition; but when State supervision is not given, and when the citizen is left without redress, then, according to the Kuklux law, it is the duty of the Federal Government with all its powers to vindicate the citizen in all his rights.

It is on that point the Democratic party takes issue with us. You draw a line of demarcation, and upon that side stands every Democrat, and upon this every Republican. Let me read you the last confession of faith in the last National convention of the Democratic party. This is what the platform of two years ago in the Presidential struggle said: "Subject to our Constitutional obligations to maintain the equal rights of citizens, our

policy shall aim at local government and not at centralization, and there shall be no Federal subversion of the internal policy of the several States, but each shall be left free to enforce the rights and promote the well-being of its inhabitants by such means as the judgment of its own people shall dictate."

Wherefore, if a man happens to be maimed or half murdered by Kuklux klans in Alabama or Louisiana, it must prove a great comfort to his wounded body and bruised spirit to hear that the great Democratic party of the United States says that the National Government shall not interfere, but that the local Government shall "promote the well-being of its inhabitants by such means as the judgment of its own people shall dictate." The meaning of all this is, that the community inflicting the outrage shall organize themselves into a jury to try themselves for having done it. No matter how much you may be maltreated by any community, no matter if you are warned to leave in twenty-four hours, no matter what your injury may be in the forfeiture of your estate and the abuse of your person, you must look for your redress wholly to the villains who inflicted the outrage—you cannot in any stress ask the United States to intervene in your behalf.

I hold in my hand an official report made by a select committee of both branches of Congress, and I find that the Union men, both black and white, murdered in the South since the war closed, are greater in number than those who lost their lives in the Mexican war and in the war of 1812 combined. More men have been wounded in the South than were wounded in the Mexican war and in the war of 1812. Yet the Democrats coolly remand you to local self-government, and obligingly tell you that there is no power in the Federal Government to intervene in your behalf. We all know, gentlemen, that remanding the man who is injured, in the great majority of these cases of Southern outrage, to the local authorities, is the greatest farce in the world, or would be if it were not so ghastly a tragedy of blood. You send him who has been outraged by a band of villains, to be tried by that band itself, while the United States, according to Democratic authority, has no right whatever to intervene. Assuredly, we present most extraordinary contradictions on this question of citizenship, the most extraordinary

in this, that if an American citizen be harmed in any respect by a foreign government, we at once fly into a tempestuous rage, order naval vessels into commission, summon the army, start all the diplomatic functions of the Government, display in every form our readiness and our eagerness to vindicate that man at the expense of blood and treasure. It has been so always, regardless of party. I might give you a hundred cases if I had time. Let me give you two extreme cases: I select them because of their extraordinary character. I will give you a Democratic precedent and then a Republican precedent.

A little more than twenty years ago the first happened. After the revolution in Germany, in 1848, and in consequence of it, a large emigration came to this country. Among those emigrants a man who settled in the State of New Jersey declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. He never went farther. He was not fully naturalized. He never paid a cent of taxes, local, State or national. He never voted. In the language of our Maine statute, he never had any "last or usual place of abode;" and without going a single step beyond what I have stated, that man went back to Europe, and finally engaged in trade in the city of Smyrna, in Asia Minor. In 1853 he was arrested by an Austrian official, and was about to be taken to Vienna to be tried for high treason by the Austrian Government. He appealed to the American consul for protection. He stated his case truthfully, like a man, — stated just what a shadowy claim he had upon citizenship in this country. The consul felt doubtful, but he called into conference Duncan Ingraham, of the United States Navy, who was in the harbor with a vessel-of-war, and after conferring upon the case, they agreed that the man ought to be protected, and Captain Ingraham sent a polite note to the authorities of Smyrna saying that if Martin Costa was not put aboard his vessel in twenty-four hours, he would bombard and destroy the city. A gentle intimation of that kind, with twenty columbiads behind it, is a very persuasive sort of argument, and the man was put on board and brought back to this country, and William L. Marcy of New York, one of the greatest of the past generation of Democratic statesmen, published an able paper, vindicating Costa's right to American protection.

Let me give you a Republican precedent of later date which happened indeed only four years ago. In the long-continued revolt in Cuba, there was one John Émile Howard, who fell under the power of the Spanish Government. It was alleged that he had been aiding and abetting the rebellion, in that he had given his medical services to the rebel army. He had given some medicine, or set a broken limb, or done some act of mercy to suffering humanity. The Spanish officials arrested him, tried him by a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment in a penal colony on the coast of Africa, — a sentence worse than death. That man appealed to this Government for protection, sent his memorial to a Democratic representative, Mr. Samuel J. Randall, of the city of Philadelphia, and Mr. Randall presented the case to the House.

The facts in that memorial were these: This man was the son of a French emigrant who came to America after the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, and settled in Philadelphia. The father was naturalized fully and completely, and the naturalization carried with it that of his minor children, of whom this man was one. He grew up in Philadelphia, graduated at the Pennsylvania University, took his degree, and in 1840 went to the island of Cuba. He never returned; he never paid a tax here, never voted here; performed no act of citizenship whatever in any State of the American Union. But he had done nothing to denationalize himself; he had never sworn allegiance to any other government; he had kept steadily burning in his heart a desire to return to that which to all intents and purposes to him was his native land.

The House of Representatives upon that memorial, the facts being ascertained and corroborated, passed a resolution, by an almost unanimous vote, requesting the President of the United States to interpose in his behalf. President Grant did so, and our minister at Madrid, General Sickles of New York, was instructed to demand Howard's release; not on the ground, mark you, that the man had not done what he was charged with doing, but on the ground that whether he had or not, he was an American citizen, and was entitled, by our treaty with Spain, to be tried in a certain manner — not by court-martial — and not having been tried according to treaty stipulation, he was.

not legally held, and hence our minister to Spain, under the instruction of President Grant, demanded his release. The Spanish Ministry, always proud and unyielding, hesitated and raised quibbles, and did not want to give him up at all.

Finally, they said they would pardon him. General Sickles was promptly instructed not to accept a pardon, because a pardon implied guilt—implied that the man had been rightfully tried. General Sickles refused to accept his pardon, and after a little further diplomatic delay and hesitation, the Spanish Government gave him up, and he came back to his ancient home in the city of Philadelphia.

These are extreme cases. Compared with the citizenship which you and I enjoy—which you, the naturalized men in this audience, and you, the native born men—Costa and Howard had but shadowy claims, and yet they had enough to call forth the whole power of the Government to vindicate their right. I do not mean to dissent from the decisions made, but I do not understand, and cannot be made to comprehend, how a government that has an arm long enough and strong enough to reach to the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, and pluck a man from the hands of Austrian power, and on the other side, to reach over the Atlantic and beyond the Pyrenees, and take a man from the hands of Spanish tyranny, has not power enough to reach down into Alabama and South Carolina and protect its own citizens both native born and naturalized.

Within sixty days your attention has been called to a very tragical case in Tennessee. A brutal mob of white citizens assaulted a crowd of innocent colored men, killed five of them, and maimed eleven others. President Grant, through the department of justice, was intervening for their protection, when he withheld his power, on the assurance of Governor Brown of Tennessee that he was about to put all the enginery of the State in motion in order to punish the authors of the crimes. But you will observe that whether Governor Brown had done this or not, the Democratic doctrine denies the right of the President of the United States to intervene. See the inevitable absurdity which this Democratic doctrine involves. If those sixteen citizens of the United States had received that injury on British soil, our Government would have promptly

and most emphatically demanded reparation for the slain and recompense to the wounded. The demand would have been made at the mouth of the cannon. Or, if on the other hand, those sixteen colored men had been subjects of Queen Victoria, doing lawful business in Tennessee, and had been thus outraged and mobbed, Great Britain would have promptly demanded reparation from the United States. So that, whether these men had been American citizens on British soil, or British subjects on American soil, they would in either case have been sustained by the enginery of a great nation for their vindication; but having the misfortune to be simply American citizens on American soil, the modern Democratic doctrine is that there is no power in the Constitution or laws of the Republic whereby they can be protected or their rights vindicated.

The majesty and might of a nation are measured, fellow-citizens, by no standard so accurately as by the degree of protection given to their citizens or subjects. It is altogether idle to preach loyalty to a people unless loyalty brings protection. What did you fight for in the late war? Was it for a mere abstract idea, or for a great and strong Government, that should protect you and your children to the latest generation, in their rights of person and property? If you went out and fought for a Government that was willing to take your blood and fortune, and not willing, in return, to extend its protection to you, you are a deluded and defrauded man. I beg you, my friends, whether you be native born or naturalized, whether you be rich or poor, not to pass this idly by on the assumption that you are in no danger—that this, in the vulgar language of the campaign, is only a “nigger question.” The strength of a column is the strength of its weakest part, and I tell you the strength of government protection to citizenship is not that which goes out to the wealthy and the influential, to the strong and the mighty, but it is that which protects and upholds the lowly, the poor and the weak.

I said in the earlier part of my remarks, and I here repeat, that I have never known a case where any authorized exponent of the Democratic party, in convention or elsewhere, has given any expression in favor of the enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. If there be

such a case I should like to have it pointed out to me. While I can find no exposition of the party in favor of enforcement of those amendments, I can find numberless instances where they resolve that those amendments shall not be maintained.

I hold in my hand an official copy of the report of the joint committee of the two Houses of Congress upon the Kuklux conspiracy. Out of numberless quotations from the report of the Democratic minority that I might make I read you this: Referring to the dominance of the Republican party as the cause of these amendments, the minority declare, "But whenever that party shall go down, and go down it will some time not long in the future, that will be the end of the political power of the negro among white men on this continent." Among the Democrats who announced this extraordinary position were Mr. Bayard of Delaware and General Blair of Missouri.

The talk of these Democratic senators is very plain. It means, if it means any thing, that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are to be nullified — nothing else. Let me read you something still more significant: "Gradually," say these same Democrats, "in time, under a change of circumstances, this exceptional state of the popular mind," that is, the state of the popular mind that upholds these amendments, "will change, wear out, and pass away, and public opinion will vibrate back to its old condition as it existed prior to the disturbing influences of the war."

This, mark you, is an official declaration that secured the approval of every Democrat in both branches of Congress. Take them on their word: what does it mean by "vibrating back to the point where it was before the disturbing influences of the war"? If it means any thing, it means that the negro will ultimately go back into slavery. You withdraw all the National authority; you leave those States according to the platform upon which Horace Greeley stood as a Presidential candidate — you leave those States to settle this question for themselves under Mr. Tilden's doctrine of to-day, and very quickly they would settle the condition of the colored men.

These facts lead me to say, and I consider it the closing indictment of the case, that it is not the "white leagues" of the South, it is not the misguided, disappointed, crushed rebel with

whom the danger lies, but it lies at the door of the Northern Democracy. If to-day you will root out of the minds of the Southern Democrats the conviction that a Democratic triumph in this country is to bring about the precise state of things you have in that minority report, you will make loyal men out of them in a moment. They do not live by their own passions. They live by the comfort, assurance and hope which they receive from Massachusetts and other Northern States, and most of all from the city and State of New York.

I venture therefore to say that for the disturbed condition of things at the South to-day the Democratic party of the North is principally if not solely responsible. Let the Northern leaders of that party declare as patriotic men that they accept the Constitutional amendments in good faith. Let them say to Southern men: 'You must accept these amendments with all that they imply and all that they include, as the legitimate fruits of the war. They may offend, they may grate upon your prejudices, they may irritate and chasten, but in the judgment of those who have the care and keeping of this great government, they have been considered essential to the preservation of the future, and you must submit.' Let that word go forth from the Democrats of the North, and there will be no further disturbance in the South—none whatever. Let that go forth from any Democratic convention, especially let it go from a convention with the prestige and power of that which in New York lately nominated Mr. Tilden for governor—still more, let it go from a Democratic convention with the prestige that put Horatio Seymour six years ago before the people for President, and you will end the entire trouble in the South.

I venture to go farther: let conventions be dumb, National and State, and I will name you fifty Democrats whose word of assurance will end the trouble. Yes, I venture even to go farther still, and as in ancient times if ten righteous men had been found in Sodom the wrath of God might have been averted from the cities of the plain, so this day and this hour I can name you ten Democrats, and two of them shall be from New York, who, if with the weight of their character and the might of their influence, they shall speak peace to this country on the Southern question, will give it peace!

SHALL JEFFERSON DAVIS BE RESTORED TO FULL CITIZENSHIP?

[On the tenth day of January, 1876, Mr. Randall of Pennsylvania called up a bill (of which he had given previous notice) relieving all persons in the United States from the disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Blaine of Maine proposed an amendment, in the nature of a substitute (of which he had also given previous notice), that "all persons in the United States under the disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, with the exception of Jefferson Davis, late President of the so-called Confederate States, shall be relieved of such disabilities, upon their appearing before any judge of a United States Court, and taking and subscribing an oath that they will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same."

Mr. Randall declined to admit the amendment, and demanded the *previous question*, which was sustained by *yees* 164, *nays* 100. The Amnesty Bill was then put upon its passage, and, requiring a two-thirds vote, it was defeated, *ayes* 175, *noes* 97.

Mr. Blaine immediately rose, and addressed the House. His speech is given below.]

MR. SPEAKER, — I rise to a privileged question. I move to reconsider the vote which has just been declared. I propose to debate the question at issue, and now give notice that if the motion to reconsider shall be agreed to, it is my intention to offer the amendment which has been read several times. I will not delay the House to ask that it be read again.

Every time the question of amnesty has been introduced, during the last two Congresses, by a Democratic member, it has been done with a certain flourish of magnanimity which seemed to convey an imputation on this side of the House. It seemed to charge the Republican party, which has been in control of the Government for the last fifteen years, with being bigoted, narrow, and illiberal, grinding down certain gentlemen in the Southern States under a great tyranny, from which the

hard-heartedness of this side of the House constantly refuses to relieve them.

If I may anticipate as much wisdom as ought to characterize the gentlemen on the other side of the House, this may be the last time that amnesty need be brought to the attention of Congress. I desire, therefore, to place on record precisely what the Republican party has done in this matter. I wish to place it there as an imperishable record of liberality and magnanimity and mercy far beyond that which has ever before been shown in the world's history by conqueror to conquered.

I entered Congress at the same time with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Randall], while the hot flame of war was yet raging, when the Union was rocking to its foundations, and when no man knew whether we were to have a country or not. I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania would have been surprised when he and I were novices in the Thirty-eighth Congress, if he had been told that before our joint service ended we should see sixty-one gentlemen, who were then in arms against us, admitted to the privileges of membership in this body, and all by the grace and magnanimity of the Republican party. When the war ended, according to the universal usage of nations, the Government, then under the exclusive control of the Republican party, had the right to determine what should be the political status of the people who had suffered defeat. Did the Republicans, with full power in their hands, inaugurate any measure of persecution? Did they set forth on a career of bloodshed and vengeance? Did they take the property of the Southern people who had rebelled? Did they deprive any man of his civil rights?

Not at all. Instead of a general and sweeping condemnation, the Republican party placed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution only this exclusion:—

“That no person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”

It has been variously estimated that this section at the time of its original insertion in the Constitution included from fourteen to thirty thousand persons. As nearly as I can gather the facts of the case, it included about eighteen thousand men in the South. It did not apply to the hundreds of thousands — or millions, if you please — who had been engaged in the attempt to destroy this Government. It held under disability only those who, in joining the rebellion, had violated a special and peculiar and personal oath to support the Constitution of the United States. It was limited to these.

That disability, Mr. Speaker, was hardly placed upon the South before we began in this hall and in the other wing of the Capitol, when more than two-thirds of the members in each branch were Republicans, to remit it, and the very first bill removed the disability from 1,578 citizens of the South. The next bill removed it from 3,526 others. Amnesty was thus granted by wholesale. Many of the gentlemen on this floor shared the grace conferred on those occasions. After these bills had passed, with several smaller bills specifying individuals, the Congress of the United States in 1872, still being two-thirds Republican in both branches, passed this general law: —

“That all political disabilities, imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments of the Constitution of the United States, are hereby removed from all persons whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.”

Since that measure passed, a very considerable number of the gentlemen whom it still left under disability have been relieved specially, by name, in separate Acts. But I believe, Mr. Speaker, in no instance since the Act of May 22, 1872, have the disabilities been removed, except upon respectful petition to the Congress of the United States from the person interested. I believe in no instance, except one, have they been refused upon the petition being presented. I believe in no instance, except one, has there been any other than a unanimous vote for removing the disability.

I find there are widely varying opinions in regard to the number that are still under disabilities in the South. By con-

ference with the Department of War and of the Navy, and with the assistance of some records which I have caused to be searched, I am able to state to the House, I believe with substantial accuracy, the number of gentlemen in the South still under disabilities. Those who were officers of the United States army, educated at its own expense at West Point and who joined the rebellion, and are still included under this Act, number, as nearly as the War Department can state it, 325; those in the Navy about 295. Those under the other heads—Senators and Representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States—make up a number somewhat more difficult to state accurately, but estimated at 125 to 130. The entire list, therefore, is about 750 persons now under disabilities out of the great unnumbered host that engaged in the rebellion.

I am very frank to say that in regard to all these gentlemen, save one, I do not know any reason why amnesty should not be granted, as it has been to many others of the same class. I am not here to argue against it. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Kasson] suggests "on their application." I agree with him on that point. But in the absence of the respectful form of application, which since May 22, 1872, has become a sort of common law as preliminary to amnesty, I simply wish to make it a condition that they shall go before a United States court, and, with uplifted hand, swear that they will conduct themselves as good and loyal citizens of the United States. That is all.

Gentlemen may say that this is a foolish exaction. Possibly it is. But I confess I have a prejudice in favor of it. I insist upon it, because I do not want to impose citizenship on any gentleman. If I am correctly informed, and I state it on apparently good authority, there are some gentlemen in this list who have spoken contemptuously of resuming citizenship, and have spoken still more contemptuously of applying for citizenship. I may state it erroneously, and if I do I am ready to be corrected; but I understand that Mr. Robert Toombs has, on several occasions, at watering-places, both in this country

and in Europe, openly and publicly stated that he would not ask the United States for citizenship.

I insist, therefore, that if Mr. Robert Toombs is not prepared to go into a court of the United States, and swear that he honestly intends to be a good and loyal citizen, he may live and die outside of that great privilege. I do not think that the two Houses of Congress should convert themselves into a joint convention for the purpose of embracing Mr. Robert Toombs, and requesting him to favor us by coming back and accepting the honors of citizenship. All we ask on this side of the House is, that each of these gentlemen shall show his good faith by coming forward and taking the oath, which all the members on this floor take, and are proud to take. It is a very small exaction to make as a preliminary to full restoration to all the rights of citizenship.

In my amendment, Mr. Speaker, I have excepted Jefferson Davis from amnesty. I do not place his exclusion on the ground that he was, as he has been commonly called, the head and front of the rebellion, because I do not think the exception would be tenable. Mr. Davis was in that respect as guilty, no more so, no less so, than thousands of others who have received the benefit and grace of amnesty. Probably he was less efficient as an enemy of the United States, probably he was more useful as a disturber of the councils of the Confederacy, than many who have already received amnesty. It is not because of any particular and special damage that he above others did to the Union, or because he was personally or especially of consequence, that I except him. But I except him on this ground: that he was the responsible author, knowingly, deliberately, guiltily, of the great crime of Andersonville.

I base his exclusion on that ground; and I believe to-day, that so rapidly does one event follow on the heels of another in the age in which we live, that even those of us who were contemporaneous with the war, and especially those who have grown up since, fail to remember the crime at Andersonville.

Since the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Randall] introduced this bill last month, I have taken occasion to re-read some of the historic cruelties of the world. I have read once

more the details of those atrocious murders by the Duke of Alva in the Low Countries, which are always mentioned with a thrill of horror throughout Christendom. I have refreshed my memory with the details of the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, that stands out in history as another of those atrocities beyond imagination. I have read anew the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. But neither the deeds of the Duke of Alva in the Low Countries, nor the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, nor the thumb-screws of the Spanish Inquisition, surpass the hideous crime of Andersonville. This is not matter of mere passion but of proof. Thank God, Mr. Speaker, that while this Congress was under different control from that which exists here to-day, with a Committee composed of both sides and of both branches, that tale of horror was placed where it cannot be denied, and where it must remain as a warning.

I hold in my hand the story written out by a committee of Congress. I state that Winder, who is dead, was sent to Andersonville with a full knowledge of his previous atrocities in Richmond. These were so terrible, that Confederate papers, the *Richmond Examiner* for one, after Winder had gone thanked God that Richmond was rid of his presence. We in the North knew from returning skeletons what Winder had accomplished at Belle Isle and Libby; and, fresh from those accursed cruelties to his fellow-men, he was sent by Mr. Jefferson Davis, against the protests of others in the Confederacy, to construct this den of horrors at Andersonville.

It would be utterly beyond the scope of the occasion, and beyond the limits of my hour, to go into full details. But in arraigning Mr. Davis, I will not ask any one to take the testimony of a Union soldier. I ask gentlemen of this House to take only the testimony of men who themselves were engaged in and devoted to the Confederate cause. If that testimony does not entirely justify the declaration I have made, then I will take prompt occasion to state that I have been in error in my reading.

After detailing the preparation of that prison, the arrangements made with studied cruelty for the victims, the report which I hold in my hand, and which was concurred in by Democratic members as well as Republican members of Con-

gress, gives a condensed description of the horrors—and I beg members to hear it, for it is far more impressive than any thing I can say. After giving full details, the report states:—

“The subsequent history of Andersonville has startled and shocked the world with a tale of horror, of woe, and death before unheard and unknown to civilization. No pen can describe, no painter sketch, no imagination comprehend its fearful and unutterable iniquity. It would seem as if the concentrated madness of earth and hell had found its final lodgement in the breast of those who inaugurated the rebellion and controlled the policy of the Confederate government, and that the prison at Andersonville had been selected for the most terrible human sacrifice which the world has ever seen. Into its narrow walls were crowded thirty-five thousand enlisted men, many of them the bravest and best, the most devoted and heroic of those grand armies which carried the flag of their country to final victory. For long and weary months here they suffered, maddened, were murdered, and died. Here they lingered, unsheltered from the burning rays of a tropical sun by day, and drenching and deadly dews by night, in every stage of mental and physical disease, hungered, emaciated, starving, maddened; festering with unhealed wounds; gnawed by the ravages of scurvy and gangrene; with swollen limb and distorted visage; covered with vermin which they had no power to extirpate; exposed to the flooding rains which drove them drowning from the miserable holes in which, like swine, they burrowed; parched with thirst, and mad with hunger; racked with pain, or prostrated with the weakness of dissolution; with naked limbs and matted hair; filthy with smoke and mud; soiled with the very excrement from which their weakness would not permit them to escape; eaten by the gnawing worms which their own wounds had engendered; with no bed but the earth: no covering save the cloud or the sky; these men, these heroes, born in the image of God, thus crouching and writhing in their terrible torture and calculating barbarity, stand forth in history as a monument of the surpassing horrors of Andersonville, as it shall be seen and read in all future time, realizing in the studied torments of their prison-house the ideal of Dante’s ‘Inferno’ and Milton’s ‘Hell.’”

I venture the assertion, from reading the testimony upon which the report is based, that this description is not overdrawn. I will read but a single paragraph from the testimony of Rev. William John Hamilton, a Catholic priest at Macon, who, I believe, never was in the North. He is a Southern man, and a Democrat, and a Catholic priest. And when you unite those three qualities in one man, you will not find much testimony that would be strained in favor of the Republican party, or any member of it.

This man had gone to Andersonville on a mission of mercy to the men of his own faith, to administer to them the rites of his church in their last moments. That is the way in which he happened to be a witness. I will read his answer under oath to

a question addressed to him in regard to the bodily condition of the prisoners. He said, —

“ Well, as I said before, when I went there I was kept so busily engaged in giving the sacrament to the dying men that I could not observe much, but of course I could not keep my eyes closed as to what I saw there. I saw a great many men perfectly naked [their clothes had been taken from them by rebels, as other testimony shows], walking about the stockade perfectly nude. They seemed to have lost all regard for delicacy, shame, morality, or any thing else. I would frequently have to creep on my hands and knees into the holes that the men had burrowed in the ground, and stretch myself out alongside of them to hear their confessions. I found them almost living in vermin in those holes; they could not be in any other condition but a filthy one, because they got no soap, and no change of clothing, and were there all huddled up together.”

Let me read further, from the same witness, a personal description : —

“ The first person I conversed with on entering the stockade was a countryman of mine, a member of the Catholic Church, who recognized me as a clergyman. I think his name was Farrell. He was from the north of Ireland. He came toward me and introduced himself. He was quite a boy. I do not think, judging from his appearance, that he could have been more than sixteen years old. I found him without a hat, and without any covering on his feet, and without jacket or coat. He told me that his shoes had been taken from him on the battle-field. I found the boy suffering very much from a wound on his right foot, — in fact, the foot was split open like an oyster, — and, on inquiring the cause, they told me it was from exposure to the sun in the stockade, and not from any wound received in battle. I took off my boots, and gave him a pair of socks to cover his feet, and told him I would bring him some clothing, as I expected to return to Andersonville the following week. I had to return to Macon to get another priest to take my place on Sunday. When I returned, on the following week, on inquiring for this man Farrell, his companions told me he had stepped across the dead-line, and requested the guards to shoot him. He was not insane at the time I was conversing with him.”

Mr. Speaker, I do not desire to go into such horrible details as these for any purpose of arousing bad feeling. I wish only to say that the man who administered the affairs of that prison went there by order of Mr. Davis, was sustained by him, and the Rev. William John Hamilton, from whose testimony I have read, states again that he went to General Howell Cobb, commanding that department, and asked that intelligence as to the condition of affairs there be transmitted to the Confederate government at Richmond. There are many proofs to show that Mr. Davis was thoroughly informed as to the condition of affairs at Andersonville.

One word more, and I shall lay aside this book. When the

march of General Sherman in the Atlanta campaign was in progress, there was danger, or supposed danger, that his army might come into the neighborhood of Andersonville; and the following order, to which I invite the attention of the House, — a regular military order, — Order No. 13, dated, Headquarters Confederate States Military Prison, Andersonville, July 27, 1864, was issued by Brigadier-General John H. Winder: —

“The officers on duty and in charge of the battery of Florida artillery at the time will, upon receiving notice that the enemy have approached within seven miles of this post, open fire upon the stockade with grape-shot, without reference to the situation beyond these lines of defence.”

Here, within this horrible stockade, were thirty-five thousand poor, helpless, naked, starving, sickened, dying men! The Catholic priest to whom I have referred states that he begged General Howell Cobb to represent that, if these men could not be exchanged, or could not be relieved in any other way, they should be taken to the Union lines in Florida and paroled; for they were shadows, they were skeletons. Yet it was declared in a regular order, issued by the commandant of the prison, who had been specially selected by Mr. Davis, that if the Union forces should come within seven miles, the battery of Florida artillery should open fire with grape-shot on these shadows and skeletons without the slightest possible regard to what was going on outside. And they had stakes put up with flags in order that the line of fire might be properly directed from the battery of Florida artillery.

I mention only one additional horror in this dark valley of cruelty and death. When one of the tortured victims escaped from its confines — as was sometimes though not often the case — he was remorselessly hunted down by bloodhounds. In a single month twenty-five escaped, but in the official record kept by the notorious Wirz “*they were taken by the dogs before the daily returns were made out.*”

Mr. Speaker, the Administration of Martin Van Buren, that went down in a popular convulsion in 1840, had no little of obloquy thrown upon it because it was believed that the Seminoles in the swamps of Florida had been hunted with bloodhounds.

Bloodthirsty dogs were sent after the hiding savages, and the civilization and Christian feeling of the American people

revolted against the cruelty. I state here, upon the testimony of witnesses as numerous as would require me all day to read, that bloodhounds were used at Andersonville; that large packs of them were kept, and Confederate officers directed them on the hunt; that they were sent after the poor unfortunate, shrinking men who by any accident could get out of that horrible stockade.

I do not wish to be understood as arraigning the Southern people for these inhumanities. God forbid that I should charge sympathy with such wrongs upon the mass of any people. There were many evidences of great uneasiness in the South about the condition of Andersonville. I know that leading officers of the Confederacy protested against it. I know that many of the subordinate officers protested against it. I know that a distinguished gentleman from North Carolina, now representing his State in the other end of the Capitol, protested against it. But I regret to say that these wrongs were known to the Confederate Congress, they were known at the doorway of their Senate, along the corridors of their Capitol. A gentleman whom I see at this moment, who served in the Confederate Congress, and who had before served in the Senate of the United States, brought them to the attention of the Confederate Congress, and I class him with those whose humanity was never burned out by the angry fires of the rebellion. I allude to the Honorable and now venerable Henry Stuart Foote.

It is one of the rank offenses of Jefferson Davis, Mr. Speaker, that besides conniving at the cruelties at Andersonville, he concealed them from the Southern people. He labored not only to conceal them, but to make false statements about them. We have obtained, and have now in the Congressional Library, a complete series of Mr. Davis's messages — the official imprint from Richmond. I have looked over them, and I have an extract here from his message of Nov. 7, 1864, at the very time when these horrors were at their height and their worst. Mr. Davis said : —

“The solicitude of the Government for the relief of our captive fellow-citizens has known no abatement, but has on the contrary been still more deeply evoked by the additional sufferings to which they have been wantonly subjected by deprivation of adequate food, clothing, and fuel, which they were not even permitted to purchase from the prison sutler.”

And he adds that the —

“Enemy attempted to excuse their barbarous treatment by the unfounded allegation that it was retaliatory for like conduct on our part.”

In answer to this atrocious slander by the Confederate President, now become historic, I am justified in declaring that there is not a Confederate soldier living who has any credit as a man in his community, and who was a prisoner in the hands of the Union forces, who will say that he ever was cruelly treated; that he ever was deprived of just such rations as the Union soldiers had — the same food and the same clothing.

Mr. COOK of Georgia. Thousands of them say it — thousands of them; men of as high character as any in this House.

Mr. BLAINE. I take issue upon that. There is not one who can substantiate it — not one. As for measures of retaliation, although goaded by this terrific treatment of our friends imprisoned by Mr. Davis, the Senate of the United States specifically refused to pass a resolution of retaliation, as contrary to modern civilization and to the first precepts of Christianity. No retaliation was attempted or justified. It was forbidden, and Mr. Davis knew it was forbidden as well as I knew it or any other man, because what took place in Washington or what took place at Richmond was known on either side of the line within a day or two thereafter.

Mr. Speaker, this is not a proposition to punish Jefferson Davis. Nobody is attempting that. I thought the indictment of Mr. Davis at Richmond, under the administration of President Johnson, was not justifiable, for he was indicted only for that of which he was guilty in common with all others who went into the Confederate revolt. But here and now I express my firm conviction that there is not a government, not a civilized government on the face of the globe — I am very sure there is not a European government — that would not have arrested Mr. Davis at the close of the war, and when they had him in their power would not have tried him for maltreatment of the prisoners of war, and shot him within thirty days. France, Russia, England, Germany, Austria, any one of them would have done it. The poor victim Wirz deserved his death for brutal treatment and murder of many victims, but it was

weak policy on the part of our government to allow Jefferson Davis to go at large and to hang Wirz. Wirz was nothing in the world but a mere subordinate, acting under orders, and there was no special reason for singling him out for death. I do not say he did not deserve it. He deserved no mercy, but, as I have often said, his execution seemed like passing over the president, superintendent, and board of directors in the case of a great railway accident and hanging the brakeman of the rear car.

I repeat, there is no proposition here to punish Jefferson Davis. Nobody is seeking to do it. That time has gone by. The statute of limitations, the common feelings of humanity, supervene for his benefit. But what you ask us to do is to declare by a vote of two-thirds of both branches of Congress that we consider Mr. Davis worthy to fill the highest offices in the United States, if he can find a constituency to indorse him. He is already a voter; he is at liberty to engage in any calling; he can buy and he can sell; he can go and he can come. He is as free as any man in the United States. It is now proposed in the pending bill for which the gentleman from Pennsylvania stands sponsor, that Mr. Davis, by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and a two-thirds vote of the House, shall be declared eligible and worthy to fill any office under the Government of the United States including the Chief Magistracy thereof. For one, upon full deliberation, I refuse my assent to that proposition.

One word, Mr. Speaker, by way of explanation, which I omitted. It has been said in mitigation of Jefferson Davis's responsibility for the Andersonville horror, that the men who died there (I think the number was about twelve thousand) fell a prey to an epidemic, and died of a disease which could not be averted. The record shows this to be untrue. Out of 35,000 men about 33 per cent died; while of the soldiers encamped near by to guard the prisoners, only one man in four hundred died; that is, within half a mile, only one in four hundred died, while inside the stockade one in three died.

As to the general question of amnesty, Mr. Speaker, as I have already said, it is too late to debate it. Whether the general and generous remission of political disability by the Republicans has been in all respects wise, or whether it has been

unwise, I will not detain the House here and now to discuss. Even if I had a strong conviction upon that question, I do not know that it would be productive of any good to enunciate it at this time. But I must say, it is a singular spectacle that the Republicans, in possession of the entire Government, have deliberately called back into political power the leading men of the South, nearly every one of whom is their bitter and relentless and malignant foe; and to-day, from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, the very men who have received this amnesty are as busy as they were before the war in consolidating the old slave States into one compact political organization. We see the banner held out, blazoned again with the inscription that with the united South and a few votes from the North this country can be governed. I want the people to understand the character of the movement; to appreciate its animus, to measure its intent. But I do not think that offering amnesty to the seven hundred and fifty men who are now without it will hasten or retard the course of events in the South.

It is often said that "we shall lift Mr. Davis again into great consequence by refusing him amnesty." That is not for me to consider. I only see before me, when his name is presented, a man who, by a wave of his hand, by a nod of his head, could have put an end to the atrocious cruelties at Andersonville!

Some of us had kinsmen there, many of us had friends there, all of us had countrymen there. In the name of those kinsmen, friends, and countrymen, I here protest, and shall with my vote protest, against calling back and crowning with the honors of full American citizenship the man who stands responsible for that organized murder.

REMONETIZATION OF SILVER.

[Speech of James G. Blaine of Maine, delivered in the United States Senate, Thursday, Feb. 7, 1878.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. No. 1093) to authorize the free coinage of the standard silver dollar and to restore its legal-tender character.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — The discussion on the question of remonetizing silver has been prolonged and exhaustive. I may not expect to add much to its value, but I promise not to add much to its length. I shall endeavor to consider facts rather than theories, to state conclusions rather than arguments.

I believe gold and silver coin to be the money of the Constitution — indeed, the money of the American people anterior to the Constitution, money which the organic law of the Republic recognized as independent of its own existence. No power was conferred on Congress to declare that either metal should not be money. Congress has therefore, in my judgment, no more power to demonetize silver than to demonetize gold; no more power to demonetize either than to demonetize both. In this statement I am but repeating the weighty dictum of the first of Constitutional lawyers. “I am certainly of opinion,” said Mr. Webster, “that gold and silver, at rates fixed by Congress, constitute the legal standard of value in this country, and that neither Congress nor any State *has authority to establish any other standard or to displace this standard.*” Few persons can be found, I apprehend, who will maintain that Congress possesses the power to demonetize both gold and silver, or that Congress could be justified in prohibiting the coinage of both; and yet in logic and legal construction it would be difficult to show where and why the power of Congress over silver is greater than over gold — greater over either than over both. If, there-

fore, silver has been demonetized, I am in favor of remonetizing it. If its coinage has been prohibited, I am in favor of ordering it to be resumed. If it has been restricted, I am in favor of ordering it to be enlarged.

What power, then, has Congress over gold and silver? It has the exclusive power to coin them; the exclusive power to regulate their value,—very great, very wise, very necessary powers, for the discreet exercise of which a critical occasion has now arisen. However men may differ about causes and processes, all will admit that within a few years a great disturbance has taken place in the relative values of gold and silver, and that silver is worth less or gold is worth more in the money markets of the world in 1878 than in 1873, when the further coinage of silver dollars was prohibited in this country. To remonetize it now as though essential conditions had not changed, is willfully and blindly to deceive ourselves. If our demonetization were the only cause for the decline in the value of silver, then remonetization would be its proper and effectual cure. But other causes, beyond our control, have been far more potentially operative than the simple fact that Congress prohibited its further coinage. As legislators we are bound to take cognizance of these causes. The demonetization of silver in the German Empire and the consequent partial, or well-nigh complete, suspension of coinage in the governments of the Latin Union, have been the leading causes for the rapid decline in the value of silver. I do not think the over-supply of silver has had, in comparison with these other causes, an appreciable influence in the decline of its value, because its over-supply with respect to gold in these later years has not been so great as was the over-supply of gold with respect to silver for many years after the mines of California and Australia were opened; and the over-supply of gold from those rich sources did not affect the relative positions and uses of the two metals in any European country.

I believe then, if Germany were to remonetize silver and the kingdoms and states of the Latin Union were to re-open their mints, silver would at once resume its former relation with gold. The European countries when driven to full remonetization, as I believe they will be in the end, must of necessity adopt their

old ratio of fifteen and a half of silver to one of gold, and we shall then be compelled to adopt the same instead of our former ratio of sixteen to one. If we fail to do this we shall, as before, lose our silver, which like all things else seeks the highest market; and if fifteen and a half pounds of silver will buy as much gold in Europe as sixteen pounds will buy in America, the silver, of course, will go to Europe. But our line of policy in a joint movement with other nations to remonetize is simple and direct. The difficult problem is what we shall do when we aim to re-establish silver without the co-operation of European powers, and really as an advance movement to coerce those powers into the same policy. Evidently the first dictate of prudence is to coin such a dollar as will not only do justice among our citizens at home, but will prove a protection — an absolute barricade — against the gold mono-metallists of Europe, who, whenever the opportunity offers, will quickly draw from us the one hundred and sixty millions of gold coin which we now hold. If we coin a silver dollar of full legal-tender, obviously below the current value of the gold dollar, we are simply opening our doors and inviting Europe to take our gold. With our gold flowing out from us we shall be forced to the single silver standard and our relations with the leading commercial countries of the world will be not only embarrassed but crippled.

The question before Congress then — sharply defined in the pending House bill — is, whether it is now safe and expedient to offer free coinage to the silver dollar of $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains, with the mints of the Latin Union closed and Germany not permitting silver to be coined as money. At current rates of silver, the free coinage of a dollar containing $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains, worth in gold about ninety-two cents, gives an illegitimate profit to the owner of the bullion, enabling him to take ninety-two cents' worth of it to the mint and get it stamped as coin and force his neighbor to take it for a full dollar. This is an unfair advantage which the Government has no right to give to the owner of silver bullion, and which defrauds the man who is forced to take the dollar. It assuredly follows that if we give free coinage to this dollar of inferior value and put it in circulation, we do so at the expense of our better coinage in gold;

and unless we expect the invariable experience of other nations to be in some mysterious way suspended for our peculiar benefit, we inevitably lose our gold coin. It will flow out from us with the certainty and with the force of the tides. Gold has indeed remained with us in considerable amount during the circulation of the inferior currency of the legal tender; but that was because there were two great uses reserved by law for gold,—the collection of customs and the payment of interest on the public debt. But if the inferior silver coin is also to be used for these two reserved purposes, then gold has no tie to bind it to us. What gain, therefore, should we make for the circulating medium, if on opening the gate for silver to flow in, we open a still wider gate for gold to flow out? If I were to venture upon a dictum on the silver question, I should declare that until Europe remonetizes silver we cannot afford to coin a dollar as low as $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains. After Europe remonetizes on the old standard, we cannot afford to coin a dollar above 400 grains. If we coin too low a dollar before general remonetization our gold will leave us. If we coin too high a dollar after general remonetization our silver will leave us. It is only an equated value before and after general remonetization that will preserve both gold and silver to us.

Consider further what injustice would be done to every holder of a legal-tender or national-bank note. That large volume of paper money—in excess of seven hundred millions of dollars—is now worth between ninety-eight and ninety-nine cents on the dollar in gold coin. The holders of it, who are indeed our entire population from the poorest to the richest, have been promised from the hour of its issue that their paper money would one day be as good as gold. To pay silver for the green-back is a full compliance with this promise and this obligation, provided the silver is made as it always has been hitherto, as good as gold. To make our silver coin even three per cent less valuable than gold inflicts at once a loss of more than twenty millions of dollars on the holders of our paper money. To make a silver dollar worth but ninety-two cents precipitates on the same class a loss of nearly sixty millions of dollars. For whatever the value of the silver dollar is, the whole paper issue of the country will sink to its standard when its coinage

is authorized and its circulation becomes general in the channels of trade. Some one in conversation with Commodore Vanderbilt during one of the many freight competitions of the trunk lines said, "It cannot be that the Canadian Railroad has sufficient carrying capacity to compete with your great line?" — "That is true," replied the Commodore, "but they can fix a rate and force us down to it." Were Congress to pass a law to-day declaring that every legal-tender note and every national-bank note shall hereafter pass for only ninety-six or ninety-seven cents on the dollar, there is not a constituency in the United States that would re-elect a man who supported it, and in many districts the representative would be lucky if he escaped merely with a defeat at the polls.

Yet it is almost mathematically demonstrable that the same effect will follow from the coinage of an inferior silver dollar. Assurances from empirics and scientists in finance that remonetization of the former dollar will at once and permanently advance its value to par with gold, are worth little in the face of opposing and controlling facts. The first effect of issuing any silver dollar that will pay customs dues and interest on the public debt, will undoubtedly be to raise it to a practical equality with gold; but that condition will last only until the amount needful for customs shall fill the channels of its use; and the overflow going into general circulation will rapidly settle to its normal and actual value, and then the discount will come on the volume of the paper currency, which will sink, *pari passu*, with the silver dollar in which it is made redeemable. That remonetization will have a considerable effect in advancing the value of the silver dollar is very probable, but not enough to overcome the difference now existing, — a difference resulting from causes independent of our control in the United States.

The responsibility of re-establishing silver in its ancient and honorable place as money in Europe and America, devolves really upon the Congress of the United States. If we act here with wisdom and firmness, we shall not only successfully remonetize silver, and bring it into general use as money in our own country, but the influence of our example will be potential among European nations, with the possible exception of Eng-

land. Indeed, our annual indebtedment to Europe is so great that, if we have the right to pay it in silver, we necessarily coerce those nations, by the strongest of all forces, self-interest, to aid us in upholding the value of silver as money. But if we attempt the remonetization on a basis which is obviously below the fair standard of value as it now exists, we incur all the evil consequences of failure at home, and the certainty of successful opposition abroad. We are, and shall be, the greatest producers of silver in the world, and we have a larger stake in its complete monetization than any other country. The difference to the United States, between the general acceptance and the general destruction of silver as money in the commercial world, will possibly within the next half-century equal the entire bonded debt of the Nation. But, to gain this advantage, we must make it actual money, the accepted equal of gold in the markets of the world. Remonetization here, followed by general remonetization in Europe, will secure to the United States the most stable basis for its currency that we have ever enjoyed, and will effectually aid in solving all the problems by which our financial situation is surrounded.

On the much-vexed and long-mooted question of a bi-metallic or mono-metallic standard, my own views are sufficiently indicated in the remarks I have made. I believe the struggle now going on in this country, and in other countries, for a single gold standard, would, if successful, produce disaster in the end throughout the commercial world. The destruction of silver as money, and the establishment of gold as the sole unit of value, must have a ruinous effect on all forms of property except those investments which yield a fixed return in money. These would be enormously enhanced in value, and would gain a disproportionate, and therefore unfair, advantage over every other species of property. If, as the most reliable statistics affirm, there are nearly seven thousand millions of coin or bullion in the world, not very unequally divided between gold and silver, it is impossible to strike silver out of existence as money without results which will prove distressing to millions, and utterly disastrous to tens of thousands. Alexander Hamilton, in his able and invaluable report in 1791 on the establishment of a mint, declared that "to annul the use of either gold or silver as money

is to abridge the quantity of circulating medium, and is liable to all the objections which arise from a comparison of the benefits of a full circulation with the evils of a scanty circulation." I take no risk in saying that the benefits of a full circulation, and the evils of a scanty circulation, are both immeasurably greater to-day than they were when Mr. Hamilton uttered these weighty words, always provided that the circulation is one of actual money, and not of depreciated "promises to pay."

In the report from which I have already quoted, Mr. Hamilton argues at length in favor of a double standard, and all the subsequent experience of ninety years has brought out no clearer statement of the case, or developed a more complete comprehension of this subtle and difficult subject. "On the whole," says Mr. Hamilton, "it seems most advisable not to attach the unit exclusively to either of the metals, because this cannot be done effectually without destroying the office and character of one of them as money, and reducing it to the situation of mere merchandise." Mr. Hamilton wisely concludes that this reduction of either of the metals to mere merchandise (I again quote his exact words) "would probably be a greater evil than occasional variations in the unit from the fluctuations in the relative value of the metals, especially if care be taken to regulate the proportion between them, with an eye to their average commercial value." I do not think that this country, holding so vast a proportion of the world's supply of silver in its mountains and its mines, can afford to reduce the metal to the "situation of mere merchandise." If silver ceases to be used as money in Europe and America, the mines of the Pacific slope will be closed and dead. Mining enterprises of the gigantic scale existing in this country cannot be carried on to provide backs for mirrors, and to manufacture cream-pitchers and sugar-bowls. A source of incalculable wealth to this entire country is destroyed the moment silver is permanently disused as money. It is for us to check that tendency, and bring the continent of Europe back to the full recognition of the value of the metal as a medium of exchange.

The question of beginning anew the coinage of silver dollars has aroused much discussion as to its effect on the public credit. The senator from Ohio [Mr. Matthews] placed this phase of

the subject in the very forefront of the debate — insisting, prematurely and illogically, I think, on a sort of judicial construction in advance, by concurrent resolution, of a certain law in case that law should happen to be passed by Congress. My own view on this question can be stated very briefly. I believe the public creditor can afford to be paid in any silver dollar that the United States can afford to coin and circulate. We have forty thousand millions of property in this country, and a wise self-interest will not permit us to overturn its relations by seeking for an inferior dollar wherewith to settle the honest demands of any creditor. The question might be different from a merely selfish point of view if, on paying the dollar to the public creditor, it would disappear after performing that function. But the trouble is that the inferior dollar you pay the public creditor remains in circulation, to the exclusion of the better dollar. That which you pay at home will stay here; that which you send abroad will come back. The interest of the public creditor is indissolubly bound up with the interest of the whole people. Whatever affects him affects us all; and the evil that we might inflict upon him by paying an inferior dollar would recoil upon us with a vengeance as manifold as the aggregate wealth of the Republic transcends the comparatively small limits of our bonded debt. Remember that our aggregate wealth is always increasing, and our bonded debt steadily growing less! If paid in a good silver dollar, the bondholder has nothing to complain of. If paid in an inferior silver dollar, he has the same grievance that will be uttered still more plaintively by the holder of the legal-tender note and of the national-bank bill, by the pensioner, by the day laborer, and by the countless host of the poor, whom we have with us always, and on whom the most distressing effect of inferior money will be ultimately precipitated.

But I must say, Mr. President, that the specific demand for the payment of our bonds in gold coin, and in nothing else, comes with an ill grace from certain quarters. European criticism is leveled against us, and hard names are hurled at us across the ocean, for simply daring to state that the letter of our law declares the bonds to be payable in standard coin of July 14, 1870; explicitly declared so, and declared so in the

interest of the public creditor, and the declaration inserted in the very body of the eight hundred millions of bonds that have been issued since that date. Beyond all doubt, the silver dollar was included in the standard coins of that public act. Payment at that time would have been as acceptable and as undisputed in silver as in gold dollars, for both were equally valuable in the European as well as in the American market. Seven-eighths of all our bonds owned out of the country are held in Germany and in Holland. Germany has demonetized silver, and Holland has been forced thereby to suspend its coinage, since the subjects of both powers purchased our securities. The German Empire, the very year after we made our specific declaration for paying our bonds in coin, passed a law destroying, so far as lay in its power, the value of silver as money. I do not say that it was specially aimed at this country, but it was passed regardless of its effect upon us, and was followed, according to public and undenied statement, by a large investment on the part of the German Government in our bonds, with a view, it was understood, of holding them as a coin reserve for drawing gold from us to aid in establishing their new gold standard at home. Thus, by one move the German Government destroyed, so far as lay in its power, the then existing value of silver as money, enhanced consequently the value of gold, and then got into position to draw gold from us at the moment of their need, which would also be the moment of our own sorest distress. I do not say that the German Government, in these successive steps, did a single thing which it had not a perfect right to do, but I do say that the subjects of that Empire have no reason to complain of our Government for the initial step which has impaired the value of one of our standard coins. The German Government, by joining with us in the remonetization of silver, can place that standard coin in its old position, and make it as easy for this Government to pay and as profitable for their subjects to receive the one metal as the other.

When we pledged the public creditor in 1870 that our obligations should be paid in the standard coin of that date, silver bullion was worth in the London market a fraction over sixty pence per ounce; its average for the past eight months has

been about fifty-four pence ; the price reckoned in gold in both cases. But the large difference is due in part to the rise of gold as well as to the fall of silver. Allowing for both causes and dividing the difference, it will be found, in the judgment of many of the wisest men in this country, perfectly safe to issue a dollar of 425 grains standard silver ; as one that, anticipating the full and legitimate influence of remonetization, will equate itself with the gold dollar, and effectually guard against the drain of our gold during the time necessary for international conference in regard to the general re-establishment of silver as money. When that general re-establishment shall be effected with a coinage of fewer grains, the dollar which I am now advocating will not cause loss or embarrassment to any one. The miner of the ore, the owner of the bullion, the holder of the coin, and the Government that issues it, will all in turn be benefited. It will yield a profit on recoinage and will be advantageously employed in our commercial relations with foreign countries. Meanwhile it will insure to our laborers at home a full dollar's pay for a dollar's worth of work.

I think we owe this to the American laborer. Ever since we demonetized the old dollar we have been running our mints at full speed, coining a new silver dollar for the use of the Chinese cooly and the Indian pariah — a dollar containing 420 grains of standard silver, with its superiority over our ancient dollar ostentatiously engraved on its reverse side. To these "outside barbarians" we send this superior dollar, bearing all our national emblems, our patriotic devices, our pious inscriptions, our goddess of liberty, our defiant eagle, our federal unity, our trust in God. This dollar contains $7\frac{1}{2}$ grains more silver than the famous "dollar of the fathers," proposed to be recoined by the pending bill, and more than four times as many of these new dollars have already been coined as ever were coined of all other silver dollars in the United States. In the exceptional and abnormal condition of the silver market now existing throughout the world we have felt compelled to increase the weight of the dollar with which we carry on trade with the heathen nations of Asia. Shall we do less for the American laborer at home? Nay, shall we not do a little better and a little more for those of our own blood and our

own fireside? If you remonetize the dollar of the fathers your mints will be at once put to work on two different dollars, — different in weight, different in value, different in prestige, different in their reputation and currency throughout the commercial world. It will read strangely in history that the weightier and more valuable of these dollars is made for an ignorant class of heathen laborers in China and India, and that the lighter and less valuable is made for the intelligent and educated laboring-man who is a citizen of the United States. Charity, the adage says, begins at home. Charity, the independent American laborer scorns to ask, but he has the right to demand that justice should begin at home. In his name and in the name of common sense and common honesty, I ask that the American Congress will not force upon the American laborer an inferior dollar which the naked and famishing laborers of India and China refuse to accept.

The bill which I now offer as a substitute for the House bill contains three very simple provisions:—

1. That the dollar shall contain four hundred and twenty-five grains of standard silver, shall have unlimited coinage, and be an unlimited legal tender.

2. That all the profits of coinage shall go to the Government, and not to the operator in silver bullion.

3. That silver dollars or silver bullion, assayed and mint-stamped, may be deposited with the Assistant Treasurer at New York, for which coin certificates may be issued, the same in denomination as United States notes, not below ten dollars, and that these shall be redeemable on demand in coin or bullion. We shall thus secure a paper circulation based on an actual deposit of precious metal, giving us notes as valuable as those of the Bank of England and doing away at once with the dreaded inconvenience of silver on account of bulk and weight.

I do not fail, Mr. President, to recognize that the committals and avowals of senators on this question preclude the hope of my substitute being adopted. I do not indeed fail to recognize that on this question I am not in line with either extreme,—with those who believe in the single gold standard or with those who by premature and unwise action, as I must regard it,

would force us to the single silver standard. Either will be found, in my judgment, a great misfortune to our country. We need both gold and silver, and we can have both only by making each the equal of the other. It would not be difficult to show that, in the nations where both have been fully recognized and most widely diffused, the steadiest and most continuous prosperity has been enjoyed, — that true form of prosperity which reaches all classes, but which begins with the day-laborer whose toil lays the foundation of the whole superstructure of wealth. The exclusively gold nation like England may show the most massive fortunes in the ruling classes, but it shows also the most helpless and hopeless poverty in the humbler walks of life. The gold and silver nation like France can exhibit no such individual fortunes as abound in a gold nation like England, but it has a peasantry whose silver savings can pay a war indemnity that would have beggared the gold bankers of London, and to which the peasantry of England could not have contributed a pound sterling in gold or even a shilling in silver.

The effect of paying the labor of this country in silver coin of full value, as compared with irredeemable paper, — or as compared, even, with silver of inferior value, — will make itself felt in a single generation to the extent of tens of millions — perhaps hundreds of millions — in the aggregate savings which represent consolidated capital. It is the instinct of man from the savage to the scholar — developed in childhood and remaining with age — to value the metals which in all lands are counted “precious.” Excessive paper money leads to extravagance, to waste, to want, as we painfully witness to-day. With abounding proof of its demoralizing and destructive effect, we hear it proclaimed in the Halls of Congress, that “the people demand cheap money.” I deny it. I declare such a phrase to be a total misapprehension — a total misinterpretation of the popular wish. The people do not demand cheap money. They demand an abundance of good money, which is an entirely different thing. They do not want a single gold standard that will exclude silver and benefit those already rich. They do not want an inferior silver standard that will drive out gold and not help those already poor. They want both metals,

in full value, in equal honor, in whatever abundance the bountiful earth will yield them to the searching eye of science and to the hard hand of labor.

The two metals have existed side by side in harmonious, honorable companionship as money, ever since intelligent trade was known among men. It is well-nigh forty centuries since "Abraham weighed to Ephron the silver, which he had named in the audience of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant." Since that time nations have risen and fallen, races have disappeared, dialects and languages have been forgotten, arts have been lost, treasures have perished, continents have been discovered, islands have been sunk in the sea, and through all these ages and through all these changes, silver and gold have reigned supreme as the representatives of value — as the media of exchange. The dethronement of each has been attempted in turn, and sometimes the dethronement of both; but always in vain! And we are here to-day, deliberating anew over the problem which comes down to us from Abraham's time — *the weight of the silver* that shall be "current money with the merchant."

THE HALIFAX AWARD.

[On the 26th of February, 1878, Mr. Blaine submitted the following resolution for the consideration of the Senate:—

Resolved, That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to communicate to the Senate at the earliest practicable day, if not in his judgment incompatible with the public interest, copies of all correspondence between our Government and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty in regard to the selection of M. Maurice Delfosse, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from Belgium, as the third commissioner under the twenty-third article of the treaty of Washington on the question of the fisheries.

Objection was made and the resolution went over. On the 11th of March Mr. Blaine called up the resolution, and made the following speech:—]

MR. PRESIDENT,—The resolution of inquiry, which I offered a fortnight ago, was met with objection and was laid over. I call it up now to explain my reasons for desiring its adoption. For some time past there have been rumors of an unpleasant character touching the mode in which M. Delfosse, the Belgian minister accredited to this country, was urged by the British Government as the third commissioner under the treaty of Washington on the question of the Fisheries. These rumors come in a form that enforces attention, and while I do not pretend to vouch for their entire accuracy, I think they are sufficiently grave to call for authentication or denial.

It appears by these reports that during the conference of the Joint High Commission in April, 1871, Lord Ripon, speaking for the English Government, said in relation to the several proposed arbitrations which were under discussion, that it would not be a proper thing for England to offer Belgium or Portugal as arbitrators; and he especially spoke of Belgium as being incapacitated for the function by reason of her peculiar relations with England. This declaration was promptly assented to by the American commissioners. With the understanding

thus volunteered by Lord Ripon, the Halifax commission of three arbitrators on the fisheries was agreed to — our Government to name one, the British Government to name one, and the two Governments conjointly to name the third. It was stipulated that if the two Governments could not agree on the third commissioner within three months, the Austrian ambassador at London should name him. As soon as the fishery clause of the treaty went into effect in July, 1873, the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, formally invited the British minister, Sir Edward Thornton, to confer with him in regard to the appointment of the third commissioner. He found Sir Edward without instructions from his Government, and after delaying for some days Mr. Fish took the initiative and submitted a number of names for his consideration. Among these, selected from a large field, were Mariscal, minister from Mexico; Offenberg, minister from Russia; Borges, from Brazil; Polo, from Spain; the Count de Noailles, from France; Westenberg, from Holland, and others. Mr. Fish did not include M. Delfosse among these, as he thought that his name had been fairly excluded by the understanding of the Joint High Commission.

Sir Edward Thornton made no response for several weeks and then answered Mr. Fish, declining to accept any of the names submitted by him and proposing in turn the single name of M. Delfosse. It was understood, I believe, that Sir Edward was acting under the direct instructions of Lord Granville, British Secretary of Foreign affairs. Mr. Fish peremptorily declined to accept M. Delfosse and quoted Lord Ripon's remark in regard to Belgium, and again urged Sir Edward to accept one of the names proposed by him or else to propose some names himself. In answer to this Sir Edward stated that Lord Dufferin, the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, speaking for the Canadians, objected to taking as the third commissioner any one accredited to our Government. Immediately after this declaration Sir Edward appeared at the State Department with fresh instructions from Lord Granville to insist on M. Delfosse, though at that very moment M. Delfosse was accredited to our Government. The only alternative presented by Sir Edward was that his Government would accept some "Dutch gentleman" that might be chosen at the Hague by the American and

British ministers. This mode of selection was at once rejected by Mr. Fish as not being within the terms of the treaty. The three months within which the two Governments were to act conjointly having been thus exhausted, apparently by the design of the British Government, the matter was by the treaty remanded to the Austrian ambassador at London. A delay of some years then ensued in consequence of the negotiations for a reciprocity treaty which, if secured, would have precluded the necessity of arbitrating the fishery question. The correspondence was not renewed until 1876.

The result of the whole was that in February, 1877, the Austrian ambassador at London nominated M. Delfosse as the third commissioner. It is now reported on the authority of an interview recently published in the *New-York Herald* that Mr. Fish finally assented to the appointment of M. Delfosse by the Austrian ambassador. This may or may not be true, but it is not material to the issue; for the matter had lapsed absolutely into the hands of the ambassador, and as he was resident in London, in easy communication with the British ministry, they had means of influencing the decision that were not within our power. Mr. Fish may well have thought that as the appointment of M. Delfosse was inevitable it was prudent and expedient to submit to it gracefully and in such a way as not to incur the personal ill-will of the third commissioner. I can well see how a wise secretary, like Mr. Fish, might in the end have been thus influenced after having exhausted every effort, as he so ably and fearlessly did, to keep M. Delfosse off the commission.

I do not intend in any remarks I am making to cast reflections on M. Delfosse, who is known as an honorable representative of his Government. I only mean to imply and to assert that, if Lord Ripon is to be credited, M. Delfosse was not in a position to be an impartial arbitrator; and that in my judgment Great Britain never should have proposed him. Mr. Fish was therefore justified in resisting his appointment as long as resistance promised to be effectual. Nor do I mean to impute to Sir Edward Thornton any proceeding that was not strictly honorable. The highly esteemed representative of the British Government at this Capital, in all he did was simply following the

instructions of Lord Granville. But I do mean to say, if I am correctly informed, that the correspondence for which my resolution calls will disclose a designed and persistent effort on the part of the British Government to secure an advantage in the selection of the third commissioner on the question of the fisheries. It is but just to remark that the Dominion of Canada had no more right to interpose in the matter than had the States of Massachusetts and Maine; and that the governors of those States had the same right to speak for their people in regard to selecting a third commissioner as had Lord Dufferin to speak for the people of the Dominion. The negotiation was between two great nations, and subordinate States and provinces had no right to dictate, or even to suggest, unless called upon by the two principals.

It may be somewhat premature to speak of the award made by the Halifax commission, but as it is already discussed in the press of both countries, a brief reference to it may not be out of place. The extraordinary nature of that award can only be appreciated when the surrounding facts are understood. In the original discussion of the fishery question by the Joint High Commission in 1871, the American commissioners could be induced to offer only \$1,000,000 for all the fishing privileges subsequently embodied in the treaty. The British commissioners declined this offer, and would enter into no negotiation that did not include the admission of the products of the Canadian fisheries into the American market free of duty. This concession, highly advantageous to Canada and highly injurious to our fisheries, was finally inserted in the treaty. It was further agreed to decide by arbitration what amount of additional compensation should be paid by us for the right to use the inshore fisheries of Nova Scotia for twelve years. The Halifax commission took the subject into consideration, and two commissioners (both in effect selected by Great Britain) determined that we should pay her five and a half millions of dollars in gold coin, or at the rate of nearly half a million dollars per annum. The duties on the products of Canadian fisheries imported into this country (all remitted by the treaty) would be almost another half million dollars per annum; so that under this award we should be actually paying nearly a million of

dollars per annum in gold coin for the privilege of inshore fishing on the coast of Nova Scotia, where the total catch by American fishermen, beyond what we had the right to take without this treaty, would not amount to much over \$300,000 per annum. In other words, we are paying to Great Britain a million of dollars per annum for the privilege of catching less than four hundred thousand dollars' worth of fish. Such is a mere outline of the facts of the case, and the injustice of the award is so palpable that it is difficult to treat it with the respect due to all subjects involving international relations.

The question as to the binding force of the award is naturally and necessarily one of the gravest interest, not only on account of the large amount involved but on account of the very peculiar circumstances under which the decision against us was reached. The award was signed only by Sir Alexander Galt, the British commissioner, and by M. Delfosse. The American commissioner, Mr. Kellogg, refused to sign it, and affirmed his dissent in writing; declaring it to be his deliberate opinion that "the advantages accruing to Great Britain under the treaty were greater than those conferred on the United States;" and he further declared that he deemed it his duty to state that "it is questionable whether it is competent for the board to make an award under the treaty except with the unanimous consent of all the arbitrators." Mr. Dwight Foster, the agent of our Government, stated that he "had no instructions as to what he should do under the circumstances, but he could not keep silent, and give ground for the inference that our Government would consider the award a valid one." I mention these facts to show that objections to the validity of the award were not the result of afterthought, but were incorporated as part of the proceedings before the arbitrators.

The ground on which Mr. Kellogg questioned the competency of two of the arbitrators to make an award is that found in all the legal authorities on arbitration. The articles in the treaty of Washington creating the Halifax Board of Arbitration gave no authority to a majority of the Board to make an award, nor was the third commissioner empowered to act as umpire. Both in the tribunal at Geneva and in the Claims Commission at Washington, it was expressly stipulated that a majority of the

arbitrators should decide. In the Halifax commission no such stipulation was made, and the inference therefore is strong, if not irresistible, that their award should be made according to the general law of arbitration. What that law is, upon English authority, may be briefly stated.

Redman on "Arbitration and Awards," considered one of the highest authorities in England, says:—

"On a reference to several arbitrators with no provision that less than all shall make an award, each must act; and all must act together; and every stage of the proceedings must be in the presence of all; and the award must be signed by all at the same time."

Francis Russell, another English authority of eminence, says:—

"On a reference to several arbitrators together, when there is no clause providing for an award made by less than all being valid, each of them must act personally in performance of the duties of his office as if he were sole arbitrator; for as the office is joint, if one refuse or omit to act, the others can make no valid award."

Stewart Kyd, an earlier but not less authoritative writer, enforces the same doctrine. After alluding to the Roman law and to its permission for the majority of arbitrators to decide, Mr. Kyd makes the following statement:—

"In this respect the law of England is somewhat different; for unless it be expressly provided in the submission that a less number than all the arbitrators named may make the award, the concurrence of all is necessary."

If these eminent English authors are to be accepted, it is quite apparent that the Halifax award has no binding effect *in law*. As to the equity of the case, I have already given the undeniable facts that govern it.

I am not now discussing, much less presuming to define, the action which our Government should ultimately take in regard to the award. If we should follow what I believe would be the inevitable course of Great Britain under similar circumstances we should utterly refuse to pay a single penny, and ground our refusal both on the law and the equity of the case. The treaty as it stands is a mockery of justice, and will work the certain destruction of a great American interest. It is in fact nothing else than asking us to pay a million dollars per annum to

Great Britain for destroying the entire fishing interest of America and still further crippling and weakening us as a commercial power. For the utter abrogation of the treaty I should be willing to pay the annual indemnity for the years we have used the inshore fisheries, during which years the Canadians have had free access to the markets of forty-five millions of people; or I should be willing to pay double the award to be rid of the treaty. We might by this course anticipate by a period of seven years a return to that policy which alone can insure the prosperity or even save the life of a great and important trade, indissolubly associated with our commercial development and absolutely essential to our success and prestige as a naval power. Paying thus even an unfair price for the inshore fisheries as long as we shall have used them, we remove all possible ground for imputation, even by the ignorant and the hostile, upon the honor of our Government and the good faith and fair dealing of our people.

When we were poor and weak as a nation, we so highly esteemed the value of the fisheries that we encouraged their development by rewards and bounties. These were abandoned some years ago, but still we preserved to our fishermen a preference in our own markets. Even that is given away by the provisions of this treaty. By the Halifax award, if we accept it, and continue the treaty, we pay to Great Britain one million dollars per annum for destroying a school of commerce, which, properly nurtured, will be her great rival in the future. Against such a policy I enter my protest, if I stand alone. I believe that the products of American industry, on land and sea, should have the first and best chance in the American markets. I believe the American fisherman should be preferred by us to the Canadian fisherman. If we cannot pay him a bounty to encourage and sustain him, let us at least not pay a bounty to Great Britain to destroy him.

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. President, I interpose no objection to the passage of this resolution, while on the other hand I think it wise and well that we shall have all the facts in relation to this matter before us. I agree entirely with my colleague, with the senator from Massachusetts, and with the gentleman whose letter has been read at the table by the Clerk, that we get no

compensation for that award in any equivalent granted by the inshore fisheries along the coast of Nova Scotia. I have no hesitation in declaring that an equivalent in the receipt of the fish caught in the provinces in our market is far beyond any thing which we receive in return under that treaty. There can be no doubt about it. And yet we are living to-day under a treaty negotiated here in this city; and while it is the law of the land and a contract existing between the two high contracting parties, the honor of this Government demands that we maintain all the obligations that are imposed upon us. If it be true that we were overreached or that in the selection of the arbitrator an improper person was taken we must remember that he was finally taken by the assent of this Government; and when we come to the consideration of the subject it will be one which involves the honor of our Government and one which I need not undertake to say will demand of us that we meet promptly and fully what shall be required.

MR. BLAINE. I quite agree with my colleague upon that, and I think our merit will be all the greater if we pay an award of five and a half millions when we have proved to the world that we did not get any thing for it. Paying one's debt for full value received is considered a proper and upright course for upright men; but paying a large sum for which we get nothing in return ought to be accounted to us for a good deal more of righteousness.

[The correspondence between the two Governments was sent to the Senate on the 26th of March, and on moving that it be printed Mr. Blaine spoke as follows:—]

MR. PRESIDENT, — I move that the correspondence between the American and British Governments in regard to the appointment of M. Delfosse on the Halifax commission be taken from the table and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I beg at the same time to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that the correspondence more than justifies all I said in regard to the very extraordinary efforts of Lord Granville to force M. Delfosse upon our Government. I would particularly direct attention to the letter of Sir Edward Thornton, of Aug. 19, 1873, and to Mr. Fish's reply on the 21st of the same month.

When the resolution calling for this correspondence was before the Senate, I agreed with my honorable colleague, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the award would be paid, not because it was just or was founded upon any fact or evidence submitted to the Halifax commission, but simply because it was ~~an~~ award which for honor's sake we might pay though we got nothing for the large sum required. If the payment of five and a half millions were the end of the matter I should be willing to vote it in silence and bury the whole matter out of sight. But the truth is that this award is only the beginning of trouble. The period for which it pays will be ended in five years and then our privilege for inshore fishing must be negotiated afresh. It was well known at Halifax during the session of the Commission that the Canadian authorities were striving not simply for the large sum in hand but for the fixing of a rate by which to assess the price of the inshore fisheries in future. It is our duty to show that the rate fixed by the Halifax Commission has no foundation whatever in truth or in fact and that no evidence was before the commission to justify the award. I hold in my hand some statistics of very great interest bearing on the question, from which it appears that the total value of the catch in the inshore fisheries by American fishermen during the four years the treaty has been in operation was only \$435,170, on which the profit was probably \$100,000. This covers the entire catch for which we obtained the right under the treaty. During the same four years the duties on Canadian fish and oil remitted by our Government amounted to a million and a half of dollars in gold, and now under this treaty we are compelled to pay half a million per annum in addition or two millions of dollars in gold coin for the four years. In other words, by remission of duties and the payment of cash from the Treasury our Government is called upon to pay three and a half millions of dollars in gold coin for the privilege of permitting our fishermen to make a profit of \$100,000 on the inshore fisheries of Nova Scotia.

Considerable comment has been made in the country on the point suggested by me that the Washington treaty required the unanimous verdict of the Halifax commissioners before a

legally valid award could be made. I quoted some eminent English authorities in support of this position. Since then a friend has shown me a copy of the *London Times* of July 6, 1877, containing an elaborate editorial article in regard to the fishery commission then about to assemble in Halifax. In discussing the powers of the commission the *Times* said:—

“On every point that comes before the fishery commission for decision the unanimous consent of all its members is, by the terms of the treaty, necessary before an authoritative verdict can be given.”

The *Times* then points out the difference between the Geneva tribunal and the Halifax commission, showing that a majority could decide at Geneva but affirming that the United States would have a perfect right to demand unanimity in the verdict at Halifax.

It is also well known that the Halifax commission was discussed by the Canadian ministry in 1875, after the negotiations for a Reciprocity treaty had failed. On that occasion Mr. Blake, the Minister of justice, remarked that the “amount of compensation we shall receive must be an amount unanimously agreed upon by the commissioners.” I mention these facts to show that I spoke with full authority when I suggested that the verdict rendered at Halifax was not legally binding under the terms of the treaty. Its payment must be justified on other grounds, and I have already intimated more than once that considerations entirely outside of the legality or the justice of the award might constrain us to respect it. But it should never be paid without such protest as will forever prevent its being quoted as a precedent or accepted as a standard to measure the value of the inshore fisheries in future negotiations.

TRADE WITH SOUTH AMERICA.

[On the 5th of June, 1878, Mr. Blaine addressed the Senate on the question of granting the aid of the Government in establishing a line of American mail-steamers to Brazil.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — This discussion is taking a much wider range than the simple granting of a subsidy to Mr. John Roach, as the senator from Michigan [Mr. Christiancy] seems to suppose. The last phase of the question propounded by the senator from Kentucky in an amendment, which is now being printed I believe, declares that hereafter ships of foreign construction shall be imported free into the United States and be entitled to American registry. From a variety of indications which I have observed in Congress, at both ends of the Capitol, for the last three or four years, it is soon, I think, to become a practical question, to be submitted to the test of legislative judgment whether on the whole we shall maintain our navigation laws, or whether, after having stood by them for eighty years, we shall conclude now to surrender them and become tributary to Great Britain. In plain truth that is what the amendment of the senator from Kentucky means. It means that with all our wealth, with all our advancement in skill and capital and prestige and power, here in the last quarter of the nineteenth century we shall confess ourselves incompetent to do what the founders of the Government considered themselves able to accomplish in the days of our National infancy.

It is an instructive lesson that the first Congress which assembled under the Federal Constitution, when the population of this country was short of four millions, when our coast line began at the eastern end of the District of Maine and was limited by the southern end of Georgia, when we did not touch the Gulf of Mexico and did not even dream of the

Pacific Ocean, when we could not manufacture the tools necessary to build a ship, when all things in the shape of mechanical contrivance and adaptation were in their veriest infancy in this country, that the wise founders of our Government decreed in the navigation laws, which have stood from that day to this, that we would lay the foundations of a great naval and commercial power. The men of that day knew that we never could have a naval or commercial power unless we could secure the skill and the art of the ship-builder at home. Our fathers ordained to this end two great things: in the first place, that no ship but one built and owned by Americans should ever engage in the coastwise trade of the United States; that this privilege should be for our own citizens absolutely and exclusively and for all time; and, in the second place, that as respected the foreign trade, no ship should float the American flag or have an American register that was not built and owned in the United States.

Gentlemen think this policy was a failure. The senator from Kentucky [Mr. Beck] has talked heretofore, and his amendment now speaks more plainly than his words, to the effect that this policy has been a failure. Let us see for a moment what ground there is for his conclusion. Down to the time of the rebellion, measuring seventy years from the foundation of the Government, we had been steadily gaining in the commercial contest with Great Britain, until in the year 1857 we stood abreast of her in ocean tonnage. More than that. In the year 1857 our foreign commerce amounted to a little over \$700,000,000, counting both ways, imports and exports, and American vessels carried \$500,000,000 of it, and vessels of all other nations carried but a shade over \$200,000,000 of it. Twenty years afterward, taking the statistics of 1877, what is the lamentable picture that is shown us? Our foreign commerce has increased to between eleven and twelve hundred millions annually, and the American vessels carry less than \$300,000,000 of it, while vessels of foreign nationalities carry over \$800,000,000 of it.

I maintain, sir, that if our Government had not met with the incalculable obstruction that was thrown against us by the war, and had been willing to uphold her shipping as stiffly as Great

Britain has upheld hers on all the lines of commerce, we should have outrun her. We had outrun her in sailing-vessels. We were ahead of her or at least equal to her in 1857. If I remember the figures aright, the tonnage stood about 5,700,000 tons for each country, and I grieve to say that it is over eight millions for Great Britain and only three millions for America to-day. We may stand here and talk about the wrongfulness of subsidies and the impolicy of granting them until doomsday; and Great Britain will applaud every speech of that kind made in the American Congress, and will quietly subsidize her steamers and take possession of the carrying-trade of the world. Great Britain to-day makes annually out of the commerce of the United States a larger sum than the interest on our public debt. She receives more in the way of net profits on the carrying-trade which America gives her, than the interest on the vast national debt with which we are burdened to-day. I submit this statement as a statistical fact capable of being illustrated and proved.

Let me now recount a few facts that in this connection are valuable; namely, that in the last six years, including 1877, Brazil exported five hundred and forty million dollars' worth of merchandise. How much did we take of it? We took two hundred and fifty millions of it. We took almost half. Brazil imported nearly the same amount that she exported—about ninety million a year out and in. How much did we send to Brazil in those six years? In the entire six years we sent forty-two million dollars' worth. They do not really know in Brazil what we have to sell and what we are able to manufacture and offer them.

The senator from New York labored to show the other day that we had failed under what was called the Garrison subsidy. The Garrison Company ran a line of steamers to Rio, which in the first place was not a first-class one, not a line that was in any degree a competing line with the British and French. Nobody wanted to embark on them when they were lying side by side with the British steamers in the port of Rio Janeiro. This is a fact which the Senate ought not to forget: that the line was started at the close of the war, when the prices of all our manufactured articles were very high, and we could not export fabrics of any kind.

Mr. EATON. If my friend will permit me, I would remind him that half the butter and cheese Brazil imports (every pound of which we can furnish from Ohio alone), nearly all the boots and shoes, which can be furnished by Massachusetts, and nearly all the agricultural implements went from Great Britain.

Mr. BLAINE. I thank my friend from Connecticut for calling my attention to the fact. I was coming to some details of that kind. I was pointing out, though, that the ten years of the Garrison subsidy were years of remarkably high prices in the United States, so that we were in no condition to be an exporting nation. The fall in prices in this country within the last five years, however, has been most extraordinary, quite as extraordinary as the previous rise, and on a very large number of articles we are able not only to compete fairly, but to undersell other nations. But the pressing question is, how can you bring seller and buyer together? To apply the homely phrase, the first thing you must do to induce a man to trade with you is, get him in your store. This applies to a nation as well as to a country merchant. You must do that before you can sell him any thing. He is not going to buy when he is on the other side of a ten-acre lot or in the next township.

The merchants on the River La Plata and in Rio Janeiro and all over the kingdom of Brazil desire a speedy and comfortable way of reaching the United States. To-day all the desirable lines of travel that run from the city of Rio Janeiro run to Europe, and the steamers that run there are just as good as the steamers that run from New York to Europe; and, of course, the merchants and travelers will go in that direction. This little bit of a Merchants' line between New York and Rio Janeiro runs vessels in which nobody would wish to go to sea. It is not a comfortable vessel, aside from any peril that may be involved in going to sea in a nine-hundred-ton ship. It is a very different thing to go to sea in a three or four thousand ton ship. It is the difference between riding on land in a freight-car and in a Pullman palace-car. When they present that as the competing line, it is simply to shut us out of Brazil and keep Brazilians from coming to us. The very first thing to connect us in any commercial relations whatever with Brazil is to enable Brazilians to come here, and to come here with

comfort, to make a journey both of pleasure and of business. They go by the thousands and the tens of thousands to Europe, and they will continue to go there just as long as there is no opportunity to come this way with equal speed and comfort.

Mr. President, there is not a more enlightened sovereign in the world than the eminent man who governs Brazil to-day. He is an imperial democrat or a democratic emperor, whichever you choose to call him. He is thoroughly devoted to the interests of his people. He illustrated in his last journey over the world the fabled tour of Peter the Great in the seventeenth century, going into the ship-yards and dock-yards and factories to find out how every thing was done. He came here; he went over this country, I venture to say, in a much more thorough manner than any gentleman on this floor has ever done. I venture to say that Dom Pedro can tell more—I do not know about the individual localities which we all know about—but taking the country as a whole, I venture to say that the imperial head of that government can tell more about the United States from personal observation than any senator on this floor. He went back profoundly impressed with the idea that Brazil had been made altogether too much a tail to the kite of the European monopolists, and that Brazilians had never had an opportunity to enter into the markets of the United States. He found that he was selling nearly half of all that he had to sell from his empire to this country, and almost literally buying nothing from us; and he said the very first thought that struck him was, “There is no way of coming to your country; we cannot get to you. We may come up to Carthagená and ship there, and come over to Havana and ship there, and thus get to New York.” That will take five or six weeks. There is occasionally a stray steamer that runs, but it cannot be depended on. The first thing therefore to be done in order to establish trade between this country and Brazil, as that wise Emperor said, is to establish a good line of communication between the two.

The Emperor while he was in the United States met John Roach. He conversed on this subject with Mr. Roach just as he stood in his own ship-yard in the active discharge of his daily business. He measured his intelligence and his energy.

After the Emperor had returned to his dominions Mr. Roach sent an agent to Rio Janeiro. He found the Emperor still zealous and eager for the line of steamers. His Majesty's Government contracted with Mr. Roach to put on a line of first-class steamers between Rio and New York that people might go back and forth, that mail-matter might go back and forth freely, that there should be luxurious accommodations if they chose to pay for them, and ample accommodations for all those who chose to avail themselves of them; and the Emperor of Brazil did that in the undoubted belief that America would respond with at least equal liberality. He made the tender. He said, "We need to come closer together; we cannot get to each other now; let us build up a line of first-class steamships, and I will pay half." That is the plain truth of it: "I will pay half if you will pay the other half. Let us try it and see what will come of it." Forthwith, as one of the results of it, a meeting was held in the city of New York, in the expectation that this line would be established, and merchants and manufacturers have taken the preliminary steps to establish a magazine in Rio in which every variety of American fabric shall be exhibited — our textiles, our metals, our products of all kinds — that a great American bazaar shall be opened there in which every thing we have to sell shall be exhibited with the price attached, and the advantages of shipments shall be made known to all buyers.

This may be an unwise waste of money. I do not myself think so. It may be a very wise thing for us to fold our hands and say to Great Britain, "Take the seas; they are yours. To be sure we have seventeen thousand miles of coast running from Behring's Straits down to the Gulf of California; we take in all the Gulf of Mexico, all the North Atlantic. We have timber, lumber, hemp, and iron, and every possible material that can make ships, but we are not equal to it. You must come forward and do our carrying-trade." That is what England is contending for to-day. She does not intend that any European nation shall ever become a great naval and commercial power.

There is no rival left to her in the commercial world, and if she can buy us out, or bully us out of a tariff that shall protect American industries, and bluff us out of enterprises that shall

stimulate lines of American steamships, she will have done all she desires to do for her factories and for her commerce.

The honorable senator from Maryland said that every one of these attempts to build up commerce by means of subsidies had been utter and ignominious failures, and he cited especially the Pacific mail, out of which there grew much scandal. The senator from California [Mr. Sargent], in the very debate of last year, in which my honorable friend from Michigan was willing to give half a million for old and inferior ships, while he is not willing now to give one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a line of new and superior steamships, said, and I quote this for the benefit of the senator from Maryland, —

“We have now to a very great extent, by means of this policy pursued by the Government, control of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. The Atlantic is an English or European lake, and nothing more. We scarcely venture out upon it with our own American lines. The case, however, is reversed in regard to the Pacific, and there the enterprise of our people, aided in this manner by our Government, has been able to seize upon the prominent lines of communication, and commerce is extended there on every hand. We have nearly as much control of the Pacific as England or any European power has of the Atlantic. The statistics show that there has been an increase of duties paid into the Treasury of the United States on account of the commerce built up by the Chinese mail-line greater by a million and a half of dollars than the amount of subsidy which has been paid out by the Government to aid in maintaining that line. The Government has made money by it.”

Even with all the mishaps and scandals which attached to that unfortunate line, so great has been its success, that it has given to us the lead in the commerce of the Pacific and has yielded back a larger revenue, aside from the indirect benefits, than the sum paid out of the Treasury of the United States to maintain the line.

Mr. WHYTE. May I ask the senator from Maine —

Mr. BLAINE. Ask the senator from California.

Mr. WHYTE. No, I will ask the senator from Maine. He is addressing me, and in reply I will ask him the question whether the building of the Pacific Railroad has not increased the duties rather than the Pacific mail-line?

Mr. BLAINE. The duties were not decreased on the Atlantic side. That very same question was asked the senator from California at the time by the senator from Vermont [Mr. Morrill], and the senator from California answered that there

was no corresponding decrease to be shown here. The senator means, I suppose, that it merely transferred the point of collection; but there was no corresponding decrease anywhere, and more than that, as the senator from California intimated—I am really borrowing his argument—the effect was largely to decrease—decrease indeed by a million dollars—the cost of tea to the consumers in this country.

I do not come from a steamship State. I come from a State that builds wooden ships and has sold them and will continue to do it, for the day of wooden ships has not gone by; they will remain for long voyages and for freights whose value is not dependent upon a particular date of delivery. They will remain I suppose as long as the tides rise and the winds blow. In that field the State I represent is without any rival in this country to-day. But is this country willing calmly to resign the sceptre of the ocean to Great Britain? Are we not ready to make one struggle, not for the North Atlantic—that is so entirely possessed by others that we are crowded out of it—but a struggle to hold, at all events, some sort of tenure of the trade in South America and on the Pacific Ocean?

I shall vote for this bill. I did not vote for the bill of last winter. I did not think it was a wise bill. I differed from my friend from Michigan, and I especially differed from my honored colleague from whom I rarely part and when I do always with the impression that I may be in the wrong; but for this bill, which offers more and asks less than any other subsidy that has ever been proposed in this country, I shall most cheerfully give my vote.

One word more. I always think, in homely phrase, that it is wise and safe to do the thing which your rival does not want you to do. I am sure that you could get a unanimous vote in the British House of Commons against the grant of this aid by the American Congress. I am sure that a policy for which the British House of Commons would vote unanimously, it is not for the interest of the American Government to uphold.

THE PROGRESS OF THE NORTH-WEST.

[Address of James G. Blaine at the Minneapolis Fair, Minnesota, Tuesday, Sept. 3, 1878.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — An assemblage of the citizens of Minnesota, coming together to rejoice over abundant harvests, and to view the bountiful products of their State, is well calculated to inspire recollections which are of interest beyond the limits of the audience that now honor me with their attention.

Near the borders of your State, on the banks of the great river now flowing in our sight, there resides a man in the full vigor of an honorable old age, long my acquaintance and my friend, whose career calls vividly to mind the wonderful progress of the North-West. In the last two years of General Jackson's Presidency, George W. Jones was the delegate in Congress from that vast area now forming the States of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, together with that part of the Territory of Dakota north of the Missouri River and east of the White Earth. In the last preceding Federal census the total civilized population of the entire territory of Michigan was less than thirty-two thousand — adventurous men standing on the outposts of civilization, and accepting and conquering the hardships of the frontier. At that time — forty-three years ago — there were but two newspapers of any kind whatever published in the whole country of which I have spoken, and not one of these west of Lake Michigan. To-day the same country has eight senators, twenty-nine representatives, and one delegate in Congress; has railroads aggregating eleven thousand miles in length and five hundred millions in cost; has seventy-seven daily newspapers, and more than eleven hundred weekly or monthly publications; has great cities larger than

Philadelphia or New York when the United States had taken its second census and chosen its third President; has a population as great, excluding the slaves of that day, as had the whole country when we met Great Britain for the second time in war; produces a larger amount of breadstuffs than the entire Union produced when General Jones entered Congress; contains more wealth than was owned in the eighteen States that divided their electoral votes between James Madison and DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency in 1812. Such facts as these may well cause us to give thanks to God and to a virtuous ancestry for the blessings of liberty and good government which have made all this progress possible.

Geographically the State of Minnesota is a land of singular and surpassing interest. Lying about equi-distant from the great oceans on the east, on the west, on the north, and on the south, her situation, as compared with her sister States, is altogether peculiar, and in one respect is without parallel on any continent. Her surface forms the central water-shed of North America; and not far from where we stand streams have their modest sources which finally lose themselves in one direction through Hudson's Bay in the Arctic waters, in another through the chain of the great lakes in the Atlantic Ocean, and a third through the Mississippi River in the Gulf of Mexico. To the westward, nature has raised an insurmountable barrier to the water-course, but the invention of man has found a more rapid transit; and through the power of steam and over the road of iron there is already projected and partly achieved the great commercial highway to the Pacific foretold by La Salle when, standing on the banks of the St. Lawrence, by the rapids whose name perpetuates his prophecy, pointing to the untrodden West, whither he had already turned his face, he pronounced to his doubting companions the inspiring word, "La Chine!"

Viewed historically, that which now constitutes the State of Minnesota has undergone as many and as rapid changes in its sovereignty as any disputed territory in Europe which has been fought over by armed hosts set in motion by the ambition of kings or the jealousy of rival nationalities. This fair land was under the dominion of France during the reigns of Louis XIV. and his great-grandson. Iberville, who led the French

colony to Louisiana, was its first Governor, and Bienville, who founded New Orleans, was its second. It was pawned by the Regent Orleans in his scheme with John Law for creating value out of moonshine, and was made with other territory the basis of that fraudulent scheme projected by the Mississippi Company—in which real estate in Minnesota, still in the undisputed possession of the savage and the wild beast, became the shadowy foundation in Paris, one hundred and sixty years ago, of a far greater monetary credit than it could command to-day in the same financial market, with all its improvements and its great intrinsic value. It was in part under the dominion of George III. of England, until he was compelled to yield his right to your soil by the treaty of 1783, and to withdraw the last Red Coat by the treaty of 1795. For thirty-seven years, all on the west side of your dividing river was attached to the crown of Spain during the reigns of the Third and Fourth Charles, and given up by the latter in 1800 to France, when for a period of three brief years Napoleon Bonaparte was the sovereign ruler of the larger half of Minnesota. The First Consul always did business on a basis of hard cash, and he transferred the French possessions in America to the United States for fifteen millions of dollars, eighty years after John Law and his speculating partner, the Duke of Orleans, had made the same possessions the basis for an issue of paper money amounting to nearly three thousand millions of francs. Some reflections are naturally suggested by these facts which would perhaps not be entirely pertinent to an address before an Agricultural Society. I may be pardoned, however, for the inference that the “resources of a great country” do not afford a sound and secure basis for an enlarged paper currency.

But these changes of European sovereignty over the soil of Minnesota are not more striking or more strange than the rapid transformation of its government since it came under the sovereignty of the United States. It is almost forgotten history, that the eastern half of your State was claimed during the Revolutionary struggle as part of Virginia, by no less a Governor than Thomas Jefferson; that as part of the Northwest Territory the gallant but unfortunate Arthur St. Clair was its chief Executive; that as part of Indiana, William

Henry Harrison, frontiersman, soldier, statesman, was made its Governor at the age of twenty-seven years; that as part of Illinois the large-framed and large-hearted Ninian Edwards ruled over it, appointed thereto by President Madison at the personal request of "a young senator named Clay" as he is significantly styled in a certain record; that as part of Michigan Territory, General Cass was its efficient and careful Executive; that as part of Wisconsin, the chivalrous and courageous Henry Dodge was its popular Governor—and also its delegate in Congress from one-half its domain, while his worthy and still living son, as delegate at the same time from Iowa, represented the other half,—a striking coincidence, rendered still more remarkable by the meeting again of father and son as Senators from the States which they represented in the House when Territories.

Nor of the section of your State west of the Mississippi does it read less strangely, that when sold to the National Government by Napoleon Bonaparte it became part of the organized Territory of Louisiana; was soon changed to Missouri, and had for long years as its Governor the brave, adventurous William Clarke, who in company with Meriwether Lewis, under the direction of President Jefferson, made that extraordinary journey from ocean to ocean—the first white men who crossed the continent on soil belonging to the United States, leaving their names forever associated with a great achievement, familiar to all who have read the hardships and conquests of the "Lewis and Clarke" expedition. Minnesota afterwards formed part of the magnificent and rapidly growing Territory of Iowa, which soon took on the stature of a full-grown, vigorous Commonwealth.

Iowa and Wisconsin having been admitted as States, their joint remainders naturally formed one government, and in 1849 the Territory of Minnesota was organized. Thus Minnesota, east and west of the Mississippi fell under the same government for the first time since the United States had acquired Louisiana from France, with the exception of a brief period under the old territorial organization of Michigan, and an equally brief one under that of Wisconsin. That seems but yesterday; yet the sowing of the next crop will mark full

rounded thirty years since the organic Act was passed by Congress, and President Zachary Taylor appointed Alexander Ramsey first Governor of the new Territory. His Excellency is among you to-day, after enjoying the highest honors of your Territory and your State, looking as fresh and as vigorous as when in the administrations of John Tyler and James K. Polk he represented a Pennsylvania district in the Congress of the United States. He might pass still as a young man, if his luminous record, made in two States and in both branches of Congress, did not enable us to measure the threescore years that crown his honored head.

To trace the history and development of Minnesota from its organization in 1849 would far transcend the proprieties or even the possibilities of this occasion. But whoever will enter into the details of the progress here made will find one of the most remarkable advances of civilization, and in a period so brief that it does not comprehend the life of one generation. In 1849 your Territory contained but forty-six hundred inhabitants; to-day your State has seven hundred thousand. In 1849 you raised fourteen hundred bushels of wheat; last year you raised thirty-three million bushels. These figures are but an index to your increase in all forms of material wealth. The pages of your census tables seem like a romance, the statistics of your progress dazzle the reader with their proportions and almost challenge his credulity at every column.

I am addressing an agricultural community. During all the depression of trade and commerce and manufactures in these past five years, you have steadily advanced in comfort and independence. While thousands elsewhere have lacked employment, and many, I fear, have lacked bread, no able-bodied man in Minnesota has been without remunerative labor and no one has gone to bed hungry. Your pursuits and their results form the basis of the ideal Republic—happily realized within your own borders. The tendency of all your industry is toward the accumulation of individual competency, and does not favor the upbuilding of colossal fortunes. You are dealing daily with the essential things of life, and are not warped in your judgment or deflected from your course by speculative and illusory schemes of gain. You are land-owners,

free-holders, proud titles that come to us with centuries of civilization and strength—titles that every man in this country should make it his object to acquire and to honor. Self-government among the owners of the soil in America is an instinct, and where that ownership is widely distributed good government is the rule. Whatever disturbances therefore may threaten the peace and order of society, whatever wild theories, transplanted from other climes, may seek foot-hold here, the Republic of the United States rests securely on that basis of agriculture where the farmers of the Revolution and the framers of the Constitution placed it. The man who possesses broad acres which he has earned by the sweat of his own face, is not apt to fall in with the doctrine of the Communist, that no one has a right to ownership in the soil. The man who has the product of his labor in wheat and in corn, in pork and in beef, in hides and in wool—commanding gold and silver as they always have done and always will do in the markets of the world—is not to be led astray with theories of fiat paper and absolute money, but instinctively consigns such wild vagaries to the appropriate domain of fiat folly and absolute nonsense.

The farmers of the Republic will control its destiny. Agriculture, commerce and manufactures are the three pursuits that enrich a nation—but the greatest of these is agriculture—for without its products the spindle cannot turn and the ship will not sail. Agriculture furnishes the conservative element in society and in the end is the guiding, restraining, controlling force in government. Against storms of popular fury; against frenzied madness that seeks collision with established order; against theories of administration that have drenched other lands in blood; against the spirit of anarchy that would sweep away the landmarks and safeguards of Christian society and Republican government, the farmers of the United States will stand as the shield and the bulwark—themselves the willing subjects of law and therefore its safest and strongest administrators.

Gradually the Government of the Republic is passing under the control of the farmers of the Mississippi valley. Indeed it is practically there to-day. The swelling and on-rushing tide of population is towards the broad plains and the rich acres

that lie between the two mountain ranges of the continent. The soil is so fertile, the land so inviting, the area so broad, that no man may dare calculate the possibilities of this great region either as respects production or population. Your own State, peopled no more densely than New York, would have a population of nine millions; peopled as densely as Massachusetts, it would have a population of sixteen millions. With the transfer of political control from the old States to the new, there is also transferred a vast weight of responsibility. It is yours to-day; it will be yours still more to-morrow. Take it; use it wisely and well for the advancement of the whole — for the honor of all. The patriotic traditions of the “old thirteen” that fought the battles of the Revolution, formed the Union of the States, and planted Liberty in the organic Law, will be your safest guide, your highest inspiration. Many of you to-day mingle with your love for Minnesota, your earlier affection for the old home and the old State far to the East, where an honored ancestry lie buried, and where the tenderest memories cluster around the familiar scenes of days long past. It is this kinship of blood, these ties of memory, that make us indeed one people — uniting the East and the West, the North and the South, in the indissoluble bonds of a common, and I trust, always beneficent Government.

SOUTHERN ABUSE OF ELECTIVE FRANCHISE.

[On the 2d of December, 1878, Mr. Blaine submitted the following resolution to the Senate:—

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire and report to the Senate whether at the recent elections the Constitutional rights of American citizens were violated in any of the States of the Union; whether the right of suffrage of citizens of the United States, or of any class of such citizens, was denied or abridged by the action of the election officers of any State in refusing to receive their votes, in failing to count them, or in receiving and counting fraudulent ballots in pursuance of a conspiracy to make the lawful votes of such citizens of none effect; and whether such citizens were prevented from exercising the elective franchise, or forced to use it against their wishes, by violence or threats, or hostile demonstrations of armed men or other organizations, or by any other unlawful means or practices.

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be further instructed to inquire and report whether it is within the competency of Congress to provide by additional legislation for the more perfect security of the right of suffrage to citizens of the United States in all the States of the Union.

Resolved, That in prosecuting these inquiries the Judiciary Committee shall have the right to send for persons and papers.

On Wednesday, Dec. 11, Mr. Blaine addressed the Senate as follows:—]

MR. PRESIDENT, — The pending resolutions were offered by me with a twofold purpose in view:—

First, to place on record, in a definite and authentic form, the frauds and outrages by which certain recent elections for representatives in Congress were carried by the Democratic party in the Southern States.

Second, to find if there be any method by which a repetition of these crimes against a free ballot may be prevented.

The newspaper is the channel through which the people of the United States are informed of current events, and the accounts given in the press represent the elections in some of the Southern States to have been accompanied by violence, in not a few cases reaching the destruction of life; to have been controlled by threats that awed and intimidated a large

class of voters ; to have been manipulated by fraud of the most shameless and shameful description. Indeed in South Carolina there seems to have been no election at all in any proper sense of the term. There was a series of skirmishes over the State, in which the polling-places were regarded as forts to be captured by one party and held against the other ; and where this could not be done with convenience, frauds in the count, and tissue-ballot devices were resorted to in order effectually to destroy the voice of the majority. These in brief are the accounts given in the non-partisan press, of the disgraceful outrages that attended the recent elections ; and so far as I have seen, these statements are without serious contradiction. It is but just and fair to all parties, however, that an impartial investigation of the facts shall be made by a committee of the Senate, proceeding under the authority of law and representing the power of the Nation. Hence my resolution.

But we do not need investigation to establish certain facts already of official record. We know that one hundred and six representatives in Congress were recently chosen in the States formerly slave-holding, and that the Democrats elected one hundred and one or possibly one hundred and two and the Republicans four or possibly five. We know that thirty-five of these representatives were assigned to the Southern States by reason of the colored population, and that the entire political power thus founded on the numbers of the colored people has been seized and appropriated to the aggrandizement of its own strength by the Democratic party of the South.

The issue thus raised before the country, Mr. President, is not one of mere sentiment for the rights of the negro — though far distant be the day when the rights of any American citizen, however black or however poor, shall form the mere dust of the balance in any controversy. Nor is the issue one that involves the waving of the “bloody shirt,” to quote the elegant vernacular of Democratic vituperation ; nor still further is the issue as now presented only a question of the equality of the black voter of the South with the white voter of the South. The issue, Mr. President, has taken a far wider range, one indeed of portentous magnitude ; viz., whether the white voter of the North shall be equal to the white voter of the South in shaping

the policy and fixing the destiny of this country; or whether, to state it still more baldly, the white man who fought in the ranks of the Union Army shall have as weighty and influential a vote in the Government of the Republic as the white man who fought in the ranks of the Rebel Army. The one fought to uphold, the other to destroy, the Union of the States, and to-day he who fought to destroy is a far more important factor in the Government of the Nation than he who fought to uphold.

Let me illustrate my meaning by comparing groups of States of the same representative strength North and South. The States of South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana send seventeen representatives to Congress. Their aggregate population is composed of one million and thirty-five thousand whites and one million two hundred and twenty-four thousand colored; the colored being nearly two hundred thousand in excess of the whites. Of the seventeen representatives, it is evident that nine were apportioned to these States by reason of their colored population, and only eight by reason of their white population; and yet in the choice of the entire seventeen representatives the colored voters had no more voice or power than their remote kindred on the shores of Senegambia or on the coast of Guinea. The one million and thirty-five thousand white people had the sole and absolute choice of the entire seventeen representatives. In contrast, two States in the North, Iowa and Wisconsin, with seventeen representatives have a white population of two million two hundred and forty-seven thousand, considerably more than double the entire white population of the three Southern States I have named. In Iowa and Wisconsin, therefore, it takes one hundred and thirty-two thousand white population to send a representative to Congress, but in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana every sixty thousand white people send a representative. In other words, sixty thousand white people in those Southern States have precisely the same political power in the government of the country that one hundred and thirty-two thousand white people have in Iowa and Wisconsin.

Take another group of seventeen representatives from the

South and from the North. Georgia and Alabama have a white population of eleven hundred and fifty-eight thousand and a colored population of ten hundred and twenty thousand. They send seventeen representatives to Congress, of whom nine were apportioned on account of the white population and eight on account of the colored population. But the colored voters are not able to choose a single representative, the white Democrats choosing the whole seventeen. The four Northern States, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and California, have seventeen representatives, based on a white population of two and a quarter millions, or almost double the white population of Georgia and Alabama, so that in these relative groups of States we find the white man in the South exercising by his vote double the political power of the white man in the North.

Let us carry the comparison to a more comprehensive generalization. The eleven States that formed the Confederate government had by the last census a population of nine and a half millions, of which in round numbers five and a half millions were white and four millions colored. On this aggregate population seventy-three representatives in Congress were apportioned to those States, forty-two or three of which were by reason of the white population, and thirty or thirty-one by reason of the colored population. At the recent election the white Democracy of the South seized seventy of the seventy-three districts, and thus secured a Democratic majority in the next House of Representatives. Thus it appears that throughout the States which formed the late Confederate Government, sixty-five thousand whites—the very people that rebelled against the Union—are enabled to elect a representative in Congress, while in the loyal States it requires one hundred and thirty-two thousand of the white people that fought for the Union to elect a representative. In levying every tax, therefore, in making every appropriation of money, in fixing every line of public policy, in decreeing what shall be the fate and fortune of the Republic, the Confederate soldier South is enabled to cast a vote that is twice as influential and twice as powerful as the vote of the Union soldier North.

But the white men of the South did not acquire and do not hold this superior power by reason of law or justice, but in

disregard and defiance of both. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was expected to be and was designed to be a preventive and corrective of all such possible abuses. The reading of the clause applicable to the case is instructive and suggestive. Hear it:—

“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”

The patent, undeniable intent of this provision was that if any class of voters should be denied or in any way abridged in their right of suffrage, then the class so denied or abridged should not be counted in the basis of representation; or, in other words, that no State or States should gain a large increase of representation in Congress by reason of counting any class of population not permitted to take part in electing such representatives. But the construction given to this provision is that before any forfeiture of representation can be enforced the denial or abridgment of suffrage must be the result of a law specifically enacted by the State. Under this construction every negro voter may have his suffrage absolutely denied or fatally abridged by the violence, actual or threatened, of irresponsible mobs, or by frauds and deceptions of State officers from the governor down to the last election clerk, and then, unless some State law can be shown that authorizes the denial or abridgment, the State escapes all penalty or peril of reduced representation. This construction may be upheld by the courts, ruling on the letter of the law, “which killeth,” but the spirit of justice cries aloud against the evasive and atrocious conclusion that deals out oppression to the innocent and shields the guilty from the legitimate consequences of willful transgression.

The colored citizen is thus most unhappily situated; his

right of suffrage is but a hollow mockery ; it holds to his ear the word of promise but breaks it always to his hope, and he ends only in being made the unwilling instrument of increasing the political strength of that party from which he suffered ever-tightening fetters when he was a slave and contemptuous refusal of civil rights since he was made free. He resembles indeed those unhappy captives in the East who, deprived of their birthright, are compelled to yield their strength to the aggrandizement of the monarch from whose tyrannies they have most to fear, and to fight against the power from which alone deliverance might be expected. The franchise intended for the shield and defense of the negro has been turned against him and against his friends and has vastly increased the power of those from whom he has nothing to hope and every thing to dread.

The political strength thus unjustly seized by Southern Democrats by reason of the negro population is equal to thirty-five representatives in Congress. It is massed almost solidly and offsets the great State of New York ; or Pennsylvania and New Jersey together ; or the whole of New England ; or Ohio and Indiana united ; or the combined strength of Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, California, Nevada, Nebraska, Colorado, and Oregon. The seizure of this power is wanton usurpation ; it is flagrant outrage ; it is violent perversion of the whole theory of Republican government. It inures solely to the apparent advantage and yet, I believe, to the permanent dishonor of the Democratic party. It is by reason of this trampling down of human rights, this ruthless seizure of unlawful power, that the Democratic party holds the popular branch of Congress to-day and will in less than ninety days have control of this body also, thus grasping the entire Legislative department of the Government through the unlawful capture of the Southern States. If the proscribed vote of the South were cast as its lawful owners desire, the Democratic party could not gain control. Nay, if the ballot of the colored man were not counted on the other side, against the instincts and the interests, against the principles and the prejudices, of its lawful owners, Democratic success would be hopeless. It is not enough, then, for modern Democratic tactics that the negro vote shall be silenced ; the demand goes farther and insists

that it shall be counted on the Democratic side, that all the representatives in Congress and all the Presidential electors apportioned by reason of the negro vote shall be so cast and so controlled as to insure Democratic success — regardless of justice, in defiance of law.

This great wrong is wholly unprovoked. I doubt if it be in the power of the most searching investigation to show that in any Southern State during the period of Republican control any legal voter was ever debarred from the freest exercise of his suffrage. Even the revenges which would have leaped into life with many who despised the negro were buried out of sight with a magnanimity which the "superior race" fail to follow and seem reluctant to recognize. I know it is said in reply to such charges against the Southern elections as I am now reviewing, that unfairness of equal gravity prevails in Northern elections. I hear it in many quarters and read it in the papers that in the late exciting election in Massachusetts intimidation and bulldozing, if not so rough and rancorous as in the South, were yet as wide-spread and effective.

I have read and yet I refuse to believe that the distinguished gentleman, who made an energetic but unsuccessful canvass for the governorship of that State, has indorsed and approved these charges, and I have accordingly made my resolution broad enough to include their thorough investigation. I am not demanding fair elections in the South without demanding fair elections in the North also. But venturing to speak for the New England States, of whose laws and customs I know something, I dare assert that in the late election in Massachusetts, or any of her neighboring Commonwealths, it will be impossible to find even one case where a voter was driven from the polls, where a voter did not have the fullest, fairest, freest opportunity to cast the ballot of his choice and have it honestly and faithfully counted in the returns. Suffrage on this continent was first made universal in New England, and in the administration of their affairs her people have found no other appeal necessary than that which is addressed to their honesty of conviction and to their intelligent self-interest. If there be any thing different to disclose I pray you show it to us that we may amend our ways.

But whenever a feeble protest is made against such injustice as I have described in the South, the response we receive comes to us in the form of a taunt, "What are you going to do about it?" and "How do you propose to help yourselves?" This is the stereotyped answer of defiance which intrenched wrong always gives to inquiring justice. Those who imagine it to be conclusive do not know the temper of the American people. For let me assure you that against the complicated outrage upon the right of representation lately triumphant in the South there will be arrayed many phases of public opinion in the North not often hitherto in harmony. Men who have cared little, and affected to care less, for the rights or the wrongs of the negro suddenly find that vast monetary and commercial interests, great questions of revenue, adjustments of tariff, investments in manufactures, in railways, and in mines, are under the control of a Democratic Congress whose majority was obtained by depriving the negro of his rights under a common Constitution and common laws. Men who have expressed disgust with the waving of bloody shirts and have been offended with talk about negro equality are beginning to perceive that the question of to-day relates more pressingly to the equality of white men under this Government, and that however careless they may be about the rights or the wrongs of the negro, they are jealous and tenacious about the rights of their own race and the dignity of their own firesides and their own kindred.

I know something of public opinion in the North. I know a great deal about the views, wishes, and purposes of the Republican party of the Nation. Within that entire great organization there is not one man, whose opinion is entitled to be quoted, that does not desire peace and harmony and friendship and a patriotic and fraternal union between the North and the South. This wish is spontaneous and universal throughout the Northern States; and yet, among men of character and sense, there is surely no need of attempting to deceive ourselves as to the precise truth. First pure, then peaceable. Gush will not remove a grievance, and no disguise of State rights will close the eyes of our people to the necessity of correcting a great National wrong. Nor should the South make the fatal

mistake of concluding that injustice to the negro is not also injustice to the white man; nor should it ever be forgotten that for the wrongs of both a remedy will assuredly be found. The war, with all its costly sacrifices, was fought in vain unless equal rights for all classes be established in all the States of the Union. In words which are those of friendship, however they may be accepted, I tell the men of the South here on this floor and beyond this Chamber, that even if they could strip the negro of his Constitutional rights they can never permanently maintain the inequality of white men in this nation. They can never make a white man's vote in the South doubly as powerful in the administration of the Government as a white man's vote in the North.

In a memorable debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Macaulay reminded Daniel O'Connell, when he was moving for Repeal, that the English Whigs had endured calumny, abuse, popular fury, loss of position, exclusion from Parliament rather than that the great agitator himself should be less than a British subject; and Mr. Macaulay warned him that they would never suffer him to be more. Let me now remind you that the Government, under whose protecting flag we sit to-day, sacrificed myriads of lives and expended thousands of millions of treasure that our countrymen of the South should remain citizens of the United States, having equal personal rights and equal political privileges with all other citizens. I venture, now and here, to warn the men of the South, in the exact words of Macaulay, that we will never suffer them to be more!

[NOTE. — The resolution offered by Mr. Blaine was amended by assigning the work of investigation to a special committee instead of the Judiciary. The report of the well-known "Teller Committee" was the result of the movement.]

SPEECH OF MR. BLAINE AT THE DINNER OF
THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY OF NEW YORK,
DEC. 23, 1878.

[The President of the Society, Mr. D. F. Appleton, called on Senator Blaine to respond to the following toast, introducing him, not as a native, but as a representative man from New England:—

“New England Character—adapted to every requirement: it fits her sons not only to fill, but to adorn every station.” Mr. Blaine’s response is given below.]

GENTLEMEN OF THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY. — Your President has kindly relieved me from a personal explanation. I am only a brother-in-law, so to speak. Brothers-in-law are useful in families occasionally, and in a New-England family, where modesty is the prevailing fault, and where you can rarely induce one of the direct blood and descent to say any thing in praise of his race, it is, perhaps, fortunate that, unembarrassed by personal prudery, I can speak my mind freely about you. I never saw New England until after I was a man grown, but I have lived more than half my life on its soil, and I have six children, who represent the ninth generation in descent from ancestors who belonged to the old Massachusetts colony. I am ready to say, Mr. President, in any presence, recollecting, as I always do, with pride, my Pennsylvania birth and my Scotch and Scotch-Irish ancestry—I am ready to say, that in the settlement of this continent and the shaping and moulding of its free institutions, the leading place belongs to New England. Every chapter of its stalwart history is weighty with momentous events. A small number of immigrants came in 1620; there was no appreciable increase of immigration until after 1630; there was none after 1640. The twenty-one thousand men who came in those brief years are the progenitors of a race that includes one-third of the people

of the United States of America. They are the progenitors of a race of people twice as numerous as all who spoke the English language when they came to these shores.

The tyrannical father of Frederick the Great said to his tutor, "Instruct this young boy in history; do not dwell much on the ancients, but let him know every thing that has happened in the last hundred and fifty years." I submit to you, Mr. President, that the great event which has happened in the last hundred and fifty years has been the progress of the English-speaking race. Not seven millions of people spoke the tongue when the Pilgrim Fathers landed at Plymouth; not seventeen millions spoke it when the American Revolution was born. In this hundred years the progress of other nations has been great. The German empire has been re-formed, and is stronger and firmer than it ever existed before; Russia, springing from semi-barbarism, has come to be a first-class power; Italy has been born again, and promises something of its ancient grandeur; France has fallen and risen, and fallen and again risen under the aid and inspiration of Republican energy and patriotism. Yet with all this progress of all these countries, the one great fact of the last hundred years is that when the revolution of the American colonies was fought, the English-speaking people of the world were not 17,000,000, and to-day they are 100,000,000 in number.

Another fact — I pray you will excuse my reviewing history. We are in the habit of deploring the hardships of the men who settled New England, and in deploring their hardships we are in the habit of alluding to them as a poor and friendless and downcast race of men. They were any thing else. They had the nerve and courage to endure hardship. They were a class of men, the like of whom never before and never since emigrated from any land. They were men of intelligence and learning: they were men of property. The twenty-one thousand men that came to New England and settled the five colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, New Haven, Connecticut, and Providence, brought with them according to authentic history, five hundred thousand pounds — two and a half millions of our dollars. Reckoning money as worth then six times what it is now, this property represents, in its power to purchase, at

least fifteen millions of our money of to-day. Show me any other twenty-one thousand emigrants in this world that ever carried fifteen millions of property with them—anywhere! How few towns in the United States of twenty-one thousand people to-day represent more than fifteen millions of property!

These Puritan emigrants were men as I have already said of property and education and large experience in affairs; they were men who were accomplished in the literature of Milton and Locke and Lightfoot; they were men in whose ministry were John Robinson and Brewster and Davenport; they were men in whose statesmanship were Cromwell and Hampden and Pym; they were men who, in all the great departments of civil polity and in all the great features of personal and individual character, led the van of the English race. When we wonder at what has been done in New England we wonder without due reflection, for those men brought with them all the elements of the great success that has since crowned their efforts. They brought one thing which has endured well, and that was the belief that if you set in motion a principle founded on truth, it will go through. [Applause.] They sturdily believed, in the language of one of their most eloquent men, that an army of principles will penetrate where an army of men cannot enter. The Rhine cannot stop it or the ocean arrest its progress. It will march to the horizon of the world, and it will conquer. And the conquest is permanent!

That this strong race has been abused and reviled, is, of course, inevitable. You remember the old fellow in London, fumbling with his watch-chain, who replied to some one complimenting him on its strength, "Of course it is strong. There isn't a pick-pocket in London as hasn't taken a tug at it in his day." There is hardly any one outside of New England who has not taken a hand in abusing the Yankee race. I never heard it abused in quite so eloquent a manner as by our friend of the Central Railroad this evening when speaking for the West. Assuredly I agree with him that New-Englanders ought to remember the influence which the West has had upon New England, and by the West you must remember New England means all of the North American continent outside of her own borders. We are constantly telling the Western people how much New Eng-

land has done for them, and in sober truth it has done a great deal. But let me frankly acknowledge that the West has moulded and modified and developed and advanced New England in a degree which New England does not perhaps fully appreciate. Just as New England has re-acted upon Old England, so the New-Englanders who have gone West have re-acted upon the New-Englanders who have remained at home. The New England of fifty years ago of which our reverend friend, Dr. Storrs, spoke so eloquently, does not exist to-day. The New England of which my friend Depew has spoken of as swarming into New York is a thing of the past. They have taken possession. The current has practically been equalized, and by action and re-action, New-England ideas, potent always in the West and throughout the country, have become still more potent by the fact that the original source of the influence has been largely affected by the streams which have returned to fructify and enrich at home.

Another feature. We forget that when the Pilgrim Fathers came to this country they left a state of affairs in England which boded revolution, and which in effect wrought out two revolutions before the English people achieved the rights for which they were contending. Yet, in 1620, the Pilgrim Fathers planted in this country the exact rights which those at home in England obtained by the beheading of Charles I. and the expulsion of his son, James II., from the throne. They brought with them the abandonment of feudalism; they brought the abolition of primogeniture; they brought the annulment of the entail law; they brought the destruction of the privileges of the nobility; they brought and founded here sixty-eight years before it was realized in England, all the great reforms for which two bloody revolutions were fought — revolutions which cost one king his head and another his crown in Old England.

Mr. President, I should like to see this brilliant company seated at a typical New England feast of the olden time, — a feast spread on tables that came over in the *Mayflower*, — you can find plenty of them at home; the guests seated on chairs that belonged to John Alden and Miles Standish, — and no well-regulated New-England family is without a broken assortment of them. It would be extremely edifying to see a

feast that should reproduce as far as might be the harder times and the coarser fare which they endured in order that we might enjoy the more bounteous and more sumptuous repast with which we are indulged to-day by the New England Society of New York — and I almost catch my breath when I say the New England Society of New York — you do not know how we regard it in New England! There are a great many men in New England who aspire to a seat in Congress, first in the House, and then in the Senate, and thence forward or backward to the Cabinet, and then, under the inspiration of the strong air and the mountain scenery of Vermont aspire still higher [turning round to Mr. Evarts—a movement which provoked loud laughter]. But that is only the few. The one thing which every boy, as he grows up in New England, looks forward to as the crowning glory of his life, is to dine on some auspicious day with the New England Society of New York. Without this, his sum of human happiness is incomplete. I have received your invitation for many years past, but it has been my misfortune never to have been able to be present until now, and I am here this evening to acknowledge all the pleasure I enjoy in the present, and to express my regret for all that I have missed in the past! And while we are enjoying this dinner and complimenting ourselves—or I am complimenting you—I should like, Mr. President, to impress upon every New-Englander, whether seated at the primitive table of coarse fare or the modern table of costly luxury, that with one voice we should echo the declarations of our distinguished friend, the Secretary of the Treasury [Mr. Sherman], in favor of an honest dollar, and declare with equal earnestness our faith in an honest ballot! The principles of our Fathers demand that we should supplement the peaceful and promising picture drawn by the eloquent Secretary of State (Mr. Evarts) with the resolution that wherever an honest dollar circulates, an honest ballot shall sustain it. I could wish that in this respect the habit and the practice of the New England States might spread rapidly and succeed completely throughout the whole country. For I am reminded, with a citizen of Massachusetts on one side of me and a native of Massachusetts on the other, that in that great Commonwealth, in a

hotly-contested election, in which the passions and pride and prejudices of men were enlisted, there was a contest so close that the party in power, having, as we would say, all the counters in their possession, in a total poll of more than one hundred thousand votes were beaten by a majority of one,—and Edward Everett the Whig walked out and Marcus Morton the Democrat walked in. None but the English-speaking people have yet been fully educated in the belief that a majority of one is as good as a majority of one hundred thousand, but we do believe it and we practice it and abide by it in New England. I need not say that a majority going even into the millions, if it be founded on force or on fraud, will never bring contentment or peace or honor or profit to the people of the United States.

Mr. President, I thank you very sincerely, I thank you all, gentlemen of the New England Society, for the cordiality of your welcome. In this inspiring scene, in this brilliant assemblage, surrounded with every thing that gives comfort and grace and elegance to social life, in this meeting, protected by law, itself representing law, let me recall one sad memory,—the memory of those who in 1620 landed on the Plymouth shore, and did not survive the first year. Of all the men engaged in heroic contests, those deserve our tenderest remembrance who, making all the sacrifice and enduring all the hardship, are not permitted to enjoy the triumph. Quincy died before the first shot was fired in the Revolution which he did so much to create; Warren was killed at the first clash of arms in defense of the cause which was so sacred to his patriotic heart; Reynolds, rallying his corps for the critical battle of Gettysburg, fell while yet its fate was doubtful; McPherson, in the great march to the sea, lost his life before the triumphant close of that daring and romantic expedition. For these and all like unto them, from Plymouth Rock to the last battlefield of the civil war, who perished in their pride, and perished before they could know that they were dying not in vain but for a cause destined to victory, I offer, and I am sure you will join with me in offering, our veneration and our homage!

CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO THE PACIFIC SLOPE.

[The question of abrogating so much of the Burlingame Treaty as permitted the free immigration of Chinese was before the Senate of the United States in February, 1879. On the 14th of that month Mr. Blaine addressed the Senate as follows:—]

MR. PRESIDENT, — In the remarks made yesterday by the honorable senator from Ohio [Mr. Matthews] he intimated, if he did not directly assert, that the Government of the United States had solicited from the Chinese Empire the treaty now under consideration. The statement is I think, though of course not so intended, the exact reverse of the historic fact. What is known as the Reed Treaty had given to the merchants of the United States, and to all who desired to trade in China, the facilities they desired. The Burlingame Treaty involving other points was certainly asked from the United States in the most impressive manner by a Chinese embassy. The eminent gentleman who had gone to China as our minister, had transferred his services to the Chinese Empire, and returning to us with great *prestige* at the head of a special embassy from China, with a great number of friends at home, was able to do what perhaps no other man then living could have done for China. He was often spoken of during his lifetime as merely a stump speaker. He has been ten years in his grave; and I desire, now that his name is before us, to refer to him as a man of great address and great ability, a man who showed his power by the commanding position which he acquired in the Chinese Empire and by the influence which he exerted in his own country in its relations to China.

This subject divides itself naturally into two parts, one of form and one of substance. The one of form is whether we may rightfully adopt this mode of terminating the treaty.

The second and graver question is whether it is desirable to exclude Chinese immigration from this country. I noticed that the senator from Ohio yesterday in discussing the first of these questions called the attention of the Senate to the gravity of the obligation which exists between the two countries, but he stopped reading at a very significant point. He read the following paragraph or part of a paragraph from the fifth article of the treaty : —

“The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.”

Here the honorable senator from Ohio stopped, and it was well for his argument that he did, for directly after the words that he read are the following : —

“The high contracting parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other than an *entirely voluntary emigration* for these purposes. They consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offense for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any other foreign country, or for a Chinese subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of the United States to China or to any other foreign country without their free and voluntary consent respectively.”

I maintain that the latter clause of the treaty has been persistently violated by China from the hour it was made. In the sense in which we receive immigration from Europe not one Chinese immigrant has ever come to these shores. The qualifying words were understood at the time to have been penned by Mr. Seward. They are worth repeating; and as my honorable friend from Ohio did not read them yesterday, I will read them again in his hearing : —

“The high contracting parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other than an *entirely voluntary emigration* for these purposes.”

The words are worth emphasizing; not merely “voluntary,” it must be “*entirely* voluntary,” and then each nation is to make laws to secure this end. I am informed by those who are more familiar with this subject than I am, that no notice has been received at the State Department showing that China has ever complied with that provision of the treaty requiring

her to make laws regulating emigration. Still less has she attempted to enforce a law on the subject. The mere making of a law and not enforcing it would be no compliance with the treaty. The Chinese agree, in other words, to enforce the provision that there should be nothing else than "voluntary" emigration, an "entirely voluntary" emigration. They have never done as they agreed, they have been absolutely faithless on that point.

The treaty stands as broken and defied by China from the hour it was made to this time. Its terms have never been complied with. We have been compelled to legislate against it. We legislated against it in the Cooly law. The Chinese were so flagrantly violating it that statutes of the United States were enacted to contravene the evil the Chinese were doing. The evil has gone on, probably not so grossly since these laws were passed as before, but in effect the same. The point which the senator makes in regard to our Punic faith in attempting to break this treaty, is therefore answered by the fact that the treaty has been broken continuously by the other power.

The senator from Ohio asked what we should do in a similar case if the other contracting party were Great Britain or Germany or France or any power that was able to make war. I ask the honorable senator what he would advise us to do if Great Britain or France or Germany should locate six commercial companies in New York, whose business it should be to bring to this country the worst class and the lowest class of the population of those three kingdoms? What would the honorable senator from Ohio say to that? or does he hesitate to declare what we should say to it?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Does the senator desire an answer?

Mr. BLAINE. Yes, if the senator pleases.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then, Mr. President, I would say this, that instead of inaugurating an arbitrary and *ex parte* act of legislation on our own part, giving our own construction to the treaty and the conduct of the other party under it, I would, through the usual diplomatic representative of this country, make representations to that Government making complaints of the alleged breach of the treaty, and ask what answer could be made to that; and only in the event, as a last resort, of a

contumacious refusal to obey the plain requisitions of the treaty obligation, would I resort to a repudiation of our own obligations under it.

Mr. BLAINE. Ah! I asked him what he would do in case the contracting parties had themselves broken the treaty and we were the victims of the breach. He answers me that he would take hat in hand and bow politely before them, and ask them if they would not behave better! What are we to do as a measure of self-defense when they have broken it, and taken the initiative? I say that this country and this Senate would not hesitate to call any European power to account. The argument the senator meant to employ was that we were doing toward a helpless power, not able to make war against us, that which we would not do if a cannon were pointed toward us by a strong power. Does the senator doubt that if any one of these countries should locate six commercial companies here to import the worst portion of their population and put it upon our shores (and you cannot find so bad a population in all Europe as that of which I am speaking), that we would hesitate in our course towards the offending power?

In regard to this treaty, the senator says we should give notice. It has been stated many times in the hearing of the Senate, that nearly one year ago we called the attention of the Executive to this matter. Certainly it must be the presumption of Congress that the President did his duty in the premises. It is not for any senator here to speak of what he has done or what he has not done. The presumption is that all departments have done their duty; and the plain duty of the Executive was to bring this resolution by way of notice to the attention of the Chinese Government. There is another feature to which I beg the honorable senator from Ohio to direct his attention. I hold in my hand a book which contains all the treaties which have been made by the United States with foreign powers from the organization of the Government to the year 1873. The treaties are about two hundred and thirty in number, I think; about one-half of them with European powers, the remainder with South American, Central American, Mexican, Asiatic, and African countries. I believe I could say, although I am a little modest about universal affirmations, I

believe it is almost true as a universal affirmation, that you cannot find, with the exception of the Burlingame Treaty, any one in that whole list relating to a commercial connection, which does not either terminate itself by a certain date or provide the mode of its termination. Almost all of them have a given date upon which they expire. Some of them have a time within which either party may give notice, but there is a clause in almost every one of them providing that by a certain process either country may free itself from the obligations that it assumed. The Burlingame Treaty is peculiar; it relates to a commercial and personal connection of trade and of emigration, but it does not say that it shall last ten years or twenty years, or any other period; it is interminable in its provisions; it does not provide that we shall give notice in a certain way, or that China shall give notice in a certain way. There is no provision in the world by which it can be terminated unless one of the parties shall take the initiative, as is now proposed.

It is, "I repeat," evident that one party or the other must take the initiative. The senator from Ohio says he would go to the Emperor and make certain representations. Then I ask the honorable senator, Suppose the Emperor should refuse, what would he do? Suppose the Emperor should say, "You have entered into a treaty with my Government for all time; its very terms show that there was to be no limit to it." I ask the honorable senator from Ohio what he would then do? Suppose we are unanimously of opinion here that the treaty ought not to continue, what would the honorable senator do in case the Emperor should say, "I desire to stand by that treaty"? What then?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Does the senator wish an answer?

Mr. BLAINE. Yes, if it be agreeable to the honorable senator from Ohio.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I should take it into consideration. [Laughter.]

Mr. BLAINE. That is a very exact and executive way of doing things. The honorable senator would consider. That is just about as definite a point as I supposed the senator would come to. If the Senate unanimously determine that this treaty ought to be ended and we send an embassy,

as he suggests, to the Emperor and the Emperor says, "No, I think it ought not to be ended," the senator says he would come back and sit down and take it into serious consideration.

The learned senator from Ohio, eminent in the law as he is known to be, read us a lesson upon the great obligations that rest upon us as a nation of honorable people, as if indeed we were about to do something in the way of terminating a treaty that would give us a bad name and fame among the nations of the earth.

In answer to the honorable senator, without attempting to defend all that has been done by various nations in regard to the termination of treaties, let me say that it has been the usual habit and is laid down in the very *principia* of the law of nations (which I need not quote), that when a people find a treaty "pernicious to the nation," — the very words of Vattel, — they may terminate it. We took advantage of this French authority on a very memorable occasion. The treaty which we made with France in 1778, a treaty that was considered to be the origin of our strength in the Revolutionary war, contained this article: —

"Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other, first obtained."

The French afterward said that the Americans, without giving them the slightest notice, "stealthily precipitated" a peace, and left them open either to war or negotiation; and when we were accused of it, we quoted their own author and replied that this action was absolutely essential to the life of our young Nation. We were compelled to do it, and we did it. Self-preservation is the first law of nations, as well as of nature, and we resorted to it.

I proceed, Mr. President, to the second branch of my subject. The Chinese question is not new in this body. We have had it here very often, and have had it here in important relations, and I wish to lay down this principle, that, so far as my vote is concerned, I will not admit a man by immigration to this country whom I am not willing to place on the basis of a citizen. Let me repeat that we ought not to permit in this

country of universal suffrage the immigration of a great people, great in numbers, whom we ourselves declare to be utterly unfit for citizenship.

What do we say on that point? In the Senate of the United States, on the fourth day of July, 1870, a patriotic day, we were amending the naturalization laws. We had practically made all the negroes of the United States voters; at least we had said they should not be deprived of suffrage by reason of race or color. We had admitted them all, and we then amended the naturalization laws so that the emigrant from Africa could become a citizen of the United States. Then Senator Trumbull moved to add:—

“Or persons born in the Chinese Empire.”

He said:—

“I have offered this amendment so as to bring the distinct question before the Senate, whether they will vote to naturalize persons from Africa, and vote to refuse to naturalize those who come from China. I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.”

The yeas and nays were as follows on the question of whether we would ever admit a Chinaman to become an American citizen. The yeas were:—

“Messrs. Fenton, Fowler, McDonald, Pomeroy, Rice, Robertson, Sprague, Sumner, and Trumbull. — 9.”

The nays were:—

“Messrs. Bayard, Boreman, Chandler, Conkling, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Gilbert, Hamilton of Maryland, Hamlin, Harlan, Howe, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Osborn, Ramsey, Saulsbury, Sawyer, Scott, Stewart, Stockton, Thayer, Thurman, Tipton, Vickers, Warner, Willey, Williams, and Wilson. — 31.”

It will thus be seen that the vote was thirty-one against nine in a Senate three-fourths Republican, declaring that the Chinaman never ought to be made a citizen. I think this settles the whole question, if the position assumed by that vote was a correct one, because in our system of Government as it is to-day you cannot, with safety to all, permit a large immigration of people who are not to be made citizens. The senator from California [Mr. Sargent] tells us that already the male adult Chinese in California are as numerous as the white

voters. I take him as an authority from his own State, as I should expect him to take my statement as authority about my own State.

It seems to me that if we adopt as a permanent policy the free immigration of those who, by overwhelming votes in both branches of Congress must forever remain political and social pariahs in a great free Government, we have introduced an element that we cannot control. We cannot stop where we are. We are compelled to do one of two things—either exclude the immigration of Chinese or if we admit them, include them in the great family of citizens.

The argument is often put forward that there is no special danger that large numbers of Chinese will come here; that it is not a practical question; and as the honorable senator from Ohio is free to answer, I ask him if the number should mount up into the millions, what would be his view?

MR. MATTHEWS. The senator seems to expect a reply to his inquiry. I would say that when there was a reasonable apprehension by the United States of the immigration mounting up to such numbers, then I would take that into consideration.

MR. BLAINE. Take that into consideration also! The senator is definite! If the Chinese should amount to millions in the population of the Pacific slope, he would begin to take it into consideration! That is practical legislation! That is legislating for an evil which is upon us to-day! The senator's statesmanship is certainly of a considerate kind.

A word now about the question of numbers. Did it ever occur to my honorable friend from Ohio that the large numbers, the incalculable hordes in China, are much nearer to the Pacific coast of the United States, in point of money and transit, in point of expense of reaching it, than the people of Kansas? A man in Shanghai or Hong-Kong can be delivered at San Francisco more cheaply than a man in Omaha. I do not speak of the Atlantic coast, where the population is still more remote; but you may take the Mississippi Valley, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, all the great commonwealths of that valley, and they are, in point of expense, farther off from the Pacific slope than the population of China and Japan.

I am told by those who are familiar with the commercial

affairs of the Pacific slope that a person can be sent from any of the great Chinese ports to San Francisco for about thirty dollars. I suppose in an emigrant train over the Pacific Railroad from Omaha, not to speak of the expense of reaching Omaha, but from that point alone, it would cost fifty dollars per head. So that in point of cheap transportation to California the Chinaman to-day has an advantage over an American laborer in any part of the country, except in the case of those who are already on the Pacific coast.

Ought we to exclude them? The question lies in my mind thus: Either the Caucasian race will possess the Pacific slope or the Mongolian race will possess it. Give Mongolians the start to-day, with the keen thrust of necessity behind them, and with the ease of transportation and the inducement of higher wages before them, and it is entirely probable if not demonstrable that while we are filling up the other portions of the continent, they will occupy the great space of country between the Sierras and the Pacific coast. The Chinese are themselves to-day establishing steamship lines; they are themselves to-day providing the means of transportation; and when gentlemen say that we admit from all other countries, where do you find the slightest parallel? In a Republic especially, in any Government that maintains itself, the unit of order and of administration is in the family. The emigrants that come to us from all portions of the British Isles, from Germany, from Norway, from Denmark, from France, from Spain, from Italy, come here with the idea of the family as much engraven on their minds and on their customs and habits as ours. The Asiatic cannot live with our population and make a homogeneous element. The idea of comparing European immigration with an immigration that has no regard to family, that does not recognize the relation of husband and wife, that does not observe the tie of parent and child, that does not feel in the slightest degree the humanizing and the ennobling influences of the hearth-stone and the fireside! When gentlemen talk loosely about emigration from European countries as contrasted with that, they certainly are forgetting history and forgetting themselves.

My honorable colleague [Mr. Hamlin] and the senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Howe] voted that the Chinaman ought not to

be a citizen of this country, voted that he ought not to become a voter in this country. My honorable friend from Wisconsin now says, *sotto voce*, that he did not vote that the Chinaman never should be enfranchised; but he is like the honorable senator from Ohio; he voted "no," and then proceeded to take the question "into consideration"—leisurely, and he has been leisurely considering it for ten years. When the question was before us, whether the Chinaman should be a subject of naturalization, the senator from Wisconsin said "no," and he said "no" at a time when he said the negro directly from Africa might come in and be naturalized. He said "no" at a time when every other immigrant from every portion of the habitable globe was the subject of naturalization. I think the Chinaman in California, if he is to be forced upon us in great numbers, would be safer as a voter, dangerous as that would be, than as a political pariah.

MR. HOWE. Why not apply that remedy?

MR. BLAINE. You do not remedy one evil by precipitating another evil. I wish to remove both. You only present me another evil. I am opposed to the Chinese coming here; I am opposed to making them citizens; I am opposed to making them voters. But the senator from Wisconsin must contemplate the fact that with the ordinary immigration now going on, if the statistics given by the honorable senator from California are correct, we shall soon have a large majority of the male adults of California non-voters; and with the Republic organized as it is to-day, I do not believe that you can maintain a non-voting class in this country. Negro suffrage was a necessity. Abused as suffrage has been in the South, curtailed unfairly, it is still the shield and defense of that race; and with all its imperfections and all its abuses and all its shortcomings by reason of his own ignorance or by the tyranny of others, the suffrage of the negro has wrought out, or has pointed the way by which shall be wrought out, his personal liberty, his political salvation.

I have talked with a great many gentlemen on the opposite side of this question, and I never yet have seen one who did not, like the honorable senator from Ohio, desire to escape present responsibility, and take the subject into consideration

when it came to the point of how far this immigration shall be permitted to go? The honorable senator declined to tell me where he would limit it. I have never yet found any one who would say that he would allow it to be illimitable. I have never yet found an advocate of Chinese immigration, who was willing to name a point where he would fix it and restrain it. Is there any senator on this floor—and I ask to be answered if there is—who will say that under the operation of the Burlingame Treaty, as it is now administered, he is willing that the Chinese should come in and occupy the three Pacific States to the exclusion of the whites? I will repeat my question in another form: Should we be justified in sitting still here in the administration of this Government and permitting this treaty to remain in force and the immigration which it allows, to go forward until those three States of the Pacific side should be overridden by that population? That is what I ask every senator.

Mr. HAMLIN. If my colleague wants an answer, I will give him one for myself. I will come a little nearer my colleague than the senator from Ohio; I will take it into consideration now. I will meet every question as it shall arise, and I will state to my colleague how I would meet it when it shall arise. It has not arisen now. When the time shall come that I become satisfied that the population of China will overrun our country, and there shall be danger or imminent peril from that immigration, I will join with my colleague in abrogating all treaties with them; not one single little paragraph of a treaty, while we ask them to maintain it in its integrity for all the commercial advantages that the treaty bestows upon us, and all the protection that that treaty gives us to the right of trial by jury under our own laws. I will not meet it by an attempt to abrogate a treaty upon a little point, while we are the beneficiaries in the great and substantial points. I am indifferent to all the danger that shall come away down into the stillness of ages from the immigration of the Chinese. Treat them, I will not say like pagans, because Confucius would shame us if we go to his counsel—treat them like Christians, and they will become good American citizens. [Applause in the galleries.]

Mr. BLAINE. But my colleague voted that they should not become American citizens.

Mr. HAMLIN. I do not want to interrupt my colleague, but I will state before the debate shall close, the reasons which were satisfactory to my mind for my vote then, and I am half inclined to believe that I will so state them that my colleague himself will see that I then voted right.

Mr. BLAINE. I would have voted with my colleague on that question, as I have already stated.

Mr. SARGENT. Will the senator from Maine [Mr. Blaine] allow me to justify a statement he has made? I will take but a moment. I understood his colleague [Mr. Hamlin] to say that the average importation of Chinese during the last twenty years had been four thousand a year.

Mr. HAMLIN. Between four and five thousand. I think it is utterly impossible to state with precise accuracy what is the number of Chinese in this country at this time. I think, however, it can be approximated very closely. The senator from California has stated the basis of his conclusions. Now I will give from the *Alta Californian Almanac*, published in San Francisco, the calculation, and I will read it to the Senate. It may be they have made an under-estimate, but they would not be very likely to do it in that community.

Mr. SARGENT. That paper is very strongly pro-Chinese, and the only one on the Pacific coast.

Mr. HAMLIN. The only one! I think there are five in the city of San Francisco which favor the immigration of Chinese. I have two or three of them here. In thirty years, according to the official report, the gain in the arrivals over departures has been 130,863, or at the rate of 4,662 per annum. The deaths, according to the *Alta Almanac*, page 43, number about 20 for every 1,000 per annum; but taking the largest number given for arrivals, 233,000, and taking the official figure of returns, 93,000, and deaths of 20 in every 1,000 per annum, and you have 128,000 deducted from the 233,000, leaving the number on this continent at the present time the enormous number of about 100,000! The *Alta Almanac* further gives, on page 43, the number in California at 78,000, while I understand the official record of the Chinese themselves places the

number in California at but 60,000. Now, I say to my colleague, it was upon that information that I said the arrivals beyond the departures had been between four and five thousand.

Mr. BLAINE. Still the wonder grows with me that if the aggregate immigration is so small and will remain so small, as my colleague states, he should still have thought and have voted that they ought not to be citizens, and could not be safely trusted with the elective franchise. All that my honorable colleague has said makes me wonder still more at that vote, although, as I state, I would have given the same vote with him; but I would have given it on entirely different considerations and with an entirely different view. I am sure, even if I repeat myself in so saying, that no gentleman can justify an indefinite immigration from China who is not willing to assume and justify all the responsibilities of making the immigrants citizens of the United States, because we cannot continue to expose the Pacific coast to that immigration with a non-voting class largely outnumbering the voting class.

The senator from Ohio [Mr. Matthews] made light of the race trouble. I supposed if there be any part of the world where a man would not make light of a race trouble it was the United States. I supposed if there were any people in the world that had a race trouble on hand it was the American people. I supposed if the admonitions of our own history were any thing to us, we should regard the race trouble as the one thing to be dreaded, the one thing to be avoided. We are not through with it yet. It has cost us a great many lives; it has cost us a great many millions of treasure. Does any man feel that we are safely through with it now? Does any man here to-day assume that we have so entirely solved and settled all the troubles growing out of the negro-race trouble that we are prepared to invite a similar one? If so, he learns a lesson from history which I have not been taught. If any gentleman, looking into the future of this country, sees, for certain sections of it at least, peace and good order and absolute freedom from any trouble growing out of race, he sees with more sanguine vision than mine. With this trouble already upon us, it would, in my judgment, be the last degree of recklessness deliberately

to invite or permit another and possibly a far more serious one to be thrust upon us.

Treat them like Christians, my colleague says; and yet I believe the Christian testimony from the Pacific coast is that the conversion of Chinese is largely a failure; that the demoralization of the white race is a much more rapid result of the contact than the conversion of the Chinese race, and that up to this time there has been little progress made in the one direction while much evil has been done in the other. I heard the honorable senator from California who sits on this side of the Chamber [Mr. Booth] say that there is not, as we understand it, in all the one hundred and twenty thousand Chinese (whether I state the exact number does not matter in this point of view), there does not exist among the whole of them the relation of family. There is not a peasant's cottage inhabited by a Chinaman; there is not a hearth-stone, as it is found and cherished in an American home, or an English home, or a German home, or a French home. There is not a domestic fireside in that sense; and yet you say that it is entirely safe to sit down and quietly permit that mode of life to be fastened upon our country. A half-century ago this question could not have been made a practical one. Means of communication, ease of access, cheapness of transportation, have changed the issue, and forced it upon our attention. I believe now that if the Congress of the United States should in effect confirm the treaty and the status of immigration as it now is, law and order could not be maintained in California without the interposition of the military five years hence. Do I overstate that?

MR. SARGENT. I am sorry to say that I think the senator does not overstate it.

MR. BLAINE. I do not justify the brutality of the treatment of those Chinese who are here. That is greatly to be regretted and greatly to be condemned. But you must deal with things as you find them. If you foresee a conflict upon that coast by reason of an immigration that calls for the interposition of the military, I think it is a great deal wiser and more direct way to avoid the trouble by preventing the immigration.

I have heard much of late about their cheap labor. I do not

myself believe in cheap labor. I do not believe cheap labor should be an object of legislation, and it cannot be in a Republic. The wealthy classes in a Republic where suffrage is universal, cannot safely legislate for cheap labor. I repeat it. The wealthy classes in a Republic where suffrage is universal, must not legislate in favor of cheap labor. Labor should not be cheap, and it should not be dear; it should have its share, and it will have its share. There is not a laborer on the Pacific coast to-day — I say that to my honorable colleague whose whole life has been consistent and uniform in defense and advocacy of the interests of the laboring classes — there is not a laboring-man on the Pacific coast to-day who does not feel wounded and grieved by the competition that comes from this immigration. Then the answer is, "But, are not American laborers equal to Chinese laborers?" I answer that question by asking another. Were not free white American laborers equal to African slaves in the South? When you tell me that the Chinaman driving out the free American laborer only proves the superiority of the Chinaman, I ask you if the African slave driving out the free white labor from the South proved the superiority of slave labor? The conditions are not unlike: the parallel is not complete, and yet it is a parallel.

Chinese labor is servile labor. It is not free labor such as we intend to develop and encourage and build up in this country. It is labor that comes here under a mortgage. It is labor that comes here to subsist on what the American laborer cannot subsist on. You cannot work a man who must have beef and bread, and would like beer, in competition with a man who can live on rice. In all such conflicts and in all such struggles the result is not to bring up the man who lives on rice to the beef and bread standard, but it is to bring down the man living on beef and bread to the rice standard. Slave labor degraded free labor. It took out its respectability, it put an odious caste upon it. It throttled the prosperity of one of the fairest portions of the Union; and a worse than slave labor will throttle and impair the prosperity of a still finer and fairer section of the Union. We can choose here to-day whether our legislation shall be in the interest of the American free laborer or in favor of the servile laborer from China.

I rose, Mr. President, to speak briefly. I have had many interruptions or I should have long since taken my seat. In conclusion, I maintain that the legislation now proposed is in strictest accord with international obligation on these two grounds: First we have given notice; and second the Chinese Empire has persistently violated the treaty. Whether you take it on the one ground or the other, we are entirely justified in adopting the pending measure. The Chinese have never lived for one year or even one month by the terms of the treaty. A treaty, I repeat, which is interminable, so far as its own language is involved, must be terminated if either party desires its termination, by just such action as this bill proposes.

The question of form being disposed of, the question of substance is whether on full consideration we shall devote that interesting and important section of the United States which borders on the Peaceful Sea to be the home and the refuge of our own people and our own blood, or whether we shall leave it open, not to the competition of other nations like ourselves, but to those who, degraded themselves, will inevitably degrade us. We have this day to choose whether we shall have for the Pacific coast the civilization of Christ or the civilization of Confucius.

CHINESE IMMIGRATION.

[The day following the preceding speech Mr. Blaine delivered the following, in answer to a speech from Senator Eustis of Louisiana:—]

MR. PRESIDENT, — I have heard nothing in the debate, — I believe I have listened to all of it, — that could possibly give the honorable senator from Louisiana a justification for saying that there was any defense made of outrages perpetrated in California against the Chinese who are already there. I think the human race on all continents would join in execrating any cruelty or injustice toward those foreigners who are in California in pursuance of treaty stipulations, and who are entitled to the protection of the law. Nor can the senator adduce from any thing that I said, nor do I think he can adduce from what any other senator has said, a shadow of plea in behalf of extending lenity toward those in the South who abuse the colored race. The senator from Louisiana forgets a great distinction in the matter. The colored race in Louisiana are differently related to us from the Chinese who have not yet left China. I beg the honorable senator to observe that this legislation is aimed at the Chinese who have not yet left China. I beg him further to observe that the great majority of the colored race in Louisiana had rights there when his own honored ancestry were still living in New England. The problem is wholly different. If birth, if nativity, if long settlement, if domicile, give any rights so far as Louisiana is concerned, the senator himself is but a carpet-bagger of the second generation, as compared with the negroes, who have been in Louisiana for eight generations.

I do not deny that a race trouble springs from the situation and surroundings of the negro. I spoke of it freely yester-

day. There is a trouble, but that trouble is not to be healed by the remedy which I understand the honorable senator from Louisiana to advocate, viz.: that National authority and the National protection shall be withdrawn, and that the negroes shall be given up to the government of what the senator from Louisiana calls the superior race. But I think the senator errs in speaking of the Anglo-Saxon as specially in conflict with the negro in Louisiana. He is better versed in the history of Louisiana than I, but I have heard that a vast deal of the trouble in Louisiana comes not from the Anglo-Saxon race, but from descendants of the Latin race; and when he speaks of the Anglo-Saxon race, he probably applies the term to the race which, by numbers, has the least right to dominate in the State of Louisiana.

Do not let us confuse the issue. Let me admit the honorable senator's argument to its full extent. Let me admit the race trouble of the South as strongly as he will paint it, and then I ask, with that before our eyes and imprinted on our history, to be dealt with in a future generation, whether we shall deliberately invite another race trouble of perhaps more serious character? Do not let the senator from Louisiana confound all distinctions of justice and all rules of logic, by telling us that a negro whose ancestors have been here for nine generations is to be treated by the laws of the United States in the same manner as a Cooly who wants to ship to-day from Hong-Kong to our coast on the Pacific. As a nation we owe nothing to the Cooly. We owe much to the negro. I will here read a paragraph which can never be read too often:—

“Yet, if God wills that the war continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid with another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, ‘The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’”

Nothing truer or more sublime in diction was ever pronounced from the days of the prophet Ezekiel to the death of Abraham Lincoln.

I regret that I do not see the junior senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Hoar] in his seat. When I was absent from the

Senate last night, he made some remarks, from which I read the following:—

“The argument of the senators from California, and of the junior senator from Maine, and the senator from Nevada, is the old argument of the slave-holder and the tyrant over and over again with which the ears of the American people have been deafened, and which they have overthrown.”

I think here is another confounding of distinctions. I thought I was arguing for free labor against servile labor. The trouble in the South, in the era of slavery, was an unequal and unfair partition of land. There were vast estates on which the slaves worked; and yet in all the opulence of the wealthiest days of slavery, the largest plantations paled before the magnificent dukedoms of California on which Coolies are imported to labor. When the senator from Massachusetts says that I am using the language of the slave-holder, he is arguing in favor of these grants of ten, twenty, forty, sixty, seventy, eighty, one hundred thousand acres, larger than some of the German principalities, wrought and cultivated by Cooly labor, — labor contracted for before the consul signs the certificate at Hong-Kong, and delivered at San Francisco according to order from the deck of the steamer. Does he wish to place American free labor against that which is mere slave labor? It is a slight confounding of distinctions which the honorable senator from Massachusetts has made. That is all. I would say more if he were in his seat.

My colleague (Mr. Hamlin) certainly will not think I mean any thing except the utmost kindness to him when I refer to the votes that were given on this question, especially when I say again, as I said yesterday, that had I been here I should have voted with him. But in the record of the case, as read by the honorable senator from Massachusetts, something was left out. Pending the discussion of the naturalization question, the white amendment did come up, just as my colleague states. At a later period of the same day, instead of merely striking the word “white” out of the naturalization laws, it came up in the form of an amendment to admit Africans to naturalization. For that, disembarassed from all the considerations to which my colleague has referred, he voted. Then it was that Senator

Trumbull moved to include "or persons born in the Chinese Empire." On that question the vote was given of which I spoke yesterday. So that the question came just as palpably and as directly as it could come before the Senate, whether or not we should admit the Chinaman to citizenship in the United States. I repeat, perhaps I re-repeat, that the effect of that vote must be regarded as a settlement against Chinese immigration to this country, on the simple ground that in a Republic where suffrage is universal, we cannot permit a large immigration of people who are to be forbidden the elective franchise.

I must not forget that my honorable colleague also referred to the fact, in speaking of this question as one of competition in labor, that the same competition was made in labor-saving machinery. I beg to differ from him, for the history of labor-saving machinery from the beginning, and especially under the magnificent progress which has been made since the steam-engine was invented, has been continually to advance the rank, dignity, and emolument of labor. The price of free labor and the pay for it has risen steadily in the world according to the development of the mechanical and scientific arts, by reason of the simple fact that if by an invention you decrease the number of laborers in one field, you increase the want and require the development of labor in another field. I point to an unbroken history of two and a half centuries, in which the most splendid development of the inventive talent of any age has been accompanied step by step with a steady advance in the wages of the laborer. I also point to the fact that nowhere on earth has free labor been brought in competition with any form of servile labor, in which the free labor did not come down to the level of the servile labor. It has been tried against the African slave in the South; it has been tried against the Peons in Mexico and Peru; it has been tried against the Chinaman in California; the universal result is the same. The lower strata pull down the upper. The upper never elevate the lower.

CHINESE IMMIGRATION.

[Letter from Mr. Blaine answering certain objections.]

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, D.C., Feb. 21, 1879.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW-YORK TRIBUNE.

The reflections of Mr. William Lloyd Garrison upon the senators who voted for the bill restricting Chinese immigration are made, I think, without the thorough examination which that gentleman usually brings to the discussion of public questions. Permit me, with plainness of speech, and yet with no abatement of my sincere respect for Mr. Garrison, to state the grounds on which I cast my vote for the measure.

Up to Oct. 1, 1876, the records of the San Francisco custom-house show that 233,136 Chinese had arrived in this country and that 93,273 had returned to China. The immigration since has been large, and allowing for returns and deaths, the best statistics I can procure show that about 109,000 Chinese are in California and from 20,000 to 25,000 in the adjacent States and Territories — in all 130,000 to 135,000 on the West coast.

Of this large population fully nine-tenths are adult males. The women have not in all numbered over seven thousand, and, according to all accounts, they are impure and lewd far beyond the Anglo-Saxon conception of impurity and lewdness. One of the best-informed Californians I ever met, says that not one score of decent and pure women could ever have been found in the whole Chinese immigration. It is only in the imagined, rather I hope the unimagined, feculence and foulness of Sodom and Gomorrah that any parallel can be found to the atrocious nastiness of the Chinese quarter of San Francisco. I speak of this from abounding testimony — largely from those who have

had personal opportunity to study the subject in its revolting details. In the entire Chinese population of the Pacific coast scarcely one family is to be found ; no hearthstone of comfort, no fireside of joy ; no father or mother, or brother or sister ; no child reared by parents ; no domestic and ennobling influences ; no ties of affection. The relation of wife is degraded beyond all description, the females who hold and dishonor that sacred name being sold and transferred from one man to another, without shame and without fear ; one woman being at the same time the wife to several men. Many of these women came to San Francisco under written contracts for prostitution, openly entered into. I have myself read the translation of some of these abominable documents. If as a nation we have the right to keep out infectious diseases, if we have the right to exclude the criminal classes, we surely possess the right to exclude that immigration which reeks with impurity and which cannot come to us without plenteously sowing the seeds of moral and physical disease, of destitution, and of death.

The Chinese immigration to California began with the American immigration in 1848. The two races have been side by side for more than thirty years, nearly an entire generation, and not one step toward assimilation has been taken. The Chinese occupy their own peculiar quarter in the city, adhere to their own dress, speak their own language, worship in their own heathen temples, and inside the municipal law and independent of it, administer a code among themselves, even pronouncing the death penalty and executing it in criminal secrecy. If this were for a year only, or for two or five or even ten years, it might be claimed that more time is needed for domestication and assimilation ; but this has been going on for an entire generation, and the Chinaman to-day approaches no nearer to our civilization than he did when the Golden Gate first received him. In sworn testimony before an investigating Committee of Congress, Dr. Mears, the health officer of San Francisco, (described as "a careful and learned man"), testified that the condition of the Chinese quarter is "horrible, inconceivably horrible !" He stated that the Chinese as a rule "live in large tenement-houses, large numbers crowded into individual rooms,

without proper ventilation, with bad drainage, and underground, with a great deal of filth, the odors from which are horrible." He described their "mode of taking a room ten feet high and putting a flooring half way to the ceiling, both floors being crowded at night with sleepers. In these crowded dens cases of small-pox were concealed from the police." "They live underground in bunks. The topography of that portion of Chinadom is such that you enter a house sometimes and think that it is a one-story house and you will find two or three stories down below on the side of the hill, where they live in great filth."

Another close and accurate observer, long a resident of California, says "the only wonder is that desolating pestilences have not ensued. Small-pox has often been epidemic, and could always be traced to Chinese origin. The Chinese quarter was once occupied by shops, churches, and dwellings of Americans. Now these are as thoroughly Mongolian as any part of Canton. All other races flee from the contact." Dr. Mears further testified and gave many revolting details in proof that the Chinese "are cruel and indifferent to their sick." He described cases of Chinese lepers at the city hospital: "Their feet dropped off by dry gangrene and their hands were wasted and attenuated. Their finger-nails dropped off." He said "the Chinese were gradually working Eastward and would by and by crowd into Eastern cities, where the conditions under which they live in San Francisco would produce in the absence of its climatic advantages, destructive pestilences." Perhaps a Chinese quarter in Boston, with forty thousand Mongolians located somewhere between the south end and the north end of the city and separating the two, would give Mr. Garrison some new views as to the power and right of a nation to exclude moral and physical pestilence from its borders. In San Francisco there is no hot weather, the thermometer rarely rising above sixty-five degrees. One of the most intelligent physicians in the United States says that the Chinese quarter of San Francisco transferred to St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, or any Eastern city would in a hot summer breed a plague equal to the "black death" that has so often alarmed the civilized world. When Mr. Garrison says the immigration of Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen, Frenchmen,

Germans, and Scandinavians must be put on the same footing as the Chinese coolies, he confounds all distinctions, and, of course, without intending it, libels almost the entire white population whose blood is inherited from the races he names. All the immigration from Europe to-day assimilates at once with its own blood on this soil, and to place the Chinese coolies on the same footing is to shut one's eyes to all the instincts of human nature and all the teachings of history.

Is it not inevitable that a class of men living in this degraded and filthy condition, and on the poorest of food, can work for less than the American laborer is entitled to receive for his daily toil? Put the two classes of labor side by side and the cheap servile labor pulls down the more manly toil to its level. The free white laborer never could compete with the slave labor of the South. In the Chinaman the white laborer finds only another form of servile competition—in some aspects more revolting and corrupting than African slavery. Whoever contends for the unrestricted immigration of Chinese coolies contends for that system of toil which blights the prospects of the white laborer—dooming him to starvation wages, killing his ambition by rendering his struggle hopeless, and ending in a plodding and pitiable poverty. Nor is it a truthful answer to say that this danger is remote. Remote it may be for Mr. Garrison, for the city of Boston, and for New England, but it is instant and pressing on the Pacific Slope. The late Caleb Cushing, who had carefully studied the Chinese question ever since his mission to Peking in 1842, maintained that unless resisted by the United States the first general famine in China would be followed by an immigration to California that would swamp the white race on the Pacific Slope. I observe that a New England newspaper—I especially regret that such ignorance should be shown in New England—says it is only “a strip” on the Pacific that the Chinaman seeks for a home. The Chinese are already scattered over three States and two adjacent Territories whose area is larger than the original thirteen colonies. California alone is larger than New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and is capable of maintaining a vast population of Anglo-Saxon freemen if we do not surrender it to Chinese coolies.

Before the same Committee of Investigation from whose report I have already quoted, Mr. T. W. Jackson, a man of high character, who had traveled extensively in the East, testified that his strong belief was "that if the Chinese felt that they were safe and had a firm footing in California they would come in enormous numbers, because the population of China is practically inexhaustible." Such, indeed, is the unbroken testimony of all who are entitled to express an opinion. The decision of Congress on this matter therefore becomes of the very last importance. Had it been in favor of Chinese immigration, with the encouragement which such a decision would have implied, it requires no vivid imagination to foresee that the great slope between the Sierras and the Pacific would become the emigrating ground for the Chinese Empire. I do not exaggerate therefore when I say that on the adoption or rejection of the policy passed upon by Congress, hangs the fate of the Pacific Slope — whether its labor shall be that of American freemen or servile Mongolians. If Mr. Garrison thinks the interests of his own countrymen, his own Government, and, in a still larger sense, the interests of humanity and civilization will be promoted by giving up the Pacific Coast to Mongolian labor, I beg respectfully but firmly to differ from him. There is no ground on which we are bound to receive them to our own detriment. Charity is the first of Christian graces. But Mr. Garrison would not feel obliged to receive into his family a person that would physically contaminate or morally corrupt his children. As with a family so with a nation: the same instinct of self-preservation exists, the same right to prefer the interest of our own people, the same duty to exclude that which is corrupting and dangerous to the Republic!

The outcry that we are violating our treaty obligations is without foundation. The article on emigration in the treaty has not been observed by China for a single hour since it was made. All the testimony taken on the subject — and it has been full and direct — shows conclusively that the entire emigration was "under contract;" that the coolies had been gathered together for export and gathered as agents in our Western States would gather live-stock for shipment. A very

competent witness in California, speaking to this point, says that —

“On the arrival of the Chinese in California they are consigned like hogs to the different Chinese companies, their contracts are *viséd*, and the cooly commences to pay to the companies fees to insure care if he is taken sick and his return home dead or alive. His return is prevented until after his contract has been entirely fulfilled. If he breaks his contract the spies of the six companies hunt him to prevent his returning to China by arrangements with the steamship company or their agents in the steamship employ to prevent his getting a ticket. The agents of the steamship companies testified to this same fact. If a ticket is obtained for him by others he is forcibly stopped on the day of sailing by the employés of the six companies, called ‘high-binders,’ who can always be seen guarding the coolies.”

Mr. Joseph J. Ray, a Philadelphia merchant, long resident in China, and a close observer of its emigration, says “that $\frac{999}{1000}$ of the Chinese who have reached our shores were not free agents in their coming. Files of the Hong-Kong newspapers from 1861 would supply information regarding the ‘barracoons’ at that port, and when the system had become too great a scandal, their removal to Macao (a Portuguese colony, forty miles distant), in which ‘barracoons,’ the Chinese, in every sense prisoners, were retained until their shipment to San Francisco, Callao, Havana, and other ports. These, called by courtesy immigrants, were collected from within a radius of two or three hundred miles from Canton, and consisted of the abjectly poor, who, willingly or not, were sold to obtain food for their families, or for gambling debts (the Chinese, as you are aware, being inveterate gamblers), or the scapegraces of the country fleeing to avoid punishment.”

It is of course a mere misuse of terms to call this an “entirely voluntary emigration,” and yet none other was permissible under the Burlingame Treaty. Our Government would be clearly justified in disregarding the treaty on the single ground that the Chinese Government had never respected its provisions. But without reference to that, our Government possesses the right to abrogate the treaty if it adjudges that its continuance is “pernicious to the State.” Indeed, the two pending propositions in the Senate differ not in regard to our own right to abrogate the treaty, but simply as to whether we should do it in July, 1879, by the exercise of our power without further notice to China, or whether we should do it in

January, 1880, after notifying China that we had made up our minds to do it. Nearly a year ago Congress by joint resolution expressed its discontent with the existing treaty, and thus clearly gave notice to the civilized world,—if notice were needful,—of the desire and intention of our people. In the late action of Congress the opposing proposition—moved as a substitute for the bill to which I gave my support—requested the President to notify the Emperor of China that Chinese immigration is “unsatisfactory and pernicious,” and in effect if he would not modify the treaty as we desired, then the President should notify the Emperor that after Jan. 1, 1880, the United States will “treat the obnoxious stipulations as at an end.” Both propositions—the bill that we passed and the substitute that we rejected—assumed alike the full right to abrogate the treaty. Whether it were better to abrogate it after last year’s joint resolution, or to inform the Emperor of China directly that if he will not consent to the change “we shall make it anyhow,” must be relegated for decision to the schools of taste and etiquette. The first proposition resting on our clear Constitutional power seems to me a better mode of proceeding than to ask the Emperor of China to consent to a modification and inform him at the same time that, whether he consents or not, we shall on next New Year’s Day treat “the obnoxious stipulations as at end.” As to the power of Congress to do just what has been done no one will entertain a doubt who examines the whole question. An admirable summary of the right and power is found in an opinion delivered by that eminent jurist, Benjamin R. Curtis, when he was a judge of the United States Supreme Court. Judge Curtis said:—

“It cannot be admitted that the only method of escape from a treaty is by the consent of the other party to it or a declaration of war. To refuse to execute a treaty for reasons which approve themselves to the conscientious judgment of a nation is a matter of the utmost gravity; *but the power to do so is a prerogative of which no nation can be deprived without deeply affecting its independence.* That the people of the United States have deprived their Government of this power I do not believe. That it must reside somewhere, and be applicable *to all cases*, I am convinced, and *I feel no doubt that it belongs to Congress.*”

A great deal has been said about the danger to our trade if China should resort to some form of retaliation. The natural

and pertinent retaliation is to restrict American immigration to China. Against that we will enter no protest, and should have no right to do so. The talk about China closing her ports to our trade is made only by those who do not understand the question. Last year the total amount of our exports to all Chinese ports outside of Hong-Kong was but \$692,000. I have called Hong-Kong a Chinese port, but every one knows that it is under British control, and if we were at war with China to-day Hong-Kong would be as open to us as Liverpool. To speak of China punishing us by suspending trade is only the suggestion of ignorance. We pay China a large balance in coin, and probably we always shall do it. But if the trade question had the importance which some have erroneously attributed to it, I would not seek its continuance by permitting a vicious immigration of Chinese coolies. The Bristol merchants cried out that commerce would be ruined if England persisted in destroying the slave trade. But England did not sacrifice her honor by yielding to the cry.

The enlightened religious sentiment of the Pacific coast views with profound alarm the tendency and effect of unrestricted Chinese immigration. The "pastors and delegates of the Congregational churches of California" a year since expressed their "conviction" that "the Burlingame treaty ought to be so modified *by the General Government* as to restrict Chinese immigration." Rev. S. V. Blakeslee, editor of the oldest religious paper on the Pacific coast, spoke thus in an official address:—

"Moreover, wealthy English and American companies have organized great money-making plans for bringing millions—it is true—even millions—of these Chinese into our State, and into all parts of the Union; and they have sent out emissaries into China to induce the people, by every true and false story, to migrate here. Already *two hundred and fifty thousand* have come, of whom *one hundred thousand* remain.

"The tendency of all this is tremendously toward evil; toward vice and abomination; toward all opposed to the true spirit of Americanism, and is very dangerous to our morality, to our stability, and to our success as a people and a nation. Millions more of these Chinese must come if not prevented by any legal, or moral, or mobocratic restraint, increasing incalculably by numbers the evils already existing; while a spirit of race prejudices and clanship jealousies and a conflict of interests must be developed, portending possible evil beyond all description."

In regard to the process of converting and Christianizing this people, a missionary who has been in the field since 1849, testifies that not one in a thousand has even nominally professed a change from heathenism, and that of this small number nearly one-half has been taught in missionary schools in China. The same missionary says, "as they come in still larger numbers they will more effectually support each other in their national peculiarities and vices, become still more confirmed in heathen immoralities, with an influence in every respect incalculably bad." Under what possible sense of duty any American can feel that he promotes Christianity by the process of handing California over to heathenism, is more than I am able to discover.

This question connects itself intimately and inseparably with the labor question. Immigration of the Chinese is encouraged by some openly, by many secretly, because their labor is cheap. The experiment is a most dangerous one. In a Republic where the man who works carries a ballot in his hands, it will not do for capitalized wealth to legislate for cheap labor. We do not want cheap labor: we do not want dear labor. We want labor at fair rates,—at rates that shall give the laborer his fair share, and capital its fair share. If more is sought by capital, less will in the end be realized. There is not a laboring-man from the Penobscot to the Sacramento who would not feel aggrieved, outraged, burdened, crushed, by being forced into competition with the labor and the wages of the Chinese cooly. For one, I will never consent by my vote or my voice to drive the intelligent workingmen of America to that competition and that degradation. Mr. Garrison spent the best years of an honored life in a courageous battle for the freedom and dignity of labor, and for its emancipation from thralldom. I trust he will not lessen the gratitude which the workingmen of America owe him for his noble lead in the past by an effort now to consign them to the humiliation and the poverty inevitably resulting from the competition of Chinese coolies.

Years ago, Mr. Carlyle said to an American friend, "You will have no trouble in your country so long as you have few people and much land; but when you have much people and little

land, your trials will begin." No one connected in any manner with the government of the Republic can view the situation without grave concern. At least nine large States of the South are disturbed by a race trouble, of which no man is yet wise enough to see the end; the central and largest and wealthiest of our Territories is seized by a polygamous population which flaunts defiance in the face of the General Government: discontent among unemployed thousands has already manifested a spirit of violence, and but recently arrested travel between the Atlantic and the Mississippi by armed mobs which defied three States and commanded great trunk-lines of railway to cease operations. Practical statesmanship would suggest that the Government of the United States should avoid the increase of race troubles, and that nothing but sheer recklessness will force upon the American population of the Pacific slope the odious contamination of the lowest grade of the Chinese race. It may be attempted; but, in my judgment, it will lead to direful results, in which violence and murders and massacres will be terribly frequent. Let it be proclaimed here and now that the General Government will maintain unrestricted immigration of Chinese coolies, and in less than five years a larger military force than the existing Army of the United States will be required to keep peace on the Pacific slope. I feel that I am pleading the cause of the free American laborer, and of his children and of his children's children — the cause in short of "the house against the hovel; of the comforts of the freeman against the squalor of the slave."

FALSE ISSUE RAISED BY THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

[On the 25th of February, 1865, Congress, largely Republican in both branches, enacted the following Law which was approved by President Lincoln.

“No military or naval officer, or other person engaged in the civil, military or naval service of the United States, shall order, bring, keep or have under his authority or control, any troops or armed men at the place where any general or special election is held in any State, unless it be necessary to repel the armed enemies of the United States, *or to keep the peace at the polls.*” Since the revision of the United States Statutes this law has been known as Section 2002.

Under this power “*to keep the peace at the polls*” Southern elections during the reconstruction period were fairly regular and honest. The Democratic party made the repeal of the law an issue and agitated it for years, creating the popular impression that the Republican National Administration kept large bodies of troops in the South to control elections. In the Forty-sixth Congress both Senate and House were under the control of the Democratic party. The part of the law offensive to the Democratic party was contained in the closing words which are *Italicized* above. Instead of striking those words out, the Democratic caucus of Senators and Representatives resolved to re-enact Section 2002 word for word with the exception of the *Italicized* words at the end. The caucus also determined to put the amendment on the Army Appropriation Bill and to make the passage of the Bill dependent on the President’s approving it with the Amendment. Mr. Blaine delivered the following speech on the bill in the Senate of the United States on the 14th of April, 1879.]

· MR. PRESIDENT, — The existing section of the Revised Statutes numbered 2002 reads thus: —

“No military or naval officer, or other person engaged in the civil, military or naval service of the United States, shall order, bring, keep or have under his authority or control, any troops or armed men at the place where any general or special election is held in any State, unless it be necessary to repel the armed enemies of the United States, *or to keep the peace at the polls.*”

The object of the proposed section, which has just been read at the clerk’s desk, is to get rid of the eight closing words, namely, “*or to keep the peace at the polls.*” The mode of legislation proposed in the army bill now before the Senate is

therefore an unusual mode. It is an extraordinary mode. If it be desired to repeal a single sentence at the end of a section in the Revised Statutes the ordinary way is to strike off those words, but the mode chosen in this bill is to repeat and re-enact the whole section, leaving those few words out. While I do not wish to be needlessly suspicious on a small point, I am quite persuaded that this did not happen by accident. It came by design. If I may so speak, it came of cunning, the intent being to create the impression that the Republicans in the administration of the General Government had been using troops right and left, hither and thither, in every direction, and that the Democrats as soon as they came into power enacted this section. I can imagine Democratic candidates for Congress in the next campaign all over the country reading this section to gaping audiences as one of the first offsprings of Democratic reform, whereas every word of it, every syllable of it, from its first to its last, is the enactment of a Republican Congress.

I repeat that this unusual form presents a dishonest issue, whether so intended or not. It aims to make it appear that as soon as the Democrats got possession of the Federal Government they proceeded to enact the clause which is thus expressed. The law was passed by a Republican Congress in February, 1865. There were forty-six senators sitting in this Chamber at the time, of whom only ten or at most eleven were Democrats. The House of Representatives was overwhelmingly Republican. We were in the midst of a war. The Republican administration had a million or possibly twelve hundred thousand bayonets at its command. Thus situated, with the amplest possible power to interfere with elections had they so designed, with soldiers in every hamlet and county of the United States, the Republican party themselves placed that provision on the statute-book, and Abraham Lincoln signed it.

I beg you to observe, Mr. President, that this is the first instance in the legislation of the United States in which any restrictive provision whatever was enacted in regard to the use of troops at the polls. The Republican party did it with the Senate and the House in their control. Abraham Lincoln signed it when he was Commander-in-Chief of an army larger than

ever Napoleon Bonaparte had at his command. So much by way of correcting an ingenious and studied attempt at misrepresentation.

The alleged object is to strike out the few words that authorize the use of troops "to keep peace at the polls." This country has been alarmed, perhaps I would better say amused, at the great effort made to create an impression that the Republican party relies for its popular strength upon the use of the bayonet. This Democratic Congress has attempted to give a bad name to this country throughout the civilized world, and to give it on a false issue — false in whole and in detail, false in the charge, false in all the specifications. The impression sought to be created, as I say, not only throughout the North American Continent but in Europe to-day, is that elections, at least in the Southern States of the Union, are controlled by the bayonet.

I denounce it here as a false issue. I am not at liberty to say that any gentleman making the issue knows it to be false. I trust he does not. But I shall prove to him that it is false, and that it has not a solitary inch of solid ground to rest upon. I have in my hand an official transcript of the location and the number of all the troops of the United States east of Omaha. By "east of Omaha," I mean all the United States east of the Mississippi River together with the belt of States that border the Mississippi River on the west. They include forty-one millions at least of the forty-five millions of people that this country is supposed to contain to-day. In that magnificent area, I will not pretend to state its extent, but with forty-one million people, I know officially the exact number of troops. Would any senator on the opposite side hazard a guess as to that number? Would he like to state how many men with muskets in their hands there are in the vast area I have named? Let me tell him! There are two thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven! Not one more.

From the headwaters of the Mississippi River to the lakes, and down the great chain of lakes, and down the St. Lawrence, and down the valley of the St. John, and down the St. Croix, striking the Atlantic Ocean and following it down to Key West, around the Gulf, to the mouth of the Mississippi again, a frontier of eight thousand miles either bordering on the ocean

or upon foreign territory is guarded by these 2,797 troops. Within this domain forty-five fortifications are manned and eleven arsenals protected. There are sixty troops to every million of people. In the South I have the entire number in each State and will give it.

I believe the senator from Delaware [Mr. Bayard] has been alarmed, greatly alarmed, about the overriding of the popular ballot by troops of the United States! In Delaware there is not a single armed man, not one. The United States has not even one soldier in the State!

The honorable senator from West Virginia [Mr. Hereford] on Friday last lashed himself into a passion, or at least into a perspiration, over the wrongs of his State, trodden down as he pictured it by the iron heel of military despotism. There is not a soldier of the United States, not one on the soil of West Virginia, and there has not been one for years.

I do not know whether my esteemed friend from Maryland [Mr. Whyte] has been greatly disturbed or not; but at Fort McHenry, guarding the entrance to the beautiful harbor of his beautiful city of Baltimore, there are one hundred and ninety-two artillery-men and not another soldier on the soil of his State from the Chesapeake to the crest of the Alleghenies.

In Virginia there is a school of practice at Fortress Monroe. My honorable friend who has charge of this bill [Mr. Withers] knows very well, and if he does not I will tell him, that outside of that school of artillery practice at Fortress Monroe, which has two hundred and eighty-two men, there is not a Federal soldier on the soil of Virginia — not one.

Are the senators from North Carolina frightened by the immediate and terrible prospect of being overrun by the Army of the United States? On the whole soil of North Carolina there are but thirty soldiers and they are guarding a fort at the mouth of Cape Fear River — just thirty.

I do not see a senator on the floor from South Carolina. There are one hundred and twenty artillery-men guarding the approaches to Charleston Harbor — not another soldier on the soil of that State.

Does my gallant friend from Georgia [Mr. Gordon], who knows better than I the force and strength of military organi-

zation, does he the senior senator, and does the junior also [Mr. Benjamin H. Hill] — does either of those senators feel alarm at the presence of twenty-nine Federal soldiers in Georgia? — There are just twenty-nine there — not one more! And they are guarding the entrance to the harbor of Savannah.

Florida has one hundred and eighty-two at three separate posts, principally guarding the navy yard at Pensacola near which my friend on the opposite side [Mr. Jones] lives.

Is the honorable senator from Tennessee [Mr. Bailey] oppressed with fear at the progress of military despotism in his State? There is not a single Federal soldier on the soil of Tennessee, — not one.

I see both the honorable senators from Kentucky here. They have equal cause with Tennessee to be alarmed, for there is not a Federal soldier in Kentucky — not one!

In Missouri there are a half-dozen guarding some arsenal stores!

There are fifty-seven soldiers in Arkansas, on the borders of the Indian Territory.

I think my friend from Alabama [Mr. Morgan] is greatly excited over this question, and in his State there are thirty-two Federal soldiers, located at an arsenal of the United States.

The State of Mississippi, that is in danger of being trodden under the iron hoof of military power, has not a Federal soldier on its soil.

Louisiana has two hundred and thirty-nine guarding approaches from the sea.

Texas, apart from the regiments that guard the frontier on the Rio Grande and the Indian frontier, has not one.

The entire South has eleven hundred and fifty-five soldiers to intimidate, overrun, oppress, and destroy the liberties of fifteen million people, and rob them of freedom at the polls! In the Southern States there are twelve hundred and three counties. If you distribute the soldiers by counties there is not quite one for each county; and when I give the counties I give them from the census of 1870. If you distribute these soldiers territorially there is one for every seven hundred square miles, so that if you make a territorial distribution, I would remind the honorable senator from Delaware, that the quota for his State would

be three — “one ragged sergeant and two abreast,” as the old song has it. That is the formidable force ready to descend upon Delaware and destroy the liberties of the State.

Mr. President, the old tradition has it, that the soothsayers of Rome could not look one another in the face without smiling. There are not two Democratic senators on this floor who can go into the cloak-room and look each other in the face without smiling at this talk, or, more appropriately, I should say without blushing — the whole thing is such a prodigious and absolute farce, such a miserably manufactured false issue, such a pretense without the slightest foundation in the world, and talked about most and denounced the loudest in States that have not now and have not for years had a single Federal soldier within their boundaries. In New England we have three hundred and eighty soldiers. Throughout the South it does not run quite seventy to the million people. In New England we have absolutely one hundred and twenty soldiers to the million. New England is far more overrun to-day by the Federal soldiery, far more, than is the whole South. I never heard any one complain about it in New England, or express any great fear of his liberties being endangered by the presence of a handful of Federal troops.

As I have said, the tendency of this talk is to give us a bad name in Europe. Republican institutions are looked upon there with jealousy. Every misrepresentation, every slander is exaggerated and talked about to our discredit, and the Democratic party of the country to-day stand indicted, and I here indict them, for public slander of their country, creating the impression in the civilized world that we are governed by a military despotism. How amazing it would be to any man in Europe, familiar as Europeans are with great armies, if he were told that in a territory larger than France and Spain and Portugal and Great Britain and Holland and Belgium and the German Empire all combined, there are but eleven hundred and fifty-five soldiers! That this mad cry, this false issue, this absurd talk is based upon the presence of eleven hundred and fifty-five soldiers on eight hundred and fifty thousand square miles of territory! The whole number of soldiers thus complained of is not double the number of the Democratic

police in the city of Baltimore, or in the city of New Orleans, not a third of the police in the city of New York. I repeat, the number indicts the Democracy; it shows the whole charge to be without foundation; it derides the issue as a false, scandalous and partisan makeshift.

What then is the real motive underlying this movement? Senators on that side, Democratic orators on the stump cannot make any sensible set of men at the cross-roads believe that there is danger in eleven hundred and fifty-five soldiers distributed over the South, one to each county. The moment you state it, everybody sees its palpable and laughable absurdity, and therefore we must go farther and find a motive for all this cry. It is not the troops; that is evident. There are more troops by fifty per cent scattered through the Northern States east of the Mississippi to-day than through the Southern States east of the Mississippi, and yet nobody in the North speaks of it; anybody would be laughed at for speaking of it; and therefore the issue on the troops, being a false one, conceals the true issue, which is simply to get rid of the Federal presence at Federal elections, to get rid of the *civil power of the United States* in the election of representatives to the Congress of the United States. That is the whole of it; and disguise it as you may there is nothing else in it or of it.

The Democratic party simply wishes to get rid of the supervision by the Federal Government of the election of representatives to Congress through civil means; and therefore this bill connects itself directly with another bill, and you cannot discuss this military bill without discussing a bill which was before us last winter, known as the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill. I am well aware that it is not permissible for me to discuss a bill that is pending before the other House. I am aware that propriety and parliamentary rule forbid that I should speak of what is done in the House of Representatives; but I know very well that I am not forbidden to speak of that which is not done in the House of Representatives. I am therefore perfectly free to declare that neither this military bill nor the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill ever emanated from any committee of the House of Representatives; they are not the work of any

committee of the House of Representatives, and, although the present House of Representatives is almost evenly balanced in party division, no solitary suggestion has been allowed to come from the minority of that House in regard to the shaping of these bills. Where do they come from? We are not left to infer; we are not even left to the Yankee privilege of guessing, because we know. The senator from Kentucky [Mr. Beck] obligingly told us — I have his exact words here — “that the honorable senator from Ohio [Mr. Thurman] was the chairman of a committee appointed by the Democratic party to see how it was best to present all these questions before us.” Therefore when I discuss these two bills together I am violating no parliamentary law, I am discussing the offspring and the creation of the Democratic caucus of which the senator from Ohio is the chairman.

We are told, too, a rather novel thing, that if we do not take these laws, we are not to have the appropriations. I believe it has been announced in both branches of Congress, I suppose on the authority of the Democratic caucus, that if we do not take these bills as they are planned, we shall not have any of the appropriations that go with them. The honorable senator from West Virginia [Mr. Hereford] avowed it on Friday; the honorable senator from Ohio [Mr. Thurman] avowed it last session; the honorable senator from Kentucky [Mr. Beck] avowed it at the same time, and I am not permitted to speak of the legions who proclaimed it in the other House. They say all these appropriations are to be refused — not merely the Army appropriation, for they do not stop at that. Look for a moment at the legislative bill that came from the Democratic caucus. Here is an appropriation in it for defraying the expenses of the Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, including the District of Columbia, “\$2,800,000:” “Provided” — provided what?

“That the following sections of the Revised Statutes relating to elections [going on to recite them] be repealed.”

That is, you will pass an appropriation for the support of the Judiciary of the United States only on condition that something else, entirely disconnected from the Judiciary be

repealed. We often speak of this Government being divided into three great departments, the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial—co-ordinate, independent, equal! The Legislative, under the control of a Democratic caucus, now steps forward and says, "We offer to the Executive this bill, and if he does not sign it, we are determined to starve the Judiciary." That is carrying the thing somewhat farther than I have ever known to be attempted. You do not merely propose to starve the Executive if he will not sign the bill, but you propose to starve the Judiciary that has had nothing whatever to do with the question. This has been boldly avowed here; this has been boldly avowed on the floor of the other House; this has been boldly avowed in Democratic papers throughout the whole country.

You propose not merely to starve the Judiciary but you declare that you will not appropriate a solitary dollar to take care of this Capitol. The men who take care of all this public property are provided for in the same bill. You say they shall not have a dollar of pay if the President will not agree to change the election laws.

There is the public printing that goes on for the enlightenment of the whole country, and for printing the public documents of every one of the Departments. You say they shall not have a dollar for public printing unless the President agrees to repeal these laws which regulate the election of representatives in Congress.

There is the Congressional Library that has become the pride of the whole American people for its magnificent growth and extent! You say it shall not have one dollar for its daily care, much less to add a new book, unless the President signs these bills.

There is the Department of State which has been our pride throughout the history of the Government for the ability with which it has conducted our foreign affairs. It is also to be starved. You say we shall not have any intercourse with foreign nations, not a dollar shall be appropriated for ministers or consuls unless the President signs these bills.

There is the Lighthouse Board that provides for the beacons and the warnings on seventeen thousand miles of sea and gulf

and lake coast. You say those lights shall all go out, and not a dollar shall be appropriated for the Board if the President does not sign these bills, which a Democratic caucus has agreed upon, and demands that everybody else shall assent to.

There are the mints of the United States at Philadelphia, New Orleans, Denver, San Francisco, coining silver and coining gold. You declare not a dollar shall be appropriated for them if the President does not sign these bills.

There is the Patent Office, the patents issued which embody the invention of the country—not a dollar for them. The Pension Bureau shall cease its operations unless these bills are signed, and patriotic soldiers may starve. The Agricultural Bureau, the Post-Office Department, every one of the great executive functions of the Government is threatened, taken by the throat, highwayman style, commanded to stand and deliver in the name of the Democratic Congressional caucus. No committee of this Congress in either branch has ever recommended this legislation—not one. Simply a Democratic caucus has done it.

Of course this is new. We are learning something every day. I think you may search the records of the Federal Government in vain; it will take some one much more industrious in that search than I have ever been, and much more observant than I have ever been, to find any possible parallel or any possible suggestion in our history of such a thing. Many of the senators who sit in this Chamber can remember some extraordinary vetoes. The veto of the National Bank Bill by President Jackson in 1832, remembered by the oldest in this Chamber; the veto of the National Bank Bill in 1841 by President Tyler, remembered by those not the oldest, aroused a political excitement which up to that time had no parallel; and it was believed, whether rightfully or wrongfully is no matter, it was believed by those who advocated those financial measures at the time, that they were of the very first and the very last importance to the well-being and prosperity of the people of the Union. It was so believed by men who were the great and shining lights of that day. It was so believed by that man of imperial character and imperious will, the illustrious senator from Kentucky. It was so believed by representative Whigs in

both branches of Congress. When Jackson vetoed the one, or Tyler vetoed the other, was there a suggestion that those bank charters should be put on appropriation bills, and that there should not be a dollar to support the Government until they were signed? So far from it that, in 1841, when temper was at its height, when the Whig party, in addition to losing their great measure, lost it under the sting and the irritation of what they believed was a desertion by the President whom they had chosen, and when Mr. Clay, goaded by all these considerations, rose to debate the question in the Senate, he repelled with anger the suggestion of Mr. William C. Rives of Virginia, who attempted to make upon him the point that he had indulged in some threat involving the independence of the Executive. Mr. Clay's response may be recalled and read here with profit to every one:—

“I said nothing whatever of any obligation on the part of the President to conform his judgment to the opinions of the Senate and the House of Representatives, although the senator argued as if I had, and persevered in so arguing after repeated correction. I said no such thing. I know and I respect the perfect independence of each department, acting within its proper sphere, of the other departments.”

A leading Democrat from the South, a man who has courage and frankness and many good qualities, has boasted publicly that the Democracy are in power for the first time in eighteen years, and they do not intend to stop until they have wiped out every vestige of every war measure. “Forewarned is fore-armed,” and you begin appropriately on a measure that has the signature of Abraham Lincoln. It is significant to hear these words from a man who was then in arms against the Government of the United States, doing his best to destroy it, exerting all his power in a bloody and terrible rebellion against the authority of the United States, while Abraham Lincoln was marching at the same time to martyrdom in its defense! Strange times have fallen when those of us who had the great honor to be associated in higher or lower degree with Mr. Lincoln in the administration of the Government live to hear men in public life and on the floors of Congress, fresh from the battle-fields of the rebellion, threatening the people of the United States that the Democratic party, in power for the first time in eighteen years, proposes not to stay its

hand until every vestige of the war measures has been wiped out! The Vice-President of the late confederacy boasted — perhaps I would better say stated — that for sixty out of the seventy-two years preceding the outbreak of the rebellion, from the foundation of the Government, the South, though in a minority, had, by combining with what he termed the “anti-centralists” in the North, ruled the country; and in 1866 the same gentleman indicated in a speech, I think before the Legislature of Georgia, that by a return to Congress the South might repeat the experiment with the same successful result.

I read that speech at the time, but I little thought I should live to see so near a fulfillment of its baleful prediction. I see here to-day two great measures emanating, as I have said, not from a committee of either House, but from a Democratic caucus in which the South has an overwhelming majority, two-thirds in the House, and out of forty-two senators on the other side of this Chamber professing the Democratic faith, thirty are from the South — twenty-three, a positive and pronounced majority, having themselves been participants in the revolt against the Union either in military or civil station. As a matter of fact therefore the legislation of this country to-day, shaped and fashioned in a Democratic caucus where the confederates of the South hold the majority, is the realization of Mr. Stephens’s prophecy. Very appropriately the House under that control and the Senate under that control, embodying thus the entire legislative powers of the Government, deriving its political strength from the South, elected from the South, say to the President of the United States, at the head of the Executive Department of the Government, elected by the whole people, but elected as a Northern man; elected on Republican principles, elected in opposition to the party that controls both branches of Congress to-day — they boldly say, “You shall not exercise your Constitutional power to veto a bill.”

Some gentleman may rise and say, “Do you call it revolution to put an amendment on an appropriation bill?” Of course not. There have been a great many amendments put on appropriation bills, some mischievous and some harmless; but I call it the audacity of revolution for any senator or representative, or any caucus of senators or representatives, to get together and

say, "We will have this legislation or we will stop the great departments of the Government." That is revolutionary. I do not think it will amount to revolution; my opinion is it will not. I think it is a revolution which will not revolve. But it is a revolution if persisted in, and if not persisted in, it must be retreated from with ignominy. The Democratic party in Congress have put themselves exactly in this position to-day, that if they go forward in the announced programme, they march to revolution. I think they will, in the end, go backward in ignominious retreat. That is my judgment. I think it the judgment of all who observe the operation of general principles!

The extent to which they control the legislation of the country is worth pointing out. In round numbers, the Southern people are about one-third of the population of the Union. I am not permitted to speak of the organization of the House of Representatives, but I can refer to that of the last House. In the last House of Representatives, of the forty-two standing committees the South had twenty-five. I am not blaming the honorable Speaker for it. He was hedged in by partisan forces, and could not avoid it. In this very Senate, out of thirty-four standing committees the South has twenty-two. I am not calling these things up at this time in reproach; I am only showing what an admirable prophet was the vice-president of the late Southern confederacy, how entirely true all his words have been, and how he has lived to see them realized.

I do not profess to know, Mr. President, least of all senators on this floor, certainly as little as any senator on this floor, do I profess to know, what the President of the United States will do when these bills are presented to him, as I suppose in due course of time they will be. I certainly should never speak a word of disrespect of the gentleman holding that exalted position, and I hope I should not speak a word unbecoming the dignity of the office of a senator of the United States. But as there has been speculation here and there on both sides as to what he would do, I should expect that the dead heroes of the Union would rise from their graves sooner than he should consent to be intimidated and outraged in his proper Constitutional power by threats like these!

All the war measures of Abraham Lincoln are to be wiped out, say leading Democrats! The Bourbons of France busied themselves, after the restoration, in removing every trace of Napoleon's power and grandeur, even chiseling the "N" from public monuments raised to perpetuate his glory; but the dead man's hand from St. Helena reached out and destroyed them in their pride and in their folly. Let the senators on the other side of this Chamber remember — let the Democratic party North and South remember, that the tomb of the martyred President on the prairies of Illinois is not less sacred or less potent with the American people than was the dust of Napoleon to the France that he loved! Though dead, the Great President speaketh.

When you present these bills with these threats to the living President, who bore the commission of Abraham Lincoln and served with honor in the Army of the Union which Lincoln restored and preserved, I can think of only one appropriate response from his lips or his pen:

"Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?"

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AGAINST STATE SOVEREIGNTY.—POSITION OF MR. WEBSTER.

[In a debate in the United States Senate involving this question Mr. Blaine made the following speech on the 19th of May, 1879.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — Whether the honorable Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Eaton] or myself should the more correctly remember a paragraph from Mr. Webster's speeches is a matter of small personal consequence, and of no public importance. It is not, therefore, with any intention of vindicating a better memory or a more accurate quotation that I refer to this subject; but it is because there has been a persistent attempt, in which I am sorry the Senator from Connecticut has taken part, to misrepresent Mr. Webster and declare that near the close of his life and at the end of his political career he changed his views, and that he had somewhere to some public assemblage practically retracted the great arguments he had made against the State-rights heresies and in behalf of the Constitution and the Union. The honorable Senator from Connecticut on the occasion to which he has himself made reference spoke thus : —

“I said that Mr. Webster called this ‘a confederacy of States.’ I say he called it not only a confederacy of States, but ‘a confederation of States.’”

A little later, during a brief colloquy between the Senator and myself, he said : —

“When he reads a few words from a certain speech of Mr. Webster does the honorable Senator from Maine undertake to assert on this floor that Mr. Webster did not again and again call this Government not only ‘a confederation of States’ but ‘a compact between States’? I say he did.”

Still again the Senator from Connecticut said : —

“When the proper time arrives — I have not the library of Mr. Webster in my pocket, I do not carry it around with me [laughter] — when the proper time arrives I will show that Mr. Webster called this ‘a confederacy’ and ‘the Constitution a compact.’”

The honorable Senator came into the Senate on Friday last and very frankly and magnanimously admitted that he had not been able to find that Mr. Webster had in any speech called this Government a "confederacy of States," but he was very sure he had called it "a compact" and "a compact between the States." Let me read what the honorable Senator said : —

"In 1851, in his celebrated Capon Springs speech, the language of Mr. Webster admits of no dispute. Whatever he may have said on other occasions, whatever he said in his great discussion on the floor of the Senate with Mr. Hayne or with Mr. Calhoun, on the occasion of this speech, in the most unqualified manner, he asserted the fact for which I contend, that the Constitution is a compact between parties competent to enter into a compact, to wit, the States."

The honorable senator held in his hand at that time a very mischievous book, and I may say he derived his facts, if not his inspiration, from that book, which is now before me. It is a book written by a gentleman of great influence in the South, of acknowledged ability, of long and eminent service in the public councils, — Mr. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia. It is, as I have said, a mischievous book. It is mischievous in its title, it is mischievous in its preface, it is mischievous in every word from the opening to the closing chapter ; and it is mischievous because, although the author is a sincere man himself, it is an elaborate tissue of absolute misrepresentations, and misrepresentations from a sincere man are much more hurtful than misrepresentations from one who designs to misrepresent.

In this book, Mr. Stephens takes the ground that Mr. Webster had recanted, and changed his views in regard to the nature of our Government. On the four hundred and third page of the first volume he says : —

"But besides all this, as a further proof of Mr. Webster's change of views as to the Constitution being a compact between the States, I cite you to a later speech made by him at Capon Springs, in Virginia, on the 28th June, 1851."

And he quotes then what the Senator from Connecticut quoted in this Chamber. Mr. Stephens then says : —

"In this speech Mr. Webster distinctly held that the Union was a union of States. That the Union was founded upon compact."

Again Mr. Stephens says : —

“ I did not agree with him [Mr. Webster] in his exposition of the Constitution in 1833, but I did fully and cordially agree with him in his exposition in 1839 and 1851. According to that the Constitution was and is ‘a compact between the States.’ ”

In this ingenious attempt to justify the secession that took place in 1861, handing it down to posterity in a history entitled “The War between the States,” instead of a *Rebellion against the Government*, Mr. Stephens endeavors to enlist Mr. Webster as one of the witnesses in justification of the action of the Southern people.

Mr. President, mere definition, or the mere rhetorical use, of a word is not always a matter on which time can be profitably spent. When a man speaks of a “compact” rhetorically, when he speaks of a “continental empire” rhetorically, when he speaks of an “imperial republic” rhetorically, or when, like the Senator from Connecticut, he speaks of a “representative republic of sovereign States,” I do not expect to hold him very closely to the line of the definition; and if it were simply a verbal or literary criticism as to the manner in which this man or that man happened in a piece of public declamation to characterize the Government of the United States, it would not be worth while to spend the time of the Senate upon it. But the honorable Senator from Connecticut knows, and all with whom he is associated in the political revolution now attempted in this country know, that upon the line of division involved in these words is waged the contest between the two great parties that are contending for mastery in this Government; that here is involved the true construction under which this Government is to be administered — whether the Government of the United States shall have the power to uphold itself, or whether it shall be the mere creature of the States, living and breathing and moving at their will and pleasure.

On that line the two political parties in this country divide; and I have never known a more extraordinary attempt — I will not say disingenuous, for that would imply motive — I have never known a more extraordinary attempt to twist and turn and confound distinctions than the attempt to make Mr. Webster’s speech at Capon Springs the basis on which this

revelation of his change of view should be established. Both Mr. Stephens in his history and the honorable Senator from Connecticut in his speech quoted from a pamphlet copy of Mr. Webster's Capon Springs address. I thought I discovered when the honorable Senator was speaking, that he was not specially familiar with the speeches of Mr. Webster. I hope he will not think me scant in courtesy if I say that I have discovered still less familiarity now, because he need not have gone to Mr. Stephens's history to get these extracts, nor need he have referred to lost pamphlets containing the whole speech; for here in the authentic life of Mr. Webster, the biography to which Mr. Webster's friends are willing to trust his fame, his life by George T. Curtis, the speech is given in full. Just after that speech was delivered this same delusion which the Senator from Connecticut indicates went over all the South. It was everywhere heralded in the South that Mr. Webster had defined the Union as "a compact," and here is what his eminent biographer says in regard to the report:—

"What Mr. Webster had said at Capon Springs, in speaking of one of the compacts or compromises between the northern and southern sections of the Union, on which the Constitution was founded, was at once misrepresented as a confirmation by him of the doctrine that the Constitution itself is a compact between sovereign States, and as drawing after it, as a resulting right, the right of State secession from the Union. A citizen of North Carolina accordingly wrote to Mr. Webster on this subject, and received from him the following answer, which was immediately made public."

I will not read the whole of it, but Mr. Webster says, speaking of the Government:—

"It is not a limited confederation, but a Government; and it proceeds upon the idea that it is to be perpetual, like other forms of Government, subject only to be dissolved by revolution."

"What I said at Capon Springs was an argument addressed to the North, and intended to convince the North that if by its superiority of numbers it should defeat the operation of a plain, undoubted and undeniable injunction of the Constitution, intended for the especial protection of the South, such a proceeding must necessarily end in the breaking up of the Government; that is to say, in a revolution."

Here is what Mr. Webster in the speech itself said in reviewing the condition of public sentiment then threatening the revolution which was ten years later attempted; and here is

what Mr. Stephens is careful not to quote, and what therefore my honorable friend from Connecticut could not have been expected to quote in his speech. Mr. Webster in referring to the disunion movement found in the South, the State-rights movement then running wild through the cotton States, said :—

“I make no argument against resolutions, conventions, secession speeches or proclamations. Let these things go on. The whole matter, it is to be hoped, will blow over, and men will return to a sounder mode of thinking. *But one thing, gentlemen, be assured of, the first step taken in the programme of secession, which shall be an actual infringement of the Constitution or the laws, will be promptly met.* [Great applause.]

“And I would not remain an hour in any administration that should not immediately meet any such violation of the Constitution and the law effectually and at once. [Prolonged applause.]”

Mr. Stephens does not quote that. But how absurd, Mr. President, how unjust is it to catch up a chance remark at a watering-place for the purpose of justifying a certain section of this country which drifted into war in support of a bad theory and which is drifting back into that theory as fast as it can! How absurd, how unjust is it to pick up a chance speech delivered in answer to a serenade, as the conclusive Constitutional opinions of Mr. Webster, when Mr. Webster himself had left in the very last year of his life, and after that speech was delivered, six volumes of his works on which he desired to go down to posterity, on which he rested his fame, and on which he inscribed formal introductions. From these volumes I quote the following :—

“The principles and opinions expressed in these productions are such as I believe to be essential to the preservation of the Union, the maintenance of the Constitution, and the advancement of the country to still higher stages of prosperity and renown. These objects have constituted my polar star during the whole of my political life, which has now extended through more than half the period of the existence of the Government.”

On these speeches, delivered by Mr. Webster in the Senate and in the House and on great public occasions, revised by himself, published under his auspices, he committed himself to history ; and from these neither Mr. Stephens in his mischievous narrative nor the honorable Senator from Connecticut in his remarks ventures to quote any thing at all. You can hardly open a solitary page in the whole six volumes that does not

contain a startling refutation of all the theories which they now pretend Mr. Webster had admitted in the closing days of his life. Let me take one instance at random.

In some very brief remarks that I made the other afternoon when the bill which the President vetoed was about to be voted upon, I stated that the Democratic party of to-day as represented in this Chamber were the followers of the State-rights school of Democracy represented by Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Breckinridge. I believe I was correct in that statement. I believe I was quite within the facts. I read now from Mr. Calhoun's own definition in his celebrated discussion with Mr. Webster, and I think the resolution exactly fits and fills the idea of the Senator from Connecticut as to the true theory of this Government if I understood him aright. Mr. Calhoun submitted the following:—

“Resolved, That the people of the several States composing these United States are united as parties to a Constitutional compact to which the people of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a Union between the States ratifying the same.”

That is the Democratic theory to-day. I doubt if there is a senator on the other side of the Chamber who will controvert these words of Mr. Calhoun: the Senator from Connecticut asserts the same doctrine in terms. Mr. Calhoun proceeds in a long series of resolutions to disprove the proposition that we constitute “a Nation.” In answer, Mr. Webster after an elaborate speech sums up and says:—

“And now, sir, against all these theories and opinions, I maintain—

“1. That the Constitution of the United States is not a *league, confederacy, or compact* between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacities, but a Government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating direct relations between itself and individuals.”

The honorable Senator from Connecticut devoted considerable time the other day to showing that the Constitutional Convention in 1787 expressly excluded the idea that they were founding a nation. Mr. Webster farther on in the same speech says:—

“But, sir, let us go to the actual formation of the Constitution; let us open the journal of the convention itself, and we shall see that the very first resolution which the convention adopted was, *‘that a National government*

ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislature, judiciary, and executive.'

"This itself completely negatives all idea of league and compact and confederation. Terms could not be chosen more fit to express an intention to establish a *national* government, and to banish forever all notion of a compact between sovereign States."

Yet the Senator from Connecticut broadly asserted that Mr. Webster had made the declaration that this Union was "a compact of States" just as Mr. Stephens asserts it in his mischievous book.

Mr. EATON. If my friend will permit me, was not that very resolution which he has just read voted down, and voted down on motion of Mr. Ellsworth of Connecticut?

Mr. BLAINE. No, sir; instead of being voted down, it was voted up. I will read what Mr. Webster says:—

"This resolution was adopted on the 30th of May, 1787. Afterward the style was altered, and instead of being called a *National* government it was called the Government of the United States; but the substance of this resolution was retained, and was at the head of that list of resolutions which was afterwards sent to the committee who were to frame the instrument."

Mr. Webster continues:—

"It is true, there were gentlemen in the convention, who were for retaining the confederation, and amending its articles; but the majority was against this, and was for a *National* government.

"If, sir, any historical fact in the world be plain and undeniable, it is that the convention deliberated on the expediency of continuing the *confederation*, with some amendments, and rejected that scheme, and adopted the plan of a *National* government, with a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary of its own. They were asked to preserve the *league*, they rejected the proposition. They were asked to continue the existing *compact* between States, they rejected it. *They rejected compact, league, and confederation*, and set themselves about framing the *constitution* of a *national* government; and they accomplished what they undertook."

In view of these declarations, I do not think the Senator from Connecticut or the honorable author of that book will wish to quote Mr. Webster as saying that the Union was "a compact between States." The sense in which Mr. Webster did use "compact" is seen in his reference to the ratification of the Constitution by the several States.

He said, —

"Among all the other ratifications, there is not one which speaks of the Constitution as a compact between States. Those of Massachusetts and New Hampshire express the transaction, in my opinion, with sufficient

accuracy. They recognize the Divine goodness 'in affording THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES an opportunity of entering into an explicit and solemn compact *with each other*,' by '*assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution*.' You will observe, sir, that it is the people, and not the States, who have entered into this compact, and it is the people of all the United States."

I know you will not tire of hearing Mr. Webster. I am making a very good speech out of his works, far better than any thing I could say myself. The honorable Senator from Connecticut dwelt at length, and dwelt with that modest form of affirmation which sometimes distinguishes his utterances, upon the idea that no man could deny that it was the States that formed the Constitution, and he quoted as conclusive on that point the provision that it should go into effect upon the ratification of nine States. Mr. Webster, in his second speech on Foote's resolution, spoke thus:—

"Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman [Mr. Calhoun] maintains is a notion founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin of this Government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it to be a *popular Government*, erected by the people; those who administer it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be. *It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments. It is created for one purpose; the State governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs.*"

And then Mr. Webster adds:—

"We are here to administer a Constitution emanating immediately from the people; and trusted by them to our administration. *It is not the creature of the State governments.* It is of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State Legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. *That is not one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the State.* It is a duty which the people, by the Constitution itself, *have imposed on the State Legislatures*; and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit."

He says in another speech:—

"So much, sir, for the argument, even if the premises of the gentleman were granted or could be proved. But, sir, the gentleman has failed to maintain his leading proposition. He has not shown, it cannot be shown, that the Constitution is 'a compact between State governments.' The Constitution itself, in its very front, refutes that idea. It declares that it is ordained and established *by the people of the United States*. . . . So far from saying that it is established by the governments of the several States, it does not even say that it is established by the people of the several States; but it pronounces that it is established by the people of the United States in the aggregate. The gentleman says it must mean no more than the people

of the several States. Doubtless the people of the several States, taken collectively, constitute the people of the United States; but it is in this their collective capacity, it is as all the people of the United States, that they establish the Constitution. So they declare, and words cannot be plainer than the words used.

"When the gentleman says the Constitution is a compact between the States he uses language exactly applicable to the old confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The confederation was in strictness a compact; the States, as States, were parties to it. We had no other general government."

Without continuing these extracts, Mr. President, I desire to call the attention of the Senate—I hope I do not overrate their importance—to the only occasions on which, besides this Capon Springs speech, which Mr. Webster himself hastened to correct by letter, Mr. Stephens rests his extraordinary charge. They are, first, a letter which Mr. Webster addressed when he was in London in 1839 to Baring Brothers & Co., a most respectable and eminent firm of British merchants and financial agents.

At that time agents of several States of the Union were in London trying to negotiate loans for internal improvements. A doubt was suggested as to whether under the Constitutional inhibition that no State could emit bills of credit a State had the right to negotiate a loan by issuing bonds, and Mr. Webster at the request of the merchants to whom I have referred wrote an explanatory letter. Because Mr. Webster said in explaining the different powers of the States and the United States Government that it had been left to the States to regulate their own credit—I need not read the whole letter, it is several pages in length—Mr. Stephens represents him as acknowledging the sovereignty of the States. It was a business letter wholly, and it concludes with a word which I think entirely negatives every presumption of the mischievous kind that Mr. Stephens endeavored to attribute to it. Mr. Webster says, in the closing paragraph:—

"I hope I may be justified by existing circumstances in closing this letter with the expression of an opinion of a more general nature. It is, that I believe the citizens of the United States, like all honest men, regard debts, whether public or private, and whether existing at home or abroad, to be of moral as well as legal obligation; and I trust I may appeal to their history, from the moment when *those States took their rank among the nations of the earth* to the present time, for proof that this belief is well founded."

In 1838 Mr. Calhoun introduced in the Senate an elaborate series of resolutions affirming that the States had never taken any rank among the nations of the earth, and I believe the honorable Senator follows in the wake of that argument.

MR. EATON. Produce what I say when you assert that I have said that.

MR. BLAINE. I have read a great deal from the Senator this morning, and I will read more before I get through.

MR. EATON. Perhaps that will be the best part of your speech except what you read from Webster. [Laughter.]

MR. BLAINE. I am obliged to the Senator for the exception. It is equalled only by Dogberry's injunction, "Write God first."

The other allegation of Mr. Stephens, as I was about to say, is that Mr. Webster, in 1838, five years after his speeches of 1833, had refused to vote against these resolutions of Mr. Calhoun, and that this refusal was a very pregnant suggestion that he had then changed his mind. He makes a solemn presentation of the fact that Mr. Webster had not voted on a series of five resolutions which Mr. Calhoun introduced in this body in 1838, involving all the heretical doctrines of the States-rights, pro-slavery Democracy. He does not say that Mr. Webster voted for them, but that he had not voted against them. Those resolutions of Mr. Calhoun were introduced in December, 1837. They were before the Senate, as such resolutions often are, as a foot-ball for political debate, for several months. On the 22d of March, 1838, after they had been passed upon by the Senate, Mr. Webster referred to them as follows, in regard to the slavery question:—

"Sir, this is a very grave matter; it is a subject very exciting and inflammable. I take, of course, all the responsibility belonging to my opinions; but I desire these opinions to be understood, and fairly stated. If I am to be regarded as an enemy to the South because I could not support the gentleman's resolutions, be it so. I cannot purchase favors from any quarter by the sacrifice of clear and conscientious convictions. The principal resolution declared that Congress had plighted its faith not to interfere either with slavery or the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Now, sir, this is quite a new idea. I never heard it advanced until this session.

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"On such a question, sir, when I am asked what the Constitution is, or whether any power granted by it has been compromised away, or, indeed, could be compromised away, I must express my honest opinion, and always

shall express it, if I say any thing, notwithstanding it may not meet concurrence either in the South, or the North, or the East, or the West. I cannot express by my vote what I do not believe. The gentleman has chosen to bring that subject into this debate, with which it has no concern but he may make the most of it, if he thinks he can produce unfavorable impressions against me at the South from my negative to his fifth resolution. As to the rest of them, they were commonplaces generally or abstractions, in regard to which one may well feel himself not called on to vote at all."

With that record before him Mr. Stephens wrote that Mr. Webster's ominous refusal to vote on the resolutions indicated a change of mind, when here was his defiant review of the whole subject of Mr. Calhoun's heresies. Mr. Webster then proceeded with some remarks which I am disposed to think might now be addressed to the other side of the Chamber, *mutatis mutandis*, and we should hardly realize that forty years had gone by. Let me read a single paragraph — I wish it were original with me, addressed as Mr. Webster then addressed it — to the opposite side of the Chamber.

"The honorable member from Carolina himself habitually indulges in charges of usurpation and oppression against the Government of his country. He daily denounces its important measures, in the language in which our Revolutionary fathers spoke of the oppressions of the mother country. Not merely against executive usurpation, either real or supposed, does he utter these sentiments, but against laws of Congress, laws passed by large majorities, laws sanctioned for a course of years by the people. These laws he proclaims, every hour, to be but a series of acts of oppression. He speaks of them as if it were an admitted fact that such is their true character. This is the language he utters, these are the sentiments he expresses, to the rising generation around him. Are they sentiments and language which are likely to inspire our children with the love of union, to enlarge their patriotism, or to teach them, and to make them feel, that their destiny has made them common citizens of one great and glorious Republic? A principal object in his late political movements, the gentleman himself tells us, was to *unite the entire South*: and against whom or against what does he wish to *unite the entire South*? Is not this the very essence of local feeling and local regard? Is it not the acknowledgment of a wish and object to create political strength *by uniting political opinions geographically*?

"Finally, the honorable member declares that he shall now march off under the banner of State rights. March off from whom? March off from what? We have been contending for great principles. We have been struggling to maintain the liberty and to restore the prosperity of the country. We have made these struggles here, in the National councils, with the old flag — the true American flag, the eagle and the stars and stripes — waving over the Chamber in which we sit. He now tells us, however, that he marches off under the State-rights banner.

"Let him go. I remain. I am where I have ever been, and ever mean to be."

The lineal successors of Mr. Webster's great Constitutional views can utter those words to-day and direct them to the same

side of the Chamber at which he aimed them forty years ago.

I ought not to omit one small point, because there is one still left on which this charge of Mr. Webster's change of opinion is based. I think the Senator from Connecticut intimated that he would not read the Mark A. Cooper letter, although he gave a strong incidental assurance that if he did, it would contain all that he had alluded to about Mr. Webster's alleged approving reference to compact, or confederation.

The Mark A. Cooper letter was a letter of courtesy in answer to a gentleman of that name at Macon, Georgia, inviting Mr. Webster to attend a State fair. Mr. Webster wrote with his own felicity of language in regard to agricultural topics, and toward the close of the letter occurs the following:—

“Let me take the occasion to add, my dear sir, that as the forms and products of your agriculture are quite different from ours, as your soil and climate are different, and as your social and domestic institutions are also different, it was never intended by the Constitution under which we live that so foolish and impracticable a thing as amalgamation, in these respects, or any of them, should be attempted between Northern and Southern States. The States are united, confederated:—

‘Not, chaos-like, together crushed and bruised,
But, like the world, harmoniously confused;
Where order in variety we see,
And where, though all things differ, all agree.’”

Could there be a more felicitous illustration of the character of the National Union than Mr. Webster embodied in this quotation? It calls for no explanation: it needs only to be read. Its meaning cannot be changed by the misapprehensions of Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, nor can any word Mr. Webster ever spoke be perverted to the comfort of the States-rights Democracy.

EULOGY OF SENATOR CHANDLER.

[The Senate of the United States on the 28th of January, 1880, having under consideration resolutions of respect to the memory of Honorable Zachariah Chandler, who died on the 1st of November, 1879, Mr. Blaine said, —]

MR. PRESIDENT, — Mr. Chandler sprang from a strong race of men and was reared in a State which has shed lustre on other Commonwealths by the gift of her native-born and her native-bred. She gave Webster to Massachusetts, Chief Justice Chase to Ohio, General Dix to New York, and Horace Greeley to the head of American journalism. Mr. Chandler left New Hampshire before he attained his majority, and with limited pecuniary resources sought a home in the inviting territory of the North-West. He was endowed with great physical strength, remarkable powers of endurance, energy that could not be overtaxed, courage of the highest order; was imbued with principles which throughout his life were inflexible, was intelligent and well instructed, and was thus in all respects equipped for a career in the great Commonwealth where he lived and grew and prospered and died.

For a long period following the second war with Great Britain the Territory of Michigan was governed by one of the most persuasive and successful of American statesmen; whose pure and honorable life, whose grace and kindness of manner, and whose almost unlimited power in what was then a remote frontier Territory, had enabled him to mould the large majority of the early settlers to his own political views. When in 1833 Mr. Chandler reached Detroit General Cass had left the scene of his long reign — for reign it might well be called — to assume control of the War Department under one of the strongest administrations that ever governed the country. The great majority of young men at twenty years of age naturally drifted with a current that was so strong; but Mr. Chandler had inherited political principles which were deepened by his own convictions as he grew to manhood, and he took his stand at once and firmly with the minority. He was from the outset

a recognized power in the political field; though not until his maturer years, with fortune attained and the harder struggles of life crowned with victory, would he consent to hold public position. But he was in all the fierce conflicts which raged for twenty years in Michigan, and which ended in changing the political mastery of the State. It is not matter of wonder that personal estrangements occurred in such prolonged and bitter controversy, though often without diminution of mutual respect. In one of the most exciting periods of the struggle, General Cass spoke publicly of not enjoying the honor of Mr. Chandler's acquaintance. Three years afterward, as Mr. Chandler delighted to tell with good-natured and pardonable boasting, he carried to General Cass a letter of introduction from the Governor of Michigan which so impressed the General that he caused it to be publicly read in this Chamber and placed on the permanent files of the Senate. It is to the honor of both these great men that complete cordiality of friendship was restored, and that in the hour of supreme peril to the nation which came soon after, General Cass and Mr. Chandler stood side by side maintaining the Union of the States by the exercise of the war power of the Government. They sleep their last sleep in the same beautiful cemetery near the city which was so long their home, under the soil of the State which each did so much to honor, and on the margin of the Great Lakes whose commercial development, spanned by their lives, has been so greatly promoted by their efforts.

The anti-slavery agitation which broke forth with violence in 1854, after the repeal of the Missouri compromise, was soon followed by partial re-action, and in 1856 Mr. Buchanan was chosen to the Presidency. Mr. Chandler took his seat for the first time in this body on the day of Mr. Buchanan's inauguration. It was the first public station he had ever held except the Mayoralty of Detroit for a single term, and the first for which he had ever been a candidate, except in 1852 when he consented to lead the forlorn hope of the Whigs in the contest for governor of Michigan. When he entered the Senate the Democratic party bore undisputed sway in this Chamber, having more than two-thirds of the entire body. The party was led by aggressive, able, uncompromising men, who played for

a high stake and who played the bold game of men who are willing to cast all upon the hazard of the die. The party in opposition, to which Mr. Chandler belonged, was weak in numbers but strong in character, intellect, and influence. Seward, with his philosophy of optimism, his deep study into the working of political forces, and his affluence of rhetoric, was its accepted leader. He was sustained by Sumner, with his wealth of learning and his burning zeal for the right; by Fessenden, less philosophic than Seward, less learned than Sumner, but more logical and skilled o' fence than either; by Wade, who in mettle and make-up was a Cromwellian, who, had he lived in the days of the Commonwealth, would have fearlessly followed the Protector in the expulsion of an illegal parliament, or drawn the sword of the Lord and of Gideon to smite hip and thigh the Amalekites who appeared anew in the persons of the Cavaliers; by Collamer wise and learned, pure and dignified, a conscript father in look and in fact; by John P. Hale, who never faltered in his devotion to the anti-slavery cause, and who had earlier than any of his associates broken his alliance with the old parties and given his eloquent voice to the cause of the despised Nazarenes; by Trumbull, acute, able, untiring, the first Republican senator from that great State which has since added so much to the grandeur and glory of our history; by Hamlin, with long training, with devoted fidelity, with undaunted courage, who came anew to the conflict of ideas with a State behind him, with its faith and its force, and who alone of all the illustrious Senate of 1857 is with us to-day; by Cameron, with wide and varied experience in affairs, with consummate tact in the government of parties, whose active political life began in the days of Monroe, and who, after a prolonged and stormy career, still survives by reason of strength, at fourscore, with the attachment of his friends, the respect of his opponents, the hearty good wishes of all.

Into association with these men Mr. Chandler entered when in his forty-fourth year. His influence was felt, and felt powerfully, from the first day. A writer at the time said that the effect of Chandler's coming was like the addition of a fresh division of troops to an army engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with an outnumbering foe. He encouraged, inspired, coerced

others to do things which he could not do himself, but which others could not have done without him. His first four years in the Senate were passed in a hopeless minority, where a sense of common danger had banished rivalry, checked jealousy, and produced that harmony and discipline which won the most signal of all our political victories in the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. Changed by this triumph and the startling events which followed into a majority party in the Senate, the Republicans found many of their oldest and ablest leaders trained only to the duties of the minority, and not fitted to assume with grace and efficiency the task of administrative leadership. They had been so long studying the science of attack that they were awkward when they felt the need and assumed the responsibility of defense. They were like some of the British regiments in the campaign of Namur, of whom William of Orange said there was no fortress of the French that could resist them, and none that was safe in their hands.

It was from this period that Mr. Chandler became more widely known to the whole country — achieving almost at a single bound what we term a National reputation. His defiant attitude in the presence of the impending danger of war; his superb courage under the doubts and reverses of that terrible struggle between brethren of the same blood; his readiness to do all things, to dare all things, to endure all things for the sake of victory to the Union; his ardent support of Mr. Lincoln's administration in every war measure which they proposed; his quickness to take issue with the administration when he thought a great campaign was about to be ruined by what was termed the Fabian policy; his inspiring presence, his burning zeal, his sleepless vigilance, his broad sympathies, his prompt decision, his eager patriotism, his crowning faith in the final result, all combined to give to Mr. Chandler a front rank among the devoted men who in our war history are entitled to stand next to those who led the mighty conflict on the field of battle.

To portray Mr. Chandler's career for the ten consecutive years after the war closed would involve too close a reference to exciting questions still in some sense at issue. But in that long period of service and in the shorter one that immediately preceded his death, those who knew him well could observe a

constant intellectual growth. He was fuller and stronger and abler in conference and in debate the last year of his life than ever before. He entered the Senate originally without practice in parliamentary discussion. He left it one of the most forcible as well as most fearless antagonists that could be encountered in this Chamber. His methods were learned here. He was plain and yet eloquent; aggressive and yet careful; brave without showing bravado. What he knew, he knew with precision; the powers he possessed were always at his command and he never declined a challenge to the lists. "Here and now" was his motto, and his entire senatorial career seemed guided by that courageous spirit which the greatest of American senators exhibited, in the only boast he ever made, when he quoted to Mr. Calhoun the classic defiance:—

Concurritur; horae
Memento cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta.

Mr. Chandler's fame was enlarged by his successful administration of an important Cabinet position. Called by President Grant to the head of the Interior Department by telegraphic summons, he accepted without reluctance and without distrust. His positive and uncompromising course in the Senate for eighteen years had borne the inevitable fruit of many enmities as well as the rich reward of countless friends. The appointment was severely criticised by many who, a year later, were sufficiently just and magnanimous to withdraw their harsh words and bear generous testimony to his executive ability, his painstaking industry, and his inflexible integrity; to his admirable talent for thorough organization and to his prompt and graceful dispatch of public business. What his friends had before known of his character and his capacity the chance of a few brief months in an administrative position had revealed to the entire country and had placed in history.

It would not be just even in the generous indulgence conceded to eulogy to speak of Mr. Chandler as a man without faults. But assuredly no enemy, if there be one above his lifeless form, will ever say that he had mean faults. They were all on the generous and larger side of his nature. In amassing his princely fortune he never exacted the pound of

flesh; he never ground the faces of the poor; he was never even harsh to an honest debtor unable to pay. His wealth came to him through his own ability, devoted with unremitting industry for a third of a century to honorable trade in that enlarging, ever-expanding region, whose capacities and resources he was among the earliest to foresee and to appreciate.

To his friends Mr. Chandler was devotedly true. Like Colonel Benton, he did not use the word "friend" lightly and without meaning; nor did he ever pretend to be friendly to a man whom he did not like. He never dissembled. To describe him in the plain and vigorous Saxon which he spoke himself—he was a warm friend, an honest hater, a hard hitter.

In the inner circle of home life, sacred almost from reference, Mr. Chandler was chivalric in devotion, inexhaustible in affection, and exceptionally happy in all his relations. Whatever of sternness there was in his character, whatever of roughness in his demeanor, whatever of irritability in his temper, were one and all laid aside when he sat at his own hearthstone, or dispensed graceful and generous hospitality to unnumbered guests. There he was seen at his best, and there his friends best love to recall him. As Burke said of Lord Keppel, he was a wild stock of pride on which the tenderest of hearts had grafted the milder virtues.

A sage whose words have comforted many generations of men tells us that when death comes every one can see its deplorable and grievous side; only the wise can see causes for reconciliation. Let us be wise to-day and celebrate the memory of a man who stood on the confines of age without once feeling its weakness or realizing its decay; who passed sixty-six years in this world without losing a single day of mental activity or physical strength; who had a business career of unbroken prosperity; who had attained a fourth election to the Senate of the United States, an honor enjoyed by fewer men in the Republic than even its Chief Rulership, and who strengthening with his years stood higher in the regard of his countrymen, firmer with his constituency, nearer to his friends, and dearer to his kindred, at the close of his career than on any preceding day of his eventful life.

OUGHT THE NEGRO TO BE DISFRANCHISED?
OUGHT HE TO HAVE BEEN ENFRANCHISED?

[The *North American Review* of March, 1880, contained a series of articles on these interrogatories. The articles were arranged in the form of a discussion in which Mr. Blaine opened with the following paper.]

THESE questions have lately been asked by many who have been distinguished as the special champions of the negro's rights; by many who have devoted their lives to redressing the negro's wrongs. The questions owe their origin not to any cooling of philanthropic interest, not to any novel or radical views about universal suffrage, but to the fact that, in the judgment of many of those hitherto accounted wisest, negro suffrage has failed to attain the ends hoped for when the franchise was conferred; failed as a means of more completely securing the negro's civil rights; failed to bring him the consideration which generally attaches to power; failed, indeed, in every thing except to increase the political weight and influence of those against whom, and in spite of whom, his enfranchisement was secured.

Those who have reached this conclusion, and those who are tending toward it, argue that the important franchise was prematurely bestowed on the negro; that its possession necessarily places him in inharmonious relations with the white race; that the excitement incident to its free enjoyment hinders him from progress in the rudimentary and essential branches of education; that his advance in material wealth is thus delayed and obstructed; and that obstacles, which would not otherwise exist, are continually accumulating in his path — rendering his progress impossible and his oppression inevitable. In other words, that suffrage in the hands of the negro is a challenge to

the white race for a contest in which the former is sure to be over-matched; and that the withdrawal of the franchise would remove all conflict, restore kindly relations between the races, hold white men to their proper and honorable responsibility, and assure to each race the largest prosperity attainable in a Government under which both are compelled to live.

The class of men whose views are thus hastily summarized do not contemplate the withdrawal of the suffrage from the negro without a corresponding reduction in the representation in Congress of the States where the negro is a large factor in the apportionment. Yet it is quite probable that they have not given thought to the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of compassing that end. Under the Constitution, as it is now construed, the diminution of representative strength could only result from the enactment by the States of such laws as would disfranchise the negro by some educational or property test, as it is forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment to disfranchise him on account of his race. But the Southern States will not do this, and for two reasons: first, they will in no event consent to a reduction of representative strength; and, second, they could not make any disfranchisement of the negro that would not at the same time disfranchise a great number of whites.

Another class — mostly resident in the South, but with numerous sympathizers in the North — would be glad to have the negro disfranchised on totally different grounds. Born and reared with the belief that the negro is inferior to the white man in every thing, it is hard for the class who were masters at the South to endure any phase or form of equality on the part of the negro. Instinct governs reason, and with the mass of Southern people the aversion to equality is instinctive and ineradicable. The general conclusion with this class would be to deprive the negro of voting if it could be done without impairing the representation of their States, but not to make any move in that direction so long as diminished power in Congress is the constitutional and logical result of a denial or abridgment of suffrage. In the mean while, seeing no mode of legally or equitably depriving the negro of his suffrage except with unwelcome penalty to themselves, the Southern

States as a whole — differing in degree but the same in effect — have striven to achieve by indirect and unlawful means what they cannot achieve directly and lawfully. They have as far as possible made negro suffrage of none effect. They have done this against law and against justice.

Having stated the position of both classes on this question, I venture now to give my own views in a series of statements in which I shall endeavor to embody both argument and conclusion : —

The two classes I have described, contemplating the possible or desirable disfranchisement of the negro from entirely different points of view, and with entirely different aims, are both and equally in the wrong. The first is radically in error in supposing that a disfranchisement of the negro would put him in the way of any development or progress that would in time fit him for the suffrage. He would instead grow more and more unfit for it from the time the first backward step should be taken, and he would relapse, if not into actual chattel slavery, yet into such a dependent and defenseless condition as would result in simply another form of servitude. For the ballot to-day, imperfectly enjoyed as it is by the negro, its freedom unjustly and illegally curtailed, its independence ruthlessly marred, its purity defiled, is withal and after all, the strong shield of the race against a form of servitude which would present all the cruelty and none of the alleviations of the old slave system, whose destruction carried with it the shedding of so much innocent blood.

— The second class is wrong in anticipating even the remote possibility of securing the legal disfranchisement of the negro without a reduction of representation. Both sides have fenced for position on this question. But for the clause regulating representation in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution the South would to-day be wholly under the control, and legally under the control, of those who rebelled against the Union and sought to erect the Confederate Government ; — the negroes being counted in the apportionment without the slightest concession of suffrage to the race. The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent this, and, if it does not succeed in preventing it, it is because of evasion and violation

of its clear intent and of its express provisions. Those who erected the Confederate Government may be in exclusive possession of power throughout the South, but they are not so fairly and legally; and they will not be permitted to continue in the enjoyment of political power unjustly seized — seized in derogation and in defiance of the rights not merely of the negro but of the white man in all other sections of the country. Injustice cannot stand before exposure and argument and the force of public opinion. No sharper weapons of defense will be required against the wrong which now afflicts the South and is a scandal to the whole country.

But while discussing the question of the disfranchisement of the negro, and settling its justice or expediency according to our best discretion, it may be worth while to look at its impracticability, or, to state it still more strongly, its impossibility. Logicians attach weight to arguments drawn *ab inconvenienti*. Arguments must be still more eogent, and conclusions still more decisive, when drawn *ab impossibili*. The negro is secure against disfranchisement by two Constitutional Amendments, and he cannot be remanded to the non-voting class until both these amendments are annulled. These amendments cannot be annulled until two-thirds of the Senate and two-thirds of the House of Representatives of the United States shall propose, and a majority in the Legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of all the States shall by affirmative vote approve the annulment. In other words, the negro cannot be disfranchised so long as one vote more than one-third in the United States Senate, or one vote more than one-third in the House of Representatives, shall be recorded against it; and if these securities and safeguards should give way, then the disfranchisement could not be effected so long as a majority in one branch in the Legislatures of one State more than a fourth of all the States should refuse to assent to it, and refuse to assent to a convention to which it might be referred. No human right on this continent is more completely guaranteed than the right against disfranchisement on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, as embodied in the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

In enforcement and elucidation of my second point, it is

of interest to observe the rapid advance and development of popular sentiment in regard to the rights of the negro as expressed in the last three amendments to the Constitution of the United States. In 1865 Congress submitted the Thirteenth Amendment, which merely gave the negro freedom, without suffrage, civil rights, or citizenship. In 1866 the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted, declaring the negro to be a citizen, but not forbidding the States to withhold suffrage from him — yet inducing them to grant it by the provision that representation in Congress should be reduced in proportion to the exclusion of male citizens twenty-one years of age from the right to vote, except for rebellion or other crime. In 1869 the decisive step was taken of declaring that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A most important provision in this amendment is the inhibition upon the “United States” as well as upon “any State;” for it would not be among the impossible results of a great political revolution, resting on prejudice and reaching for power, that, in the absence of this express negation, the United States might assume or usurp the right to deprive the negro of suffrage, and then the States would not be subjected to the forfeiture of representation provided in the Fourteenth Amendment as the result of the denial or abridgment of suffrage by State authority. — In this stately progression of organic enactments the will of a great people is embodied, and its reversal would be one of those revolutions which would convulse social order and endanger the authority of law. There will be no step backward, but under the provision which specifically confers on Congress the power to enforce each amendment by “appropriate legislation,” there will be applied, from time to time, fitfully perhaps and yet certainly, the restraining and correcting edicts of National authority.

As I have already hinted, there will be no attempt made in the Southern States to disfranchise the negro by any of those methods which are still within the power of the State. There is no Southern State that would dare venture on an educational qualification, because by the last census there were more than one million white persons over fifteen years of

age, in the States lately slave-holding, who could not read, and a still larger number who could not write. There was, of course, a still greater number of negroes of the same ages who could not read or write; but, in the nine years that have intervened since the census was taken, there has been a much greater advance in the education of the negroes than in the education of the poor whites of the South; and to-day on an educational qualification it is probable that, while the proportion would be in favor of the whites, the absolute exclusion of the whites in some of the States would be nearly as great as that of the negroes. Nor would a property test operate with any greater advantage to the whites. The slave States always contained a large class of very poor and entirely uneducated whites, and any qualification of property that would seriously diminish the negro vote would also cut off a very large number of whites from the suffrage.

Thus far I have directed my argument to the first question propounded, "Ought the negro to be disfranchised?" The second interrogatory, "Ought he to have been enfranchised?" is not practical but speculative. Yet, unless it can be answered with confidence in the affirmative, the moral tenure of his suffrage is weakened, and, as a consequence, his legal right to enjoy it is impaired. For myself I answer the second question in the affirmative, with as little hesitation as I answered the first in the negative. If the question were again submitted to the judgment of Congress, I would vote for suffrage in the light of experience with more confidence than I voted for it in the light of an experiment. Had the franchise not been bestowed upon the negro as his shield and weapon of defense, the demand upon the General Government to interfere for his protection would have been constant, irritating and embarrassing. Great complaint has been made for years past of the Government's interference, simply to secure to the colored citizen his plainest Constitutional right. But this intervention has been trifling compared to that which would have been required if we had not given suffrage to the negro. In the reconstruction experiments under President Johnson's plan, before the negro was enfranchised, it was clearly foreshadowed that he was to be dealt with as one having no rights except such as the whites

should choose to grant. The negro was to work according to labor laws; freedom of movement and transit was to be denied him by the operation of vagrant laws; liberty to sell his time and his skill at their market value was to be restrained by apprentice laws; and the slavery that was abolished by the Constitution of a Nation was to be revived by the enactment of a State. To counteract these and all like efforts at re-enslavement, the National authority would have been constantly invoked; interference in the most positive and peremptory manner would have been demanded, and angry conflict and possibly resistance to law would have resulted. The one sure mode to remand the States that rebelled against the Union to their autonomy was to give suffrage to the negro; and that autonomy will be complete, absolute and unquestioned whenever the rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic shall be enjoyed in every State—as the administration of justice was assured in Magna Charta—“promptly and without delay; freely and without sale; completely and without denial.”

[Messrs. L. Q. C. LAMAR, WADE HAMPTON, JAMES A. GARFIELD, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, WENDELL PHILLIPS, MONTGOMERY BLAIR, THOMAS A. HENDRICKS, followed with a series of papers in reply. Mr. BLAINE rejoined with the following paper.]

AT the instance of the editor of the *North American Review*, and not by request or desire of mine, the brief article which I wrote in regard to negro suffrage was submitted to the gentlemen who have replied to it, and in turn their articles have been submitted to me. I have now the privilege of rejoinder, and the whole series of papers thus assumes the phase of a connected discussion.

With the exception of Mr. Wendell Phillips and General Garfield, the replies are from gentlemen identified with the Democratic party, and distinguished and influential in its councils. General Garfield is a Republican, and has taken prominent and honorable part in all the legislation respecting negro suffrage. His views are so entirely in harmony with my own that nothing is left me but to commend his admirable statement

of the case. Mr. Phillips is neither a Republican nor a Democrat, but reserves to himself the right — a right most freely exercised — to criticise and condemn either party with unsparing severity, generally bestowing his most caustic denunciation upon the party to which he most inclines. It is by this sign that we feel occasionally comforted with the reflection that Mr. Phillips still has sympathies with the Republican party, and still indulges aspirations for its ultimate success.

The arraignment of the Republicans at this late day by Mr. Phillips, because they did not reduce the Confederate States to Territories and govern them by direct exercise of Federal power, is causeless and unjust; and it cannot certainly influence the judgment of any man whose memory goes back to 1866-67. For I assume that if any thing, not capable of demonstration, is yet an absolute certainty, it is that such an attempt by the Republican party would have led to its utter overthrow at the initial point of its Reconstruction policy. The overthrow of the Republican party at that time would have restored the Confederate States to full power in the Union without the imposition of a single condition, without the exaction of a single guaranty. The inestimable provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been lost: its broad and comprehensive basis of citizenship; its clause regulating representation in Congress and coercing the States into granting suffrage to the negro; its guaranty of the validity of the war debt of the Union and of pensions to its soldiers and their widows and orphans; its inhibition of any tax by General or State Government for debts incurred in aid of the rebellion or for the emancipation of any slave! These great achievements for liberty, in addition to the Fifteenth Amendment, would have been put to hazard and probably lost, could Mr. Phillips have had his way, in a vain struggle to reduce eleven States — four of them belonging to the original thirteen — to the condition of Territories. Mr. Phillips would thus have committed the General Government to a policy as arbitrary and as sure to lead to corruption and tyranny as the proconsular system of Rome.

As if the territorial policy were not enough to have destroyed the Republican party at that time, Mr. Phillips would have plunged us into the wild, visionary, and unconstitutional

scheme of confiscating the land of the rebels and giving it to the freedmen. Confiscation laws were passed by Congress during the hottest period of the war; but even then, when passions were at the highest, no enactment was proposed which did not recognize the express limitation of the Constitution that in punishing treason there should be no "forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." The Republican party has been flippantly accused by its opponents of disregarding the Constitution, but I venture to say that there is no parallel in the world to so strict an observance of written law during a critical contest as was shown by the Republicans throughout the protracted and bloody struggle that involved the fate of free government on this continent. It is impossible, therefore, that the Republican party could have adopted the policy which Mr. Phillips commends; and impossible that it could have succeeded if the attempt had been made.

Of the replies made by the other gentlemen, identified as they have been and are with the Democratic party, it is noteworthy that, with the exception of Mr. Blair, they agree that the negro ought not to be disfranchised. As all these gentlemen were hostile to the enfranchisement of the race, their present position must be taken as a great step forward, and as an attestation of the wisdom and courage of the Republican party at the time they were violently opposing its measures. This general expression leaves Mr. Blair to be treated as an exception, and for many of his averments the best answer is to be found in the suggestions and concessions of his Democratic associates. I need not make an elaborate reply to Mr. Blair, when he is answered with such significance and such point by those of his own political household. It is one of the curious developments of political history that a man who sat in the Cabinet of Abraham Lincoln and was present when Emancipation was decreed should live to write a paper against the enfranchisement of the negro, when the Vice-President of the Rebel Confederacy and two of its most distinguished officers are taking the other side!

Of Governor Hampton's paper it is fair to say that it seems to have been written to cover a case. Its theory and application are adapted to the latitude of South Carolina, and to

his own political course. Mr. Hampton is a man of strong parts, possessing courage and executive force, but he has been in the thick of the fight, and has had personal ambitions to gratify which may not place him in history as an impartial witness. His personality protrudes at every point, and his conception of what should be done and what should be undone at the South is precisely what is included in his own career. When Mirabeau was describing all the great qualities that should distinguish a popular leader, the keenest of French wits said he "had forgotten to add that he should be pock-marked."

Mr. Lamar offers a contrast to Governor Hampton. He generalizes and philosophizes with great ability, and presents the strange combination of a "refined speculatist" and a trustful optimist—embodying some of the characteristics of Mr. Calhoun whom he devoutly followed, and of Mr. Seward whom he always opposed. Mr. Lamar is the only man in public life who can be praised in New England for a warm eulogy of Charles Sumner, and immediately afterward be elected to the Senate as the representative of the "white-line" Democrats of Mississippi. Yet, inconsistent as these positions are, it is the dream of Mr. Lamar's life to reconcile them. He is intensely devoted to the South; he has generous aspirations for the Union of the States; he is shackled with the narrowing dogma of State rights, and yet withal has boundless hopes for an Imperial Republic whose power shall lead and direct the civilization of the world. Hedged in by opposing theories, embarrassed by forces that seem irreconcilable, Mr. Lamar, probably more than any other man of the Democratic party, gives anxious and inquiring thought to the future.

Of Mr. Stephens and Mr. Hendricks it may be said that in their treatment of the question, one aims to vindicate the course of his native Georgia; the other to gain some advantage for the Democratic party of the Nation. Mr. Stephens has the mind of a metaphysician, led astray sometimes in his logic and sometimes in his facts, but aiming always to promote the interest of the State to which he is devoted. Mr. Hendricks is an accomplished political leader, with large experience, possessed of tact and address, and instinctively looking at every public question from its relation to the fate and fortune of his

party. Mr. Stephens argues from the condition of Georgia. Mr. Hendricks has in view the Democracy of the nation.

These Democratic leaders unite in upholding the suffrage of the negro under existing circumstances, but each with an obvious feeling that some contradiction is to be reconciled, some record to be amended, some consistency to be vindicated. They all unite, however, on the common ground of denouncing the men who controlled the negro vote at the outset in the interest of the Republican party. The underlying conclusion, not expressed but implied, is that if the military force had been absent and the persuasion of the Freedmen's Bureau had not been applied, the negroes would have flocked, as doves to their windows, to the outstretched and protecting arms of the Democratic party. This seems to be sheer recklessness of assumption; the very bravado of argument. Why should the negro have been disposed to vote with the Democratic party? Mr. Hendricks says he was made to feel that "he owed servitude to a party through the agency of United States officials and the Freedmen's Bureau." But can Mr. Hendricks give any possible reason why the negro should have voted with the Democratic party at that time? Does not the record of Mr. Hendricks himself as the leader of the Democratic party in the Senate show the most conclusive reasons why the negro should have voted with the Republicans?

Mr. Hendricks argued and voted in the Senate against emancipating the negro from helpless slavery; when made free, Mr. Hendricks argued and voted against making him a citizen; citizenship conferred, Mr. Hendricks argued and voted against bestowing suffrage; and he argued and voted against conferring upon the negro the most ordinary civil rights, even inveighing in the Senate against giving to colored men who were eligible to seats in Congress the simple privilege of a seat in the horse-cars of Washington in common with white men. If we concede to the negro the ordinary instincts and prejudices of human nature, it must have required the combined and energetic action of the Freedmen's Bureau, the Federal officers and the United States Army to hold him back from his impulsive and irrepressible desire to vote with Mr. Hendricks and the Democratic party!

I do not use this *argumentum ad hominem* in any personal or offensive sense toward Mr. Hendricks. His position was not different from his associates and his followers in the Democratic party on all the questions where I have referred to his votes and his speeches. Mr. Lamar occupied the same ground practically; so did Mr. Stephens and Governor Hampton. Indeed, the entire Democratic party opposed legislation for the amelioration of the negro's condition at every step, and opposed it not with the mere registry of negative votes, but with an energetic hostility that too often assumed the phase of anger and acrimony. Emancipation from slavery, grant of citizenship and civil rights, conferring of suffrage, were all carried for the negro by the Republicans against a protesting and resisting Democracy. Democratic senators and representatives in Congress fought all these measures with unflagging zeal. In State Legislatures, on the stump, in the partisan press, through all the agencies that influence and direct public opinion, the Democrats showed implacable hostility to each and every step that was taken toward elevating the negro to a better condition. It was inevitable therefore that the negro who had sense enough to feel that he was free, who had perception enough to know that he was a citizen, who had pride enough to realize that he was a voter, felt and knew and realized that these great enfranchisements had been conferred upon him by the persistent energy of the Republican party, and in spite of the efforts of an embittered and united Democracy. Is further statement necessary to explain why the negro should have cast his vote for the Republican party when a free ballot was in his hands? It can be readily understood why he may now cast a vote for the Democratic party when he is no longer allowed freedom of choice, when he is no longer master of his own ballot.

It must be borne in mind that the Republicans were urged and hastened to measures of amelioration for the negro by very dangerous developments in the Southern States looking to his re-enslavement, in fact if not in form. The year that followed the accession of Andrew Johnson to the Presidency was full of anxiety and of warning to all lovers of justice, to all who hoped for "a more perfect union" of the States.

In nearly every one of the Confederate States the white inhabitants assumed that they were to be restored to the Union with their State governments precisely as they were when they seceded in 1861, and that the organic change created by the Thirteenth Amendment might be practically set aside by State legislation. In this belief they exhibited their policy toward the negro. Considering all the circumstances, it would be hard to find in history a more causeless and cruel oppression of a whole race than was embodied in the legislation of those revived and unreconstructed State governments. Their membership was composed wholly of the "ruling class," as they termed it, and in no small degree of Confederate officers below the rank of brigadier-general, who sat in the Legislature in the very uniforms which had distinguished them as enemies of the Union upon the battle-field. Limited space forbids my transcribing the black code wherewith they loaded their statute-books. In Mr. Lamar's State the negroes were forbidden, under very severe penalties, "to keep fire-arms of any kind;" they were apprenticed, if minors, to labor; preference being given by the statute to their "former owners." Grown men and women were compelled to let their labor by contract, the decision of whose terms was wholly in the hands of the whites; and those who failed to contract were to be seized as "vagrants," heavily fined, and their labor sold by the sheriff at public outcry to the highest bidder. The terms "master" and "mistress" continually recur in the statutes, and the slavery that was thus instituted was of a more degrading, merciless, and mercenary type than that which was blotted out by the Thirteenth Amendment.

South Carolina, whose moderation and justice are so highly praised by Governor Hampton, enacted a code still more cruel than that I have quoted from Mississippi. Fire-arms were forbidden to the negro, and any violation of the statute was punished by "a fine equal to twice the value of the weapon so unlawfully kept," and, "if that be not immediately paid, by corporeal punishment." It was further provided that "no person of color shall pursue or practice the art, trade, or business of an artisan, mechanic, or shopkeeper, or any other trade or employment (besides that of husbandry or that of a servant

under contract for labor), until he shall have obtained a license from the Judge of the District Court, which license shall be good for one year only." If the license was granted to the negro to be a shopkeeper or peddler, he was compelled to pay one hundred dollars per annum for it, and if he pursued the rudest mechanical calling he could do so only by the payment of a license fee of ten dollars per annum. No such fees were exacted of the whites, or of free blacks during the era of slavery. The negro was thus hedged in on all sides; he was down and he was to be kept down, and the chivalric race that denied him a fair and honest competition in the humblest mechanical pursuits were loud in their assertions of his inferiority and his incompetency.

But it was reserved for Louisiana to outdo both South Carolina and Mississippi in this infamous legislation. In that State all agricultural laborers were compelled to make labor contracts during the first ten days of January, for the next year. The contract once made, the laborer was not to be allowed to leave his place of employment during the year except upon conditions not likely to occur and easily prevented. The master was allowed to make deductions of the servants' wages for "injuries done to animals and agricultural implements committed to his care," thus making the negroes responsible for wear and tear. Deductions were to be made for "bad or negligent work," the master being the judge. For every act of "disobedience" a fine of one dollar was imposed on the offender; disobedience being a technical term made to include, besides "neglect of duty," and "leaving home without permission," such fearful offenses as "impudence," or "swearing," or "indecent language in the presence of the employer, his family, or agent," or "quarreling or fighting with one another." The master or his agent might assail every ear with profaneness aimed at the negro men, and outrage every sentiment of decency in the foul language addressed to the negro women; but if one of the helpless creatures, goaded to resistance and crazed under tyranny, should answer back with impudence, or should relieve his mind with an oath, or retort indecency upon indecency, he did so at the cost to himself of one dollar for every outburst. The "agent" referred to in the statute is the well-known overseer of the

cotton region, and the care with which the law-makers of Louisiana provided that his delicate ears and sensitive nerves should not be offended with an oath or an indecent word from a negro will be appreciated by all who have heard the crack of the whip on a Southern plantation.

It is impossible to quote all the hideous provisions of these statutes, under whose operation the negro would have relapsed gradually and surely into actual and admitted slavery. Kindred legislation was attempted in a large majority of the Confederate States, and it is not uncharitable or illogical to assume that the ultimate re-enslavement of the race was the fixed design of those who framed the laws, and of those who attempted to enforce them.

I am not speculating as to what would have been done or might have been done in the Southern States if the National Government had not intervened. I have quoted what actually was done by Legislatures under the control of Southern Democrats, and I am only recalling facts when I say that those outrages against human nature were upheld by the Democratic party of the country. All the Democrats whose articles I am reviewing were in various degrees, active or passive, principal or endorser, parties to this legislation; and the fixed determination of the Republican party to thwart it and destroy it evoked all the anathemas of Democratic wrath. It was just at this point that the Republican party was compelled to decide whether the emancipated slave should be protected by National power or handed over to his late master to be dealt with in the spirit of the enactments I have quoted.

To restore the Union on a safe foundation, to re-establish law and promote order, to insure justice and equal rights to all, the Republican party was forced to its Reconstruction policy. To hesitate in its adoption was to invite and confirm the statutes of wrong and cruelty to which I have referred. The first step taken was to submit the Fourteenth Amendment, giving citizenship and civil rights to the negro, and forbidding that he be counted in the basis of representation unless he should be reckoned among the voters. The Southern States could have been readily re-admitted to all their powers and privileges in the Union by accepting the Fourteenth Amendment, and negro

suffrage would not have been forced upon them. The gradual and conservative method of training the negroes for franchise, as suggested and approved by Governor Hampton, had many advocates among Republicans in the North; and, though in my judgment it would have proved delusive and impracticable, it was quite within the power of the South to secure its adoption or at least its trial.

But the States lately in insurrection rejected the Fourteenth Amendment with apparent scorn and defiance. In the Legislatures of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, it did not receive a single vote; in South Carolina it received only one vote; in Virginia only one; in Texas it received five votes; in Arkansas two votes; in Alabama ten; in North Carolina eleven; and in Georgia, where Mr. Stephens boasts that they gave suffrage to the negro in advance of the Fifteenth Amendment, only two votes could be found in favor of making the negro even a citizen. It would have been more candid in Mr. Stephens if he had stated that it was the Legislature assembled under the Reconstruction Act that gave suffrage to the negro in Georgia, and that the unreconstructed Legislature, which had his endorsement and sympathies, and which elected him to the United States Senate, not only refused suffrage to the negro, but loaded him with grievous disabilities, and passed a criminal code of barbarous severity for his punishment.

It is necessary to a clear apprehension of the needful facts in this discussion to remember events in the proper order of time. The Fourteenth Amendment was submitted to the States June 13, 1866. In the autumn of that year, or very early in 1867, the Legislatures of all the insurrectionary States except Tennessee had rejected it. Thus and then the question was forced upon us, whether the Congress of the United States, composed wholly of men who had been loyal to the Government, or the Legislatures of the Rebel States, composed wholly of men who had been disloyal to the Government, should determine the basis on which their relations to the Union should be resumed. In such a crisis the Republican party could not hesitate: to halt, indeed, would have been an abandonment of the principles on which the war had been fought; to surrender to the Rebel Legislatures would have

been cowardly desertion of its loyal friends, and a base betrayal of the Union cause.

Thus, in March, 1867, after and because of the rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern Legislatures, Congress passed the Reconstruction Act. This was the origin of negro suffrage. The Southern whites knowingly and willfully brought it upon themselves. The Reconstruction Act would never have been demanded had the Southern States accepted the Fourteenth Amendment in good faith. But that amendment contained so many provisions demanded by considerations of great national policy, that its adoption became an absolute necessity. Those who controlled the Federal Government would have been recreant to their plainest duty, if they had permitted the power of these States to be wielded by disloyal hands against the measures deemed essential to the security of the Union. To have destroyed the rebellion on the battle-field, and then permit it to seize the power of eleven States and prevent all changes in the organic law necessary to avert future rebellions, would have been a weak and wicked conclusion to the grandest contest ever waged for human rights and for constitutional liberty.

Negro suffrage being thus made a necessity by the obduracy of those who were in control at the South, the Fifteenth Amendment became the next and the logical step to be taken. Nothing could have been more despicable than to use the negroes to secure the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and then leave them exposed to the hazard of losing suffrage whenever those who had attempted to re-enslave them should regain political power in their States. Hence the Fifteenth Amendment — which never pretended to guarantee universal suffrage, but simply forbade that any man should lose his vote because he had once been a slave, or because his face might be black, or because his remote ancestors came from Africa.

It is matter of sincere congratulation that, after all the contests of the past thirteen years, four eminent leaders of the Democratic party should unite in approving negro suffrage. It will not, I trust, be considered cynical, certainly not offensive, if I venture to suggest that this Democratic harmony on the Republican side of a long contest has been developed just at the

time when many causes have conspired to render negro suffrage in the South powerless against the Democratic party. Even in districts where the negro vote is four to one, compared with the whites, the Democrats readily elect the Representatives to Congress. I do not recall any warm approval of negro suffrage by a Democratic leader so long as the negro was able to elect one of his own race or a white Republican. But when his numbers have been overborne by violence, when his white friends have been driven into exile, when murder has been just frequent enough to intimidate the voting majority, and when negro suffrage as a political power has been destroyed, we find leading minds in the Democratic party applauding and upholding it. So lately as Feb. 19, 1872, years after negro suffrage was adopted and while it was still a power in the Southern States, such influential and prominent Democrats as Mr. Bayard of Delaware, and Mr. Beck of Kentucky, united in an official report to Congress, wherein they declared, regarding negro suffrage, that "there can be no permanent partition of power nor any peaceable joint exercise of power among such discordant bodies of men. *One or the other must have all or none.* . . . Pseudo-philanthropists," continued Mr. Bayard and Mr. Beck, "may talk never so loudly about 'equality before the law,' where equality is not found in the great natural law of race ordained by the Creator." Mr. Beck and Mr. Bayard made this report when fresh from protracted intercourse with Southern Democratic leaders, and it will not be denied that in their expressions they fully represented the opinions of their party at that time. Will it be offensive if I again ask, what has changed the views of Democrats except the overthrow of free suffrage? So long as the negro can furnish thirty-five Representatives and thirty-five Electors to the South, his suffrage will be upheld in name, and so long as the Democratic party is dominant it will be destroyed in fact.

Mr. Hendricks is a conspicuous convert. The negro is washed and made white in his eyes as soon as he votes the Democratic ticket. He is greatly affected by the fact that negroes "helped to bury a Democratic Congressman whom they had helped to elect." In this simple incident Mr. Hendricks finds great evidence of restored kindness between the races.

Was there ever a time when the colored people refused to show respect to the whites, living or dead? The evidence would have been stronger if an instance had been quoted of white men paying respect to a deceased negro. But, unhappily, if funeral incidents are to be cited, Mr. Hendricks will find more than he cares to quote. Almost at the moment of his writing, testimony was given before a Senate Committee in Louisiana not only of the murder of two negroes for the sin of being Republicans, but of their being left without sepulture, and actually devoured by hogs on the highway! Their remains — the phrase is doubly significant in this case — were finally covered with earth by some negro women, the negro men having all fled from their white persecutors.

Mr. Hendricks's high praise of the governments of South Carolina and Louisiana, since they fell under Democratic control, is not justified by the facts. Where he speaks of Republicans connected with the government of South Carolina "meeting their punishment in prison and seeking their safety in flight," he provokes an easy retort. One of these men, an ex-Congressman, was sent to prison on disgracefully insufficient evidence, the judge delivering a bitter partisan harangue when he charged the jury to convict. Governor Hampton, to his credit be it said, pardoned him, and it would have been still more to his credit if he had pardoned him more promptly. In another case the Executive of a great Commonwealth refused Governor Hampton's requisition, on the ground that the man was not wanted for the cause and the crime alleged. These criminal charges have in many cases borne the appearance of mere political persecutions, in which the victims are not the persons most dishonored.

On the other hand, when South Carolinians by the hundred were indicted for interfering with the freedom of elections in killing negroes by the score, it was found impossible to convict one of them. Against the clearest and most overwhelming evidence, these murderers were allowed to go free, and the prosecutions were abandoned. South Carolina courts appear to be "organized to convict" when a Republican is on trial, and South Carolina juries impaneled to acquit when Democrats are charged with crime.

In the opinion of Mr. Hendricks, Louisiana under Republican control was the very worst of all the Southern governments. A change was made in April, 1877, and since then the Democratic party has held undisputed power in that State. When the Republicans surrendered the State there was a surplus of \$300,000 in its treasury; taxes were collected, credit maintained, and interest on its public securities promptly and faithfully paid. To-day, after twenty-one months of Democratic government, according to public and undenied report, the State is bankrupt; its taxes are uncollected; its treasury is empty; nearly half a million overdrawn on its fiscal agent; the interest on its public debt unpaid, and its most sacred obligations are protested and dishonored. If such decadence had happened in a State under Republican rule — succeeding a prosperous Democratic administration — the denunciations of Mr. Hendricks might have been fittingly applied.

My conclusions on the topic under discussion are: —

First, Slavery having been Constitutionally abolished by the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the question of suffrage was unsettled. But it may be safely affirmed that the Republicans had no original design of interfering with the control which the States had always exercised on that question.

Second, The loyal men who had conducted the war to a victorious end were not willing that those who had rebelled against the Union should come back with political power vastly increased beyond that which they had wielded in the days of pro-slavery domination; hence they proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, practically basing representation in Congress upon the voting population — the same for North and South.

Third, Instead of accepting the Fourteenth Amendment, the insurrectionary States scornfully rejected it, and claimed the right to settle for themselves the terms on which they would resume relations with the Union. They forthwith proceeded to nullify the Thirteenth Amendment by adopting a series of "black laws" which remanded the negro to a worse servitude than that from which he had been emancipated.

Fourth, When the Government, administered by loyal hands, found it impossible to secure the necessary guaranties for future safety from the "ruling" or rebel class of the South,

they demanded and enforced a Reconstruction policy in which loyalty should assert its rights. Hence the negro was admitted to suffrage.

Fifth, The negro having aided by loyal votes in securing the great guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans declared that he should not afterward be deprived of suffrage on account of race or color. Hence the Fifteenth Amendment.

Sixth, So long as the negro vote was effective in the South in defeating the Democracy, the leaders of that party denounced and opposed it. They withdraw their opposition just at the moment when, by fraud, intimidation, violence, and murder, free suffrage on the part of the negro in the South is fatally impaired; by which I mean that the negro is not allowed to vote freely where his vote can defeat and elect. As a minority voter in Democratic districts he is not disturbed.

Seventh, The answer often made, that, compared with the whole number of Congressional districts in the South, only a small number are disturbed, is not apposite, and does not convey the truth. For it is only in the districts where the negroes make a strong and united effort that violence is needed, and there it is generally found. Thus it is said that only in a comparatively few parishes of Louisiana was there any disturbance at the late election. But the Democrats contrived to have a disturbance at the points where it was necessary to overcome a large Republican vote, and of course had no disturbance where there was no resistance. It will generally be found that the violence occurs in districts where the Republicans have a rightful majority.

Eighth, As the matter stands, all violence in the South inures to the benefit of one political party. That party is counting upon its accession to power and its rule over the country for a series of years by reason of the great number of electoral votes which it wrongfully gains. Financial credit, commercial enterprises, manufacturing industries, may all possibly pass under the control of the Democratic party by reason of its unlawful seizure of political power in the South. Our institutions have been tried by the fiery test of war, and have survived. It remains to be seen whether the attempt to govern

the country by the power of a "Solid South," unlawfully consolidated, can be successful.

No thoughtful man can consider these questions without deep concern. The mighty power of a republic of fifty millions of people—with a continent for their possession—can only be wielded permanently by being wielded honestly. In a fair and generous struggle for partisan power let us not forget those issues and those ends which are above party. Organized wrong will ultimately be met by organized resistance. The sensitive and dangerous point is in the casting and the counting of free ballots. Impartial suffrage is our theory. It must become our practice. Any party of American citizens can bear to be defeated. No party of American citizens will bear to be defrauded. The men who are interested in a dishonest count are units. The men who are interested in an honest count are millions. I wish to speak for the millions of all political parties, and in their name to declare that the Republic must be strong enough, and shall be strong enough, to protect the weakest of its citizens in all their rights.

ENCOURAGEMENT TO AMERICAN SHIP-BUILDING AND THE REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMERCE ON THE OCEAN.

[Speech delivered in the United States Senate Jan. 27, 1881, by James G. Blaine, in reply to the speech of Senator Beck of Kentucky, in favor of admitting foreign-built ships to American register free of duty.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — If the Senate will indulge me I would be glad to speak very briefly on the various points suggested by the senator from Kentucky [Mr. Beck], who has just closed a remarkable speech. I should not like to have such a speech as he has delivered go out from the Senate of the United States unanswered even for a single day, and I propose, therefore, to review his position, at least in part. I regret that I am compelled to speak without preparation, with no data except such as I recall from memory.

The first observation I desire to make is that the honorable senator from Kentucky frankly admits that the policy he advocates looks to a permanent dependence of the United States upon England for ships. The only and slight attempt that the senator made to rebut the conclusion was in the faint hope expressed by him that the repair-shops which would spring up on this side of the water might develop into machine-shops and ship-yards large enough and numerous enough to construct steam-vessels; but throughout the entire argument of the senator he went upon the presumption, which I repeat he did not even attempt himself to rebut, that his policy proclaimed a permanent dependence of this country upon England for a merchant marine. I do not believe the Senate of the United States or the Congress of the United States or the people of the United States are ready to approve that policy.

It is a remarkable fact that for the past twenty-five years —

or make it only for the past twenty years, from the beginning of the war to this hour—the Congress of the United States has not done one solitary thing to uphold the navigation interests of the United States. Decay has been observed going steadily on from year to year. The great march forward of our commercial rival of old has been everywhere recognized, and the representatives of the people of the United States have sat in their two houses of legislation as dumb as though they could not speak, and have not offered aid or suggested remedy. This has gone on until now the honorable senator from Kentucky rises in his seat and proposes to make a proclamation of perpetual future dependence upon England for such shipping as we may require, holding up to us as models Germany, Italy, and the other European countries that are as absolutely dependent upon Great Britain for their steamships as the District of Columbia is upon Congress for its legislation.

During these years, in which Congress has not stepped forward to do one thing for the carrying-trade of the country, for all that vast external transportation whose importance the senator from Kentucky has not exaggerated but has strongly depicted, the same Congress has passed ninety-two acts in aid of internal transportation by rail, has given 200,000,000 acres of the public lands, worth to-day a thousand million dollars in money, and has added \$70,000,000 in cash, and yet, I repeat, it has scarcely extended the aid of a single dollar to build up our foreign commerce. An energetic and able man¹ who found a great ocean highway unoccupied, and had the enterprise to put American vessels of the best construction and great power upon it, has been held up to scorn and to reproach because he came to the American Congress and said, "If you will do for this enterprise what the Emperor of Brazil will do, I will give you a great line of steamships from New York to Rio Janeiro." The Emperor of Brazil had said to this enterprising man, "My Government will pay you a hundred thousand dollars a year if you will establish and maintain this line;" and New England senators, I regret to say, senators who represent the protective system of this country, remarked with quiet complacency, "If Brazil is willing

¹ John Roach of New York, an Irishman by birth, long a citizen of the United States; a man of remarkable ability, energy and integrity.

to pay for the line, we need not." Brazil naturally enough has got tired paying all and we paying none. Just as soon as it was found that we would not pay, a combination of English ship-builders said, "We will put on our ships and run that American line off; we will carry the coffee of Brazil to the United States for nothing; we will break down this attempt of the United States to begin a race upon the ocean;" and they have pretty nearly succeeded, while we have looked on with apparent unconcern, and by our indifference have even favored the efforts of the English line.

During the whole of Great Britain's mastery of the sea, while she has been seeking every line on which a steamer could float, she has never put on lines to carry from an American port to any foreign ports, but only to her own. You cannot get a British and South American steamship line except on the triangular system. They will go from New York to Liverpool taking breadstuffs or cotton, from Liverpool to Rio Janeiro taking British fabrics, from Rio Janeiro to New York bringing coffee and dye-woods; but when the proposition is made that they shall go back from New York to Rio, they decline because they do not want to interfere with the prosperity of England at home by furnishing transportation to any point for American fabrics in competition with British fabrics. The result will be that if this American line to Brazil shall be taken off, as in all probability it will be if the United States extends no aid, then letters from the United States, letters of the merchants of New York and Philadelphia and Baltimore and Boston, will be conveyed to Rio Janeiro *via* Liverpool and reach that point over two great lines of British steamships.

Mr. President, the frank admission of the honorable senator from Kentucky takes away a large part of the argument which I thought I should have to make, and which was to prove that if the United States to-day is incompetent to compete with Great Britain in the manufacture of iron ships, and if we admit iron ships from Great Britain absolutely free of duty, we shall be still more incompetent to do it next year. It requires, in the language of the trade, a great "plant" to build steamships. It requires a large investment of money, numerous machine-shops and powerful machinery. If in addi-

tion to what has been done abroad to build up English ship-yards we now pour into them all the patronage from this country, I should like the honorable senator from Kentucky or any other senator to tell me exactly at what point of time it will come to pass that any feeble effort on this side will begin to compete with those great British ship-yards. If you abandon ship-building this year because you are unable, you will be far more unable next year, you will be still less able the year ensuing, and every year will add to the monopoly of British power in that respect and to the absolute weakness and prostration of American power in competition. But the frank admission by the honorable senator from Kentucky of the future and perpetual dependence upon England removes the necessity of arguing that point. He admits it with all its damaging force.

Mr. President, *fas est ab hoste doceri*. Great Britain has been our great commercial rival. How has she succeeded? Since the first Cunard steamship sailed into Boston Harbor, now about forty years ago, down to the close of 1878, Great Britain had paid from her treasury to aid her steamship lines a sum exceeding forty million pounds sterling—more than two hundred millions of American dollars. She began this policy with great wisdom at the moment she foresaw that the steamship was to play so commanding a part in the navigation of the great oceans. I know it is a favorite argument with those who occupy the position of the honorable senator from Kentucky that Great Britain started upon the plan of subsidizing her ocean lines, and followed it for a long period of years, and afterward abandoned it. Sir, she has never abandoned it. She has abandoned subsidy only to those lines that are strong enough to go alone, and the British post-office report for the year 1879 shows that under the despised head of postal aid, to which the senator from Kentucky was pleased to refer with sneers, Great Britain paid last year £783,000, well-nigh four million dollars in coin to her lines that need help.

France obtains her steamships from England. France has adopted the commercial policy which the honorable senator from Kentucky thinks would be the revival of the American shipping interest; but does France by the mere fact of getting her ships built at Birkenhead or on the Clyde abandon the plan,

which has been for thirty years in operation under her government, of aiding her ships? Last year, sir, France paid 23,000,000 francs — more than four and a half million dollars — to aid her steamship lines. When the celebrated line of France, the company known as Messageries Impériale, competed too sharply in the Mediterranean after the opening of the Suez Canal, with the Peninsular and Oriental Company of England and was likely to endanger its supremacy, Great Britain promptly stepped forward and added \$500,000 to the Peninsular and Oriental subsidy. That is the way Great Britain has abandoned the idea of aiding her great commercial interests!

Italy, hemmed in upon the Mediterranean, with a territory that does not touch either of the great oceans, is advancing rapidly in steam-navigation. Italy last year paid \$1,600,000 to her lines; and even Austria, that enjoys but a single seaport on the upper end of the Adriatic, pays \$500,000 toward stimulating commercial ventures from Trieste. Sir, the United States cannot succeed in this great international struggle without adopting exactly the same mode that has achieved victory for France. What is it? It is not to help A B or C D or E F or anybody else by name, neither Mr. John Roach, nor Mr. John Doe nor Mr. Richard Roe, but to make a great and comprehensive policy that shall give to every company a pledge of aid from the Government of so much per mile for such a term of years. Let the American merchants feel that the Government of the United States is behind them. Let the United States take from her treasury per annum the four millions of dollars that Great Britain is paying as a postscript to her \$200,000,000 of investment; let the United States but take \$4,000,000 per annum — and that is not a great sum for this opulent country — let that be used as a fund to stimulate steamship companies from any port of the United States to any foreign port on the globe, and I venture to predict that you will see that long deferred, much desired event, the revival of the American merchant marine.

Let us do one thing more where England has pointed the way for us. We have nine navy-yards, without a navy. If we will put the expense of those navy-yards into the building up of great private ship-yards, it will form subsidy enough — if that

hated word will not offend the delicate ears of my friend from Kentucky—it will afford aid enough, if that be more to his taste; it will give help enough, in conjunction with the saving on the construction of naval vessels, to carry out a comprehensive scheme for the revival of American navigation.

We not only withhold our hands from any aid to the American merchant marine, but we keep up the shadow of a shell of a navy on the most expensive basis possible. Great Britain I believe never had more than three navy-yards for all her vast work of construction and repair. We support nine navy-yards. The navy of Great Britain is fifteen times as large really, as ours is nominally.

Mr. President, we have the largest ocean frontage of any nation on the globe. We front all continents. We border the two great oceans, the greatest of gulfs on the South, the Arctic Sea beyond the Straits of Behring. We are necessarily by our position in need of a navy.

The honorable senator from Kentucky has apparently given this subject wide and deep attention, and I shall be glad to be informed at his own convenience how, after he has brought this country to a state of absolute dependence upon Great Britain for our mercantile marine, he proposes to uphold our navy, how he proposes to build the vessels, where he will be able to secure his ship-carpenters? I do not speak of the sailors; we can hire them from the outside world. But how does he propose to retain among our people the art of building ocean-going steamers when his policy absolutely transfers the whole of the business at once to English ship-yards?

I do not expect this Congress to do any thing. I am not talking with the slightest hope of success. But I know success will come sometime. I know that the scheme of the honorable senator from Kentucky, even if Congress should adopt it, would disappoint everybody. It would disappoint everybody except the English ship-builder. It would not disappoint him. Yet I venture to say it would not be followed as the honorable senator thinks by large American investments in British ships.

It opens no possible temptation to a man desiring to invest in navigation to say to him, "You may go abroad, to England, and buy a vessel and bring her to New York and we will allow

you to register her at the custom-house, and you may float the American flag." — "No, I thank you," the shrewd investor replies. "If I do that I shall have more taxation than I shall have in Liverpool or Bristol. I prefer to keep the registry over there," just as the Williams & Guion line does. There are men in New York deriving dividends from that line just as there are men in Philadelphia deriving dividends from the Philadelphia line that is partly made up of British vessels. The very moment you disconnect the idea of a National marine and the building of it here, the very moment you put it down on the simple basis of dollars and cents, regardless of any thing American in it, then there is no temptation whatever, and you offer no extra inducement by saying that the vessel may be registered here, not the slightest in the world, and it would not be done. When the senator from Kentucky holds up the brilliant prospect that the repair-shops might be the germ of a future marine, he abandons, in effect if not in intention, all idea of building ships on this side of the water.

This subject, Mr. President, never can be considered and decided intelligently, as ultimately it must be, without taking into account the naval establishment of the United States and the mercantile marine of the United States at the same time. The naval establishment must be the outgrowth of the mercantile marine, just as it always has been, just as it always will be; and where you have no mercantile marine out of which to grow a navy, you will have no navy. As recently as the beginning of the late war the maritime States of this Union were able to provide, in that great struggle, seven thousand competent officers of the various grades of the volunteer navy, and to put on the decks of the blockading fleet seventy thousand American sailors. The senator from Kentucky said, and I think justly, that too much had been made or attempted to be made out of the fact that a few vessels had been taken by blockade-runners and destroyed, and others frightened into registry abroad; and that many were dating the downfall of the American mercantile marine from that cause. That was indeed one cause, but I agree with the senator that it was not by any means the principal cause. I agree with him that it was a coincident cause merely.

Another cause was set in operation about that time of which the commercial world at least has taken great heed. Up to that date steam-vessels had not been good freighters. The side-wheel steamer that did business between this country and Europe was not a great carrying-vessel; she required too much coal; her engine took up too much space. But in the midst of our war, by a succession of inventions — partly American and partly British — there was a complete revolution effected in ocean-going steamers, and that revolution can best be described by stating this formula: — prior to that date a vessel of 3,000 tons on a voyage of given length had to make 2,200 tons allowance for coal and machinery, and only 800 tons for freight, while now it is precisely reversed, and they can take 800 tons only for coal and machinery and 2,200 tons for freight. This is the revolution of which Great Britain has had the advantage and it is often confused with that other cause from which we suffered by reason of the war. But the senator from Kentucky is correct in stating that the destruction of the vessels during the civil struggle, large as it was estimated at the time and grievous as was the calamity to individuals and to the country, was not the great principal cause which brought about the revolution from sailing-vessels to the steam-marine.

The carrying-capacity of an ocean-going steamer is something surprising to men who have not examined it. The first steamer of the John Roach line, so called — and the steamers are by no means as large as those of the Cunard and White Star lines sailing between Liverpool and New York — the very first steamer that sailed from New York to Rio, besides an assorted cargo, which in a manifest would seem to be more than could be put in the hold of the vessel, carried also twenty thousand barrels of flour. It seems almost incredible when you think of the freight-cars which that cargo would require if carried by rail. The freight of two hundred cars, one hundred barrels to the car, was placed in the hold of that vessel. It is in this respect that these vessels have gained so enormously in the carrying-trade.

It is idle to fight against the inventions of the world: it is idle for us to fold our arms and suppose that wooden vessels are to maintain the importance they have hitherto held in the commerce of the world. I think I understand something of that

subject. I have the honor to be from the State that has built more ocean-going wooden vessels than all the rest of this Union beside, I believe. Within thirty miles of my own residence is a town of only ten thousand people which is the largest wooden ship-building place on the globe to-day. While the days of wooden ships are by no means over, while they will be a great and needful auxiliary to the steamers of iron and steel engaged in the commerce of the world, yet it is manifest, is indeed already proven, that the great highways of international commerce, such as the North Atlantic, the West India seas, the routes from our Pacific coast to South America, to Asia and to Australia, will be occupied, and occupied almost to the exclusion of sailing-vessels, by ocean steamers. The people of the United States can take a great part in that race; they can take a great part in it whenever they make up their mind that the instrumentality by which England conquered is the one which they must use; they can take it whenever they make up their minds that a mercantile marine and a naval establishment must grow and go together hand in hand, and that the Congress of the United States is derelict in its duty if it passes another naval appropriation bill without accompanying it with some wise and forecasting provision looking also to the upbuilding of the American merchant marine.

What the honorable senator from Kentucky was pleased to say in regard to the protective system and its horrible crimes I have no time to answer. The unfortunate venture which was made in the late campaign on that subject had its origin in Kentucky; and if the honorable senator is merely trying to gloss over the remarkable blunder that somehow or other crept into the Cincinnati platform through the agency of a brilliant Kentuckian I have no special desire to reply to him. I concede to him, rather I think he will concede to me, that politically it was a blunder, and all the efforts of the distinguished military hero who ran as the candidate of the Democratic party to get back to the protection platform only ended in making that which was before serious end in a half farce.

Mr. President, I say to the upholders of protection — and the election showed that the overwhelming public opinion of this country is interested in keeping up American manufactures

against foreign manufactures — I say to them that Protection cannot be permanently maintained without building up the commercial marine of this country. If any of the gibes and taunts which the senator from Kentucky so freely distributed to the manufacturing interests of the country in his remarks shall come to the notice of and shall arouse the men in New England and elsewhere who are enjoying the benefits of a protective tariff, to the necessity of extending the strong arm of the Government to the upbuilding of its commercial marine, then those gibes and taunts will not have been addressed in vain, and I for one shall thank the honorable senator from Kentucky for that portion of his elaborate speech.

MR. BECK. . . . I do not propose to answer now any of the political suggestions of the senator from Maine. I approved the plank, as I always have done, of a tariff for revenue. Mr. Watterson was right: it is true, honest, Democratic doctrine. In 1876, when the convention met at St. Louis, there was a plank in the Democratic platform stronger and more earnest than that inserted at Cincinnati in 1880, and we carried the country on it, although we were cheated out of the Presidency. . . . Nor do I propose to interfere with the coastwise trade of the country, which is to-day sixty per cent of all we have, and is a monopoly *absolute*, so much so that the ship-builders and ship-owners of Maine and elsewhere, all along our coasts on the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf, can charge our own people what they please without interference so far as foreign nations are concerned. I am content that they may have it, and sixty per cent of all we have in the shipping business seems to me to be monopoly enough; even that is all wrong on principle. . . .

MR. BLAINE. Mr. President, the senator from Kentucky has dwelt at considerable length upon the monopoly of the coasting-trade which is enjoyed by the United States. He ought to know, and certainly does know, that the United States has been industriously engaged for the last twenty-five years in breaking down the coasting-trade. When the United States paid \$70,000,000 in constructing a railway across the continent, more than half of the profit of the coasting-trade of this country was taken away, and the railways that have gone along the

coast and up and down in various directions have reduced the coasting-trade of this country to a minimum as compared with what it was twenty-five or thirty years ago. The great nest of commerce which the honorable senator thinks he leaves in the monopoly of the coasting-trade has been removed by the railway system which the Government of the United States has built up with a subsidy ten times as large as that which is now required for the revival of the foreign carrying-trade.

When the honorable senator from Kentucky desires that the steamships which are to do the traffic of this country shall be built abroad, he forgets an important fact, of the deepest interest to the laboring-man of America; viz., that if you build a ship worth \$500,000, there is less than \$5,000 of raw material in her, while more than \$495,000 is paid for labor. The senator from Kentucky is therefore proposing legislation that will take this enormous employment of labor to the other side of the ocean, and expend large sums in foreign countries that should be paid to American mechanics at home. He forgets also that every steamship during the period of her service gives work to as large a number of men on shore as she does at sea. All this labor the honorable senator proposes to employ on the other side of the ocean. For adding to the commercial importance and the absolute monopoly of the British marine, we can safely trust the senator from Kentucky to suggest the most comprehensive and certain plan.

The honorable senator, in the early part of his remarks, in maintaining that our ship-owners were handicapped by our Navigation Laws, said in illustration of his position that in Kentucky, where they raise and run fine horses, a man would be considered a fool to put one hundred and fifty pounds on the back of a race-horse against one that was running with only one hundred and ten. Oh, no, the senator from Kentucky does not propose to do that at all! He simply proposes to withdraw the American horse from the race.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND INTEROCEANIC CANAL.

[The following dispatch from Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to James Russell Lowell, Minister at London, was also sent *mutatis mutandis* to other ministers of the United States in Europe.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 24, 1881.

SIR, — It has come under the observation of the President, through the current statements of the European press and other usual modes of communication, that the great Powers of Europe may be considering the subject of jointly guaranteeing the neutrality of the interoceanic canal now projected across the Isthmus of Panama.

The United States recognizes a proper guarantee of neutrality as essential to the construction and successful operation of any highway across the Isthmus of Panama, and in the last generation every step deemed requisite in the premises was taken by this Government. The necessity was foreseen and abundantly provided for, long in advance of any possible call for the actual exercise of power.

In 1846 a memorable and important treaty was negotiated and signed between the United States of America and the Republic of New Granada, now the United States of Colombia. By the thirty-fifth article of that treaty, the United States in exchange for certain concessions, guaranteed "positively and efficaciously" the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus and of any interoceanic communications that might be constructed upon or over it for the maintenance of free transit from sea to sea; and

also guaranteed the rights of sovereignty and property of the United States of Colombia over the territory of the Isthmus as included within the borders of the State of Panama.

In the judgment of the President this guarantee, given by the United States of America, does not require re-enforcement, or accession, or assent from any other Power. In more than one instance this Government has been called upon to vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed, and no contingency is now foreseen or apprehended in which such vindication would not be within the power of this nation.

There has never been the slightest doubt on the part of this Government as to the purpose or extent of the obligation then assumed, by which the United States became surety alike for the free transit of the world's commerce over whatever land-way or water-way might be opened from sea to sea, and for the protection of the territorial rights of Colombia from aggression or interference of any kind. Nor has there ever been room to question the full extent of the advantages and benefits, naturally due to its geographical position and political relations on the Western Continent, which the United States obtained from the owner of the Isthmian territory in exchange for that far-reaching and responsible guarantee.

If the foreshadowed action of the European Powers should assume tangible shape, it would be well for you to bring to the notice of Lord Granville the provisions of the treaty of 1846, and especially of its thirty-fifth article, and to intimate to him that any movement, with the view of supplementing the guarantee contained therein, would necessarily be regarded by this Government as an uncalled-for intrusion into a field where the local and general interests of the United States of America must be considered before the interests of any other Power save those of the United States of Colombia alone. That Republic has already derived and will continue to derive eminent advantages from the guarantee of this Government.

The President deems it due to frankness to be still more explicit on this subject, and to elucidate the views of the United States Government with somewhat of detail to the end that no uncertainty shall subsist as to the integrity of our motives or the distinctness of our aims.

It is not the wish or the purpose of the United States to interfere with any commercial enterprise in which the citizens or subjects of any foreign power may see fit to embark, under a lawful privilege. The fact that the stock and franchises of the Panama Canal or the Panama Railway are owned in Europe, either in whole or principally, is no more a subject of complaint on the part of the United States than is the circumstance that the stock of many of its own lines of railway is largely held abroad. Such ownership, with its attendant rights, is in the United States amply secured by the laws of the land, and on the Isthmus is doubly secured by the local laws of Colombia, under the guarantee of the United States.

In time of peace, the United States does not seek exclusive privileges for American ships in respect to precedence or tolls through an interoceanic canal any more than it has sought like privileges for American goods in transit over the Panama Railway, under the control of an American corporation. The extent of the privileges of American citizens and American ships is measurable under the treaty of 1846 by those of Colombian citizens and ships. It would be our earnest desire and expectation to see the world's peaceful commerce enjoy the same just, liberal, and rational treatment.

It is the political control of such a canal, as distinguished from its merely administrative or commercial regulation, of which the President feels called upon to speak with directness and with emphasis. During any war to which the United States of America or the United States of Colombia might be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile nation through the canal at Panama would be no more admissible than would the passage of the armed forces of a hostile nation over the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States or of Colombia. The United States of America will insist upon her right to take all needful precautions against a possibility that the Isthmus transit shall be in any event used offensively against her interests upon the land or upon the sea.

The two Republics between which the guarantee of neutrality and possession exists present analogous conditions with respect to their territorial extension. Each has a long line of coast on both oceans to protect as well as to improve. The possessions

of the United States upon the Pacific coast are imperial in extent and of extraordinary growth. Even at their present stage of development they would supply the larger part of the traffic which would seek the advantages of the canal. The States of California and Oregon, and the Territory of Washington, larger in area than England and France, produce for export more than a ton of wheat for each inhabitant, and the entire freights demanding water transportation eastward, already enormous, are augmenting each year with an accelerating ratio. While the population and products of the Pacific slope are thus increasing upon a vast scale, the railway system connecting the Gulf of Mexico with the interior and with the Great Lakes is rapidly extending, thus affording additional facilities for enlarging the commerce that must seek the coast-line to the Pacific, of which the projected canal at Panama will form a part, and be as truly a channel of communication between the Eastern and far Western States as our own transcontinental railways. It is the perception of this domestic function of the long-sought water-way between the two seas that border the Republic, which has caused the project to be regarded as of vital importance by this Government. The history of the enterprise is marked from the outset by the numerous expeditions which have, from time to time, been sent out by the United States at large expense to explore the various routes, and thus facilitate the work when the time should be ripe and the capital provided for the undertaking.

If the proposed canal were a channel of communication near to the countries of the Old World, and employed wholly, or almost wholly, by their commerce, it might very properly be urged that the influence of the European powers should be commensurate with their interests. With the exercise of such influence, the United States could find no fault, especially if assured of equal participation in the peaceable enjoyment of the commercial facilities so afforded. The case, however, is here reversed, and an agreement between the European States jointly to guarantee the neutrality and in effect control the political character of a highway of commerce, remote from them and near to us, forming substantially a part of our commercial coast-line and promising to become the chief means of trans-

portation between our Atlantic and Pacific States, would be viewed by this Government with the gravest concern.

The policy of the United States is one of peace and friendly intercourse with every Government and people. This disposition is not only avowed, but is abundantly shown in the fact that our armaments by land and sea are kept within such limits as to afford no ground for distrust or suspicion of menace to other nations. The guarantee entered into by this Government in 1846 was manifestly in the interest of peace, and the necessity imposed by circumstances upon the United States of America to watch over a highway between its two coasts was so imperative that the resultant guarantee was the simplest justice to the chief interests concerned. Any attempt to supersede that guarantee by an agreement between European Powers, which maintain strong armies and patrol the sea with large fleets, and whose interest in the canal and its operation can never be so vital and supreme as ours, would partake of the nature of an alliance against the United States and would be regarded by this Government as an indication of unfriendly feeling. It would be but an inadequate response to the good will we bear them and to our cheerful and constant recognition of their own rights of domestic policy, as well as those resulting from proximity or springing from neighborly interest.

The European Powers have repeatedly united in guarantees of neutrality touching the political condition of such States as Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland and parts of the Orient, where the localities were adjacent or where the interests involved concerned them nearly and deeply. Recognizing these facts, the Government of the United States has never offered to take part in such agreements or to make any agreements supplementary to them.

While thus observing the strictest neutrality with respect to complications abroad, it is the long-settled conviction of this Government that any extension to our shores of the political system by which the great Powers have controlled and determined events in Europe would be attended with danger to the peace and welfare of this Nation.

While the Government of the United States has no intention of initiating any discussion upon this subject, it is proper

that you should be prepared, in case of concerted action or conference or exchange of opinions thereon between the great Powers of Europe, to communicate to the Government to which you are accredited the views of the President as frankly and as fully as they are herein set forth. At suitable times in your personal and friendly intercourse with your colleagues of the diplomatic body at London, you may find it proper to give discreet expression to the policy and motives of your Government in the premises. •

You will be careful, in any conversations you may have, not to represent the position of the United States as the development of a new policy or the beginning of any aggressive measures. It is nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the Government, and now, in the judgment of the President, firmly inwoven as an integral and important part of our national policy.

In his address upon taking the oath of office the President distinctly proclaimed the position which the Government of the United States would hold upon this question, and if the European cabinets have failed to observe or give due heed to the declarations then made, it may be well for you on some proper occasion to call the attention of the minister of foreign affairs to the language used by the President. .

[Second dispatch on the subject of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty from Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. James Russell Lowell, Minister at London.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, NOV. 19, 1881.

SIR, — In pursuance of the premises laid down in my circular note of June 24 of this year, touching the determination of this Government with respect to the guarantee of neutrality for the interoceanic canal at Panama, it becomes my duty to call your attention to the convention of April 19, 1850, between Great Britain and the United States, commonly known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

According to the articles of that convention, the high con-

tracting parties, in referring to an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua, agreed:—

“That neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over said ship canal, and that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof.”

In a concluding paragraph the high contracting parties agreed:—

“To extend their protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway across the Isthmus, . . . which are now proposed to be established by way of Tehuantepec or Panama.”

This convention was made more than thirty years ago, under exceptional conditions which have long since ceased to exist—conditions which at best were temporary in their nature and which can never be reproduced. The remarkable development of the United States on the Pacific coast since that time has created new duties for this Government, and devolved new responsibilities upon it, the full and complete discharge of which requires, in the judgment of the President, some essential modifications in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The interests of Her Majesty’s Government involved in this question, in so far as they may be properly judged by the observation of a friendly power, are so inconsiderable in comparison with those of the United States that the President hopes a re-adjustment of the terms of the treaty may be reached in a spirit of amity and concord.

The respect due to Her Majesty’s Government demands that the objections to the perpetuity of the convention of 1850, as it now exists, should be stated with directness and with entire frankness. Among the most salient of these objections is the fact that the operation of the treaty practically concedes to Great Britain the control of whatever canal may be constructed. The insular position of the home government, with its extended colonial possessions, requires the British Empire to maintain a vast naval establishment. In our continental solidity we do not need, and in time of peace shall never create a rival to it. If therefore the United States binds itself not to fortify on land, it concedes that Great Britain, in the possible

case of a struggle for the control of the canal, shall at the outset have an advantage which would prove decisive, and which could not be reversed, except by an enormous expenditure of treasure and force. The presumptive intention of the treaty was to place the two powers on a plane of perfect equality with respect to the canal; but in practice, as I have indicated, this would prove utterly delusive, and would instead surrender it, if not in form, yet in effect, to the control of Great Britain.

The treaty binds the United States not to use military force in any precautionary measure, while it leaves the naval power of Great Britain perfectly free and unrestrained — ready at any moment of need to seize both ends of the canal and render its military occupation on land a matter entirely within the discretion of Her Majesty's Government. The military power of the United States, as shown by the recent civil war, is without limit, and in any conflict on the American continent altogether irresistible. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty commands this Government not to use a single regiment of troops to protect its interests in connection with the interoceanic canal, but to surrender the transit to the guardianship and control of the British Navy. If no American soldier is to be quartered on the Isthmus to protect the rights of his country in the interoceanic canal, surely, by the fair logic of neutrality, no war-vessel of Great Britain should be permitted to appear in the waters that control either entrance to the canal.

A more comprehensive objection to the treaty is urged by this Government. Its provisions embody a misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain and the United States with respect to the interests of each in questions pertaining to this continent. The Government of the United States has no occasion to disavow an aggressive disposition. Its entire policy establishes its pacific character, and among its chief aims is to cultivate the most friendly and intimate relations with its neighbors, both independent and colonial. At the same time, this Government, with respect to European States, will not consent to perpetuate any treaty that impeaches our rightful and long-established claim to priority on the American continent.

The United States seeks only to use for the defense of its own interests the same forecast and prevision which Her Majesty's Government energetically employs in defense of the interests of the British Empire. To guard her Eastern possessions, to secure the most rapid transit for troops and munitions of war, and to prevent any other nation from having equal facilities in the same direction, Great Britain holds and fortifies all the strategic points that control the route to India. At Gibraltar, at Malta, at Cyprus, her fortifications give her the mastery of the Mediterranean. She holds a controlling interest in the Suez Canal, and by her fortifications at Aden and on the Island of Perim she excludes all other powers from the waters of the Red Sea and practically renders it *mare clausum*. It would, in the judgment of the President, be no more unreasonable for the United States to demand a share in these fortifications, or to demand their absolute neutralization, than for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from the United States with respect to the transit across the American continent. The possessions which Great Britain thus carefully guards in the East are not of more importance to her than is the Pacific slope, with its present development and assured growth, to the Government of the United States.

The States and Territories appurtenant to the Pacific Ocean and dependent upon it for commercial outlet, and hence directly interested in the canal, comprise an area of nearly eight hundred thousand square miles — larger in extent than the German Empire and the four Latin countries of Europe combined. This vast region is but beginning its prosperous development. Six thousand miles of railway are already constructed within its limits, and it is a moderate calculation to say that within the current decade the number of miles will, at least, be doubled. In the near future the money value of its surplus for export will be as large as that of British India, and perhaps larger. Nor must it be forgotten that India is but a distant colony of Great Britain, while the region on the Pacific is an integral portion of our National Union, and is of the very form and body of our State. The inhabitants of India are alien from England in race, language and religion. The citizens of California, Oregon and Nevada, with the adjacent Territories, are

of our own blood and kindred — bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh.

Great Britain appreciates the advantage and perhaps the necessity of maintaining at the cost of large military and naval establishments the interior and nearest route to India, while any nation with hostile intent is compelled to take the longer route and sail many thousand additional miles through dangerous seas. It is hardly conceivable that the same great Power which considers herself justified in these precautions for the safety of a remote colony on another continent should object to the adoption by the United States of similar but far less demonstrative measures for the protection of the distant shores of her own domain, for the drawing together of the extremes of the Union in still closer bonds of interest and sympathy, and for holding to the simple end of honorable self-defense the absolute control of the great water-way which shall unite the two oceans, and which the United States will always insist upon treating as part of her commercial coast-line.

If a hostile movement should at any time be made against the Pacific coast, threatening danger to its people and destruction to its property, the Government of the United States would feel that it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful toward its own citizens in permitting itself to be bound by a treaty which gives the same right through the canal to a war-ship bent on an errand of destruction, that is reserved to its own Navy sailing for the defense of our coast and the protection of the lives of our people. As England insists by the might of her power that her enemies in war shall strike her Indian possessions only by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, the Government of the United States will in like manner insist that the interior, the safer, and more speedy route of the canal shall be reserved for ourselves, while our enemies, if we shall ever be so unfortunate as to have any, shall be remanded to the voyage around Cape Horn.

A consideration of controlling influence in this question is the well-settled conviction on the part of this Government that only by the exercise of supervision on the part of the United States can the Isthmus canals be definitely and at all times secured against the interference and obstruction incident to

war. A mere agreement of neutrality on paper between the great Powers of Europe might prove ineffectual to preserve the canal in time of hostilities. The first sound of a cannon in a general European war would, in all probability, annul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the canal, commanding both oceans, might be held by the first naval power that could seize it. If this should be done, the United States would suffer such grave inconvenience and loss in her domestic commerce as would enforce the duty of a defensive and protective war on her part, for the mere purpose of gaining that control which, in advance, she insists is due to her position and demanded by her necessities.

I am not arguing or assuming that a general war, or any war at all, is imminent in Europe. But it must not be forgotten that within the past twenty-five years all the great Powers of Europe have been engaged in war—most of them more than once. In only a single instance in the past hundred years has the United States exchanged a hostile shot with any European power. It is in the highest degree improbable that for a hundred years to come, even that experience will be repeated.

It consequently becomes evident that the one conclusive mode of preserving any Isthmus canal from the possible distraction and destruction of war is to place it under the control of that Government least likely to be engaged in war, and able in any and in every event to enforce the guardianship which she will assume. For protection of her own interest, therefore, the United States in the first instance asserts her right to control the Isthmus transit; and, secondly, she offers by such control that absolute neutralization of the canal as respects European powers which can in no other way be certainly attained and lastingly assured.

Another consideration forcibly suggests the necessity of modifying the convention under discussion. At the time it was concluded Great Britain and the United States were the only nations prominent in the commerce of Central and South America. Since that time other leading nations have greatly enlarged their commercial connections with that country, and are to-day contending for supremacy in the trade of those shores; within the past four years, indeed, the number of

French and German vessels landing on the two coasts of Central America far exceeds the number of British vessels.

While, therefore, Great Britain and the United States may agree to do nothing, and according to the present convention each remain bound to the other in common helplessness, a third power, or a fourth, or a combination of many, may intervene and give direction to the project which the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty assumed to be under the sole control of the two English-speaking nations. Indeed, so far as the canal scheme now projected at Panama finds a national sponsor or patron, it is in the Republic of France; and the non-intervention enjoined upon this country by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, if applied to that canal, would paralyze the United States in any attempt to assert the plain rights and privileges which this Government acquired through a solemn treaty with the Republic of Colombia, anterior to the Clayton-Bulwer Convention. The modification of the treaty of 1850, now sought, is not only to free the United States from unequal and inequitable obligations to Great Britain, but also to empower this Government to treat with all other nations seeking a foot-hold on the Isthmus, on the same basis of impartial justice and complete independence.

One of the motives that originally induced this Government to assent to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, not distinctly expressed in the instrument, but inferable from every line of it, was the expected aid of British capital in the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal. That expectation has not been realized, and the changed condition of this country since 1850 has diminished, if it has not entirely removed from consideration, any advantage to be derived from that source.

Whenever, in the judgment of the United States Government, the time shall be auspicious and the conditions favorable for the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal, no aid will be needed outside of the resources of our own Government and people; and while foreign capital will always be welcomed and never repelled, it cannot henceforth enter as an essential factor in the determination of this problem.

It is earnestly hoped by the President that the considerations now presented will have due weight and influence with Her Majesty's Government, and that the modifications of the treaty

desired by the United States will be conceded in the same friendly spirit in which they are asked. The following is a summary of the adjustments which would meet the views of this Government:—

First, Every part of the treaty which forbids the United States to fortify the canal and hold the political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it is located, to be canceled.

Second, Every part of the treaty in which Great Britain and the United States agree to make no acquisition of territory in Central America to remain in full force. As an original proposition this Government would not admit that Great Britain and the United States should be put on the same basis, even negatively, with respect to territorial acquisitions on the American Continent, and would be unwilling to establish such a precedent without full explanation. But the treaty contains that provision with respect to Central America, and if the United States should seek its annulment it might give rise to erroneous and mischievous apprehensions among a people with whom this Government desires to be on the most friendly terms. The United States has taken special occasion to assure the Spanish American Republics that we do not intend and do not desire to cross their borders or in any way disturb their territorial integrity. We shall not therefore willingly incur the risk of a misunderstanding by annulling the clauses in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which forbid such a step with respect to Central America. But the acquisition of military and naval stations necessary for the protection of the canal and voluntarily ceded to the United States by the Central American States is not to be regarded as a violation of the provision contained in the foregoing.

Third, The United States will not object to the clause looking to the establishment of a free port at each end of whatever canal may be constructed, if England desires the clause to be retained.

Fourth, The clause in which the two Governments agreed to make treaty stipulations for a joint protectorate of whatever railway or canal might be constructed at Tehuantepec or Panama has never been perfected. No treaty stipulations for

the proposed end have been suggested by either party, although citizens of the United States long since constructed a railway at Panama and are now engaged in the same work at Tehuantepec. It is a fair presumption, in the judgment of the President, that this provision should be regarded as obsolete by the non-action and common consent of the two Governments.

Fifth, The clause defining the distance from either end of the canal where, in time of war, captures might be made by either belligerent on the high seas was left incomplete and the distance was never determined. In the judgment of the President, speaking in the interest of peaceful commerce, this distance should be made as liberal as possible, and might, with advantage, as a question relating to the high seas and common to all nations, be a matter of stipulation between the great Powers of the world.

In assuming as a necessity the political control of whatever canal or canals may be constructed across the Isthmus, the United States will act in entire harmony with the Governments within whose territory the canals should be located. Between the United States and the other American Republics there can be no hostility, no jealousy, no rivalry, no distrust. This Government entertains no design in connection with this project for its own advantage which is not also for the equal or greater advantage of the country to be directly and immediately affected. Nor does the United States seek any exclusive or narrow commercial advantage. It frankly agrees, and will by public proclamation declare at the proper time in conjunction with the republic on whose soil the canal may be located, that the same rights and privileges, the same tolls and obligations for the use of the canal shall apply with absolute impartiality to the merchant marine of every nation on the globe. Equally, in time of peace, the harmless use of the canal shall be freely granted to the war-vessels of other nations. In time of war, aside from the defensive use to be made of it by the country in which it is constructed and by the United States, the canal shall be impartially closed against the war-vessels of all belligerents. It is the desire and the determination of the United States that the canal shall be used only for the development and increase of peaceful commerce among all the nations, and shall not be

considered a strategic point in warfare to tempt the aggressions of belligerents, or be seized under the compulsions of military necessity by any of the great Powers that may have contests in which the United States has no stake, and will take no part.

If it be asked why the United States objects to the assent of European Powers to the terms of neutrality for the operation of the canal, the answer of this Government is that the right to assent implies the right to dissent, and thus the whole question would be thrown open for contention as an international issue. It is the fixed purpose of the United States to consider it strictly and solely as an American question, to be dealt with and decided by the American Powers.

In presenting the views contained herein to Lord Granville, you will take occasion to say that the Government of the United States seeks this particular time for the discussion as most opportune and auspicious. At no period since the peace of 1783 have the relations between the British and American Governments been so cordial and friendly as now. I am sure Her Majesty's Government will find in the views now suggested, and the propositions now submitted, additional evidence of the desire of this Government to remove all possible grounds of controversy between two nations, which have so many interests in common, and so many reasons for honorable and lasting peace.

You will at the earliest opportunity acquaint Lord Granville with the purpose of the United States touching the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and, in your own way, you will impress him fully with the views of your Government. I refrain from directing that a copy of this instruction be left with his Lordship, because, in reviewing the case, I have necessarily been compelled, in drawing illustrations from British policy, to indulge somewhat freely in the *argumentum ad hominem*. This course of reasoning, in an instruction to our own minister, is altogether legitimate and pertinent, and yet might seem discourteous if addressed directly to the British Government. You may deem it expedient to make this explanation to Lord Granville, and if afterwards he shall desire a copy of this instruction, you will, of course, furnish it.

[Third dispatch on the subject of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty from Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. James Russell Lowell, Minister at London.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 29, 1881.

SIR, — One week after mailing my instruction to you on the 19th instant touching the presentation to Her Majesty's Government of a proposal for the modification of the convention between the two countries, of April 19, 1850, better known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, I received Mr. Hoppin's dispatch of the 11th instant, communicating the response of Lord Granville to my circular note of the 24th of June last in relation to the neutrality of any canal across the Isthmus of Panama. I regret that Mr. Hoppin should not have advised me by telegraph of the purport of his Lordship's reply, as it would have enabled me to present the arguments of my dispatch of the 19th instant in a more specific form as meeting a positive issue rather than as generally dealing with a subject which for thirty years has been regarded in but one light by the public opinion of the United States. It seems proper now, however, in reply to his Lordship's note of Nov. 10, to give a summary of the historical objections to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the very decided differences of opinion between the two governments to which its interpretation has given rise.

I need hardly point out to you the well-known circumstance that even at the time of the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, a very considerable opposition was shown thereto on the part of far-sighted men in public life, who correctly estimated the complications which the uncertain terms of that compact might occasion. It was ably contended in Congress that its provisions did not, even then, suffice to meet the real points at issue with respect to the guarantee of the neutrality of the whole American Isthmus on bases comporting with the National interests of the United States, and the differences of interpretation soon became so marked as to warrant the extreme proposal of Her Majesty's Government to refer them to the arbitration of a friendly power.

The justice of those doubts became still more evident six years later, when the pretensions put forth by Her Majesty's

Government toward territorial protection, if not absolute control, of portions of Nicaragua and of the outlying Bay Islands brought up the precise question as to the extent to which the Clayton-Bulwer compact restrained the projected movement; and thereupon the interpretations respectively put upon that instrument by the United States and Great Britain were perceived to be in open conflict. The attempt made in the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty, which was negotiated on the 17th of October, 1856, to reconcile these opposing contentions, and to place the absolute and independent sovereignty of Nicaragua over its territory on an unmistakable footing, so far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned, failed by reason of the rejection by Her Majesty's Government of an amendment introduced by the Senate into the Clarendon-Dallas project. From that time onward the inability of the two Governments to agree upon a common interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty may be accepted as an historical fact.

In the discussions between the two Governments which attended the failure of the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty, the attitude of the United States with respect to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was amply defined. As early as the 12th of March, 1857, I find that General Cass, then Secretary of State, in the course of a conference with Lord Napier, Her Majesty's representative —

"passed some reflections on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; he had voted for it in the Senate, and in doing so he believed that it abrogated all intervention on the part of England in the Central American territory. The British Government had put a different construction upon the treaty, and he regretted the vote he had given in its favor." (Dispatch of Lord Napier to the Earl of Clarendon, March 12, 1857.)

On the 6th of May, 1857, President Buchanan, in an audience given to Lord Napier, and in response to his lordship's suggestion that if the attempted adjustment of the difference between the Governments as to the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty should fail, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty remained to fall back upon, characterized that instrument in much stronger terms than General Cass had done. To quote Lord Napier's words:—

"The President denounced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as one which has been fraught with misunderstanding and mischief from the beginning; it was concluded under the most opposite constructions by the contracting

parties. If the Senate had imagined that it could obtain the interpretation placed upon it by Great Britain, it would not have passed. If he had been in the Senate at the time, that treaty never would have been sanctioned." (Dispatch of Lord Napier to the Earl of Clarendon, May 6, 1857.)

These views are more explicitly and formally repeated in a note addressed by Secretary Cass to Lord Napier on the 29th of May, 1857. He says:—

"The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, concluded in the hope that it would put an end to the differences which had arisen between the United States and Great Britain concerning Central American affairs, had been rendered inoperative in some of its most essential provisions by the different constructions which had been reciprocally given to it by the parties. And little is hazarded in saying that, had the interpretation since put upon the treaty by the British Government, and yet maintained, been anticipated, it would not have been negotiated under the instructions of any executive of the United States, nor ratified by the branch of the Government intrusted with the power of ratification."

The publicity of these statements, and the strong feeling which then prevailed in all quarters that the Clayton-Bulwer Convention was inadequate to reconcile the opposite views of Great Britain and the United States towards Central America, led to a very decided conviction that the treaty should be abrogated. Lord Napier reflected this growing impression when, on the 22d of June, 1857, he wrote to Lord Clarendon that,—

"It is probable that if the pending discussions regarding Central America be not closed during the present summer, an attempt will be made in the next session of Congress to set aside the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. . . . There can be no doubt of the views of the President and Cabinet in this matter."

Before this tendency could find expression in any official act, a movement on the part of Her Majesty's Government placed the whole matter in a new aspect. Sir William Gore Ouseley was sent out Oct. 30, 1857, as a special minister, with the double purpose of concluding with the Central American States, and especially with Guatemala and Honduras, settlements of the questions relative to the Bay Islands, the Mosquito Territory, and the boundaries of British Honduras, and also of visiting Washington on the way, and conferring with the Secretary of State of the United States, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of his Government, and establishing "a perfect understanding with the United States upon the points respecting which differences have hitherto existed between the two

countries." Among these differences was now superadded to the territorial question of Mosquito and the Islands, the very question which to-day most concerns us, the question of interoceanic communication, which had for some time been the occasion of correspondence between General Cass and Lord Napier, and in relation to which General Cass wrote, on the 20th of October, 1857, as follows : —

"I have thus endeavored to meet the frank suggestions of your lordship by restating, with corresponding frankness, the general policy of the United States with respect to the Governments and the interoceanic transits of Central America; but since your lordship has referred to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, as contemplating a 'harmonious course of action and counsel between the contracting parties in the settlement of Central American interests,' you will pardon me for reminding your lordship that the differences which this treaty was intended to adjust between the United States and Great Britain still remain unsettled, while the treaty itself has become the subject of new and embarrassing complications."

Prior to the arrival of Sir William Ouseley in the United States, Lord Napier held an important interview with President Buchanan on the 19th of October, 1857, with the object of obtaining "further elucidation of the opinions of the President with reference to the adjustment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty." On that occasion Lord Napier declared that he believed it to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in Sir William Ouseley's mission, "to carry the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty into execution according to the general tenor of the interpretation put upon it by the United States; but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central American Republics, in lieu of a direct engagement with the Federal Government," and asked that, pending the negotiation intrusted to Sir William Ouseley, "no proposal to annul the (Clayton-Bulwer) treaty would be sanctioned or encouraged" by the President or the members of the United States Government. To this the President cheerfully consented, and promised to modify the statements in his annual message to Congress, accordingly, and under no circumstances to countenance any attempt against the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in Congress.

Matters being in this state, with Sir William Ouseley's mission announced, and the benevolently expectant attitude of the United States toward it assured, Lord Napier, on the 27th of October, 1857, in conference with General Cass, brought up

contingently, as a discarded alternative of his Government, a former proposal to refer the disputed questions to arbitration:—

“General Cass remarked in reply [says Lord Napier, writing to the Earl of Clarendon] that he did not repudiate the principle of arbitration on all occasions; he had invoked it, and would do so again where it seemed justly applicable, but that in this matter it was declined by the American Government for the following reasons: The language of the treaty was so clear that in his opinion there ought not to be two opinions about it. . . . That it was a mere question of the interpretation of the English language, and he held that a foreign Government was not so competent to decide in such a question as the United States and England, who possessed that language in common.”

The Earl of Clarendon in reply approved Lord Napier's course in broaching anew the suggestion of arbitration, and authorized him to renew formally, in writing, the offer to refer the disputed questions arising out of the interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to the decision of any European power (instruction of Nov. 13, 1857), and this was accordingly done by Lord Napier in a note to General Cass, dated Nov. 30, 1857.

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1857, President Buchanan, after narrating the negotiation and failure of the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty, said, —

“The fact is, that when two nations like Great Britain and the United States, mutually desirous, as they are, and I trust ever may be, of maintaining the most friendly relations with each other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which they understand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent and to commence anew. . . . Whilst entertaining these sentiments, I shall nevertheless not refuse to contribute to any reasonable adjustment of the Central American questions which is not practically inconsistent with the American interpretation of the treaty. Overtures for this purpose have been recently made by the British Government in a friendly spirit which I cordially reciprocate.”

Meanwhile the Earl of Clarendon had instructed Sir William Ouseley, under date of Nov. 19, 1857 —

“not to commit Her Majesty's Government to any course whatever in respect to the Bay Islands, till the intentions of the Congress of the United States in regard to the treaty of 1850 are clearly ascertained.”

The situation, then, at the close of 1857, presented a triple deadlock. The United States had agreed not to move toward the abrogation of the treaty until it could be seen what interpretation of its provisions would result from Sir William Ouse-

ley's mission. Sir William had received positive instructions not to move until the United States should decide whether to abrogate the treaty or not; and Lord Napier was forbidden to move until the United States should make formal answer to the proposal for arbitration. The instructions of Lord Clarendon to Lord Napier, Jan. 22, 1858, contained these words:—

“We are decidedly of opinion that it would neither be consistent with our dignity nor our interest to make any proposal to the United States Government until we have received a formal answer to our formal offer of arbitration. In the event of the offer being refused, it will be a great and hardly justifiable proof of the spirit of conciliation by which we are animated, if we then show ourselves disposed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; but we must not be in too great haste.”

In order, apparently, to break this deadlock, Lord Napier wrote to General Cass, Feb. 17, 1858, that—

“Something in the nature of an alternative was thus offered to the American Cabinet. Should the expedient of arbitration be adopted, a great portion of Sir William Ouseley's duty would be transferred to other agencies. Should arbitration be declined, it was hoped that the efforts of Her Majesty's envoy would result in a settlement agreeable to the United States, inasmuch as in essential points it would carry the treaty of 1850 into operation in a manner practically conformable to the American interpretation of that instrument.”

On the 10th of March, 1858, the Earl of Malmesbury, who had succeeded Lord Clarendon in the foreign office, instructed Lord Napier that until an answer was returned to the proposal for arbitration—

“No further step can be taken by Her Majesty's Government with that of the United States in regard to that matter; [and further, that] when this point is cleared up, Her Majesty's Government, supposing that the Government of the United States decline arbitration, will have to determine whether they should originate a proposal for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, or adopt any other course which the circumstances at the moment may seem to recommend.”

It appears, however, that the proposal to abrogate the treaty, which Lord Malmesbury reserved the right to originate, had already been communicated to the Government of the United States by Lord Napier, under instructions from Lord Clarendon. In a dispatch, dated March 22, 1858, Lord Napier wrote:—

“The Earl of Clarendon authorized me to inform General Cass that Her Majesty's Government would not decline the consideration of a proposal for the abrogation of the treaty by mutual concert. . . . I have accordingly, on

two occasions, informed General Cass that if the Government of the United States be still of the same mind, and continue to desire the abrogation of the treaty of 1850, it would be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government that they should insert a proposal to that effect in their reply to my note respecting arbitration."

Lord Napier further reports in detail the conversations which he had with General Cass as to the most proper method of effecting such abrogation, if agreed to.

In reply to this dispatch of Lord Napier, the Earl of Malmesbury instructed him, April 8, 1858, that his action was approved, and that he should confine himself to pressing for an answer to his proposal for arbitration. His Lordship added these significant words:—

"Her Majesty's Government, if the initiative is still left to them by the unwillingness of the United States themselves to propose abrogation, desire to retain full liberty as to the manner and form in which any such proposal shall be laid on their behalf before the Cabinet at Washington. . . . The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has been a source of increasing embarrassment to this country and Her Majesty's Government, if they should be so fortunate as to extricate themselves from the difficulties which have resulted from it, will not involve themselves, directly or indirectly, in any similar difficulties for the future."

The answer of General Cass, to Lord Napier's several proposals, was briefly to the effect that pending the results expected from Sir William Ouseley's mission to the Central American States, the United States could not adopt the alternative of arbitration, "even if it had not been twice rejected before," and that if—

"the President does not hasten to consider now the alternative of repealing the treaty of 1850, it is because he does not wish prematurely to anticipate the failure of Sir William Ouseley's mission, and is disposed to give a new proof to Her Majesty's Government of his sincere desire to preserve the amicable relations which now happily subsist between the two countries." (General Cass to Lord Napier, April 6, 1858.)

In this posture of affairs the Earl of Malmesbury instructed Sir William Ouseley to open direct negotiations with the Central American States; and on the 18th of August instructed Lord Napier to inform the Government of the United States of the intentions and object of Her Majesty's Government in the premises. His lordship added,—

"Modification, arbitration, and abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty have been *flatly rejected*. Great Britain and Nicaragua are now about to treat as independent states."

I have emphasized the phrase "flatly rejected," in view of a subsequent instruction of the Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Napier, on the 8th of December, 1858, wherein he said, —

"I think you would have done better if you had not too pointedly brought before the United States Government the notion that the British Government might view with favor a proposal to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty."

It is not difficult in following this narrative to discern that General Cass, though not desiring to express it, had an additional motive for declining to propose, at that particular time, the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He did not desire by such proposed abrogation to indicate his willingness that Sir William Gore Ouseley should make treaties with the separate states of Central America unrestrained by the clauses of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty inhibiting the extension of British power in that region. General Cass, with his accustomed caution and wisdom, clearly perceived that for the United States to propose abrogation on the very eve of Sir William Ouseley's mission would lead to injurious inferences and would imply conclusions which the United States was not prepared to admit. Objectionable as General Cass thought the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, he preferred to adhere to its terms rather than give the implied consent of this Government that Great Britain should obtain such treaties as the force of her power might secure in Central America. The subsequent note of Lord Malmesbury, not strained by an uncharitable construction, throws additional light on the subject and confirms the wisdom of General Cass in declining to propose abrogation at that time. General Cass moreover evidently desired to retain those very clauses of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to which, in my dispatch of the 19th, I proposed on the part of this government to adhere.

I have dwelt with somewhat of detail on this historic episode, partly because it admirably illustrates the spirit with which both governments have regarded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty from the first, and partly because it had more direct bearing on the question of the guarantee of any Isthmian transit than any other discussion of the time. In perusing the voluminous correspondence, the part unprinted as well as that printed

and submitted at the time to Congress and to Parliament, I am more than ever struck by the elastic character of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the purpose it has served as an ultimate recourse on the part of either Government to check apprehended designs in Central America on the part of the other, although all the while it was frankly admitted on both sides that the engagements of the treaty were misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious.

I am strengthened in this impression by the circumstance that in his response to my dispatch of the 24th of June last, Earl Granville takes the ground that the position of Great Britain and the United States toward the projected Panama Canal is determined by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. How far the engagements of that compact extend to the Isthmus of Panama, in the sense in which they extend to the projected Nicaraguan transit under the provisions of Article VIII., does not seem likely to become a subject for discussion between the two Governments. For it will be observed that this article does not stretch the guarantees and restrictions of Article I. over either the Tehuantepec route through Mexican territory, or the Panama route through Colombian territory. It is in terms an agreement to extend the protection of both countries, by treaty stipulations, to those or any other practicable waterways or railways from ocean to ocean across the Isthmus, outside of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America. So far as this inchoate agreement to agree hereafter is applicable to the Panama transit, I have amply shown, in my dispatch of the 19th instant, that the obligations embraced on the part of the United States in concluding the prior convention with the Republic of New Granada (now Colombia) in 1846, require that the United States should be freed from unequal and inequitable obligations to Great Britain under the vague and as yet unperfected compact of 1850.

My main object in writing this instruction has been to strengthen you in any discussion which may now ensue as to the benefits of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the mutual interest of the two countries in conserving it as the basis of a settlement of all questions between them touching Central

American and Isthmian questions. It will be seen that from the time of its conclusion in 1850 until the end of 1858, its provisions were thrice made the basis of a proposal to arbitrate as to their meaning, that modification and abrogation have been alike contingently considered, and that its vexatious and imperfect character has been repeatedly recognized on both sides. The present proposal of this Government is to free it from those embarrassing features, and leave it, as its framers intended it should be, a full and perfect settlement, for all time, of all possible issues between the United States and Great Britain with regard to Central America.

If in your conferences with Earl Granville it should seem necessary, you will make free use of the precedents I have cited, and should you, within the discretionary limits confided at the end of my dispatch of June 24th, have given a copy thereof to his lordship, you are equally at liberty to let him have a copy of this also, with the same explanation, that it is for your use, and not written as a formal note for communication to Her Majesty's Government.

ARBITRARY ARRESTS IN IRELAND.

[Dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Lowell, American Minister at London.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 26, 1881.

SIR,— Since my instruction of the 31st of March last, in reply to yours of the 12th of that month, touching the case of Mr. Michael P. Boyton, I have received your dispatches of March 21, of March 25, and April 7, all relating to the same subject. The prudence you have shown in dealing with Mr. Boyton's claim of citizenship is commendable, and the statements as to the law in his case, made in your letters to him, are in full accord with the interpretation of this Department.

In answer to a resolution of the Senate, calling for the facts and correspondence in the matter, I laid before the President a full report, which was communicated to the Senate on the 20th instant. In that report I showed that the evidence presented by Mr. Boyton himself, and by his friends here in his behalf, was not such as to prove his claim to citizenship under our laws.

Had his citizenship been established, I should not have hesitated to do for him all that I could properly do for an American citizen, accused of offending against British law in British jurisdiction. How far such protection would avail to relieve an American citizen from the operation of a British law, is a point upon which I am not prepared to express an opinion, in view especially of the fact that a copy of the so-called "Coercion Act," under which the Boyton proceedings were had, has not yet reached the Department. As described by the public press, it contains provisions giving a latitude of action to the British authorities which this Government would be loath to see insisted upon in the case of an American citizen. For example,

upon reasonable suspicion of the commission, within a fixed time prior to the passage of the law, of an act therein defined as giving cause for arrest, the authorities are understood to be empowered to decree the detention of any person, and his imprisonment for a prolonged period without the obligation of speedy trial or the production of proof of criminality. While in some sense an *ex post facto* enactment, it is in others a conferment of arbitrary and irresponsible power, and, in either view, repugnant to the principles of civil liberty and personal rights which are the common possession of British and American jurisprudence.

That the fact of American citizenship could, of itself, operate to exempt any one from the penalties of a law which he had violated, is, of course, an untenable proposition. Conversely, however, the proposition that a retroactive law, suspending at will the simplest operations of justice, could be applied without question to an American citizen, is one to which this Government would not give anticipatory assent.

In the specific case of Mr. Boyton, it is inferred from your statement of the facts that the act complained of, the incitement of divers persons to murder divers other persons, was committed subsequently to the passage of the Protection Act. Had Mr. Boyton's American citizenship been established, we could not, in view of this, have pleaded the retroactive application of the law. Neither could we have decently protested against the application of some process of law where so grave an offense was charged against a foreigner while a guest in the dominions of a friendly state. The allegation that such an act was done by an alien and a guest, while throwing upon the country to which the offender owes allegiance no duty to defend him or disprove his crime, on the other hand does not absolve the justice of the country where the commission of the act is alleged, from the burden of proving the guilt of the criminal by due course of law within a reasonable time, or, in default of prompt and lawful proof, from the obligation of releasing him. Immunity would not be asked, but prompt and certain justice, under the usual and unstrained operation of law, would be certainly expected.

I have set these views before you hypothetically, as suggested

by Mr. Boyton's case, not as applicable thereto. It is not desired that you should communicate them to Her Majesty's Government in advance of any case warranting our intervention, but you will bear them in mind if a contingency should unhappily arise calling for your interposition.

[Dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Lowell, American Minister at London.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 2, 1881.

SIR,—Referring to my general instruction of the 26th ultimo, in relation to the case of Michael P. Boyton, I now inclose to you a copy of a letter of the 30th of the same month from the Honorable Samuel J. Randall, in behalf of Mr. Joseph B. Walsh, a citizen of the United States, who, it appears, was arrested on the 3d of March last, under the provisions of the late act of Parliament, known as the "Protection Act." Mr. Walsh is represented as being imprisoned in Dublin, and it is probable that Kilmainham Jail is the place of confinement. His relatives in this country, knowing only of his arrest and imprisonment, are unable to afford the Department any information as to the specific charge, if any, upon which he is held; and it seems probable that the prisoner himself is in ignorance in regard to the particular offense for which he is thus subjected to summary detention and confinement.

Mr. Walsh has been a citizen of the United States since 1875. His character as a law-abiding citizen is vouched for by well-known and respectable citizens of Pennsylvania. I enclose a copy of his certificate of naturalization.

I have already indicated to you in my instruction of the 26th of May, the entire absence of any disposition on the part of this Government to interfere with the administration of the local or general municipal laws of Great Britain. The laws of that country, and especially those that relate to the personal liberty and security of the citizen, have always been so much in harmony with the principles of jurisprudence cherished by Americans as a birthright, that they have never failed to command the respect of the Government and people of the United States. But whatever the necessity may be in the estimation of Her Majesty's Government for the existence and enforcement in

Ireland of the exceptional legislative measures recently enacted in respect to that country, this Government cannot view with unconcern the application of the summary proceedings attendant upon the execution of these measures to naturalized citizens of the United States of Irish origin, whose business relations may render necessary their presence in any part of the United Kingdom, or whose filial instincts and love for kindred may have prompted them to revisit their native country.

If American citizens within British jurisdiction offend against British laws, this Government will not seek to shield them from the legal consequences of their acts. But it must insist upon the application to their cases of those common principles of criminal jurisprudence which in the United States secure to every man who offends against its laws, whether he be an American citizen or a foreign subject, those safeguards to personal liberty which afford the strongest protection against oppression under the forms of law.

That an accused person shall immediately upon arrest be informed of the specific crime or offense upon which he is held, and that he shall be afforded an opportunity for a speedy trial before an impartial court and jury, are essentials to every criminal prosecution, necessary alike to the protection of innocence and the ascertainment of guilt. You will lose no time in making the necessary inquiries into the cause of Mr. Walsh's arrest and detention, in which it is probable that Mr. Barrows, the consul at Dublin, may be able to aid you. If you shall find that the circumstances of the case, in the light of this and previous instructions, are such as to call for interference on the part of this Government, you will make such temperate but earnest representations as in your judgment will conduce to his speedy trial, or in case there is no specific charge against him, to his prompt release.

OPPRESSION OF THE HEBREWS IN RUSSIA.

[The following dispatch was written by Secretary Blaine to James Russell Lowell, United States Minister at London.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 22, 1881.

SIR, — On the 26th of July last, you transmitted a memorandum of the laws and police regulations of Russia affecting persons of the Hebrew faith, which you had received from Sir Charles Dilke, one of Her Majesty's Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. Although no information was then given as to the motive of this courteous and acceptable communication, I naturally inferred that it was in a measure the result of the consultations which the United States Minister at St. Petersburg had been directed to hold informally with his British colleague at that court touching the treatment of such American or British Jews as should, because of business engagements or other causes calling them to Russia, unfortunately find themselves under the operation of the proscriptive laws of the empire against all Israelites, native or foreign.

The question has for some years seriously engaged the attention of this Government as presented in the cases of American citizens of Hebrew faith visiting Russia on peaceful, law-observing errands. Under the direction of the late President Garfield the representation of what we believed to be our just claims in the premises was vigorously renewed through the United States Minister at St. Petersburg by means of instructions, of which I enclose for your information copies, with the relative annexes. Those instructions still properly reflect the opinion of this Government that there should be a change in the treatment of American Israelites in Russia. The circumstance that the case of Mr. Lewisohn, a British subject expelled

from the Russian capital, attracted the attention of Her Majesty's Government, suggests to the President that the almost identical interests of the two Governments in the premises justify similar action on their part.

The dispatches of the American Envoy at St. Petersburg show that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has made frequent assertions of a strong desire on the part of his Government to seek a solution which would harmonize all interests. While declining to admit that the existing convention may exempt American citizens from abject submission to the religious laws of the land, the minister has on several occasions promised that the military authorities, in the enforcement of those laws, would give to American citizens the widest practicable latitude in interpreting the obligations of the statutes. In point of fact, it is believed that American (and presumably British) sojourners in Russia enjoy, under the almost absolute discretionary powers of the imperial military commanders, the privileges and immunities which are granted to any foreigners. This Government conceives, however, that it should not be content with leaving the persons and the material interest of its citizens in Russia to the discretionary control of the military power, however friendly its declared purpose may be. In this conception it may very properly assume to be joined by Her Majesty's Government, which has ever been watchfully jealous of the moral freedom of its subjects in foreign lands.

It must be inexpressibly painful to the enlightened statesman of Great Britain, as well as of America, to see a discarded prejudice of the Dark Ages gravely revived at this day — to witness an attempt to base the policy of a great and sovereign State on the mistaken theory that thrift is a crime of which the unthrifty are the innocent victims, and that discontent and disaffection are to be diminished by increasing the causes from which they arise. No student of history need be reminded of the lessons taught by the persecutions of the Jews in Central Europe and on the Spanish Peninsula. Then, as in Russia to-day, the Hebrew fared better in business than his neighbor; then, as now, his economy and patient industry bred capital, and capital bred envy, and envy bred persecution, and persecution bred disaffection and social separation. The old tradition moves in

its unvarying circle — the Hebrews are made a people apart from other people, not of their own volition, but because they have been repressed and ostracised by the communities in which they reside. In Great Britain and in the United States the Israelite is not segregated from his fellow-men. His equal part in our social framework is unchallenged, his thrift and industry add to the wealth of the State, and his loyalty and patriotism are unquestioned.

It was perfectly clear to the mind of the late President that an amelioration of the treatment of American Israelites in Russia could result only from a very decided betterment of the condition of the native Hebrews, that any steps taken toward the relief of one would necessarily re-act in favor of the other, and that, under all the peculiar and abnormal aspects of the case, it is competent and proper to urge the subject upon the attention of Russia. To his successor in the Chief Magistracy, these conclusions are no less evident, and I am charged by the President to bring the subject to the formal attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, in the firm belief that the community of interests between the United States and England in this great question of civil rights and equal tolerance of creed for their respective citizens in foreign lands will lead to consideration of the matter with a view to common action thereon. It would seem, moreover, a propitious time to initiate a movement which might also embrace other Powers whose service in the work of progress is commensurate with our own, to the end that Russia may be influenced by their joint representations and that their several citizens and subjects visiting the Empire on law-observing missions of private interest shall no longer be met with subjection of conscience to military forms and procedure which obtain nowhere else in Europe.

You may read this dispatch to Lord Granville, and, if he desires it, leave with him a copy. You will say to him that, while abating no part of his intention to press upon the Russian Government the just claim of American citizens to less harsh treatment in the Empire by reason of their faith, the President will await with pleasure an opportunity for an interchange of views upon the subject with the Government of Her Majesty.

DISPATCHES CONCERNING THE WAR BETWEEN PERU, CHILI, AND BOLIVIA.¹

[Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. Christiancy, Minister at Peru, instructing him on a certain basis of fact to recognize the Government of Calderon.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 9, 1881.

SIR, — In your last dispatch you informed this Department that the Chilian Government refused absolutely to recognize General Piérola as representing the civil authority in Peru, and that Señor Calderon was at the head of a provisional government.

If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to domestic order and negotiation with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as the existing Provisional government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end.

Mr. Elmore has been received by me as the confidential agent of such Provisional government.

[Letter of instructions from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Hurlbut when he left the United States on his mission to Peru.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.

SIR, — The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I should desire.

¹ Mr. Blaine's instructions to our Minister to Peru will first be given; then his instructions to our Minister to Chili.

Judging from the most recent dispatches of our ministers, you will probably find on the part of the Chilian authorities in possession of Peru a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the Provisional government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. To obtain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome than by demanding too much to force the continuance of the military control of Chili. It is hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association with the Chilian authorities, to impress upon them that the more liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain a lasting and satisfactory settlement. The Peruvians must be aware of the sympathy of the people and Government of the United States, and will, I feel confident, be prepared to give to your representations the consideration to which the friendly anxiety of this Government entitles them.

The United States cannot refuse to recognize the rights which the Chilian Government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession of territory will be the necessary price to be paid for peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to declare that under no circumstances could the loss of territory be accepted as the result of negotiation. The great objects of the Provisional authorities of Peru would seem to be to secure the establishment of a Constitutional government, and next, to succeed in the opening of negotiations for peace without the declaration of preliminary conditions as an *ultimatum* on either side. It will be difficult, perhaps, to obtain this from Chili; but as the Chilian Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this is a war of conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States extends in Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Government to consent that the question

of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall begin. If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peruvian Government to make any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me after you have reached your post.

As you are aware more than one proposition has been submitted to the consideration of this Government looking to a friendly intervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be imposed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this Government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the Government of the United States would be willing to tender its good offices towards the execution of such a project.

As a strictly confidential communication, I enclose you a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States minister at Santiago. You will thus be advised of the position which this Government assumes toward all the parties to this deplorable conflict. It is the desire of the United States to act in a spirit of the sincerest friendship to the three republics, and to use its influence solely in the interest of an honorable and lasting peace.

[Secretary Blaine's instructions to Minister Hurlbut concerning certain alleged American claims against Peru.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, Aug. 4, 1881.

SIR, — As you are aware several communications have been recently addressed to this Department in reference to certain alleged claims of citizens of the United States upon the Government of Peru, with most earnest request for the good offices of

the United States Government in their behalf. While I cannot anticipate that in the present distressed and unsettled condition of that country our representations, however urgent, will receive prompt or satisfactory attention, I deem it best, in view of possible contingencies, to furnish you with general instructions. The two claims for which special consideration and active intervention have been asked are those known as the Cochet claim and the Landreau claim. In reference to the Cochet claim no information has been laid before the Department of a sufficiently definite character to warrant a specific instruction, and in the absence of the requisite data here you will be left to take such steps as may seem expedient on investigating the origin and character of the claim. The primal point at issue is whether any American citizen or association of citizens has acquired an interest in the claim in a manner entitling him or them to the good offices of this Government in making any representation to Peru. As the American holders of the claim or their attorneys will be on the ground, you will no doubt be placed in possession of all the facts, but you will take no step committing your Government to the use of its good offices without first reporting in full to the Department for well-considered and definite instruction. In regard to the Landreau claim, I see no reason to differ from the conclusion to which my predecessors seem to have arrived. John C. Landreau was an American citizen, apparently entitled under a lawful contract to reasonable compensation for important services to Peru. While in conformity with the established practice of our Government, you cannot in such case make an official demand for the settlement of this claim, you will employ your good offices to procure its prompt and just consideration. You will have observed that in the contract made by the Peruvian Government with Landreau and his brother it is expressly stipulated that any questions arising under its provisions shall be submitted to the judicial tribunal of Peru, and that in no case shall diplomatic intervention be asked. You will also notice that the Supreme Court of Peru, sustaining a decision of the court below, has ruled that it had no jurisdiction of this contract, thus leaving Landreau in a position in which he can neither appeal to his own Government nor

obtain a judgment from the tribunals to which, by the contract, he was authorized to apply.

While this Government will not, as at present informed, undertake to construe the contract or to decide upon the extent of the compensation due to Landreau, you are instructed to call the attention of the Peruvian Government to this injustice, and to say that the Government of the United States will expect some adequate and proper means to be provided by which Landreau can obtain a judicial decision upon his rights. If the constitution of the Peruvian courts or the interpretation of the law by Peruvian judges deprives Landreau of the justice which the contract itself guaranteed him, then, in the opinion of this Government, Peru is bound in duty and in honor, to do one of three things:—Supply an impartial tribunal, extend the jurisdiction of the present courts, or submit the case of Landreau to arbitration.

I desire also to direct your attention to the fact that in the anticipated treaty which is to adjust the future relations of Chili and Peru, the latter may possibly be compelled to submit to the loss of territory. If the territory to be surrendered should include the guano deposits which were discovered by Landreau, and for the discovery of which Peru contracted to pay him a royalty upon the tonnage removed, then the Peruvian Government should, in the treaty, stipulate with Chili for the preservation and payment to Landreau of the amount due under his contract. If transfer be made to Chili it should be understood that this claim of an American citizen, if fairly adjudicated in his favor, shall be treated as a proper lien on the property to which it attaches, and that Chili accepts the cession with that condition annexed. As it may be presumed that you will be fully informed of the progress of the negotiations between Chili and Peru for a treaty of peace, you will make such effort as you judiciously can to secure for Landreau a fair settlement of his claim. You will take special care to notify both the Chilian and Peruvian authorities of the character and status of the claim in order that no definitive treaty of peace shall be made in disregard of the rights which Landreau may be found to possess.

[On the 14th of September, Mr. Hurlbut in acknowledging the foregoing dispatch, called the "special attention of the Secretary of State to the extracts (enclosed) from a letter of Mr. J. R. Shipherd to him." Mr. Hurlbut stated that he had received no telegrams and no instructions from the State Department touching the "points reported by Mr. Shipherd," and stated further that he had no faith in Mr. Shipherd or his schemes. When the dispatch was received in Washington, Secretary Blaine was engaged, as he was for some three weeks, with the French and German visitors who came to the United States to attend the Yorktown Centennial. On the 17th of November the Secretary sent the following dispatch to Mr. Hurlbut:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 17, 1881.

SIR, — Your dispatch in reference to the Cochet and Landreau claims, indicates a prudent and discreet course on your part. After my instruction in regard to this subject had been mailed I became convinced that there was no need of even the preliminary inquiry, which I suggested in regard to the Cochet claim. There is no just ground whatever on which this Government could intervene on behalf of it. So far as there may be any basis for the claim, it originates in the demand of a native Peruvian against his Government. If American citizens purchased an interest in such claim they purchased nothing more than the original claimant possessed. They did not and could not purchase the good offices of this Government, and you are instructed not to extend them in the case of the Cochet claim. Your proposed course in regard to the Landreau claim is approved; but that claim must not, of course, be pressed in any manner that would seem to embarrass Peru in the hour of her great distress. Your previous instruction to use your good offices in procuring an adjudication of the Landreau claim was made in view of the possible fact—of which there was wide rumor—that numerous French and English claims were to be presented, in which event I was anxious that the resources of Peru should not be exhausted in the settlement of other claims to the prejudice and detriment of one belonging to an American citizen. You will still be guided by the spirit and intent of that instruction.

The statements which you say were made to you by Mr. Jacob R. Shipherd are very extraordinary. It is in the first place extraordinary that he should have written to you at all, for I carefully advised him that ministers of the United States

in Foreign countries were not permitted to extend their good offices in aid of any claim unless so instructed by the Department of State. I repeatedly told him that any representations on behalf of the claims he was urging must be made at Lima by his own agents. His writing you was therefore an impropriety, and his attempting to instruct you as to what I had written you was as grotesquely absurd as the language he attributes to me. He simply makes the mistake common to a certain class of honest enthusiasts who imagine that the polite and patient listener is the author of their own extravagant fancies. I recognize several of the singular propositions imputed to me as having been made by Mr. Shipherd and not in any sense admitted or assented to by me. I told him in the three or four interviews which he sought with me that I could see no possible ground on which the United States Government could lend its good offices in aid of the Cochet claim. You will therefore pay no attention whatever to any thing Mr. Shipherd may write you in regard to claims against the Government of Peru. You will, indeed, do well to return at once to the writers any letters you may receive relating to private claims, unless you first have the matter regularly referred to you by the Department of State. Such reference will never be made except in cases where in the judgment of the Government there is a denial of justice to an American citizen. Legations of the United States in foreign countries must not be converted into agencies for the prosecution of private claims. The Department trusts to your sound discretion and prudent action in all matters of this character.

[*The Credit Industriel*, a fiscal institution of France, attempted to secure the diplomatic endorsement of the United States as an agency to adjust the financial relations of Chili and Peru. To this proposition the Department of State refused assent. Rumors were in circulation that the agents of the *Credit Industriel* were at Lima seeking the patronage of the American Legation. Other rumors of the same kind referred to the Peruvian Company of New York. These rumors reaching the State Department, Mr. Blaine sent the following instruction to Mr. Hurlbut:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 1881.

SIR,— On the 27th ultimo I sent you the following telegram: "Influence of your position must not be used in aid of *Credit Industriel* or any other financial or speculating associa-

tion." On the 2d instant I received your reply in these words: "It has not been; it will not be." My reason for telegraphing you was the continual circulation of rumors that the aid of your Legation was earnestly desired to promote the interest of the "Credit Industriel of France," an association which is making efforts to re-organize the finances of Peru. Agents of the Credit Industriel had visited the Department of State and ineffectually endeavored to enlist the interest of this Government in their behalf. However trustworthy the Credit Industriel may be, I did not consider it proper for the Department to have any thing whatever to do with it. It is a foreign corporation, responsible to French law, and must seek its patronage and protection from France. At the same time it is no part of your duty to interfere with its negotiations with the Peruvian Government. If it can be made an effective instrumentality to aid that unhappy country in its prostrate and helpless condition it would be ungenerous and unjust to obstruct its operations. Your duty is negative, and you will have fully complied with your instruction by simply abstaining from all connection with the association.

I have another word of caution to give you. I presume that you will be asked by the agents or officers of the Peruvian Company of New York to lend your influence as United States minister to promote its interests. It would, of course, present to you the claim of an American organization composed of reputable citizens and entitled to your good offices where they may, with propriety, be extended. But you will specially avoid any advocacy of the claims of that or any other company or individual in the pursuit of personal ends or business enterprises. To a minister of your experience I need not point out the distinction between diplomatic good offices and personal advocacy. To extend all proper protection to American citizens, and to secure for them in any interests they may have, a respectful hearing before the tribunals of the country to which you are accredited, and generally to aid them with information and advice, are among the imperative and grateful duties of a minister — duties which increase his usefulness and add to his respect, and duties which I have no doubt you will faithfully perform. To go beyond and assume the tone of advocacy, with its inevitable inference of personal interest and its possible sus-

picion of improper interest, will at once impair, if it does not utterly destroy, the acceptability and efficiency of a diplomatic representative. I recite these elementary grounds at the present time, because, if I am correctly advised, all manner of schemes are on foot at Lima for the re-organization of the disordered finances of Peru, and the interested parties are seeking, first of all, the countenance and endorsement of the American legation. You will exercise the utmost care in any step you may take, and if any occasion shall arise where the interposition of this Government may aid in restoring the credit of Peru you will confer by telegraph with the Department, and you will take no important step without full and explicit instruction.

[As the contest between Peru and Chili grew more desperate in the autumn of 1881, Minister Hurlbut, not having time to wait for instructions where an interchange of notes required six weeks and sometimes eight, acted upon his own responsibility and took several steps which the Department of State was compelled to dissent from and to disapprove. On the 22d of November, 1881, Secretary Blaine sent the following dispatch to Minister Hurlbut:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, NOV. 22, 1881.

SIR,—Your dispatches to No. 23, inclusive, have been received, and I learn with regret that a construction has been put upon your language and conduct indicating a policy of active intervention on the part of this Government, beyond the scope of your instructions. As those instructions were clear and explicit, and as this Department is in the possession of no information which would seem to require the withdrawal of the confidence reposed in you, I must consider this interpretation of your words and acts as the result of some strange and perhaps prejudiced misconception.

My only material for forming an opinion consists of your memorandum to Admiral Lynch, your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola, and the convention with President Calderon, ceding a naval station to the United States. I would have preferred that you should hold no communication with Admiral Lynch on questions of a diplomatic character. He was present as a military commander of Chilian forces, and you were accredited to Peru. Nor do I conceive

that Admiral Lynch, as the commander of the Chilian army of occupation, had any right to ask or receive formal assurance from you as to the opinions of your Government. The United States was represented in Chili by a properly accredited minister, and from his own Government the Admiral could and ought to have received any information which it was important for him to have. It was to be expected, and even desired, that frank and friendly relations should exist between you, but I cannot consider such confidential communication as justifying a formal appeal to your colleague in Chili, for the correction or criticism of your conduct. If there was any thing in your proceedings in Peru to which the Government of Chili could properly take exception, a direct representation to this Government, through the Chilian minister here, was due, both to the Government and to yourself.

Having said this, I must add that the language of the memorandum was not unnaturally capable of misconstruction. While you said nothing that may not fairly be considered as warranted by your instructions, you omitted to say with equal emphasis some things which your instructions supplied, and which would perhaps have relieved the sensitive apprehensions of the Chilian authorities. For, while the United States would unquestionably "regard with disfavor" the imperious annexation of Peruvian territory as the right of conquest, you were distinctly informed that this Government could not refuse to recognize that such annexation might become a necessary condition in a final treaty of peace. The main purpose of your effort was expected to be, not so much a protest against any possible annexation, as an attempt by friendly but unofficial communications with the Chilian authorities (with whom you were daily associated), to induce them to support the policy of giving to Peru, without the imposition of harsh and absolute conditions precedent, the opportunity to show that the rights and interests of Chili could be satisfied without such annexation. There is enough in your memorandum, if carefully considered, to indicate this purpose, and I only regret that you did not state it with a distinctness, and if necessary with a repetition, which would have made impossible any but the most willful misconception.

As at present advised I must express disapproval of your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola. I think that your proper course in reference to Garcia's communication would have been either entirely to ignore it as claiming an official character which you could not recognize, or, if you thought that courtesy required a reply, to state that you were accredited to the Calderon Government, and could, therefore, know no other, and that any communication which General Piérola thought it his duty or interest to make, must be made directly to the Government at Washington. You had no responsibility in the matter, and it was injudicious to assume any. The recognition of the Calderon Government had been duly considered and decided by your own Government, and you were neither instructed nor expected to furnish General Piérola or the Peruvian public with the reasons for that action. The following language in your letter to Señor Garcia might well be misunderstood:—

“Chili desires, and asks for Tarapacá, and will recognize the Government which agrees to its cession. The Calderon Government will not cede it. It remains to be seen whether that of Piérola will prove more pliable.”

It might easily be supposed, by an excited public opinion on either side, that such language was intended to imply that the Government of the United States had recognized the Government of Calderon because of its resolution not to cede Peruvian territory. No such motive has ever been declared by this Government. The Government of Calderon was recognized because we believed it to be the interest of both Chili and Peru that some respectable authority should be established which could restore internal order, and initiate responsible negotiations for peace. We desired that the Peruvian Government should have a fair opportunity to obtain the best terms it could, and hoped that it would be able to satisfy the just demands of Chili without the painful sacrifice of the national territory. But we did not make, and never intended to make, any special result of the peace negotiations the basis of our recognition of the Calderon Government. What was best, and what was possible for Peru to do, we were anxious to the extent of our power to aid her in doing, by the use of whatever influence or

consideration we enjoyed with Chili. Further than that, the Government of the United States has, as yet, expressed neither opinion nor intention.

I must also express the dissatisfaction of the Department with your telegram to the minister of the United States near the Argentine Confederation, suggesting that a minister be sent by that Government to Peru.

This would have been clearly without the sphere of your proper official action at any time, but as there existed a serious difference at that time between Chili and the Argentine Confederation, you might naturally have anticipated that such a recommendation would be considered by Chili as an effort to effect a political combination against her. The United States was not in search of alliances to support a hostile demonstration against Chili, and such an anxiety might well be deemed inconsistent with the professions of an impartial mediation.

As to the convention with regard to a naval station in the bay of Chimbote, I am of the opinion that although it is a desirable arrangement the time is not opportune. I should be very unwilling to ask such a concession under circumstances which would almost seem to impose upon Peru the necessity of compliance with our request, and I have no doubt that whenever Peru is relieved from present embarrassments she will cheerfully grant any facilities which our naval or commercial interests might require. Nor in the present excited condition of public opinion in Chili should I be willing to afford to evil-disposed persons the opportunity to intimate that the United States contemplated the establishment of a naval rendezvous in the neighborhood of either Peru or Chili. The very natural and innocent convenience which we require might be misunderstood or misrepresented, and as our sole purpose is to be allowed, in a spirit of the most impartial friendship, to act as mediator between these two powers, I would prefer at present to ask no favors of the one and to excite no possible apprehension in the other.

Having thus stated with frankness the impression made upon the Department by such information as you have furnished, it becomes my duty to add that this Government is unable to understand the abolition of the Calderon Government and the

arrest of President Calderon himself by the Chilian authorities, or I suppose I ought to say by the Chilian Government, as the secretary for foreign affairs of that Government has in a formal communication to Mr. Kilpatrick declared that the Calderon Government "is at an end." As we recognized that Government in supposed conformity with the wishes of Chili, and as no reason for its destruction has been given to us, you will still consider yourself accredited to it, if any legitimate representative exists in the place of President Calderon. If none such exists you will remain in Lima until you receive further instructions, confining your communications with the Chilian authorities to such limits as your personal convenience and the maintenance of the rights and privileges of your Legation may require.

[Without instructions from the Department of State, Mr. Hurlbut entirely on his own judgment and responsibility negotiated with the Government of Peru for a Naval and Coaling Station for the United States. He also entertained a proposition for the transfer of a Railroad Company of which he was to become the Trustee for an American Company. On learning these facts, Mr. Blaine sent the following dispatch to Mr. Hurlbut.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 3, 1881.

SIR,—Since sending my instruction of the 22d ultimo to you, I have more carefully examined the protocol transmitted in your dispatch of the 5th of October, signed by yourself on behalf of the United States, and Señor Galvez, minister of foreign affairs, on behalf of Peru, for the cession of a naval and coaling station to the United States at Chinbote. I find it difficult to discover what substantial advantages would be gained by this Government in the event of its acceptance of the proposed agreement.

I have already had occasion to remark that the time was not opportune for any negotiation for a concession from a Government reduced to such extremity as that in which Peru stands to-day, and to call your attention to other grave considerations which should outweigh any apparent temptation to our sense of immediate self-interest in asking or accepting the concession of special privileges in that country.

The advantages offered by this protocol grow more shadowy

as its provisions are more closely examined. The first article concedes to the United States the right to establish a coaling-station at Chimbote, and the second immediately adds that this shall not be exclusive; that Peru reserves the right to concede the same facilities to any other friendly power which may solicit them. The third subjects to Peruvian law whatever land might be acquired by the United States for the purposes of a coaling-station; and by the fourth article Peru has the right to withdraw all that is conceded by the agreement whenever she sees fit, upon one year's notice.

A naval and coaling station on the South Pacific coast, carefully chosen with the aid of the professional knowledge of those specially qualified to determine its capacity to answer the wants of our National ships, and over which we might exercise proper and necessary jurisdiction, with a secure tenure, would be of undoubted value, and this Government, at a fitting time, may be willing to negotiate upon fair terms for such a privilege. In the protocol presented I observe that you have, with perfect justice, offered no consideration to Peru for this amiable concession, which would only enable us to enjoy on her shores the same privileges which we substantially possess to-day, and which she is ready to extend to every other power with which she is not in actual war. It has the merit at least of innocent diplomacy. Nothing was given and nothing was taken.

While your negotiation of this protocol may be regarded as an error of judgment, involving no serious or lasting consequences, I regret that another proceeding which you report in the same dispatch is of a graver nature, and I cannot pass it by without the most decided expression of disapprobation.

You have commenced an extraordinary negotiation with President Calderon in regard to a Railroad company of which you, while American minister, propose to become the trustee or intermediary, the road to be ultimately turned over to an American company, — an unfinished road, which you say has already cost nine millions of dollars.

The principal terms of the arrangement will be the payment to the Peruvian Government of one million dollars in money and the same in paid-up stock to clear off all existing incumbrances, for which sums they concede the right to construct

and operate the road for twenty-five years after it is finished. You consider the grant very valuable and the possibilities of the company very large. The special advantage which the United States may derive from these possibilities is that the price to be charged for coal carried over the road may be limited, as the railroad runs to Chimbote and the railroad arrangement is a sequel to and part of the plan for a coaling-station there.

I have learned of this negotiation with profound astonishment and regret.

It is hardly conceivable that under any circumstances whatever your Government would consent that its minister should accept such a position, but for the minister himself, without instruction and without permission, to assume the charge of an extensive financial scheme for the purchase, completion, and transfer of a railroad is an utter disregard of every rule of prudence and propriety that should govern the conduct of a representative of the country. At a time like the present, when the ruin of Peruvian interests and the embarrassment of that Government in its almost hopeless attempts to contrive a method of raising money have given birth to so many speculative schemes, and filled the press with accounts of contending companies and their enticing proposals, the direct participation of the American minister in a plan for the re-organization of a wrecked railway company cannot fail to lead to misapprehensions on the part of other Governments and distrust of the United States and its minister, whose motives and proceedings would be viewed in the most unfavorable light.

Whether the grant be valuable or the possibilities of the railroad large, or the profit of the speculation great, are questions of little moment compared to those higher considerations of national interest and dignity which should govern every act and every word in the intercourse and dealings of this Nation with others, as conducted by a representative clothed with its power and charged with its interests and its honor. The construction of a railroad and the cheapening of coal may be laudable enterprises in themselves, but this Government does not send its envoys abroad to undertake them. It is inconsistent with the first duty of a diplomatic agent to assume such

functions; and however disinterested or innocent might be the design, it would inevitably awaken surmises prejudicial to his standing and would impair, if not utterly destroy, his influence with his colleagues and with the people of the country to which he was accredited.

With some relief I note that this negotiation was not wholly completed at the time of writing your dispatch. I presume it was broken off by the arrest of President Calderon; but I should be better pleased to learn that upon mature reflection the impropriety of engaging in such a project and of undertaking functions so incompatible with your representative character had occurred to your own mind, and that you had abandoned it altogether.

If, on the contrary, you have actually endeavored to carry it out by any compact or convention with the Peruvian Government you will at once notify that Government that the project is disapproved, and will not be ratified; and you will abstain from taking any further steps in the name of the United States tending to the acquisition or control of the railroad or to the interference in any way whatever in that enterprise so long as you are the accredited representative of this Government.

[The following are the original instructions delivered by Secretary Blaine to General Kilpatrick when the latter was about to sail on his mission to Chili.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.

SIR,—The unfortunate condition of the relations between Chili and Peru makes the mission upon the duties of which you are now entering one of grave responsibility and great delicacy. Difficult as would be any intervention of the United States under ordinary circumstances, our position is further embarrassed by the failure of the conference at Arica, undertaken at the suggestion of my predecessor. It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate and not to discuss terms of peace, and that the arbitration of the United States upon any questions of difference with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable and would not be accepted by the Chilian Government. Since that time the war has closed in the complete success of Chili, and in

what can scarcely be considered less than the conquest of Peru and Bolivia.

This Government cannot therefore anticipate that the offer of friendly intervention in the settlement of the serious questions now pending would be agreeable to the Government of Chili. It would scarcely comport with self-respect that such an offer should be refused, and it would be of no benefit to Peru and Bolivia that it should be offered and declined. But I am sure the Chilian Government will appreciate the natural and deep interest which the United States feels in the termination of a condition so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of all the South American republics. It should also know that if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this Government can contribute to the restoration of friendly relations between the belligerent powers, they will, upon proper intimation, be promptly offered.

While, therefore, no instructions are given you to tender officially any advice to the Government of Chili which is unsought, you will, on such opportunity as may occur, govern your conduct and representations by the considerations to which I now call your attention.

Without entering upon any discussion as to the causes of the late war between Chili on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other, this Government recognizes the right which the successful conduct of that war has conferred upon Chili; and, in doing so, I will not undertake to estimate the extent to which the Chilian Government has the right to carry its calculation of the indemnities to which it is entitled, nor the security for the future which its interests may seem to require. But if the Chilian Government, as its representatives have declared, seeks only a guarantee of future peace, it would seem natural that Peru and Bolivia should be allowed to offer such indemnity and guarantee before the annexation of territory, which is the right of conquest, is insisted upon. If these powers fail to offer what is a reasonably sufficient indemnity and guarantee, then it becomes a fair subject of consideration whether such territory may not be exacted as the necessary price of peace.

But at the conclusion of a war avowedly not of conquest,

but for the solution of differences which diplomacy had failed to settle, to make the acquisition of territory a *sine qua non* of peace is calculated to cast suspicions on the professions with which war was originally declared. It may very well be that at the termination of such a contest the changed condition and relation of all the parties to it may make re-adjustment of boundaries or territorial changes wise as well as necessary. But this, where the war is not one of conquest, should be the result of negotiation and not the absolute preliminary condition on which alone the victor consents to negotiate. At this day, when the right of the people to govern themselves, the fundamental basis of republican institutions, is so widely recognized, nothing is more difficult or more dangerous than the forced transfer of territory, carrying with it an indignant and hostile population; and nothing but a necessity proven before the world can justify it. It is not a case in which the Power desiring the territory can be accepted as a safe or impartial judge.

While the United States Government does not pretend to express an opinion whether or not such an annexation of territory is a necessary consequence of this war, it believes that it would be more honorable to the Chilian Government, more conducive to the security of a permanent peace, and more in consonance with those principles which are professed by all the republics of America, that such territorial changes should be avoided as far as possible; that they should never be the result of mere force, but, if necessary, should be decided and tempered by full and equal discussion between all the Powers whose people and whose national interests are involved.

At the present moment, the completeness of the victory of Chili seems to render such a diplomatic discussion impossible. The result of the conflict has been not only the defeat of the allied armies, but the dissolution of all responsible government in Peru. Its soil is occupied, the collection of its revenues is transferred to the conquerors, its executive, legislative, and judicial functions are in abeyance. It can neither enforce order within nor assure peace without.

An effort, and apparently a very earnest and honest one, has been made to create a Provisional government, which shall

gradually restore order and the reign of law. But it is obvious that for such a government to succeed in obtaining the confidence either of its own people or foreign Powers, it must be allowed a freedom and force of action which cannot be exercised while Chili holds absolute possession and governs by military authority. This Government, therefore, has been glad to learn from its minister in Chili, whom you succeed, that the Chilian authorities have decided to give their support to the efforts of Señor Calderon to establish on a steady footing a Provisional government in Peru.

You will, as far as you can do so with propriety and without officious intrusion, approve and encourage this disposition on the part of the Chilian Government, and this Department will be exceedingly gratified if your influence as the representative of the United States shall be instrumental in inducing the Government of Chili to give its aid and support to the restoration of regular, constitutional government in Peru, and to postpone the final settlement of all questions of territorial annexation to the diplomatic negotiations which can then be resumed with the certainty of a just, friendly, and satisfactory conclusion.

In any representation which you may make, you will say that the hope of the United States is that the negotiations for peace will be conducted, and the final settlement between the two countries determined, without invoking on either side, the aid or intervention of any European Power.

The Government of the United States seeks only to perform the part of a friend to all the South-American republics engaged in this unhappy conflict, and it will regret to be compelled to consider how far that feeling might be affected, and a more active interposition forced upon it, by any attempted complication of this question with European politics.

If at any time you shall judge it expedient and advantageous to read this dispatch to the minister of foreign affairs, you are authorized to do so. The decision on this point is left to your discretion.

[Mr. Kilpatrick had pursued a course at Santiago, which in the judgment of the State Department had created erroneous and hurtful impressions with the Government of Chili touching the intentions of the United States. Mr. Blaine addressed him the following dispatch to that effect:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22, 1881.

SIR,— Your dispatch of Oct. 14, with a copy of your reply to Señor Balmaseda, has been received. The communication to which it was a reply should have accompanied it, in order that the Department could properly judge of your answer. Your letter is not approved by the Department. You had made known to the Government of Chili the scope of your instructions, and had given abundant assurance of the friendly feeling of your own Government.

If the conduct of Mr. Hurlbut in Peru had given sufficient ground of complaint to the Chilian Government, that complaint should have been made in Washington. Mr. Hurlbut's presentation speech to President Calderon, his memorandum to Admiral Lynch, his letter to Garcia, and telegraphic reports from Buenos Ayres, were not subjects upon which you were called to pass judgment, nor upon which you should have been interrogated by the Chilian Government. Nothing in your conduct or language had excited its apprehensions, and no explanation was due or could have been expected from you, of the language or conduct of your colleague in Peru. I should have been glad if it had occurred to you to call the attention of the secretary for foreign affairs to the impropriety of such a communication, and, in referring to the fact, that your instructions, gave all the assurance which he could either desire or ask, of the friendly disposition of the United States, I should have much preferred that you had furnished him with a copy of those instructions instead of submitting a paraphrase which does not fully represent their spirit and meaning.

Indeed, I find it difficult to understand how the Chilian Government could have been under any misapprehension as to the disposition or purpose of the United States, when the instructions both to yourself and to Mr. Hurlbut had been already frankly communicated. It is still more difficult to understand the abolition of the Calderon Government and the arrest of

the President himself, in the face of the assurance addressed to you by Señor Valderrama: viz., —

“You are therefore authorized to say to your Government that every effort would be given by Chili to strengthen the Government of President Calderon, giving to it the most perfect freedom of action, considering the Chilian occupation. That no question of territorial annexation would be touched until a constitutional government could be established in Peru, acknowledged and respected by the people, with full powers to enter into diplomatic negotiations for peace.”

The President has learned with great regret of the arrest and removal of President Calderon, but in the present state of his information will not undertake to appreciate its significance. He hopes that when the facts are better known, he will be relieved from the painful impression that it was intended as a rebuke to the friendly disposition of the United States. The present condition of affairs, the difficulty of prompt communication with the legations of Peru and Chili, and the unfortunate notoriety of the differences between yourself and your colleague in Peru, have, in the judgment of the President, rendered a special mission necessary. You will inform the Chilian Government that a special envoy will be immediately sent, and you will assure that Government that he will come in the spirit of impartial friendship, anxious to learn that recent occurrences have not been intended to disturb the long-continued and friendly relations existing between us; and instructed by the President to lay before the Chilian Government frankly, but with a scrupulous consideration for the rights and interests of that Government, the views which he holds upon the deplorable condition of affairs in South America, a condition now fast assuming proportions which make its settlement a matter of deep concern to all the republics of the continent. The President anticipates that this step, suggested by friendly interest and justified by our existing relations, will be properly appreciated by the Chilian Government; and he sincerely hopes that no action of that Government will tend further to complicate existing difficulties before the arrival of the minister.¹

¹ Similar notice of the Special Mission was sent to Mr. Hurlbut at Lima.

SPECIAL MISSION TO CHILI, PERU, AND BOLIVIA.

[The confusion resulting in Peru and Chili as described in dispatches to Mr. Hurlbut and Mr. Kilpatrick (pages 343-363) induced the President to dispatch a special envoy accredited to the three countries, not to supersede the ministers already there in the ordinary business of their Legations, but to assume control of the negotiations pending between the United States and the belligerent countries on the subject of their hostilities. Honorable William H. Trescott, formerly Assistant Secretary of State under General Cass, and special envoy to China with Hon. James F. Swift in 1879-80, was selected for the mission. He was accompanied by Mr. Walker Blaine, who was holding the post of Third Assistant Secretary of State at the time. The following are the instructions which Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, gave to Mr. Trescott:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1, 1881.

SIR,— While the circumstances under which the President has deemed it proper to charge you with a special mission to the Republics of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia, render it necessary that much shall be confided to your own discretion, it is desirable that you should be placed in full possession of his views as to the general line of conduct which you will be expected to pursue.

For this purpose it is not necessary at present to go farther back in the history of the unfortunate relations between Chili on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other, than the time when the defeat of General Piérola, his abandonment of the capital and the coast, and their occupation by the Chilean army, seemed to have put an end to all responsible native government in Peru. Lima having been surrendered on the 19th January, 1881, Piérola driven across the mountains, the Chilean military occupation consolidated; and the Chilean Government refusing to recognize Piérola as representing the Government of Peru, it became absolutely necessary that some Government

should be established, if Peru were not to remain simply a military district of Chili.

On February 25, 1881, Mr. Christiancy, the United States minister at Lima, wrote this Department as follows:—

“A movement has, therefore, been initiated among some of the leading citizens of Lima and Callao, *and encouraged by the Chilean authorities*, to establish a new Government in opposition to that of Piérola [who is still at Tacna or Yareja].”

From this date to April 13, 1881, Mr. Christiancy kept the Department informed of the probabilities of the establishment of the Calderon Government, so called from the name of the eminent Peruvian statesman who had been chosen President. On that date he wrote:—

“In my own private opinion, however, if the provisional government had come up without any appearance of support from the Chilean authorities, it would have had many elements of popularity and would probably have succeeded in obtaining the acquiescence of the people. This new Government realizes the importance of an early peace with Chili, the necessity of which must be recognized by every thoughtful man; while that of Piérola professes to intend to carry on the war; but it has no means for the purpose at present, and my own opinion is that any effort to do so will end in still greater calamities to Peru.”

On May 23, the same minister, in a postscript to his dispatch of the 17th, says:—

“Since writing the above it has become still more probable that the threat of ‘indefinite occupation’ was intended only to drive the Peruvians into the support of the provisional government, as two days ago they allowed the Government to send seventy-five soldiers to Tacna, Oroyo, etc., to control that part of the country, so as to allow the members of Congress to come to Lima; and it now begins to look as if Calderon might secure a quorum (two-thirds) of the Congress. If he does succeed, it will be some evidence that Peru acquiesces in that Government. And if he gets the two-thirds of the members, I think I shall recognize the provisional government, or that of the Congress and the President they may elect, unless in the mean time I shall receive other instructions.”

On the 9th of May, 1881, instructions had been sent to him from this Department, which crossed this dispatch, in which he was told:—

“If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as the existing provisional government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end.”

Acting under these instructions, although with some expressed doubt as to the probable permanence of its existence, Mr. Christiancy, on the 26th of June, 1881, formally recognized the Calderon Government. It is clear that this recognition was not an unfriendly intervention as far as the wishes and interests of Chili were concerned, for under date of May 7, 1881, two days before these instructions of the 9th were sent to Mr. Christiancy, Mr. Osborn, the United States minister to Chili, wrote from Santiago as follows:—

“In my dispatch of April 5, regarding the war in this section, I mentioned the fact that the minister of war, Mr. Vergara, who had been with the army at Lima, had been sent for, and was then on his way to Chili. Since his arrival the Government has labored to reach a conclusion touching the course to be pursued with Peru, and to that end numerous and extended discussions among the ministers and prominent citizens of the republic, who had been invited to participate, have taken place. Three plans or propositions were discussed: First, that spoken of by me in my No. 201, involving the withdrawal of the army to Arica; second, the occupation of the entire Peruvian coast by the Chilian forces, and its government by Chilian authorities; and third, the strengthening of the Government of Calderon, and the negotiation of a peace therewith. The propriety of entering into negotiations with Piérola was not even dignified with a consideration. After much labor the Government reached the conclusion that the last proposition afforded the easiest way out of their complications, and it has been determined to send Mr. Godoy to Peru, in charge of the negotiations. . . . The ministry has freely counseled with me regarding the difficulties of the situation, and in view of their previous determination to have nothing to do with Piérola, I cannot but applaud the result of their deliberations. To vacate the country now would be to turn it over to anarchy, and to attempt to occupy the entire coast would, in time, involve both countries in ruin. The most feasible way to peace is, in my opinion, the one resolved upon. In fact it is the only one which offers any reasonable hope of a solution of the difficulties during the present generation.”

In giving the support of recognition to the Calderon Government, therefore, so far was this Government from doing what could be considered an unfriendly act to Chili, that it was, in fact, giving its aid to the very policy which Chili avowed, and which, in the opinion of competent judges, was the only method of reasonable solution.

This conclusion of the Government was confirmed by the information which was transmitted to the Department by General Kilpatrick, who succeeded Mr. Osborn as the United States Minister to Chili. General Kilpatrick was appointed after the recognition of the Calderon Government, and was furnished with instructions to which I have already referred.

In his dispatch, under date August 15, 1881, he says:—

“I have the honor to report that, so far as the assurance of public men can be relied upon, your instructions have been complied with; your ideas of final peace accepted, not only by the present administration at Santiago, but still better of Señor Santa María, the President elect, whose administration will have begun when you receive this note.”

General Kilpatrick then proceeds to give a detailed account of a long interview with the leading and most influential members of the Chilian Government, in which he quotes the following as the final assurances given to him by the Chilian Secretary of State:—

“You may therefore say to your Government that every effort would be given by Chili to strengthen the Government of President Calderon, giving to it the most perfect freedom of action, considering the Chilian occupation; that no question of Chilian annexation would be touched until a constitutional government could be established in Peru, acknowledged and respected by the people, with full powers to enter into diplomatic negotiation for peace; that no territory would be exacted unless Chili failed to secure ample and just indemnification in other and satisfactory ways, as also ample security for the future; and that in no case would Chili exact territory save where Chilian enterprise and Chilian capital had developed the desert and where to-day nine-tenths of the people were Chilian.”

But after this recognition, made in entire good faith to both parties, three things followed:—

1. The presence of a United States minister at Lima accredited to the Calderon Government, and the reception in Washington of a minister from that Government, gave it, unquestionably, increased strength and confidence.

2. The adherents of Piérola, realizing the necessity of peace and the existence of a stable Government to negotiate it, gradually abandoned the forlorn hope of continued resistance, and gave their adhesion to the Calderon Government.

3. The Congress which assembled within the neutral zone set apart for that purpose by the Chilian authorities, and which was further allowed by the Chilian Government to provide for the military impositions by the use of the national credit, and was thus recognized as the representative of the Peruvian people, authorized President Calderon to negotiate a peace, but upon the condition that no territory should be ceded.

As soon as these facts indicated the possibility of a real and independent vitality in the Constitution of the Calderon Gov-

ernment the Chilian military authorities issued an order forbidding any exercise of its functions within the territory occupied by the Chilian army—that is, within the entire territory west of the mountains, including the capital and ports of Peru.

Unable to understand this sudden and, giving due regard to the professions of Chili, this unaccountable change of policy, this Government instructed its minister at Lima to continue to recognize the Calderon Government until more complete information would enable it to send further instructions. If our present information is correct, immediately upon the receipt of this communication they arrested President Calderon, and thus, as far as was in their power, extinguished his Government. The President does not now insist upon the inference which this action would warrant. He hopes that there is some explanation which will relieve him from the painful impression that it was taken in resentful reply to the continued recognition of the Calderon Government by the United States. If, unfortunately, he should be mistaken, and this motive be avowed, your duty will be a brief one. You will say to the Chilian Government that the President considers such a proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offense, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the Government of the United States, with the assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of such a contingency and instructions will be sent you.

But I do not anticipate such an occurrence. From the information before the Department, of which you are possessed, it is more probable that this course will be explained by an allegation that the conduct and language of the United States minister in Peru had encouraged the Calderon Government to such resistance of the wishes of Chili as to render the negotiation of a satisfactory treaty of peace with the Calderon Government impossible. Any explanation which relieves this action by the Chilian Government of the character of an intentional offense will be received by you to that extent, provided it does not require as a condition precedent the disavowal of Mr. Hurlbut.

Whatever may be my opinion as to the discretion of all that may have been said or done by Mr. Hurlbut, it is impossible for me to recognize the right of the Chilian Government to take such action without submitting to the consideration of this Government any cause of complaint against the proceedings of the representative of the United States. The Chilian Government was in possession of the instructions sent to our minister at the capital of Peru, as well as those to his colleague at Santiago. There was no pretense that the conduct of General Kilpatrick was any thing but friendly. Chili was represented here by a minister who enjoyed the confidence of his Government, and nothing can justify the assumption that the United States was acting a double part in its relations to the two countries. If the conduct of the United States minister seemed inconsistent with what Chili had every reason to know was the friendly intention of the United States, a courteous representation through the Chilian minister here would have enabled this Government promptly to correct or confirm him. You are not therefore authorized to make to the Chilian Government any explanation of the conduct of General Hurlbut, if that Government, not having afforded us the opportunity of accepting or disavowing his conduct, insists upon making its interpretation of his proceedings the justification of its recent action.

It is hoped, however, that you will be able, by communication at once firm and temperate, to avoid these embarrassments. If you should fortunately reach the point where frank, mutual explanation can be made without the sacrifice of that respect which every Government owes to itself, you will then be at liberty, conforming your explanation to the recent instruction to Mr. Hurlbut, with a copy of which you are furnished, to show to the Government of Chili how much both his words and acts have been misconceived.

It is difficult for me to say how far an explanation would be satisfactory to the President which was not accompanied by the restoration or recognition of the Calderon Government. The objects which he has at heart are, first, to prevent the misery, confusion, and bloodshed which the present relations between Chili and Peru seem only too certain to renew; and,

second, to take care that in any friendly attempt to reach this desirable end the Government of the United States is treated with the respectful consideration to which its disinterested purpose, its legitimate influence, and its established position entitle it. The President feels in this matter neither irritation nor resentment. He regrets that Chili seems to have misconceived both the spirit and intention of the Government of the United States, and he thinks her course has been inconsiderate. He will gladly learn that a calmer and wiser judgment directs her counsels, and asks in no exacting spirit the correction of what were perhaps natural misunderstandings. He would be satisfied with the manifestation of a sincere purpose on the part of Chili to aid Peru, either in restoring the present provisional government or establishing in its place one which will be allowed the freedom of action necessary to insure internal order and to conduct a real negotiation to some substantial result.

Should the Chilian Government, while disclaiming any intention of offense, maintain its right to settle its difficulties with Peru without the friendly intervention of other Powers, and refuse to allow the formation of any Government in Peru which does not pledge its consent to the cession of Peruvian territory, it will be your duty, in language as strong as is consistent with the respect due to an independent Power, to express the disappointment and dissatisfaction felt by the United States at such a deplorable policy.

You will say that this Government recognizes without reserve the right of Chili to adequate indemnity for the cost of the war, and a sufficient guarantee that it will not again be subjected to hostile demonstration from Peru; and further, that if Peru is unable or unwilling to furnish such indemnity, the right of conquest has put it in the power of Chili to supply it, and the reasonable exercise of that right, however much its necessity may be regretted, is not ground of legitimate complaint on the part of other Powers. But this Government feels that the exercise of the right of absolute conquest is dangerous to the best interests of all the Republics of this continent; that from it are certain to spring other wars and political disturbances; and that it imposes, even upon the conqueror, burdens which are scarcely compensated by the apparent increase of strength which it

gives. This Government also holds that between two independent nations, the mere existence of war does not confer the right of conquest until the failure to furnish the indemnity and guarantee which can be rightfully demanded.

The United States maintains, therefore, that Peru has the right to demand that an opportunity should be allowed her to find such indemnity and guarantee. Nor can this Government admit that a cession of territory can be properly exacted far exceeding in value the amplest estimate of a reasonable indemnity.

Already, by force of its occupation, the Chilian Government has collected large sums from Peru; and it has been openly and officially asserted in the Chilian Congress that these military impositions have furnished a surplus beyond the cost of maintaining its armies in that occupation. The annexation of Tarapacá, which, under proper administration, would produce annually a sum sufficient to pay a large indemnity, seems not to be consistent with the execution of justice.

The practical prohibition of the formation of a stable government in Peru, and the absolute appropriation of its most valuable territory, is simply the extinction of a State which has formed part of the system of Republics on this continent, honorable in the traditions and illustrations of its past history, and rich in resources for future progress. The United States, with which Peru has for many years maintained the most cordial relations, has the right to feel and to express a deep interest in her distressed condition; and while, cherishing equal friendliness to Chili, we will not interpose to deprive her of the fair advantages of military success, nor put any obstacle to the attainment of future security, we cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peruvian nationality. If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent State be persisted in, this Government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chili has assumed, and will hold itself free to appeal to the other Republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chili and Peru, but which threaten with extreme danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America.

If, however, none of these embarrassing obstacles supervene, and Chili receives in a friendly spirit the representations of the United States, it will be your purpose —

First, To concert such measures as will enable Peru to establish a regular Government, and initiate negotiation.

Second, To induce Chili to consent to such negotiation without cession of territory as a condition precedent.

Third, To impress upon Chili that in such negotiation she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for a reasonable indemnity ; and, in this connection, to let it be understood that the United States would consider the imposition of an extravagant indemnity, so as to make the cession of territory necessary in satisfaction, as more than is justified by the actual cost of the war, and as a solution threatening renewed difficulty between the two countries.

As it is probable that some time will elapse before the completion of all the arrangements necessary for a final negotiation, this Government would suggest a temporary convention, which, recognizing the spirit of our present friendly representation, would bring Peru and Chili into amicable conference and provide for a meeting of plenipotentiaries to negotiate a permanent treaty of peace.

If negotiation be assured, the ability of Peru to furnish the indemnity will be a matter of direct interest. Upon this subject we have no information upon which definite instructions can now be based. While you will carefully abstain from any interposition in this connection, you will examine and report to this Department promptly any plans which may be suggested.

You will not indicate any wish that the Government of the United States should act as umpire in the adjudications between the contending powers. Should an invitation to that effect be extended, you will communicate by telegraph for instructions. The single and simple desire of this Government is to see a just and honorable peace at the earliest day practicable, and if any other American Government can more effectively aid in producing this auspicious result, the United States will cordially sustain it and lend such co-operation as the circumstances may demand.

OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MEXICO.

[Dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Morgan, Minister to Mexico.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 1, 1881.

SIR, — As the relations between the Government of the United States and that of Mexico happily grow more amicable and intimate, it is but natural that a disposition should in like manner be developed between the citizens of the respective countries to seek new means of fostering their material interests, and that the ties which spring from commercial interchange should tend to grow and strengthen with the growing and strengthening spirit of good will which animates both peoples. That this spirit exists is the most grateful proof that the frank and conciliatory policy of the United States towards Mexico has borne and is bearing good fruit. This is especially visible in the rapidly extending desire on the part of the citizens of this country to take an active share in the prosecution of those industrial enterprises for which the resources of Mexico offer so broad and promising a field, as well as in the responsive and increasing disposition which is manifest on the part of the Mexican people to welcome such projects. No fact in the historical relations of the two great Republics of the Northern Continent gives happier promise for both, and it is a source of especial gratification to this Government that the jealousies and distrusts which have at times clouded the perfect friendship of the two Governments are thus yielding to the more wholesome spirit of reciprocal frankness and confidence.

It seems proper at this time, when a new administration has constitutionally and peacefully come into power in Mexico, devoted to fulfilling and extending the just policy of its predecessor, to call your attention to those general precepts which,

in the judgment of the President, should govern the relations between the two Republics, and to bear testimony to which will be your most important duty as the diplomatic representative of the United States.

The record of the last fifteen years must have removed from the minds of the enlightened statesmen of Mexico every lingering doubt touching the policy of the United States toward her sister republic. That policy is one of faithful and impartial recognition of the independence and the integrity of the Mexican nation. At this late day it needs no disclaimer on our part of the existence of even the faintest desire in the United States for territorial extension south of the Rio Grande. The boundaries of the two republics have been long settled in conformity with the best jurisdictional interests of both. The line of demarcation is not conventional merely. It is more than that. It separates a Spanish-American people from a Saxon-American people. It divides one great nation from another with distinct and natural finality. The increasing prosperity of both Commonwealths can only draw into closer union the friendly feeling, the political sympathy, and the varied interests which their history and neighborhood have created and encouraged. In all your intercourse with the Mexican Government and people it must be your chief endeavor to reflect this firm conviction of your Government.

It is a source of profound gratification to the Government of the United States that the political condition of Mexico is so apparently and assuredly in the path of stability, and the administration of its Constitutional Government so regular, that it can offer to foreign capital that just and certain protection without which the prospect even of extravagant profit will fail to tempt the extension of commercial and industrial enterprise. It is still more gratifying that with a full comprehension of the political and social advantages of such a mode of developing the material resources of the country, the Government of Mexico cordially lends its influence to the spirit of welcome and encouragement with which the Mexican people seem disposed to greet the importation of wealth and enterprise.

The present progress in this direction by the National Government of Mexico is but an earnest of the great good

which may be accomplished when the intimate and necessary relations of the two countries and peoples are better understood than now. To conduce to this better understanding must be your constant labor. While, therefore, carefully avoiding all appearance of advocacy of any personal undertakings which citizens of the United States may desire to initiate in Mexico, you will take every opportunity which you may deem judicious to make clear the spirit and motive that control this movement in the direction of developing Mexican resources. You will impress upon the Government of Mexico the earnest wish and hope felt by the people and Government of this country that these resources may be multiplied and rendered fruitful for the primary benefit of the Mexican people themselves; that the forms of constitutional and stable Government may be strengthened as domestic wealth increases and as the conservative spirit of widely distributed and permanent vested interests is more and more felt; that the administration of the Mexican finances, fostered by these healthful tendencies, may be placed upon a firm basis; that the rich sections of the great territory of the republic may be brought into closer intercommunication; in a word, that Mexico may promptly and firmly assume the place toward which she is so manifestly tending as one of the most prosperous and well-ordered States in the harmonious system of Western republics.

In future dispatches more detailed instructions will be given you touching certain points of interest to the two Governments in the direction of an enlarged reciprocal trade and interchange of commodities. It is my present design simply to acquaint you with the President's views and feeling toward Mexico and with the spirit which will animate his policy.

You can read this dispatch to the minister of foreign affairs, and, if he desires, leave a copy of it with him.

[Views of the United States Government touching the disturbed relations between Mexico and Guatemala. Dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Morgan, United States Minister to Mexico.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 16, 1881.

SIR, — In my instruction of the 1st instant, I endeavored to set forth the spirit of good will which animates this Govern-

ment toward Mexico. I trust no doubt can remain as to the sincerity of our friendship. Believing that this friendship, and the frankness which has always distinguished the policy of this country toward its neighbors, warrant the tender of amicable counsel when occasion therefor shall appear, and deeming such counsel due to our recognized impartiality, and to the position of the United States as the founder and, in some sense, the guarantor and guardian of Republican principles on the American continent, it seems proper now to call your attention to a subject touching which we feel some natural concern. I refer to the question of boundaries and territorial jurisdiction pending between Mexico and Guatemala.

In the time of the Empire, the forces of Iturbide overran a large part of the territory of what now constitutes Central America, which had then recently thrown off the Spanish domination. The changing fortunes of war resulted in the withdrawal of Mexican forces from most of that region, except the important provinces of Soconusco and Chiapas, which remained under their control. Since that time the boundaries between the two countries have never been adjusted upon a satisfactory basis. Mexico, becoming a Republic, did not forego claims based on the imperial policy of conquest and absorption, while Guatemala, resisting further progress of Mexican arms, and disputing, step by step, the conquests already made, has never been able to come to a decision with her more powerful neighbor concerning the relative extension of their jurisdiction in the disputed strip of territory lying between the Gulf of Tehuantepec and the Peninsula of Yucatan.

Under these circumstances, the Government of Guatemala has made a formal application to the President of the United States to lend his good offices toward the restoration of a better state of feeling between the two Republics. This application is made in frank and conciliatory terms, as to the natural protector of the rights and national integrity of the Republican forms of Government existing near our shores and to which we are bound by many ties of history and of material interest. This Government can do no less than give friendly and considerate heed to the representations of Guatemala, even as it would be glad to do were the appeal made by Mexico, in the

interest of justice and a better understanding. Events, fresh in the memory of the living generation of Mexicans, when the moral and material support of the United States, although then engaged in a desperate domestic struggle, was freely lent to avert the danger which a foreign empire threatened to the national life of the Mexican Republic, afford a gratifying proof of the unselfishness with which the United States regards all that concerns the welfare and existence of its sister republics of the continent.

It is alleged, on behalf of Guatemala, that diplomatic efforts to come to a better understanding with Mexico have proved unavailing; that under a partial and preliminary accord looking to the ascertainment of the limits in dispute, Guatemalan surveying parties, sent out to study the land, with a view to proposing a basis of definitive settlement, have been imprisoned by the Mexican authorities; that Guatemalan agents for the taking of a census of the inhabitants of the territory in question have been dealt with in like summary manner; and, in fine, that the Government of Mexico has slowly but steadily encroached upon the bordering country heretofore held by Guatemala, substituting the local authorities of Mexico for those already in possession, and so widening the area in contention.

It is not the province of the United States to express an opinion as to the extent of either the Guatemalan or the Mexican claim to this region. This Government is not a self-constituted arbiter of the destinies of either country, or of both, in this matter. It is simply the impartial friend of both, ready to tender frank and earnest counsel touching any thing which may menace the peace and prosperity of its neighbors. It is, above all, anxious to do any and every thing which will tend to make stronger the natural union of the republics of the continent, in the face of the tendencies of other and distant forms of government to influence the internal affairs of Spanish America. It is especially anxious, in the pursuance of this policy, to see the Central American Republics more securely united than they have been in protection of their common interests, which interests are, in their outward relations, identical in principle with those of Mexico and the United States. It feels that every thing which may lessen the good will and

harmony earnestly to be desired between the Spanish-American Republics of the Isthmus must in the end disastrously affect their mutual well-being. The responsibility for the maintenance of this common attitude of united strength is, in the President's conception, shared by all, and rests no less upon the strong States than upon the weak.

Without, therefore, in any way prejudicing the contention between Mexico and Guatemala, but acting as the unbiased counselor of both, the President deems it his duty to set before the Government of Mexico his conviction of the danger to the principles that Mexico has signally and successfully defended in the past, which would ensue should disrespect be shown for the boundaries that separate her from her weaker neighbors, or should the authority of force be resorted to in the establishment of rights over territory which they claim, without the conceded justification of her title thereto. Especially would the President regard it as an unfriendly act toward his cherished plan of upbuilding strong Republican governments in Spanish America, if Mexico, whose power and generosity should be alike signal in such a case, should seek or permit any misunderstanding with Guatemala, when the path toward a pacific avoidance of trouble is an international duty at once easy and imperative.

You are directed to request an interview with Señor Mariscal, in which to acquaint him with the purport of this instruction. In doing so, your judgment and discretion may have full scope to avoid any misunderstanding on his part of the spirit of friendly counsel which prompts the President's course. Should Señor Mariscal evince a disposition to become more intimately acquainted with the President's views after your verbal exposition thereof, you are at liberty to read this dispatch to him, and, should he so desire, to give him a copy.

[Views of the Government of the United States touching disturbed relations of Mexico and Guatemala. Second dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Morgan, Minister to Mexico.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1881.

SIR, — I had hardly completed my instruction to you of the 16th instant, when information reached me from the United States minister at the Guatemalan capital, placing in a still

graver light the condition of the relations between Mexico and Guatemala, touching the possession of the territory of Soconusco. In fact, so serious is the apprehension caused in the mind of the President by these untoward reports, that I feel constrained to supplement my previous instructions to you on the subject with even more energy and directness.

It would appear now that the movement on the part of Mexico was not merely to obtain possession of the disputed territory, but to precipitate hostilities with Guatemala, with the ultimate view of extending her borders by actual conquest. Large bodies of Mexican troops are said to be on their way to Soconusco, and the exigency is reported to be so alarming that plans for national defense are uppermost in the minds of President Barrios and his advisers. Frequent border raids into Guatemalan territory have inflamed the passions of the residents of the frontier country, and the imminence of a collision is very great. Of the possible consequence of war it may be premature to speak, but the information possessed by the Department intimates the probable extension of hostilities to the other Central American States and their eventual absorption into the Mexican federal system.

I cannot believe it possible that these designs seriously enter into the policy of the Mexican Government. Of late years the American movement toward permanence of international boundaries has been so marked, and so essential a part of the continental policy of the American Republics, that any departure therefrom becomes necessarily a menace to the interests of all.

This is a matter touching which the now established policy of the Government of the United States to refrain from territorial acquisition gives it the right to use its friendly offices in discouragement of any movement on the part of neighboring States which may tend to disturb the balance of power between them. More than this, the maintenance of this honorable attitude of example involves to a large extent a moral obligation on our part, as the disinterested friend of all our sister States, to exert our influence for the preservation of the national life and integrity of any one of them against aggression, whether this may come from abroad or from another American Republic.

No State in the American system has more unequivocally condemned the forcible extension of domain, at the expense of a weaker neighbor, than Mexico herself; and no State more heartily concurs in the condemnation of Filibusterism in every form than the United States. It is clearly to the mutual interest of the two countries, to whose example the success of Republican institutions on this continent is largely due, that their policy in this regard should be identical and unmistakable.

As long as the broadened international diplomacy of our day affords peaceable recourse to principles of equity and justice in settlement of controversies like that between Mexico and Guatemala, the outbreak of a war between them would, in the judgment of the President, involve much graver results than the mere transitory disturbance of the *entente cordiale* so much desired by the United States Government between all the American republics. Besides the transfers of territory which might follow as enforced compensation for the costs of a war, it is easy to foresee the serious complications and consequent dangers to the American system, should an opening be afforded to foreign Powers to throw their influence or force into the scale in determination of the contest. Mexico herself has but too recently recovered from the effects of such a foreign constraint not to appreciate at its full force the consideration thus presented. The peaceful maintenance of the *status quo* of the American commonwealths is of the very essence of their policy of harmonious alliance for self-preservation, and is of even more importance to Mexico than to the United States.

I have adverted in my dispatch of the 16th instant, to the desire of the United States that its neighbors should possess strong and prosperous Governments, to the assurance of their tranquillity from internal disturbance and outside interference. While we wish this happy result for Mexico, we equally wish it for the other Spanish-American nations. It is no less indispensable to the welfare of Central America than of Mexico, and, by moral influence and the interposition of good offices, it is the desire and the intention of the United States to hold up the republics of Central America in their old strength and to do all that may be done toward insuring the tranquillity of their relations among themselves and their collective security as an

association of allied interests, possessing in their common relationship to the outer world all the elements of national existence. In this enlarged policy we confidently ask the co-operation of Mexico. A contrary course on her part could only be regarded as an unwise step, while any movement directly leading to the absorption, in whole or part, of her weaker neighbors would be deemed an act unfriendly to the best interests of America.

It is desired that you should make earnest but calm representation of these views of the President to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. In addition to embodying the main points of my previous instruction, you will make use of such temperate reasoning as will serve to show Señor Mariscal that we expect every effort to be made by his Government to avert a conflict with Guatemala, by diplomatic means, or, these failing, by resort to arbitration. You will intimate to Señor Mariscal discreetly, but distinctly, that the good feeling between Mexico and the United States will be fortified by a frank avowal that the Mexican policy toward the neighboring States is not one of conquest or aggrandizement but of conciliation, peace, and friendship.

I have written this instruction rather to strengthen your own hands in the execution of the delicate and responsible duty thus confided to you than with a view to its formal communication to Señor Mariscal by leaving a copy of it with him. If, in your discretion, the important ends in view will be subserved by your making the Minister acquainted with portions hereof, you are at liberty to do so, while regarding the instruction as a whole in a confidential light, and as supplementary to my instruction of the 16th, which you have been authorized to communicate *in extenso*, if desirable.

[Views of the Government of the United States touching the disturbed relations between Mexico and Guatemala. Third dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Morgan, Minister to Mexico.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, NOV. 28, 1881.

SIR, — Referring to your correspondence with this department since its instruction tendering the good offices of the Government of the United States in aid of the amicable set-

tlement of the differences between Mexico and Guatemala, I have to remark that it would be a matter of the gravest disappointment if I found myself compelled to agree with you in the conclusion which you seem to have reached in your last dispatch.

Reporting in your dispatch of Sept. 22, 1881, your most recent conversation with Señor Mariscal, the Mexican secretary for foreign affairs, you say, —

“I venture to suggest that, unless the Government is prepared to announce to the Mexican Government that it will actively, if necessary, preserve the peace, it would be the part of wisdom on our side to leave the matter where it is. Negotiations on the subject will not benefit Guatemala, and you may depend upon it what we have already done in this direction has not tended to the increasing of the cordial relations which I know it is so much your desire to cultivate with this nation.”

“To leave the matter where it is,” you must perceive, is simply useless, for it will not remain there. The friendly relations of the United States and Mexico would certainly not be promoted by the refusal of the good offices of this Government, tendered in a spirit of the most cordial regard both for the interests and honor of Mexico, and suggested only by the earnest desire to prevent a war useless in its purpose, deplorable in its means, and dangerous to the best interests of all the Central American republics in its consequences. To put aside such an amicable intervention as an unfriendly intrusion, or to treat it as I regret to see the Mexican secretary for foreign affairs seems disposed, as a partisan manifestation on behalf of claims which we have not examined and interests which we totally misunderstand, can certainly not contribute “to the increasing of the cordial relations which you know it is so much our desire to cultivate with Mexico.”

But, more than this, “to leave the matter where it is” is to leave Mexico and Guatemala confronting each other in armed hostility, with the certainty that irritation and anger on the one side and extreme apprehension on the other will develop some untoward incident leading to actual collision. In such event no successful resistance can be anticipated on the part of Guatemala. Whether the claims of Mexico be moderate or extravagant, whether the cession of territory be confined to the present alleged boundary lines or be extended to meet the

necessities of a war indemnity, there would be another lamentable demonstration on this continent of the so-called right of conquest, the general disturbance of the friendly relations of the American republics, and the postponement for an indefinite period of that sympathy of feeling, that community of purpose, and that unity of interest, upon the development of which depends the future prosperity of these countries.

The Republic of Guatemala, one of those American republics in whose fortunes this Government naturally feels a friendly interest, communicated to this Government that there existed between it and Mexico certain differences which, after much diplomatic consultation, had failed to reach a satisfactory settlement. Recognizing the relation of the United States to all the republics of this continent, aware of the friendly services which this Government has never failed to render to Mexico, and presuming not unnaturally that Mexico would receive our amicable counsel with cordiality and confidence, the Government of Guatemala asked our good offices with that Power for the purpose of inducing it to submit to an impartial arbitration those differences upon which they had been unable to agree.

To refuse such a request would not only have been a violation of international courtesy to Guatemala, but an indication of a want of confidence in the purposes and character of the Mexican Government which we could not and did not entertain.

In tendering our good offices, the Mexican Government was distinctly informed that the United States —

“is not a self-constituted arbitrator of the destinies of either country or of both in this matter. It is simply the impartial friend of both, ready to tender frank and earnest counsel touching any thing which may menace the peace and prosperity of its neighbors.”

Before this instruction could have reached you, information was received that large bodies of Mexican troops had been ordered to the frontier in dispute. You were therefore directed to urge upon the Mexican Government the propriety of abstaining from all such hostile demonstration in order to afford opportunity for the friendly solution of the differences between the two governments. It is unnecessary now to repeat the reasons which you were instructed to submit to the consideration of

the Mexican Government, which were stated in the most earnest and friendly spirit, and which were communicated by you to the Mexican secretary for foreign affairs with entire fidelity.

I now learn from your dispatches that our information was correct; that Mexican troops have been ordered to the disputed boundary line, and that, while the Mexican Government does not absolutely reject a possible future arbitration, it is unwilling to postpone its own action to further discussion, and does not receive the good offices of this Government in the spirit in which they have been tendered. The United States does not pretend to direct the policy of Mexico, nor has it made any pretension to decide in advance upon the merits of the controversy between Mexico and Guatemala. The Mexican Government is of course free to decline our counsel, however friendly. But it is necessary that we should know distinctly what the Mexican Government has decided. It is useless, and from your dispatches I infer it would be irritating, to keep before the Government of Mexico the offer of friendly intervention, while, on the other hand, it would not be just to Guatemala to hold that Government in suspense as to whether there was a possibility of the acceptance of the amicable mediation which we have offered.

You will, therefore, upon the receipt of this instruction, ask for an interview with the secretary for foreign affairs. You will press upon his reconsideration the views which you have already submitted to him; assure him of the earnestness with which this Government desires a peaceful solution of the existing differences, and inform him of our profound regret and disappointment that the tender of our good offices has not been received in the spirit in which it was made. You will, if he affords you the opportunity, endeavor to enforce the practicability of the solution which you suggested both to himself and the Guatemalan minister, by which the arbitration could be limited to the question of boundary without involving the title to the province of Chiapas.

If the Government of Mexico should be disposed to accept an arbitration, limited in its points of settlement—as M. Herrera, the Guatemalan minister has indicated as probably acceptable to his Government—you will ask the assurance of

the Mexican Government that pending the discussions necessary to perfect such an arrangement all hostile demonstration should be avoided, and if possible that the Mexican troops should be withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the disputed boundary. But this latter request you will not insist upon, if it should be an obstacle to obtaining the consent of Mexico to a limited arbitration.

Should the Mexican Government, however, decide that it is not consistent with its views to accept a friendly intervention in the differences between itself and Guatemala, you will inform the Secretary for foreign affairs that you accept this decision as undoubtedly within the clear right of Mexico. You will express the very deep and sincere regret which this Government will feel if it shall find the powerful Republic of Mexico unwilling to join the Government of the United States in maintaining and establishing the principle of friendly arbitration for international differences on the continent of America. Mexico and the United States, acting in cordial harmony, can induce all the other independent governments of North and South America to aid in fixing this policy of peace for all future disputes between nations of the Western Hemisphere. It would be a marked and impressive precedent, if, in a dispute with a weaker neighbor, Mexico should frankly consent to a friendly arbitration of all existing differences.

You will further say to Mr. Mariscal that you are definitely instructed to call his attention to an expression of opinion which you have reported in your dispatch of 11th of August, 1881, as follows:—

“He, Señor Mariscal, appears to entertain a very bad opinion of the President of Guatemala, and to think that his appeal to the United States has a purpose beyond the settlement of the boundary between the two countries. He said, for instance, he had been informed that you had expressed an opinion favorable to the consolidation of the Central American republics into one Government; that the President of Guatemala was favorable to such a project; that he would like, in such an event, to become the President of the new nation, and that he was endeavoring to obtain the influence of the United States to further his ambition in that direction. He seems impressed with the idea that General Barrios is Mexico’s enemy, and that it would not be well to have his power increased.”

Of course the Government of the United States has no information as to the personal ambitions of General Barrios, and it

would deem any inquiry into or consideration of such a subject both unworthy and improper in any discussion of the great interests which concern the people of Central America, and their relation to the kindred republics of this continent. I am unwilling to believe, and, if compelled to believe, should deeply regret, that any such consideration could affect the temper or thought of the Mexican Government in determining its policy towards the republics of Central America.

But in reference to the union of the Central American republics under one Federal Government, the United States is ready to avow that no subject appeals more strongly to its sympathy nor more decidedly to its judgment. Nor is this a new policy. For many years this Government has urged upon the Central American States the importance of such an union to the creation of a well-ordered and constitutionally governed republic, and our ministers have been instructed to impress this upon the individual governments to which they have been accredited, and to the Central American statesmen with whom they have been associated. We have always cherished the belief that in this effort we had the sincere sympathy and cordial co-operation of the Mexican Government. Under the conviction that the future of the people of Central America is absolutely dependent upon the establishment of a Federal Government which would give strength abroad and maintain peace at home, our chief motive in the recent communications to Mexico was to prevent the diminution, either political or territorial, of any one of these States, or the disturbance of their exterior relations, in order that, trusting to the joint aid and friendship of Mexico and the United States, they might be encouraged to persist in their effort to establish a Government which would, both for their advantage and ours, represent their combined wealth, intelligence and character.

If this Government is expected to infer from the language of Señor Mariscal that the prospect of such a result is not agreeable to the policy of Mexico, and that the interest which the United States has always manifested in its consummation renders unwelcome the friendly intervention which we have offered, I can only say that it deepens the regret with which we shall learn the decision of the Mexican Government, and

compels me to declare that the Government of the United States will consider a hostile demonstration against Guatemala for the avowed purpose, or with the certain result of weakening her power in such an effort, as an act not in consonance with the position and character of Mexico, not in harmony with the friendly relations existing between us, and injurious to the best interests of all the republics of this continent.

The Government of the United States has sincere sympathy with the Spanish republics of America, and profound interest in their prosperity; and is influenced by no selfish considerations in its earnest efforts to prevent war between them. This country will continue its policy of peace even if it cannot have the great aid which the co-operation of Mexico would assure; and it will hope, at no distant day, to see such concord and co-operation between all the nations of America as will render war impossible.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM.

[After the United States had negotiated a Treaty of Reciprocity with the Kingdom of Hawaii (Sandwich Islands), Great Britain sought to claim the same trade relations under a treaty which contained the "most favored nation" clause. Being advised of this movement by Honorable James M. Comly, American minister at Honolulu, Secretary Blaine sent instructions contained in the following dispatches:—]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 30, 1881.

SIR, — Your dispatch of the 6th instant has been considered in connection with your former advices, to which you particularly refer.

Your course, upon the question to which you have called the attention of the Department, is approved. While I desire earnestly to avoid the use of imperative language toward the Hawaiian Government, and prefer that our relation in any consequent discussion should be that of friendly advice and support, this Government cannot permit any violation, direct or indirect, of the terms and conditions of the treaty of 1875.

That treaty was made at the continuous and urgent request of the Hawaiian Government. It was, as it was intended to be, an evidence of the friendship of the United States, and was shaped by a large and liberal disposition on our part to consult the wishes and interests of the Hawaiian Government. As you are aware, there was much opposition to some of its concessions by our own citizens whose capital was employed in certain agricultural industries. The term of the treaty was limited in order that both parties might obtain practical experience of its operation; and in order to secure the experiment from possible disturbance it was expressly stipulated —

"on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty that so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States." (Article IV.)

It would be an unnecessary waste of time and argument to undertake an elaborate demonstration of a proposition so obvious as that the extension of the privileges of this treaty to other nations under a "most favored nation" clause in existing treaties, would be as flagrant a violation of the explicit stipulation as a specific treaty making the concession.

You are instructed to say to the Hawaiian Government that the Government of the United States considers this stipulation as of the very essence of the treaty and cannot consent to its abrogation or modification, directly or indirectly. You will add that if any other power should deem it proper to employ undue influence upon the Hawaiian Government to persuade or compel action in derogation of this treaty, the Government of the United States will not be unobservant of its rights and interests and will be neither unwilling nor unprepared to support the Hawaiian Government in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations.

In reference to the probability of a judicial construction of the treaty by the Hawaiian courts, upon proceedings instituted by a British merchant, I would have been glad if you had been able to furnish me with the correspondence between the British commissioner and the Hawaiian secretary for foreign affairs. From your history of the controversy, I find it difficult to understand how Her Britannic Majesty's Government can consistently maintain a right of diplomatic intervention for the settlement of any claim for the difference in duty imposed under the British treaties and under the treaty with the United States.

Be that as it may, a judicial decision of this question by the Hawaiian courts would be as unsatisfactory to the United States as to Great Britain. I am unaware whether or not a treaty, according to the Hawaiian Constitution, is, as with us, a supreme law of the land, upon the construction of which — the proper case occurring — every citizen would have a right to the judgment of the courts.

But even if it be so, and if the judicial department is entirely independent of the executive authority of the Hawaiian Government, then the decision of the court would be the authorized interpretation of the Hawaiian Government, and however bind-

ing upon that Government would be none the less a violation of the treaty.

In the event, therefore, that a judicial construction of the treaty should annul the privileges stipulated, and be carried into practical execution, this Government would have no alternative and would be compelled to consider such action as the violation by the Hawaiian Government of the express terms and conditions of the treaty, and, with whatever regret, would be forced to consider what course in reference to its own interests had become necessary upon the manifestation of such unfriendly feeling.

The diligence and ability which you have given to the consideration of this subject render perhaps any further instruction unnecessary, but I will suggest that in your communications with the Hawaiian Government you should convey the impression that the Government of the United States believes it to be the desire and intention of the Hawaiian Government to carry out the provisions of the treaty in good faith, and that we understand and appreciate the unjust pressure of foreign interests and influence brought to divert it from its plain and honorable duty. The position of the Government of the United States in your representations should be rather that of encouragement of the Hawaiian Government to persevere in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations, than complaint of any anticipated dereliction.

The Department will be glad of the fullest and promptest communication upon this subject.

[Dispatch on same subject from Secretary Blaine to Mr. Comly, Minister at Honolulu.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 1881.

SIR, — In your dispatch you have informed this Department of the efforts made by the British commissioner to prejudice the interests and influence of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands; and you properly assume that such efforts, so far as they tend to improve the diplomatic position of his country by his personal conduct, must be counteracted by corresponding endeavors on your part without the formal intervention of this Government.

The action of the Government must necessarily await the actual occurrence or threatened probability of some official transaction in conflict with its treaty rights. But with the proper information before it, the Department would undoubtedly instruct you to anticipate any transaction of this character by such diplomatic remonstrance as our relations with Hawaii would justify.

It is difficult to say that the information derived through the newspapers in reference to a supposed Coolie convention with Great Britain is of a character to require the official intervention of this Government. But I take it for granted that, since the return of King Kalakaua, you will be able to learn whether such a convention is contemplated; and if, in your opinion, there is enough in the general rumors to warrant it, you will consider yourself as instructed to make formal inquiry of the Hawaiian Government whether such a project is entertained.

You say that the proposed convention provides for a —

“‘protector of the coolie immigrants,’ who tries all cases of disputes arising among the coolies themselves, and, also, between coolies and citizens of the country where they reside; and cases of appeal from his judgment go, not to the courts of the country, but to the British consul or diplomatic representative.”

I do not understand whether this is a recital from some existing convention or a rumor of what the contemplated convention is expected to be.

In the treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands relative to emigration of laborers from India to the Dutch colony of Surinam, signed in 1870 and ratified in 1872 (the most recent to which I have been able to refer), I find the following provision:—

“XIX. All emigrants within the provision of this convention shall, in the same manner as other subjects of the British Crown, and conformably to the ordinary rules of international law, enjoy in the Netherland colony the right of claiming the assistance of the British consular agent; and no obstacle shall be opposed of the laborers resorting to the consular agent, and communicating with him, without prejudice, however, to the obligations arising out of his engagements.”

Properly interpreted and fairly applied, I do not see any reasonable ground of objection to this or to a similar provision. But a convention containing stipulations such as you describe

would be very different. To secure to the coolie immigrants from India, who are unquestionably British subjects, such an extreme privilege of extraterritoriality would be extending to them advantages not possessed by the subjects of any other power. As Articles VIII. and X. of the treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands of 1849, guarantee to the citizens and consular officers of the United States the treatment of the most favored nation and a participation in all privileges granted to others, the United States would have to insist upon equal treatment for its citizens and consuls. It can scarcely be doubted that other powers would make the same demand.

A consideration of the embarrassment which such a condition of foreign rights and privileges would create for the Hawaiian Government would present almost insuperable difficulties to such a convention.

But if negotiations such as you describe are really in progress, you will ask for an interview with the secretary for foreign affairs and make the following representation of the views of the United States :—

The Government of the United States has, with unvarying consistency, manifested respect for the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom and an earnest desire for the welfare of its people. It has always felt and acted on the conviction that the possession of the islands by a peaceful and prosperous power, with which there was no possibility of controversy or collision, was most desirable, in reference to its own large and rapidly increasing interests on the Pacific. It has declined, even at the request of the Hawaiian people, to assume over their affairs a Protectorate, which would only be a thinly disguised domination, and it has confined its efforts and influence to strengthening their Government and opening to their commerce and enterprise the readiest and most profitable connection with its own markets. But this policy has been based upon our belief in the real and substantial independence of Hawaii. The Government of the United States has always avowed and now repeats that, under no circumstances, will it permit the transfer of the territory or sovereignty of these islands to any of the European powers. It is needless to re-state the reasons upon which that determination rests. It is too obvious for argument that the

possession of these islands by a great maritime Power would not only be a dangerous diminution of the just and necessary influence of the United States in the waters of the Pacific, but in case of international difficulty it would be a positive threat to American interests too important to be lightly risked.

Neither can the Government of the United States allow an arrangement which, by diplomatic *finesse* or legal technicality, substitutes for the native and legitimate constitutional Government of Hawaii, the controlling influence of a Foreign Power. That is not the real and substantial independence which it desires to see and which it is prepared to support. This Government would consider a scheme by which a large mass of British subjects, forming in time not improbably the majority of its population, should be introduced into Hawaii, be made independent of the native Government, and be ruled by British authorities, judicial and diplomatic, as one entirely inconsistent with the friendly relations now existing between us, as trenching upon treaty rights which we have secured by no small consideration, and as certain to involve the two countries in irritating and unprofitable discussion.

In thus instructing you, however, I must impress upon you that much is trusted to your discretion. There would be neither propriety nor wisdom in making such declarations unnecessarily or prematurely. If, therefore, you find that the proposed convention is not one with the extreme provisions to which you refer, or if you have reason to believe that your representations of the unfriendly impression which it would make here will be sufficient to change the purpose of the Hawaiian Government, you will confine yourself to ordinary diplomatic remonstrance. In any event, it will be prudent to indicate that such would, in your opinion, be the view taken by this Government before making the formal protest, which, under the contingency of persistent adverse action on the part of the Hawaiian Government, you are authorized to make.

[A few days after the foregoing, Mr. Blaine sent a supplementary and explanatory dispatch to Mr. Comly, from which the following extract is taken. It contains the essential part.]

THE policy of this country with regard to the Pacific is the natural complement to its Atlantic policy. The history of our European relations for fifty years shows the jealous concern with which the United States has guarded its control of the coast from foreign interference, and this without extension of territorial possession beyond the main land. Its aim has always been to preserve the friendly neutrality of the adjacent States and insular possessions. Its attitude toward Cuba is in point. That rich island, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and the field for our most extended trade in the Western Hemisphere, is, though in the hands of Spain, a part of the American commercial system. Our relations, present and prospective, toward Cuba, have never been more ably set forth than in the remarkable note addressed by my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Everett, to the ministers of Great Britain and France in Washington, on the 1st of December, 1852, in rejection of the suggested tripartite alliance forever to determine the neutrality of the Spanish Antilles. In response to the proposal that the United States, Great Britain, and France should severally and collectively agree to forbid the acquisition of control over Cuba, by any or all of them, Mr. Everett showed that, without forcing or even coveting possession of the island, its condition was essentially an American question; that the renunciation forever by this Government of contingent interest therein would be far broader than the like renunciation by Great Britain or France; that if ever ceasing to be Spanish, Cuba must necessarily become American, and not fall under any other European domination, and that the ceaseless movement of segregation of American interests from European control and unification in a broader American sphere of independent life could not and should not be checked by any arbitrary agreement.

Nearly thirty years have demonstrated the wisdom of the attitude then maintained by Mr. Everett and have made indispensable its continuance and its extension to all parts of the American Atlantic system where a disturbance of the existing status might be attempted in the interest of foreign Powers.

The present attitude of this Government toward any European project for the control of an Isthmian route is but the logical sequence of the resistance made in 1852 to the attempted pressure of an active foreign influence in the West Indies.

Hawaii, although much farther from the Californian coast than is Cuba from the Floridian peninsula, holds in the western sea much the same position as Cuba in the Atlantic. It is the key to the maritime dominion of the Pacific States, as Cuba is the key to the Gulf trade. The material possession of Hawaii is not desired by the United States any more than was that of Cuba. But under no circumstances can the United States permit any change in the territorial control of either which would cut it adrift from the American system, whereto they both indispensably belong.

In this aspect of the question, it is readily seen with what concern this Government must view any tendency toward introducing into Hawaii new social elements, destructive of its necessarily American character. The steady diminution of the native population of the islands, amounting to some ten per cent between 1872 and 1878, and still continuing, is doubtless a cause of great alarm to the Government of the kingdom, and it is no wonder that a solution should be sought with eagerness in any apparently practicable quarter. The problem, however, is not to be met by a substitution of Mongolian supremacy for native control—as seems at first sight possible through the rapid increase in Chinese immigration to the islands. Neither is a wholesale introduction of the coolie element, professedly Anglo-Indian, likely to afford any more satisfactory outcome to the difficulty. The Hawaiian Islands cannot be joined to the Asiatic system. If they drift from their independent station it must be toward assimilation and identification with the American system, to which they belong by the operation of natural laws, and must belong by the operation of political necessity.

I have deemed it necessary to go, with somewhat of detail, into the real nature of our relations toward Hawaii, in order that you may intelligently construe my recent instructions in the light of our true and necessary policy on the Pacific. It may also tend to simplify your intercourse with the native Government if you are in a position to disabuse the minds of its

statesmen of any belief or impression that our course is selfishly intrusive, or looks merely to the exclusive retention of transient advantages of local commerce, in which other countries seek a share. The United States was one of the first among the great nations of the world to take an active interest in the upbuilding of Hawaiian independence and the creation of a new and potential life for its people. It has consistently endeavored, and with success, to enlarge the material prosperity of Hawaii on an independent basis. It proposes to be equally unremitting in its efforts hereafter to maintain and develop the advantages which have accrued to Hawaii and to draw closer the ties which imperatively unite it to the great body of American commonwealths.

In this line of action the United States does its simple duty both to Hawaii and itself; and it cannot permit such obvious neglect of National interest as would be involved by silent acquiescence in any movement looking to a lessening of those American ties and the substitution of alien and hostile interests. It firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands as the key to the dominion of the American Pacific demands their neutrality, to which end it will earnestly co-operate with the native Government. If, through any cause, the maintenance of such a position of neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be impracticable, this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented.

The communication to the Hawaiian Government of the views herein expressed is left, both as to manner and extent, to your own discretion. If the treaty relations with Great Britain, of which my last instruction treats, prove to be of such a nature as to require the communication of a formal protest to the Hawaiian minister of Foreign affairs, it would probably be wise for you to give him a copy of this dispatch as a just and temperate exposition of the intentions of this Government, and a succinct explanation of the reasons which have induced such a protest.

ASSASSINATION OF ALEXANDER III., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

[Secretary Blaine to Honorable John W. Foster, Minister to Russia.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1881.

SIR,—Your dispatch of the 18th ultimo, enclosing a communication from the Russian Minister of Foreign affairs in response to the proceedings of the Senate of the United States touching the death of the late Emperor, has been received, and by order of the President laid before the Senate.

The President desires, more fully than in his communication by telegraph, to convey to the Emperor the sentiments of respect and gratitude toward his father which animate the Government and people of the United States. They can never forget the course pursued by the late Emperor toward this country when our National existence was imperiled by civil strife. The peculiar danger to which we were exposed from the intervention of European Powers was clearly perceived by all the intelligent friends of the Union. Though feeling equal to any emergency that might arise in the course of the appalling conflict, the Government of the United States realized that the contest would be rendered more desperate and more bloody if any of the great Powers of Europe should espouse the cause of the insurrectionary States.

A dynasty, not now in power, but then ruling over a country in which the people have always been our friends, had resolved upon intervention if co-operation with other nations could be secured. This design, so fraught with danger to liberty and constitutional government on both sides of the Atlantic, was promptly met by the late Emperor with a refusal to take any

unfriendly step against the United States. Nor did his Imperial Majesty stop at merely declining to join a coalition adverse to us; he openly declared in our favor, and fearing, from what he knew of designs against us, that other Powers might unwarily be drawn into a hostile attitude towards this country, the Emperor sent to the waters which both expose and protect our National Capital a large and powerful fleet of war-vessels as a proclamation to the world of his sympathy in our struggle and of his readiness to strike a blow on the side of the Union if any Foreign Power should strike a blow in aid of the insurrection.

In our happily re-united country, now contented and prosperous throughout all its borders, those who upheld the Union and those who were arrayed against it join in equal gratitude to the Emperor who aided in saving all our people from the embarrassment and danger of foreign intervention.

The Government of the United States does not recall these historical facts from a desire to awaken unpleasant recollections in any breast, but as a tribute to the memory of a Sovereign whose great power, at a most important crisis, was exerted on the side of our Union, even at the risk of plunging his own Empire into war.

The President requests that you will seek an audience with the Emperor and communicate these expressions of regard which the people of the United States have entertained for his father. Assure the Emperor that the Government and people of this country abhor assassination, and can never see in it a remedy for political evils. There is no instance in history where an abuse has been corrected, a wrong righted, an oppression ameliorated, or a reform promoted, by assassination. The people of the United States have too fresh a recollection of a similar crime at home, and they know too well that assassination always strikes wildly and blindly, willfully and wickedly.

Congratulate the Emperor upon his accession to the throne, and, on behalf of the Government and the people of the United States, extend to him the heartiest wishes for his success as a Sovereign, and for the prosperity and happiness of the Russian people.

BARON STEUBEN'S FAMILY AT YORKTOWN.

[Dispatch from Secretary Blaine to Honorable Andrew D. White, United States Minister to Germany.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, July 30, 1881.

SIR, — During the darkest period of the Revolutionary war a German soldier of character and distinction tendered his sword in aid of American independence. Frederick William Augustus, Baron Steuben, joined Washington at Valley Forge, in the memorable and disastrous winter of 1778. He attested the sincerity of his attachment to the patriot cause by espousing it when its fortunes were adverse, its prospects gloomy, and its hopes, but for the intense zeal of the people, well-nigh crushed.

Baron Steuben was cordially welcomed by Washington, and immediately placed on duty as Inspector-General of the army. A detailed history of his military career in America would form an epitome of the Revolutionary struggle. He had served in the Seven Years' War on the staff of the great Frederick, and had acquired in the campaigns of that master of military science a skill and experience sorely needed by the untrained soldiers of the Continental army. The discipline and effective organization which, under the commanding patronage of Washington, were at once imparted to the American army by the zeal and diligence of Steuben transformed the volunteers and raw levies into veterans, who successfully met the British regulars in all the campaigns of that prolonged struggle.

The final surrender of the British army under Lord Cornwallis occurred at Yorktown, Va., on the nineteenth day of October, 1781. Baron Steuben bore a conspicuous part in the arduous campaign which ended so auspiciously for the Continental army, and it fell to his lot to receive the first official

notification of the proposed capitulation, and to bear it to the illustrious Commander-in-chief.

The Centennial of that great event in American history is to be celebrated with appropriate observances and ceremonies on the approaching anniversary. I am directed by the President to tender, through you, an invitation to the representatives of Baron Steuben's family in Germany to attend the celebration as guests of the Government of the United States. You will communicate the invitation through the Imperial minister of foreign affairs, and will express to him the very earnest desire of this Government that it shall be accepted.

Those who come as the representatives of Baron Steuben's family will be assured of as warm a welcome in our day of peace and prosperity as was given to their illustrious kinsman in the dark days of adversity and war. They will be the honored guests of fifty millions of Americans, a vast number of whom have German blood in their veins and constitute one of the most worthy and valuable elements that make up the strength of the Republic. Intensely devoted, with patriotic fidelity, to America, they yet retain, cherish and transmit the most affectionate memory of Fatherland. To these the visit of Baron Steuben's relatives will have something of the revival of family ties, while to all Americans, of whatever origin, the presence of German guests will afford fitting opportunity of testifying their respect for that great country within whose imperial limits are included so much of human grandeur and human progress.

FRANCE PROPOSES JOINT INTERVENTION IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN WAR.

[Secretary Blaine to Honorable L. P. Morton, Minister to France.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 5, 1881.

SIR,—I acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of Aug. 11, 1881, giving an account of your interview on the day previous with the President of the Republic in regard to the attitude and correspondent relations of France, Great Britain, and the United States with the South American States, Chili and Peru.

The suggestions offered by President Grévy concerning the situation of affairs in Peru have received the respectful consideration due to the utterances of so eminent a statesman. This Government agrees with the Chief Magistrate of France in profoundly deploring the disorders and sufferings which have already fallen upon, and those which still impend over the people of Peru, and fully shares the humane and enlightened sentiments which have inspired in him a personal interest in that unfortunate struggle, and have induced him to suggest a concerted effort by France, Great Britain, and the United States to bring the conflict to an end.

Interventions of this character have been frequent in the diplomatic history of Europe and have been sometimes followed by beneficial results in preserving the equilibrium of the Powers. But the United States has not belonged to that system of States, of which France and Great Britain are important members, and has never participated in the adjustment of their contentions. Neither interest nor inclination leads this country to desire a voice in the discussion of those questions.

Our relations to the States of the American continent, however, are widely different, and the situation is so nearly reversed, that this Government, while appreciating the disinterested motive that inspired the suggestion, is constrained gravely to doubt the expediency of a joint intervention with European powers in the affairs of American States, either by material pressure or by moral or political influence. These Republics of America are younger sisters of this Government. Their proximity of situation, similarity in origin and frame of Government, unity of political interest on all questions of foreign intercourse, and their geographical remoteness from Europe have naturally given to American States close and especial relations to each other, and in the course of time removed them farther from the European system.

The commercial and political interests of the United States on this continent, transcend in extent and importance those of any other Power, and where these interests are deeply involved this Government must preserve a position in which its influence will be most independent and most efficient. The United States has watched the progress of the struggle between Peru and Chili with constant anxiety, and has endeavored, as opportunity offered, to arrange terms of peace. While the interest which President Grévy has manifested for the cause of peace, and the sympathy he has shown with the unhappy victims of this war, find an earnest response here, both from the Government and the people, the United States must decline to enter into negotiations with European powers for a joint intervention in the affairs of Chili and Peru. You will communicate this conclusion to the French Government.

PROPOSED PEACE CONGRESS OF AMERICAN STATES.

[The project of a Peace Congress of American Nations was originally approved by President Garfield. After his death President Arthur directed that the invitations be issued. The following is a copy of the invitation sent to the Argentine Republic. A similar letter was sent to the other Independent Governments of North and South America.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 29, 1881.

SIR, — The attitude of the United States with respect to the question of general peace on the American continent is well known through its persistent efforts for years past to avert the evils of warfare, or, these efforts failing, to bring positive conflicts to an end through pacific counsels or the advocacy of impartial arbitration.

This attitude has been consistently maintained, and always with such fairness as to leave no room for imputing to our Government any motive except the humane and disinterested one of saving the kindred States of America from the burdens of war. The position of the United States as the leading Power of the New World might well give to its Government a claim to authoritative utterance for the purpose of quieting discord among its neighbors, with all of whom the most friendly relations exist. Nevertheless, the good offices of this Government are not and have not at any time been tendered with a show of dictation or compulsion, but only as exhibiting the solicitous good will of a common friend.

For some years past a growing disposition has been manifested by certain States of Central and South America to refer disputes affecting grave questions of international relationship and boundaries to arbitration rather than to the sword. It has been on several such occasions a source of profound satisfaction

to the Government of the United States to see that this country is in a large measure looked to by all the American Powers as their friend and mediator. The just and impartial counsel of the President in such cases has never been withheld, and his efforts have been rewarded by the prevention of sanguinary strife or angry contentions between peoples whom we regard as brethren.

The existence of this growing tendency convinces the President that the time is ripe for a proposal that shall enlist the good will and active co-operation of all the States of the Western Hemisphere, both north and south, in the interest of humanity and for the common weal of nations. He conceives that none of the Governments of America can be less alive than our own to the dangers and horrors of a state of war, and especially of war between kinsmen. He is sure that none of the Chiefs of Governments on the continent can be less sensitive than he is to the sacred duty of making every endeavor to do away with the chances of fratricidal strife. He looks with hopeful confidence to such active assistance from them as will serve to show the broadness of our common humanity and the strength of the ties which bind us all together as a harmonious system of American commonwealths.

Impressed with these views, the President extends to all the independent countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a General Congress to be held in the city of Washington on the twenty-fourth day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America. He desires that the attention of the Congress shall be strictly confined to this one great object; that its sole aim shall be to seek a way of permanently averting the horrors of cruel and bloody combat between countries, oftenest of one blood and speech, or the even worse calamity of internal commotion and civil strife; that it shall regard the burdensome and far-reaching consequences of such struggles; exhausted finances, oppressive debt, onerous taxation, ruined cities, paralyzed industries, devastated fields, ruthless conscription, the slaughter of men, the grief of the widow and the orphan;—with a legacy of embittered resentments, that long survive those who provoked them and heavily afflict the innocent generations that come after.

The President is especially desirous to have it understood that, in putting forth this invitation, the United States does not assume the position of counseling, or attempting to counsel, through the voice of the Congress, any determinate solution of existing questions which may now divide any of the countries of America. Such questions cannot properly come before the Congress. Its mission is higher. It is to provide for the interests of all in the future, not to settle the individual differences of the present. For this reason especially the President has indicated a day for the assembling of the Congress so far in the future as to leave good ground for hope that by the time named the present situation on the South Pacific coast will be happily terminated, and that those engaged in the contest may take peaceable part in the discussion and solution of the general question affecting in an equal degree the well-being of all.

It seems also desirable to disclaim in advance any purpose on the part of the United States to prejudge the issues to be presented to the Congress. It is far from the intent of this Government to appear before the Congress as in any sense the protector of its neighbors or the predestined and necessary arbitrator of their disputes. The United States will enter into the deliberations of the Congress on the same footing as the other Powers represented, and with the loyal determination to approach any proposed solution, not merely in its own interest, or with a view to asserting its own power, but as a single member among many co-ordinate and co-equal States. So far as the influence of this Government may be potential, it will be exerted in the direction of conciliating whatever conflicting interests of blood, or government, or historical tradition may necessarily come together in response to a call embracing elements so vast and diverse.

You will present these views to the Minister of Foreign relations of the Argentine Republic, enlarging, if need be, in such terms as will readily occur to you, upon the great mission which it is within the power of the proposed Congress to accomplish in the interest of humanity, and upon the firm purpose of the United States to maintain a position of the most absolute and impartial friendship towards all. You will thereupon, in the name of the President of the United States, tender to His

Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic a formal invitation to send two commissioners to the Congress, provided with such powers and instructions on behalf of their Government as will enable them to consider the questions brought before that body within the limit of submission contemplated by this invitation. The United States, as well as the other Powers, will, in like manner, be represented by two commissioners, so that equality and impartiality will be amply secured in the proceedings of the Congress.

In delivering this invitation through the Minister of foreign affairs, you will read this dispatch to him and leave with him a copy, intimating that an answer is desired by this Government as promptly as the just consideration of so important a proposition will permit.

NOTE.—The invitation for a Congress of American Nations was practically cancelled by Secretary Frelinghuysen on the 9th of January, 1882, some six weeks after it was issued. The formal withdrawal of the invitation was some months later.

But before the intelligence of Secretary Frelinghuysen's action reached the Nations invited, half of them and by far the most populous half, had cordially accepted the invitation.

Mexico in accepting said, "The attitude which the Washington Government has assumed in this humanitarian enterprise is entitled to the eulogy of the entire world and to the most favorable consideration of the nations immediately interested therein."

The five States of Central America accepted the invitation. Costa Rica "expressed enthusiasm upon the subject." When the invitation was withdrawn, Guatemala "expressed great regret that a project of such vital importance to the Central American States should have failed even temporarily and hoped it would be revived at no distant day."

Venezuela accepted promptly. "It is certainly," said the distinguished President Guzman Blanco, "a source of satisfaction that the first Republic of the world, loyal to her noble antecedents, should consent to preside over the deliberations of a Peace Congress that proposes to devise means of ending future disagreements in America without any appeal to arms with its terrible legacies."

"The Government of Brazil," so wrote our Minister, Mr. Osborn, "has accepted the invitation to the Peace Congress, and I am not without reasons for knowing that His Majesty the Emperor looks forward to the assembling of the Congress with interest and hopes that great good will result therefrom."

When intelligence of the withdrawal of the invitation reached Rio Janeiro, some of the Emperor's Ministers disclosed their hostility to the Peace Congress. Mr. Osborn intimates that these ministers were acting in accordance with "European influence."

The Governments not heard from when the invitation was withdrawn are Colombia, Peru, Chili, Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

WITHDRAWAL OF INVITATIONS TO A PEACE CONGRESS.

[The following letter was sent to President Arthur, Feb. 3, 1882, by ex-Secretary Blaine:—]

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:— The suggestion that a Congress of all American nations should assemble in the city of Washington for the purpose of agreeing on such a basis of arbitration for International troubles as would remove all possibility of war in the Western Hemisphere, was warmly approved by your predecessor. His assassination on the 2d of last July necessarily suspended all action on the part of the Government. After your accession to the Presidency I acquainted you with the project, and submitted to you a draft for the invitation. You received the suggestion with appreciative consideration, and, after carefully examining the form of invitation, directed it to be sent. It was accordingly dispatched in November to the independent Governments of America, North and South, including all, from the Empire of Brazil to the smallest republic. In a communication, recently sent to the Senate, addressed by the present Secretary of State the 9th of last month to Mr. Trescott, now on a special mission to Peru and Chili, I was greatly surprised to find a proposition looking to the annulment of these invitations, and I was still more surprised when I read the reasons assigned. I quote Mr. Frelinghuysen's language:—

“The United States is at peace with all nations of the earth, and the President wishes hereafter to determine whether it will conduce to the general peace, which he would cherish and promote, for this Government to enter into negotiations and consultation for the promotion of peace with selected friendly nationalities without extending the line of confidence to

other people with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms. If such partial confidence would create jealousy and ill will, peace, the object sought by such consultation, would not be promoted. The principles controlling the relations of the republics of this hemisphere with other nationalities may, on investigation, be found to be so well established that little would be gained at this time by re-opening the subject, which is not novel."

If I correctly apprehend the meaning of these words, it is that we might offend some European powers if we should hold in the United States a Congress of "selected nationalities" of America. This is certainly a new position for the United States and one which I earnestly beg you will not permit this Government to assume. European Powers assemble in Congress whenever an object seems to them of sufficient gravity to justify it. I have never heard of their consulting the Government of the United States in regard to the propriety of their so assembling, nor have I ever known of their inviting an American representative to be present, nor would there in my opinion be any good reason for their so doing. Two Presidents of the United States in the year 1881 adjudged it to be expedient that American Powers should meet in Congress for the sole purpose of agreeing upon some basis for arbitration of differences that may arise between them, and for the prevention, as far as possible, of wars in the future. If that movement is now to be arrested for fear it may give offense in Europe, the voluntary humiliation of the United States could not be more complete, unless we should petition European Governments for the privilege of holding the Congress.

It is difficult to see how this country could be placed in a less enviable position than would be secured by sending in November a cordial invitation to all the Independent Nations in America to meet in Washington for the sole purpose of devising measures of peace, and in January recalling the invitation for fear it might create "jealousy and ill will" on the part of monarchical governments in Europe. It would be difficult to devise a more effective way for the United States to lose the friendship of its American neighbors, and it would certainly not add to our *prestige* in the European world. Nor can I see, Mr. President, how European Governments should feel "jealousy and ill will" toward the United States because of an effort on its part to assure lasting peace between

the nations of America, unless indeed it be the interest of the European Powers that the American nations should at intervals fall into war, and bring reproach on Republican institutions. But from that very circumstance I see an additional and powerful motive for American Governments to be at peace among themselves. The United States is indeed at peace with all the world, as Mr. Frelinghuysen well says; but there are, and have been, serious troubles between other American republics. Peru, Chili and Bolivia have been for more than two years engaged in a desperate conflict. It was the fortunate intervention of the United States last spring that averted war between Chili and the Argentine Republic. Guatemala is at this moment asking the United States to interpose its good offices with Mexico to keep off war.

These important facts were all communicated in your late message to Congress. It was the existence or menace of these wars that influenced President Garfield, and, as I supposed, influenced yourself, to desire a friendly conference of all the nations of America to devise methods of permanent peace and consequent prosperity for all. Shall the United States now turn back, hold aloof, and refuse to exert its great moral power for the advantage of its weaker neighbors? If you have not formally recalled the invitation to a Peace Congress, Mr. President, I beg you to consider well the effect of so doing. The invitation was not mine. It was yours. I performed only the part of Secretary of State to advise, and to draft. You spoke in the name of the United States to each of the independent nations of America. To revoke that invitation for any cause would be embarrassing; to revoke it for avowed fear of "jealousy and ill will" on the part of European Powers would appeal as little to American pride as to American hospitality. Those you have invited may decline, and, having now cause to doubt their welcome, will perhaps do so. This would break up the Congress, but it would not touch our dignity.

Beyond the philanthropic and Christian ends to be obtained by the American conference, devoted to peace and good will among men, we might well hope for material advantages as a result of a better understanding and closer friendship with the nations of America. At present the condition of trade between

the United States and its American neighbors is unsatisfactory to us, and even deplorable. According to the official statistics of our own Treasury Department the balance against us in American trade last year was \$120,000,000 in coin—a sum greater than the yearly product of the gold and silver mines in the United States. This large balance was paid by us in foreign exchange, and a very large proportion of it went to England, where shipments of cotton, provisions, and breadstuffs supplied the money. If any thing should change or check the balance in our favor in European trade, our commercial exchanges with Spanish America would drain us of our reserve of gold coin at a rate exceeding \$100,000,000 per annum, and might precipitate the suspension of specie payment in this country. Such a result at home would be worse than a little “jealousy and ill will” abroad.

I do not say, Mr. President, that the holding of a Peace Congress will necessarily change the currents of trade, but it will bring us into kindly relations with all the American nations; it will promote the reign of law and order; it will increase production and consumption; it will stimulate the demand for articles which American manufacturers can furnish with profit. It will, at all events, be a friendly and auspicious beginning in the direction of American influence and American trade in a large field which we have hitherto neglected, and which has been practically monopolized by our commercial rivals in Europe.

As Mr. Frelinghuysen's dispatch foreshadowing an abandonment of a Peace Congress has been made public by your direction, I deem it a matter of propriety and justice to give this letter to the press.

I am, Mr. President, with great respect, your ever obedient servant,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GARFIELD ADMINISTRATION.

PEACE CONGRESS OF AMERICAN NATIONS.—TRADE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE foreign policy of President Garfield's Administration had two principal objects in view: first, to bring about peace, and prevent future wars in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly, commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States, by supplying those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to compete with the manufacturing nations of Europe.

To attain the second object the first must be accomplished. It would be idle to attempt the development and enlargement of our trade with the countries of North and South America if that trade were liable at any unforeseen moment to be violently interrupted by such wars as that which for three years has engrossed and almost engulfed Chili, Peru, and Bolivia; as that which was barely averted by the friendly offices of the United States between Chili and the Argentine Republic; as that which has been postponed by the same good offices, but not decisively abandoned, between Mexico and Guatemala; as that which is threatened between Brazil and Uruguay; as that which is even now foreshadowed between Brazil and the Argentine States. Peace is essential to commerce, is the very life of honest trade, is the solid basis of international prosperity; yet there is no part of the world where a resort to arms is so prompt as in the Spanish-American Republics. Those Republics have grown out of the old Colonial divisions, formed from capricious grants to favorites by royal charter,

and their boundaries are in many cases not clearly defined and consequently afford the basis of continual disputes, breaking forth too often in open war. To induce the Spanish-American States to adopt some peaceful mode of adjusting their frequently recurring contentions was regarded by the late President as one of the most honorable and useful ends to which the diplomacy of the United States could contribute — useful especially to those States by securing permanent peace within their borders, and useful to our own country by affording a coveted opportunity for extending its commerce and securing enlarged fields for our products and manufactures.

Instead of friendly intervention here and there, negotiating a treaty between two countries to-day, securing a truce between two others to-morrow, it was apparent to the late President that a more comprehensive plan should be adopted if war was to cease in the Western Hemisphere. It was evident that certain European Powers had in the past been interested in promoting strife between the Spanish-American countries, and might be so interested in the future, while the interest of the United States was wholly and always on the side of peace with all our American neighbors, and peace among them all.

It was therefore the President's belief that incidental and partial adjustments failed to attain the desired end and that a common agreement of peace, permanent in its character and continental in its extent, should if possible be secured. To effect this end it had been resolved, before the fatal shot of July 2d, to invite all the independent Governments of North and South America to meet in a Peace Congress at Washington. The date to be assigned was the 15th of March, 1882, and the invitations would have been issued directly after the New England tour, which the President was not permitted to make. Nearly six months later, on the 22d of November, President Garfield's successor issued the invitations for the Peace Congress in the same spirit and with the same limitations and restrictions that had been originally designed.

As soon as the project was understood in South America it received a most cordial approval, and some of the countries, not following the leisurely routine of diplomatic correspondence, made haste to accept the invitation. There can be no

doubt that within a brief period all the nations invited would have formally signified their readiness to attend the Congress. But in six weeks after the invitations had gone to the several countries, President Arthur caused them to be recalled, or at least suspended. The subject was afterwards referred to Congress, in a special message, in which the President ably vindicated his Constitutional right to assemble the Peace Congress, but expressed a desire that the Legislative Department of the Government should give an opinion upon the expediency of the step before the Congress should be allowed to convene. Meanwhile the nations that received the invitation were in an embarrassing situation; for after they were asked by the President to come, they found that the matter had been reconsidered and referred to another department of the Government.

This change was universally accepted as a practical though indirect abandonment of the project, for it was not from the first probable that Congress would take action upon the subject. The good will and welcome of the invitation would be destroyed by a long debate in the Senate and House, in which the question would necessarily become intermixed with personal and party politics, and the project would be ultimately wrecked from the same cause and by the same process that destroyed the usefulness of the Panama Congress during the Administration of John Quincy Adams when Mr. Clay was at the head of the State Department. The time for Congressional action would have been after the Peace Conference had closed its labors. The Conference could not agree upon any thing that would be binding upon the United States, unless assented to as a treaty by the Senate, or enacted into a law by both branches of Congress. The assembling of the Peace Conference was not in derogation of any right or prerogative of the Senate or House. The money necessary for the expenses of the Conference — which would not have exceeded ten thousand dollars — could not, with reason or propriety, have been withheld. If Congress had refused it, patriotism and philanthropy would have promptly supplied it.

The Spanish-American States are in special need of the help which the Peace Congress would afford them. They require external pressure to keep them from war; when at war they

require external pressure to bring them to peace. Their outbreaks are not only frequent but are sanguinary and sometimes cruel. The inhabitants of those countries are a brave people, belonging to a race that has always been brave, descended of men that have always been proud. They are of hot temper, quick to take affront, ready to avenge a wrong whether real or fancied. They are at the same time generous and chivalrous, and though tending for years past to estrangement and alienation from us, they would promptly respond to any advance made by the Great Republic of the North, as they have for two generations termed our Government. The moral influence upon the Spanish-American people of such an International assembly as the Peace Congress, called by the invitation and meeting under the auspices of the United States, would have proved beneficent and far-reaching. It would have raised the standard of their civilization. It would have turned their attention to the things of peace; and the Southern continent, whose undeveloped wealth amazed Humboldt, might have received a new life, might have seen a new and splendid career opened to its inhabitants.

Such friendly interventions as the proposed Peace Congress, and as the attempt to restore peace between Chili and Peru, fall within the line of both duty and interest on the part of the United States. Nations like individuals often require the aid of a common friend to restore relations of amity. Peru and Chili are in deplorable need of a wise and powerful mediator. Though exhausted by war, they are unable to make peace, and, unless aided by the intervention of a friend, political anarchy and social disorder will come to the conquered, and evils scarcely less serious to the conqueror. Our own Government cannot take the ground that it will not offer friendly intervention to settle troubles between American countries, unless at the same time it freely concedes to European Governments the right of such intervention, and thus consents to a practical destruction of the Monroe doctrine and an unlimited increase of European influence on this continent. The late special envoy to Peru and Chili, Mr. Trescott, gives it as his deliberate and published conclusion that if the instructions under which he set out upon his mission had not been revoked, peace

between those angry belligerents would have been established as the result of his labors — necessarily to the great benefit of the United States. If our Government does not resume its efforts to secure peace in South America some European Government will be forced to perform that friendly office. The United States cannot play between nations the part of dog in the manger.

A significant and important result would have followed the assembling of the Peace Congress. A friendship and an intimacy would have been established between the States of North and South America which must have enforced a closer commercial connection. A movement in the near future, as the legitimate outgrowth of assured peace, would, in all probability, have been a commercial conference at the City of Mexico or at Rio Janeiro, whose deliberations would be directed to a better system of trade on the two continents. To such a conference the Dominion of Canada could properly be asked to send representatives, as that Government is allowed by Great Britain a large liberty in regulating its trade relations. In the Peace Congress, to be composed of independent governments, the Dominion could not have taken part, and was consequently not invited. From this trade-conference of the two continents the United States could hardly have failed to gain great advantages. At present the commercial relations of this country with the Spanish-American countries, both continental and insular, are unsatisfactory and unprofitable — indeed, those relations are absolutely oppressive to the financial interests of the Government and people of the United States. In our current exchanges it requires about one hundred and twenty millions of dollars to pay the balance which Spanish America brings against us every year. This amount is fifty per cent more than the average annual product of the gold and silver mines of the United States during the past five years. This vast sum does not of course go to Spanish America in coin, but it goes across the ocean in coin or its equivalent, to pay European countries for manufactured articles which they furnish to Spanish America — a large proportion of which should be furnished by the manufacturers of the United States.

At this point of the argument the Free-trader appears and declares that our Protective tariff destroys our power of compe-

tition with European countries, and that if we will abolish Protection we shall soon have South-American trade. The answer is not sufficient, for to-day there are many articles which we can send to South America and sell as cheaply as European manufacturers can furnish them. It is idle, of course, to make this statement to the genuine apostle of Free Trade and the implacable enemy of Protection, for the great postulate of his argument, the foundation of his creed, is that nothing can be made as cheaply in America as in Europe. Nevertheless facts are stubborn and the hard figures of arithmetic cannot be satisfactorily answered by airy figures of speech. The truth remains that the coarser descriptions of cottons and cotton prints, boots and shoes, ordinary household furniture, harness for draught animals, agricultural implements of all kinds, doors, sashes and blinds, locks, bolts and hinges, silverware, plated ware, woodenware, ordinary papers and paper hangings, common vehicles, ordinary window-glass and glassware, rubber goods, coal oils, lard oils, kerosenes, white-lead, lead pipe and articles in which lead is a chief component, can be and are produced as cheaply in the United States as in any other part of the world. The list of such articles might be lengthened by the addition of those classed as "notions," but only enough are given to show that this country would, with proper commercial arrangements, export much more largely than it now does to Spanish America.

In the trade relations of the world it does not follow that mere ability to produce as cheaply as another nation insures a division of an established market, or, indeed, any participation in it. France manufactures many articles as cheaply as England — some articles at even less cost. Portugal lies nearer to France than to England, and the expense of transporting the French fabric to the Portuguese market is therefore less than the transportation of the English fabric. Yet Great Britain has almost a monopoly in the trade of Portugal. The same condition applies, though in a less degree, to the trade of Turkey, Syria and Egypt, which England holds to a much greater extent than any of the other European nations that are able to produce the same fabric as cheaply. If it be said in answer that England has special trade relations by treaty with Portugal and special obligations binding the other countries, the

ready answer is that she has no more favorable position with respect to those countries than can be readily and easily acquired by the United States with respect to all the countries of America. That end will be reached whenever the United States desires it and wills it, and is ready to take the steps necessary to secure it. At present the trade with Spanish America runs so strongly in channels adverse to us, that, beside our inability to furnish manufactured articles, we do not get the profit on our own raw products that are shipped there. Our petroleum reaches most of the Spanish-American ports after twice crossing the Atlantic, paying often a better profit to the European middle man who handles it than it does to the producer of the oil in the north-western counties of Pennsylvania. Flour and pork from the West reach Cuba by way of Spain, and though we buy and consume ninety per cent of the total products of Cuba, almost that proportion of her purchases are made in Europe — made, of course, with money furnished directly from our pockets.

As our exports to Spanish America grow less, as European exports constantly grow larger, the balance against us will show an annual increase, and will continue to exhaust our supply of the precious metals. We are increasing our imports from South America, and the millions we annually pay for coffee, wool, hides, guano, cinchona, caoutchouc, cabinet woods, dye woods and other articles, go for the ultimate benefit of European manufacturers who take the gold from us and send their fabrics to Spanish America. If we could send our fabrics, our gold would stay at home and our general prosperity would be sensibly increased. But so long as we repel Spanish America, so long as we leave her to cultivate intimate relations with Europe alone, so long our trade relations will remain unsatisfactory and even embarrassing. Those countries sell to us very heavily. They buy from us very lightly. The amount they bring us in debt each year is larger than the heaviest aggregate balance of trade we have against us in the worst of times. The average balance against us for the whole world in the five most adverse years we ever experienced, was about one hundred millions of dollars. This plainly shows that in our European exchanges there is always a balance in our favor and that our chief defi-

ciency arises from our ill-adjusted commercial relations with Spanish America. It follows that if our Spanish-American trade were placed on a better and more equitable foundation, it would be well-nigh impossible even in years most unfavorable to us, to bring us in debt to the world.

With such heavy purchases as we are compelled to make from Spanish America, it could hardly be expected that we should be able to adjust the entire account by exports. But the balance against us of one hundred and twenty millions in gold coin is far too large and is in time of stringency a standing menace of financial disaster. It should not be forgotten that every million dollars' worth of products or fabrics that we sell in Spanish America is a million dollars in gold saved to our own country. The immediate profit is to the producer and the exporter, but the entire country realizes a gain in the ease and affluence of the money market which is insured by keeping our gold at home.

It is only claimed for the Peace Congress, designed under the administration of President Garfield, that it was an important and impressive step on the part of the United States towards closer relationship with our continental neighbors. The present tendency in those countries is towards Europe, and it is a lamentable fact that their people are not so near to us in feeling as they were sixty years ago when they threw off the yoke of Spanish tyranny. We were then a weak republic of but ten millions, but we did not hesitate to recognize the independence of the new Governments, even at the risk of a war with Spain. Our foreign policy at that time was especially designed to extend our influence in the Western Hemisphere, and the statesmen of that era — the era of De Witt Clinton and the younger Adams, of Clay and Crawford, of Webster and Calhoun, of Van Buren and Benton, of Jackson and Edward Livingston — were always courageous in the inspiring measures which they advocated for the expansion of our commercial dominion.

Threescore years have passed. The power of the Republic in many directions has grown beyond all anticipation, but we have relatively lost ground in some great fields of enterprise. We have added thousands of miles to our ocean front, but our foreign commerce is relatively less, and from ardent friendship

with Spanish America we have drifted into indifference if not into coldness. It is but one step further to reach a condition of positive unfriendliness, which may end in what would be equivalent to a commercial alliance against us. Already one of the most dangerous of movements—that of a European guarantee and guardianship of the Interoceanic canal—is suggested and urged upon the foreign Powers by representatives of a South-American country. If these tendencies are to be averted, if Spanish-American friendship is to be regained, if the commercial empire that legitimately belongs to us is to be ours, we must not lie idle and witness its transfer to others. If we would reconquer it, a great first step is to be taken. It is the first step that costs. It is also the first step that counts. Can a wiser step be suggested than the Peace Congress of the two Americas, that was devised under Garfield and had the weight of his great name?

In no event could harm have resulted from the assembling of the Peace Congress. Failure was next to impossible. Success might be regarded as certain. The subject to be discussed was Peace, and the measures by which it can be permanently preserved in North and South America. The labors of the Congress would probably have ended in a well-digested system of arbitration, under which all future troubles between American States could be promptly and satisfactorily adjusted. Such a consummation would have been worth a great struggle and a great sacrifice. It could have been reached without struggle and would have involved no sacrifice. It was within our grasp. It was ours for the asking. It would have been a signal victory of philanthropy over the selfishness of human ambition; a complete triumph of Christian principles as applied to the affairs of nations. It would have reflected enduring honor on our own country and would have imparted a new spirit and a new brotherhood to all America. Nor would its influence beyond the sea have been small. The example of seventeen independent nations solemnly agreeing to abolish the arbitrament of the sword, and to settle every dispute by peaceful adjudication, would have exerted an influence to the utmost confines of civilization, and upon generations of men yet to come.

MR. BLAINE'S LETTER ACCEPTING THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION FOR THE PRESIDENCY IN 1884.

AUGUSTA, ME., July 15, 1884.

The Honorable John B. Henderson and others of the Committee, etc.

GENTLEMEN, — In accepting the nomination for the Presidency tendered me by the Republican National Convention, I beg to express a deep sense of the honor which is conferred and of the duty which is imposed. I venture to accompany the acceptance with some observations upon the questions involved in the contest — questions whose settlement may affect the future of the Nation favorably or unfavorably for a long series of years.

In enumerating the issues upon which the Republican party appeals for popular support, the Convention has been singularly explicit and felicitous. It has properly given the leading position to the industrial interests of the country as affected by the tariff on imports. On that question the two political parties are radically in conflict. Almost the first act of the Republicans, when they came into power in 1861, was the establishment of the principle of Protection to American labor and to American capital. This principle the Republican party has ever since steadily maintained, while on the other hand the Democratic party in Congress has for fifty years persistently warred upon it. Twice within that period our opponents have destroyed tariffs arranged for Protection, and since the close of the civil war, whenever they have controlled the House of Representatives, hostile legislation has been attempted — never more conspicuously than in their principal measure at the late session of Congress.

Revenue laws are in their very nature subject to frequent revision in order that they may be adapted to changes and modifications of trade. The Republican party is not contending for the permanency of any particular statute. The issue between the two parties does not have reference to a specific law. It is far broader and far deeper: it involves a principle of wide application and beneficent influence against a theory which we believe to be unsound in conception and inevitably hurtful in practice. In the many tariff revisions which have been necessary for the past twenty-three years, or which may hereafter become necessary, the Republican party has maintained and will maintain the policy of Protection to American industry, while our opponents insist upon a revision, which practically destroys that policy. The issue is thus distinct, well defined, and unavoidable. The pending election may determine the fate of Protection for a generation. The overthrow of the policy means a large and permanent reduction in the wages of the American laborer, besides involving the loss of vast amounts of American capital invested in manufacturing enterprises. The value of our present revenue system to the People is not a matter of theory, and I shall submit no argument to sustain it. I only invite attention to certain facts of official record which seem to constitute a demonstration.

In the census of 1850 an effort was made, for the first time in our history, to obtain a valuation of all the property in the United States. The attempt was in large degree unsuccessful. Partly from lack of time, partly from prejudice among many who thought the inquiries foreshadowed a new scheme of taxation, the returns were incomplete and unsatisfactory. Little more was done than to consolidate the local valuation used in the States for purposes of assessment, and that, as is well known, differs widely from a complete exhibit of all the property.

In the census of 1860, however, the work was done with great thoroughness — the distinction between “assessed” value and “true” value being carefully observed. The grand result was that the “true value” of all the property in the States and territories (excluding slaves) amounted to fourteen thousand millions of dollars (\$14,000,000,000.) This aggregate was the net result of the labor and the savings of all the people within

the area of the United States from the time the first British colonist landed in 1607 down to the year 1860. It represented the fruit of the toil of two hundred and fifty years.

After 1860 the business of the country was encouraged and developed by a Protective Tariff. At the end of twenty years the total property of the United States, as returned by the census of 1880, amounted to the enormous aggregate of forty-four thousand millions of dollars (\$44,000,000,000.) This great result was attained, notwithstanding the fact that countless millions had in the interval been wasted in the progress of a bloody war. It thus appears that while our population between 1860 and 1880 increased sixty per cent, the aggregate property of the country increased two hundred and fourteen per cent — showing a largely enhanced wealth *per capita* among the people. Thirty thousand millions of dollars (\$30,000,000,000) had been added during these twenty years to the permanent wealth of the nation — \$1,500,000,000 per annum.

These results are regarded by the older nations of the world as phenomenal. That our country should surmount the peril and the cost of a gigantic war and for an entire period of twenty years make an average gain to its wealth of one hundred and twenty-five million dollars per month surpasses the experience of all other nations, ancient or modern. Even the opponents of the present Revenue system do not pretend that in the whole history of civilization any parallel can be found to the material progress of the United States, since the accession of the Republican party to power.

The period which has elapsed since 1860 has not only been one of material prosperity, but at no time in the history of the United States has there been such progress in the moral and philanthropic field. Religious and charitable institutions, schools, seminaries, and colleges, have been founded and endowed far more liberally than at any previous time in our history. Greater and more varied relief has been extended to human suffering and the entire progress of the country in wealth has been accompanied and dignified by a broadening and uplifting of our character as a People.

Our opponents find fault that our revenue system produces a surplus; but they should not forget that the law has given a

specific purpose to which the whole of the surplus is profitably and honorably applied — the reduction of the public debt and the consequent relief of the burden of taxation. No dollar has been wasted, and the only extravagance with which the party stands charged is the generous pensioning of soldiers, sailors, and their families — an extravagance which embodies the highest form of justice in the recognition and payment of a sacred debt. When reduction of taxation is to be made, the Republican party can be trusted to accomplish it in such form as will most effectively aid the industries of the nation.

A frequent accusation by our opponents is that the foreign commerce of the country has steadily decayed under the influence of the Protective tariff. In this way they seek to array the importing interest against the Republican party. It is a common and yet radical error to confound the commerce of the country with its carrying-trade — an error often committed innocently and sometimes designedly — but an error so gross that it does not distinguish between the ship and the cargo. Foreign commerce represents the exports and imports of a country regardless of the nationality of the vessel that may carry the commodities of exchange. Our carrying-trade has from obvious causes suffered many discouragements since 1860, but our foreign commerce has in the same period steadily and prodigiously increased — increased indeed at a rate and to an amount which absolutely dwarf all previous developments of our trade beyond the sea. From 1860 to the present time the foreign commerce of the United States (divided with approximate equality between exports and imports) reached a grand total of twenty-four thousand millions of dollars (\$24,000,000,000). The balance in this astounding aggregate of exchanges inclined in our favor, but it would have been much larger if our trade with the countries of America, elsewhere referred to, had been more wisely adjusted.

It is difficult even to appreciate the magnitude of our export trade since 1860 and we can gain a correct conception of it only by comparison with preceding results in the same field. The total exports from the United States from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 down to the day of Lincoln's election in

1860, added to all that had previously been exported from the American Colonies from their original settlement, amounted to less than nine thousand millions of dollars (\$9,000,000,000). On the other hand our exports from 1860 to the close of the last fiscal year exceeded twelve thousand millions of dollars (\$12,000,000,000) — the whole of it being the product of American labor. Evidently a Protective tariff has not injured our export trade when under its influence we exported in twenty-four years thirty-three per cent more than the total amount that had been exported in the entire previous history of American commerce. All the details, when analyzed, correspond with this amazing result. The commercial cities of the Union never had such growth as they have enjoyed since 1860. Our chief emporium, the city of New York, with its dependencies, has within that period doubled her population and increased her wealth fivefold. During the same period the imports and exports which have entered and left her harbor are more than double in bulk and value the whole amount exported by her between the settlement of the first Dutch colony on the island of Manhattan and the outbreak of the civil war in 1860.

The agricultural interest is by far the largest in the Nation, and in every adjustment of Revenue Laws is entitled to the first consideration. Any policy hostile to the fullest development of agriculture in the United States must be abandoned. Realizing this fact the opponents of the present system of Revenue have labored very earnestly to persuade the farmers of the United States that they are robbed by a Protective Tariff, and the effort is thus made to consolidate their influence in favor of Free Trade. But happily the farmers of America are intelligent and cannot be misled by sophistry when conclusive facts are before them. They see plainly that during the past twenty-four years, wealth has not been acquired in one section or by one interest at the expense of another section or another interest. They see that the agricultural States have made even more rapid progress than the manufacturing States.

The farmers see that in 1860 Massachusetts and Illinois had about the same wealth — between eight and nine hundred million dollars each — and that in 1880 Massachusetts had advanced

to twenty-six hundred millions, while Illinois had advanced to thirty-two hundred millions. They see that New Jersey and Iowa were in 1860 just equal in population and that in twenty years the wealth of New Jersey was increased by the sum of eight hundred and fifty millions of dollars, while the wealth of Iowa was increased by the sum of fifteen hundred millions. They see that the nine leading agricultural States of the West have grown so rapidly in prosperity that the aggregate addition to their wealth since 1860 is nearly as great as the wealth of the entire country in that year. They see that the South, which is mainly agricultural, has shared in the general prosperity and that having recovered from the loss and devastation of war, has gained so rapidly that its total wealth is at least double that which it possessed in 1860, exclusive of slaves.

In these extraordinary developments the farmers see the helpful impulse of a home market, and they see that the financial and revenue system, enacted since the Republican party came into power, has established and constantly expanded the home market. They see that even in the case of wheat, which is our chief cereal export, they have sold, in the average of the years since the close of the war, three bushels at home to one they have sold abroad, and that in the case of corn, the only other cereal which we export to any extent, one hundred bushels have been used at home to three and a half bushels exported. In some years the disparity has been so great that for every peck of corn exported one hundred bushels have been consumed in the home market. The farmers see that in the increasing competition from the grain-fields of Russia and from the distant plains of India, the growth of the home market becomes daily of greater concern to them and that the impairment of that market would depreciate the value of every acre of tillable land in the Union.

Such facts as these touching the growth and consumption of cereals at home give us some slight conception of the vastness of the internal commerce of the United States. They suggest also that, in addition to the advantages which the American people enjoy from protection against foreign competition, they enjoy the advantages of absolute free trade over a larger area

and with a greater population than any other nation. The internal commerce of our thirty-eight States and nine Territories is carried on without let or hindrance, without tax, detention or Governmental interference of any kind whatever. It spreads freely over an area of three and a half millions of square miles — almost equal in extent to the whole continent of Europe. Its profits are enjoyed to-day by fifty-six millions of American freemen, and from this enjoyment no monopoly is created. According to Alexander Hamilton, when he discussed the same subject in 1790, “the internal competition which takes place does away with every thing like monopoly, and by degrees reduces the prices of articles to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed.” It is impossible to point to a single monopoly that has been created or fostered by the Industrial System which is upheld by the Republican party.

Compared with our foreign commerce these domestic exchanges are inconceivably great in amount — requiring merely for one instrumentality as large a mileage of railway as exists to-day in all the other nations of the world. These internal exchanges are estimated by the Statistical Bureau of the Treasury Department to be annually twenty times as great in amount as our foreign commerce. It is into this field of home trade — at once the creation and the heritage of the American people — that foreign nations are striving to enter. It is into this field that the opponents of our present revenue system would freely admit the countries of Europe — countries in whose internal trade we could not reciprocally share; countries to which we should be surrendering every advantage of traffic; from which we should be gaining nothing in return.

A policy that would abandon this field of home trade must prove disastrous to the mechanics and workingmen of the United States. Wages are unjustly reduced when an industrious man is not able by his earnings to live in comfort, educate his children, and save a sufficient amount for the necessities of age. The reduction of wages inevitably consequent upon throwing our home market open to the world, would deprive the workingmen of the United States of the power to do this. It would prove a great calamity to our country. It would produce a

conflict between the poor and the rich, and in the sorrowful degradation of labor would plant the seeds of public danger.

The Republican party has steadily aimed to maintain just relations between Labor and Capital — guarding with care the rights of each. A conflict between the two has always led in the past and will always lead in the future to the injury of both. Labor is indispensable to the creation and profitable use of capital, and capital increases the efficiency and value of labor. Whoever arrays the one against the other is an enemy of both. That policy is wisest and best which harmonizes the two on the basis of absolute justice. The Republican party has protected the free labor of America so that its compensation is larger than is realized in any other country. It has guarded our people against the unfair competition of contract labor from China and may be called upon to prohibit the growth of a similar evil from Europe. It is obviously unfair to permit capitalists to make contracts for cheap labor in foreign countries to the hurt and disparagement of the labor of American citizens. Such a policy (like that which would leave the time and other conditions of home labor exclusively in the control of the employer) is injurious to all parties — not the least so to the unhappy persons who are made the subjects of the contract. The institutions of the United States rest upon the intelligence and virtue of all the people. Suffrage is made universal as a just weapon of self-protection to every citizen. It is not the interest of the Republic that any economic system should be adopted which involves the reduction of wages to the hard standard prevailing elsewhere. The Republican party aims to elevate and dignify labor — not to degrade it.

As a substitute for the industrial system which under Republican administrations has developed a prosperity so extraordinary, our opponents offer a policy which is but a series of experiments upon our system of revenue — a policy whose end must be harm to our manufactures and greater harm to our labor. Experiment in the industrial and financial system is the country's greatest dread, as stability is its greatest boon. Even the uncertainty resulting from the recent tariff agitation in Congress has hurtfully affected the business of the entire country. Who can measure the injury to our shops and our homes,

to our farms and our commerce, if the uncertainty of perpetual tariff agitation is to be inflicted upon the country?

Our Foreign relations favor our domestic development. We are at peace with the world — at peace upon a sound basis with no unsettled questions of sufficient magnitude to embarrass or distract us. Happily removed by our geographical position from participation or interest in those questions of dynasty or boundary which so frequently disturb the peace of Europe, we are left to cultivate friendly relations with all, and are free from possible entanglements in the quarrels of any. The United States has no cause and no desire to engage in conflict with any Power on earth, and we may rest in assured confidence that no Power desires to attack the United States.

With the nations of the Western Hemisphere we should cultivate closer relations and for our common prosperity and advancement we should invite them all to join with us in an agreement that, for the future, all international troubles in North or South America shall be adjusted by impartial arbitration and not by arms. This project was part of the fixed policy of President Garfield's Administration and it should in my judgment be revived. Its accomplishment on this continent would favorably affect the nations beyond the sea, and thus powerfully contribute at no distant day to the universal acceptance of the philanthropic and Christian principle of arbitration. The effect even of suggesting it to the Spanish-American States has been most happy and has increased the confidence of those people in our friendly disposition. It fell to my lot as Secretary of State in June, 1881, to quiet apprehension in the Republic of Mexico, by giving the assurance in an official dispatch that "there is not the faintest desire in the United States for territorial extension south of the Rio Grande. The boundaries of the two Republics have been established in conformity with the best jurisdictional interests of both. The line of demarcation is not merely conventional. It is more; it separates a Spanish-American people from a Saxon-American people; it divides one great nation from another with distinct and natural finality."

We seek the conquests of peace; we desire to extend our

commerce, and in an especial degree with our friends and neighbors on this continent. We have not improved our relations with Spanish America as wisely and as persistently as we might have done. For more than a generation the sympathy of those countries has been allowed to drift away from us. We should now make every effort to gain their friendship. Our trade with them is already large. During the last year our exchanges in the Western Hemisphere amounted to three hundred and fifty millions of dollars—nearly one-fourth of our entire foreign commerce. To those who may be disposed to underrate the value of our trade with the countries of North and South America, it may be well to state that their population is nearly or quite fifty millions—and that, in proportion to aggregate numbers, we import nearly double as much from them as we do from Europe. But the result of the Spanish American trade is in a high degree unsatisfactory. The imports during the past year exceeded two hundred and twenty-five millions, while the exports were less than one hundred and twenty-five millions—showing a balance against us of more than one hundred millions of dollars. But the money does not go to Spanish America. We send large sums to Europe in coin or its equivalent to pay European manufacturers for the goods which they send to Spanish America. We are but paymasters for this enormous amount annually to European factors.

Cannot this condition of trade in great part be changed? Cannot the market for our products be greatly enlarged? We have made a beginning in our effort to improve our trade relations with Mexico, and we should not be content until similar and mutually advantageous arrangements have been successively made with every nation of North and South America. While the great powers of Europe are steadily enlarging their colonial domination in Asia and Africa it is the especial province of this country to improve and expand its trade with the nations of America. No field promises so much; no field has been cultivated so little. Our foreign policy should be an American policy in its broadest and most comprehensive sense—a policy of peace, of friendship, of commercial enlargement.

The name of *American*, which belongs to us in our National capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism. Citi-

zenship of the Republic must be the panoply and safeguard of him who wears it. The American citizen, rich or poor, native or naturalized, white or colored, must everywhere walk secure in his personal and civil rights. The Republic should never accept a lesser duty, it can never assume a nobler one, than the protection of the humblest man who owes it loyalty — protection at home, and protection which shall follow him abroad, into whatever land he may go upon a lawful errand.

I recognize, not without regret, the necessity for speaking of two sections of our common country. But the regret diminishes when I see that the elements which separated them are fast disappearing. Prejudices have yielded and are yielding, while a growing cordiality warms the Southern and the Northern heart alike. Can any one doubt that between the sections confidence and esteem are to-day more marked than at any period in the sixty years preceding the election of President Lincoln? This is the result in part of time and in part of Republican principles applied under the favorable conditions of uniformity. It would be a great calamity to change these influences under which Southern Commonwealths are learning to vindicate civil rights, and adapting themselves to the conditions of political tranquillity and industrial progress. If there be occasional outbreaks in the South against this peaceful progress, the public opinion of the country regards them as exceptional and hopefully trusts that each will prove the last.

Any effort to unite the Southern States upon issues that grow out of the memories of the war, will summon the Northern States to combine in the assertion of that nationality which was their inspiration in the civil struggle. Thus great energies which should be united in a common industrial development will be wasted in hurtful strife. The Democratic party shows itself a foe to Southern prosperity by always invoking and urging Southern political consolidation. Such a policy quenches the rising instinct of patriotism in the heart of the Southern youth; it revives and stimulates prejudice; it substitutes the spirit of barbaric vengeance for the love of peace, progress, and harmony.

The general character of the civil service of the United States under all Administrations of the Government has been honorable. In the one supreme test—the collection and disbursement of revenue—the record of fidelity has never been surpassed in any nation. With the almost fabulous sums which were received and paid during the late war, scrupulous integrity was the prevailing rule. Indeed, throughout that trying period, it can be said to the honor of the American name, that unfaithfulness and dishonesty among civil officers were as rare as misconduct and cowardice on the field of battle.

The growth of the country has continually and necessarily enlarged the civil service, until now it includes a great body of officers. Rules and methods of appointment which prevailed when the number was smaller have been found insufficient and impracticable, and earnest efforts have been made to separate the mass of ministerial officers from partisan influence and personal control. Impartiality in the mode of appointment to be based on qualification, and security of tenure to be based on faithful discharge of duty, are the two ends to be accomplished. The public business will be aided by separating the Legislative branch of the Government from all control of appointments and the Executive will be relieved by subjecting appointments to fixed rules and thus removing them from the caprice of favoritism. But there should be rigid observance of the law which, in all cases of equal competency, gives the preference to the soldiers who risked their lives in defense of the Union.

I entered Congress in 1863, and in a somewhat prolonged service I never found it expedient to request or recommend the removal of a civil officer except in four instances, and then for non-political reasons which were instantly conclusive with the appointing power. The officers in the district, appointed by Mr. Lincoln in 1861 upon the recommendation of my predecessor, served, as a rule, until death or resignation. I adopted at the beginning of my service the test of competitive examination for appointments to West Point and maintained it so long as I had the right by law to nominate a cadet. In the case of many officers I found that the present law which arbitrarily limits the term of the commission offered a constant temptation to changes for mere political reasons. I have publicly expressed the belief

that the essential modification of that law would be in many respects advantageous.

My observation in the Department of State confirmed the conclusions of my Legislative experience, and impressed me with the conviction that the rule of impartial appointment might with advantage be carried beyond any existing provision of the Civil Service Law. It should be applied to appointments in the consular service. Consuls should be commercial sentinels—encircling the globe with watchfulness for their country's interests. Their intelligence and competency become, therefore, matters of great public concern. No man should be appointed to an American consulate who is not well instructed in the history and resources of his own country, and in the requirements and language of commerce in the country to which he is sent. The same rule should be applied even more rigidly to Secretaries of Legation in our Diplomatic service. The people have the right to the most efficient agents in the discharge of public business and the appointing power should regard this as the prior and ulterior consideration.

Religious liberty is the right of every citizen of the Republic. Congress is forbidden by the Constitution to make any law "respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." For a century, under this guarantee, Protestant and Catholic, Jew and Gentile, have worshiped God according to the dictates of conscience. But religious liberty must not be perverted to the justification of offenses against the law. A religious sect, strongly intrenched in one of the Territories of the Union, and spreading into four other Territories, claims the right to destroy the safeguard and muniment of social order, and to practice as a religious privilege that which is a crime punished with severe penalty in every State of the Union. The sacred unity of the family must be preserved as the foundation of all civil government, as the source of orderly administration, as the surest guarantee of moral purity.

The claim of the Mormons that they are divinely authorized to practice polygamy should no more be admitted than the claim of certain heathen tribes, if they should come among us, to continue the rite of human sacrifice. The law does not interfere

with what a man believes. It takes cognizance only of what he does. As citizens, the Mormons are entitled to the same civil rights as others and to these they must be confined. Polygamy ought never to receive National toleration by the admission of a community that upholds it, as a State in the Union. The Mormons must learn, as others have learned, that the liberty of the individual ceases where the rights of society begin.

The people of the United States, though often urged and tempted, have never seriously contemplated the recognition of any other money than gold and silver—and currency directly convertible into them. They have not done so, they will not do so, under any necessity less pressing than that of desperate war. The one special requisite for the completion of our monetary system is the fixing of the relative values of silver and gold. The large use of silver as the money of account among Asiatic nations, taken in connection with the increasing commerce of the world, gives the weightiest reasons for an international agreement in the premises. Our Government should not cease to urge this measure until a common standard of value shall be established—a standard that shall enable the United States to use the silver from its mines as an auxiliary to gold in settling the balances of Commercial exchange.

The strength of the Republic is increased by the multiplication of land-holders. Our laws should look to the judicious encouragement of actual settlers on the public domain, which should henceforth be held as a sacred trust for the benefit of those seeking homes. The tendency to consolidate large tracts of land in the ownership of individuals or corporations should be discouraged. One hundred thousand acres of land owned by one man is far less profitable to the Nation than when its ownership is divided among one thousand men. The evil of permitting large tracts of the National domain to be controlled by the few against the many is enhanced when the persons controlling it are aliens. It is but fair that the public land should be disposed of only to actual settlers and to those who are citizens of the Republic, or willing to become so.

Among our National interests one languishes — the foreign carrying-trade. It was very seriously crippled in our civil war, and another blow was given to it in the general substitution of steam for sail in ocean traffic. With a frontage on the two great oceans, with a freightage larger than that of any other nation, we have every inducement to restore our navigation. Yet the Government has hitherto refused its help. A small share of the encouragement given to railways and to manufactures, and a small share of the capital and the zeal given by our citizens to those enterprises, would have carried our ships to every sea. A law just enacted removes some of the burdens upon our navigation and inspires hope that this great interest may at last receive its due share of attention. All efforts in this direction should receive encouragement.

This survey of our condition as a Nation reminds us that material prosperity is but a mockery if it does not tend to preserve the liberty of the people. A free ballot is the safeguard of Republican institutions, without which National welfare is not assured. A popular election, honestly conducted, embodies the very majesty of true government. Ten millions of voters desire to take part in the pending contest. The safety of the Republic rests upon the integrity of the ballot, upon the security of suffrage to the citizen. To deposit a fraudulent vote is no worse a crime against Constitutional liberty than to obstruct the deposit of an honest vote. He who corrupts suffrage strikes at the very root of free government. He is the arch-enemy of the Republic. He forgets that in trampling upon the rights of others he fatally imperils his own rights. "It is a good land which the Lord our God doth give us," but we can maintain our heritage only by guarding with vigilance the source of popular power.

I am with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

SPEECHES BEFORE THE PEOPLE DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS OF 1884.

[During the campaign of 1884 Mr. Blaine made a tour through several States in the course of which — lasting in all some six weeks — he spoke more than four hundred times to assemblies of the people. The speeches were necessarily brief. A small selection of them are here given.]

[At the Worcester County, Massachusetts, Agricultural Fair, Sept. 18, 1884.]

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, — I am sure that, under this rich autumn sun and in this prosperous State, you will expect from me to-day nothing but words of congratulation. If there be any one spot within the limits of the United States which may challenge all others in wealth, contentment, and general happiness, it must be Worcester, in the State of Massachusetts. We are accustomed, without looking closely at figures, to think of some of the rich sections of Europe as far more populous than any portion of this country; but in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland outside the counties of Middlesex and Surry there is not so dense a population as inhabits Massachusetts from this point to the sea; there is not in the crowded Kingdom of Belgium, not even in that hive of industry — Holland — so dense a population as you on this ground represent to-day. When we compare the comfort and thrift of the entire people, there is not, perhaps, on this circling globe a community with which Worcester County cannot stand the test. In the West, on those rich lands which “laugh a crop when tickled with a hoe,” in that “boundless contiguity” of space in which the agricultural district stretches from the crest of the Alleghenies to the Great Plains, it will be a surprise to them, if it is not to you, that this county of Worcester, out of more

than seventeen hundred counties that make up the United States, is the fifteenth in the Union in the value of its agricultural products; and what is even more surprising is the fact that, standing in this high rank in agricultural industry and agricultural product, it stands still higher in mechanical industry and in manufactures. In that list it stands tenth in the United States. So that when you come to estimate the \$3,500,000,000 product of agriculture and the \$6,000,000,000 product of manufactures in a single year in the United States, you can see what must be the magnificent prosperity of this county that enables it to stand fifteenth in the one list and tenth in the other. Gentlemen, this county has been long noted. It is the county best known in the State—and so widely known throughout the Union that if any county in this country were to be presented as the exemplar, the one illustration of what free industry, and free schools, and free suffrage could do, there would be a unanimous voice in favor of presenting the county of Worcester as that exemplar. We in Maine are sometimes a little jealous of you in Massachusetts—perhaps it is only because of your superior prosperity; but outside and beyond that jealousy I am here to say on behalf of the State, which was formerly a part of the old Commonwealth, that for the county of Worcester, for the State of Massachusetts, no other feeling is entertained than that of respect and honor.

[At Hamilton, O., on the 1st of October, 1884.]

CITIZENS OF OHIO,—It is now forty years since the question of a Protective tariff engaged the attention of the American people as profoundly as it does to-day. It was in the contest between Mr. Clay and Mr. Polk in 1844 that the great National debate on that question took place. The Protective tariff was defeated, not by the popular vote, but by the bad faith of the Democratic party which succeeded in the election; and I beg to call your attention—the attention of a large manufacturing population—to the fact that the policy of protecting our industries has never been defeated in the United States by the popular vote. A contrary policy has been forced on the people at different times through the bad faith of their representatives, but never, I repeat, by a popular vote, upon a deliberate appeal to

the people in their primary capacity. It would therefore seem to be the duty of the people of the United States, if by a majority they believe in the policy of Protection, to see to it that the party is sustained which can be trusted to uphold it. Yes, but, said a gentleman to me yesterday, "Protection does not always secure abundant prosperity; there are a great many idle men now in the country." Grant it, gentlemen! There has never yet been a policy devised by the wisdom of man that will insure through all times and all seasons a continuous flow of prosperity. But the question is whether over a given series of years there has not been a larger degree of prosperity to the people under the policy of Protection than under the policy of Free Trade. The question is to be tested not by the experience of a single year, but by the experience of a series of years. We have had a Protective tariff now for more than two decades, and I ask you whether there has ever been another period in which the United States has made such progress as during the last twenty years?

It is true I admit that now and then there will come a lull and a re-action in business. Adverse changes frequently come even under the laws of Nature. You are suffering from a protracted drought in Ohio this year, but you do not on that account avow that you will have no more rains. You do not fear that seed-time and harvest will fail! On the contrary, you are the more firmly persuaded that rain is the only element that will restore fertility to your soil, verdure to your fields, richness to your crops. So in this little slough, this temporary dullness in the business in the country, the one great element that can be relied on to restore prosperity is the Protective tariff. The question is one which Ohio must in large part decide. On the fourteenth day of this month you will have an opportunity to tell the people of the United States whether you believe in the policy of Protection. If you do, you will secure not only its continuance, but its permanent triumph. If, on the other hand, you should falter and fall back, it might produce disaster elsewhere. The responsibility is upon you. Is your courage equal to your responsibility? Is your confidence equal to your courage?

[At Grafton, West Virginia, on the 6th of October, 1884.]

CITIZENS OF WEST VIRGINIA, — As your distinguished Chairman has intimated, I am not a stranger to your State. I have known it personally I might say all my life, and this section of it I have known well. I was born and reared on the banks of yonder river a few miles below the point where it enters Pennsylvania, and you do not need to be told by me that there has always been good-fellowship and unity of feeling among the inhabitants of the Monongahela Valley. But I have not seen in my journey to-day, I do not see around me and before me now the West Virginia which I knew in my boyhood. The West Virginia of forty years ago was comparatively a wilderness. The West Virginia of to-day is a prosperous industrial centre in the United States, with great lines of railways and great manufacturing establishments. West Virginia, as an independent Commonwealth, began her existence during the civil war, and at that day the most liberal estimate of her total property, according to the enumeration of the United States census, did not exceed \$100,000,000. In 1870 the census gave you an aggregate of \$190,000,000, and in 1880 it showed that you possessed capitalized wealth to the amount of \$350,000,000. From the close of the war to the year 1880, a period of only fifteen years, West Virginia had therefore gained in wealth the enormous sum of \$250,000,000. You have fared pretty well, therefore, under Republican administration.

Probably some political opponent does me the honor to listen to me, and I would ask him, as a candid man, what agency was it that nerved the arm of industry to smite the mountains and create this wealth in West Virginia? It was the Protective tariff and a financial system that gave you good money and an abundant currency. Before the war you never had a bank-bill circulating in West Virginia that would pass current five hundred miles from home. You have not to-day a single piece of paper money circulating in West Virginia that is not good all around the globe; not a bill that will not pass as readily in the money markets of Europe as in Wheeling, Baltimore or New York. So that the man who works for wages knows, when Saturday night comes, that he is to be paid for his week's labor in good money.

Under the Protective tariff your coal industries, and your iron industries, and the wealth of your forests have been brought out, and it is for you, voters of West Virginia, to say whether you wish this to continue or whether you want to try Free Trade. I make bold to say, with all respect, that there is not a Democratic statesman on the stump in West Virginia, conspicuous enough to be known to the Nation — I speak only of those I know — who advocates a Protective tariff; not one. I go further; I do not know a Democratic statesman who does not hold that a tariff for Protection is unconstitutional, and, therefore, as honest men they are bound to oppose it. The Morrison Tariff Bill would have struck at the interests of West Virginia in many vital respects, and it is an amazing fact that the representatives in Congress from West Virginia voted for that bill. There is a good old adage which I beg to recall to your minds, that God helps those who help themselves, and if West Virginia is not willing to sustain a Protective tariff by her vote and her influence she must not expect it to be sustained for her by others. If she wants the benefit of a Protective tariff she must give to a Protective tariff the benefit of her support. If she is not willing to do this she does not deserve the prosperity which a Protective tariff has brought and is still bringing to her.

I am glad that I am addressing a Southern audience; I am glad to exchange views with a community that were slaveholders — a community made up of those who were masters and those who were slaves. But I am addressing a slave State no longer. I am appealing to the new South. I am appealing to West Virginia not to vote upon a tradition or a prejudice; not to keep her eyes to the rear and to the past, but to look to the front and to the future; and if I could be heard I would make the same appeal to other Southern States — to old Virginia, to North Carolina, to Georgia, to Alabama, to Tennessee, and to Louisiana. They are all interested in a Protective tariff, and the question is, which do they prefer, to gratify a prejudice or to promote general prosperity? West Virginia can lead the way: she can break this seemingly impregnable barrier of the solid South. Solid on what? Solid on a prejudice; solid on a tradition; solid upon doctrines that separate the different por-

tions of the Union. I invite you to join in a union not merely in form, but in fact: I invite you to take your part in the solution of the industrial and financial problems of the time. If West Virginia takes that course on the 14th of October she will do much to settle the controversies that now agitate the country.

The repeal of the Protective tariff, as proposed by the terms of the Morrison Bill, would cost West Virginia a vast sum of money. Between 1870 and 1880 you gained in this State \$160,000,000, between 1880 and 1890 you will gain much more, with a tariff for Protection; but I ask any business man if he believes you can do it with Free Trade?

Here I close my words of counsel, leaving the action to you. I leave you, I trust, not as a community influenced by sectional feeling, but as a community broadly National. I leave you as a State allied on this side to Pennsylvania, and on that to Ohio, as much as you are on the other sides to Virginia and Kentucky. I leave you as a State that stands in the van of the new South, inviting the whole South to join in a great National movement which shall in fact and in feeling, as well as in form, make us a people with one union, one Constitution, one destiny.

[At Lancaster, Ohio, Oct. 11, 1884.]

MY FRIENDS, — I confess that in this place and at this time I hardly feel disposed to make any allusion to public affairs. The recollections that rush upon me as I stand here carry me back through many years, to a time before the majority of those who now hear me were born. In 1841 I was a school-boy in this town, attending the school of Mr. William Lyons, a cultivated English gentleman — the younger brother of the then Lord Lyons, and uncle of the late British Minister at Washington. He taught the youth of this vicinity with great success, with thoroughness, and with refinement. I know not whether he be living, but if he is I beg to make my acknowledgments to him, if these words may reach him, for his efficiency and excellence as an instructor. As I look upon your faces I am carried back to those days, to Lancaster as it then was. In that row of dwellings on the opposite side of the street, in one of which I then lived and am now a guest, resided

at that time the three leading lawyers of Ohio — Thomas Ewing, Henry Stanbury, and Hocking Hunter. I vividly recall their persons and their peculiarities.

A few months before there had come home from West Point a tall and very slender young man, straight as an arrow, with a sharp face and a full suit of red hair. His name was Sherman, and he had in his pocket an order to join the army in Florida. You have heard of him since. You have heard of him, and he will be heard of as long as the march through Georgia holds its place in history; he will be heard of as long as lofty character and military genius are esteemed among men.

About the same time, from a country town to the south-west of this place, there was sent to West Point a sturdy, strong-headed youth who was also heard of in the war, and whose fame has since encircled the globe. His name is Ulysses S. Grant.

In the adjoining county of Perry, twenty miles perhaps from this spot, there lived a short, stout boy, who has since become known to the world as Phil Sheridan. Combative, yet gentle in nature, he achieved a reputation not unlike that which Ney attained in the Napoleonic wars. So that Ohio was then preparing military leaders for great contingencies, for unforeseen crises.

I remember another youth of this town — slender, tall, stately — who had just left school, when I came here from my home across the Pennsylvania line, and who had begun as a civil engineer on the Muskingum River improvements. You have since heard of him too. His name is John Sherman.

At that time this town seemed to my boyish vision to be the centre of the universe, and my idea was that the world was under deep obligation for being permitted to revolve around Lancaster. I recall those scenes with peculiar pleasure. I recall my early attachment and love for this town, and for the friends and the kindred that were in it — some of whom near to me in blood were here when Arthur St. Clair was Governor of the North-west Territory, and some of whom are here still. When I think of those days, and of the deep attachments I inherited and have since maintained, I feel more like dwelling

upon old stories and old scenes, than talking about the political contests of to-day.

But, my friends, these things are gone by for more than forty years, and a new generation of men meet here in a new era, under new responsibilities. We meet upon the eve of an important election, and the people of Ohio, as is their wont and as has been their fortune, are placed in the vanguard of the fight. I am satisfied that on Tuesday next you will show, as you have shown in preceding Presidential years, that Ohio is fit to be intrusted with the responsibility of leadership in a National contest. I do not stop to argue any question: the time for argument has passed. I do not stop even to appeal to you; the appeal has been made. I stop only to remind you that if you do your duty on Tuesday next as becomes men of your lineage and your inheritance, the Republican administration of this Government will be continued; the Protective tariff will be upheld; the patriotism and the fruits of the civil struggle will be maintained, and the Government of the Union, preserved by the loyalty of the Union, will continue to be administered in loyalty to the Union. Good-night.

[At Flint, Michigan, Oct. 16, 1884.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — I have received since I have been in this State, two or three letters from persons asking me to say in public whether I had ever been a member of the Know-Nothing party. In connection with these inquiries from persons in Michigan I have received several telegrams from the Pacific coast asking whether I was not a supporter of Mr. Fillmore when he ran in 1856 as the Native American candidate for the Presidency. Let me say, in full and explicit reply to these inquiries by letter and telegraph, that I never was a member of the Know-Nothing order; that I never voted for a man who was nominated by it, either for a State or for a National office; and that instead of supporting Mr. Fillmore in 1856, when I was a young man of twenty-six I had the honor to be a member of the National Republican Convention which nominated General Frémont, and as the General is now on this platform, he will be able to bear testimony that, however inefficient my support may have been, it was very earnest and very ardent. I

was then the junior editor of the *Kennebec Journal*, and the paper was entirely devoted to General Frémont's advocacy, and aided in giving him the largest majority ever cast in Maine for a Presidential candidate of any party. The Know-Nothing order holds views in regard to immigration and naturalization from which I never hesitated to express dissent.

But while I am on that subject, I wish to say that there are at least three wrongs in connection with European immigration which, in my judgment, require correction.

First, I think that the habit which has grown up on the part of some European countries of sending their paupers to the United States ought not to be longer tolerated. I believe in the good old American system which requires that each town or each county shall take care of its own poor. If the laws of European countries tend to impoverish their working-people those countries ought to take care of them when reduced to want, instead of shipping them to us.

Second, And still more objectionable is the practice of shipping their criminals to us, as has been done, criminals being in many cases released from punishment on condition that they shall come to the United States. I think that is a very grave offense against this country which should not be permitted but should on the contrary be resented and forbidden.

Third, If a tariff for protection is designed to elevate the laboring-man of this country and secure him good wages—and if it is not for that it is not for any thing—then I think the custom which some men are trying to introduce of importing cheap contract labor from foreign countries to compete with home labor ought to be prohibited. It is a species of servitude, against the spirit of our laws, and injures all who are in any way connected with it.

These are three evils which I think should be remedied. But, as to every honest immigrant seeking to better his condition, whether he come from the British Isles or from the great German Empire, from the sunny climes of the Latin nations, or from the brave Scandinavian races of the North, we bid him God-speed and give him hearty welcome and hospitality; and, when he is admitted to citizenship, we assure him protection at home and abroad. Once among us and of us, his rights are

equal before the law with those of the native-born citizen. No distinction can be tolerated among those who are clothed with the honor of American citizenship.

[At Ann Arbor, to the students of Michigan University, Oct. 18, 1884.]

DURING the war we used to hear much about the rebel yell. It was said to imply great vigor and determination, but it seems to me that the young men of Michigan University who do me the honor to appear here to-day could have terrified the whole army of Lee. But I am glad to witness it and hear it, for it implies the enthusiasm and strength of youth; and from the youth of the country the Republican party is constantly recruited. What we lose from desertion and disappointment and dissatisfaction on the part of the elders is far more than made up—yea, fourfold made up—by the young men of the country who are just coming into active life. I wish to leave with these young collegians a problem in relation to the leading industrial issue of the time—a problem which will confront them in their future careers—that is, to find out why so many college youths who are Free-Traders at twenty become Protectionists at forty? I think the answer will be found in the fact that at forty they have taken degrees in the university of experience, which, after all, is much wider than the university of theory in which our college boys are taught. I was myself taught when I was in college the doctrine of Free Trade, but the United States stands as a perpetual and irrefutable argument and example of the value of Protection to Home industries in a new country.

I am glad to meet you—not merely as those interested in a political campaign, but as young men who are the pride and hope of the country. In dealing with the problems of the future in this marvelous experiment of a people governing themselves by free and universal suffrage, nothing can avail except an educated and constantly corrected public opinion. I wish to impress upon every man who has the advantage of a collegiate education that he is every day more and more placed in debt to his country, and that in proportion as he progresses in knowledge and wisdom, in that proportion will he be expected to pay back in patriotic labor the country which has nurtured him. I congratulate you on being born to such

opportunities, to a harvest that is ripe for the reaper, a field that is continually expanding. By the time you have your degrees you will go forth to the battle of life in a nation of 60,000,000 of freemen. You go forth, each of you, with as good an opportunity in life as any other man has, and you go with the added advantage which education gives. I commend you to your responsibility, for the responsibilities of an educated American are higher and deeper and broader than those of an educated man in any other land; and in proportion as your opportunities are greater will you be held to sterner account in this life and in the life which is to come.

[At South Bend, Indiana, Oct. 18, 1884.]

MEN OF INDIANA,—The struggle in all human society is first for bread. It is idle to propound fine theories to a man who is hungry; it is idle to commend a political principle to one who is in need of shelter; it is idle to talk philosophy to one who is naked. Food and clothing are the primary requirements of human society, the primary elements of human progress, and to secure these you must put the people in the way of earning good wages. I never saw any man moved to enthusiasm by silently contemplating the prosperity of another while he himself was in need. To move him you must make him feel that he can win prosperity himself. The beginning of wise legislation, therefore, is to give to every citizen of the land a fair and equal chance, to leave the race of life open and free for all. What agency will best accomplish that? What legislation will most tend to that end? Certainly it will not tend to that end to throw open our ports and say, Send ye all here your fabrics made by the cheapest and most distressed labor of Europe in order that our rich people shall have every thing at the lowest price, and in order that those who are not rich, but who are just opening their shops and building their factories, may meet a ruinous competition! If you do that you cannot spin a wheel or turn a lathe in these manufacturing establishments which I see on all hands unless you can get your labor at the European prices.

We begin just there. From these considerations we deduce the conclusion that the Protective tariff is primarily for the

benefit of the laboring man, because, if you consider any manufactured article, you find that the chief constituent element in its cost is the labor. In many cases the material is but one per cent and the labor is ninety-nine per cent. Therefore, all legislation of a Protective character is, and must be, mainly for the benefit of labor, because labor is the principal element in the cost of the fabric. Hence, if there be any man who is pre-eminently and above all others interested in the tariff it is the laboring man.

A Protective tariff was one of the first fruits of the election of Mr. Lincoln. We have had it for more than twenty years on the statute-book, with various amendments which have been added from time to time, to make it more protective, and the result is that all history, ancient, modern and mediæval, may be challenged for a National progress like unto that we have made since 1861. I am merely reciting the facts and figures of your assessors' books and of the United States census tables, when I say that in the last twenty years of the history of this country we have added more wealth, twice over, than we had acquired in the centuries between the discovery of the country by Columbus and the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. There must have been some peculiar and potent agent at work to produce this great result. That agent was the Protective tariff operating to nerve the arm of labor and reward it fairly and liberally. Whether that policy shall be continued or whether it shall be abandoned is the controlling issue in this campaign. All other questions are laid aside for the time. There are many other questions which are worthy of consideration, but two weeks from Tuesday next we shall have an election in every State in the Union, to determine with reference to this question, the character of the next Congress and the future policy of the Government. You have before you the Republican party, pledged to sustain the Protective tariff, and illustrating that pledge by a specific and consistent example, extending through the last twenty-three years. You have on the other hand, the Democratic party, which in fifty-one years (since 1833) has never in a single instance voted for Protection, and never controlled a Congress in which it did not oppose Protection.

I say, therefore, to the laboring men and to the mechanics, some of whom may do me the honor to listen to me, your unions, your leagues, all those Labor associations you have formed for your own advantage and your own advancement, are well and proper in their way. It is your right to have them and to administer them as you choose, but they are not as strong as a rope of sand against the ill-paid labor of Europe, if you take away the Protective tariff which is now your background and support. Do not therefore be deluded by the idea that you can dispense with the Protective tariff and substitute for it your labor unions. I do not distract your attention with any other question. I do not stop to dwell upon the great issues that have been made and settled by the Republicans within the last twenty-three years. That party has made a deeper and more serious imprint in history than any other political organization that ever was charged with a great responsibility in the United States, and it is the patriotic pride of every man in its ranks that he has been a member of it and has shared its responsibilities, its triumphs, its honors.

[At Fort Wayne, Indiana, Oct. 20, 1884.]

CITIZENS OF INDIANA, — The October elections in Ohio and West Virginia have put a new phase on the National contest, or rather they have reproduced the phase of former years. The Democratic party, as of old, consider now that they have the South solid again; they believe that they are sure of one hundred and fifty-three Electoral votes from the sixteen Southern States, and they expect, or they hope, or they dream, that they may secure New York and Indiana and that with New York and Indiana added to the solid South, they will seize the Government of the Nation. I do not believe that the farmers, the business men, the manufacturers, the merchants, the mechanics, and, last of all and most of all, I do not believe that the soldiers of Indiana can be put to that use. I do not believe that the men who added lustre and renown to your State through four years of brave service in a bloody war can be used to call to the administration of the Government the men who organized the Rebellion. In the Senate of the United States the Democratic party have thirty-seven members, of which number thirty-

two come from the South. Of their strength in the House of Representatives the majority come from the South, and now the intention is, with an absolutely solidified Electoral vote from the South, added to the votes of the two States I have named, to seize the Government of the Union.

That seizure means a great deal, my friends; it means that as the South furnishes three-fourths of the Democratic strength, it will be given the lead and control of the Nation in event of a Democratic triumph. It means that the financial and industrial systems of the country shall be placed under the direction of the South; that the currency, the banks, the tariff, the internal-revenue laws—in short, that the whole system upon which the business of the country depends shall be placed under the control of that section. It means that the Constitutional amendments to which Southern leaders are so bitterly opposed shall be enforced only so far as they may believe in them; that the National credit as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment, that the payment of pensions to the soldiers of the Union as guaranteed in the same amendment, shall be under their control; and what that control might mean can be measured by the bitterness with which those amendments were resisted by the Democrats of the South. There is not one measure of banking, of tariff, of finance, of public credit, of pensions, not one line of administration upon which the Government is conducted to-day, to which the Democrats of the South are not recorded as hostile; and to give them control would mean a change the like of which has not been known in modern times. It would be as if the dead Stuarts were restored to the throne of England; as if the Bourbons should be invited to administer the Government of the French Republic; as if the Florentine Dukes should be called back and empowered to govern the new Kingdom of Italy as consolidated under Victor Emanuel.

Such a triumph, fellow-citizens, would, in the end, be a fearful misfortune to the South itself. That section, under the wise administration of the Government by the Republican party, has been steadily and rapidly gaining for the last ten years in all the elements of material prosperity. It has added enormously to its wealth since the close of the war, and has shared fully in the general advance of the country. To call that sec-

tion now to the Rulership of the Nation would disturb its own social and political economy, would rekindle smouldering passions, and, under the peculiar leadership to which it would be subjected, it would organize an administration of resentment, of reprisal, of revenge. No greater misfortune than that could come to the Nation or to the South. It would come as a reaction against the progress of liberal principles in that section.—a progress so rapid that the Republicans are waging earnest contests in those States whose interests are most demonstrably identified with the policy of Protection as against the baleful spectacle of a solid South.

I am sure that Indiana will protest, and, on the whole, will conclude to stand where she has stood in the past. I believe that you will stand where you stood in the war; that you will stand for the principles and the policies which have made your State rich and prosperous, and which have made the American Republic, in manufactures, in agriculture, the leading Nation of the world, not merely in a material sense, but in a moral and philanthropic sense—a country in which every man has as good a chance as every other man, and which, among other great gifts, bestows absolutely free suffrage and free education. You enjoy that suffrage, and the fourth day of November next you are to say for which party, for which policy, you will cast your votes. Not for me personally. I am not speaking for myself. No man ever met with a misfortune in being defeated for the Presidency, while men have met great misfortunes in being elected to it. I am pleading no personal cause. I am pleading the cause of the American people. I am pleading the cause of the American farmer, the American manufacturer, the American mechanic, and the American laborer against the world. I am reproached by some excellent people for appearing before these multitudes of my countrymen, upon the ground that it is inconsistent with the dignity of the office for which I am named. I do not feel it to be so. There is not a courtier in Europe so proud but that he is glad to uncover his head in the presence of his sovereign. So I uncover in the presence of the only earthly sovereignty I acknowledge, and bow with pride to the free people of America.

[At Terre Haute, Indiana, Oct. 23, 1884.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — The Southern question, as for years it has been popularly termed, is precipitated into this canvass by the South itself, and to neglect to notice it would be to overlook one of the most powerful and dangerous factors in the National contest. To understand that question properly, it should be remembered that politically there are two Souths, which we may term respectively the new South and the old South. The new South represents the awakened liberal sentiment that is striving for the industrial development of that naturally rich section of the Union which recognizes the necessity of a tariff for protection, which casts the bitter memories of the civil conflict behind, and which is hopefully struggling in Virginia, in North Carolina, in Tennessee, for better things than hate and vengeance and injustice. This element includes many men who served in the Confederate armies. It naturally affiliates with the Republican party, and it seeks to lead the people away from the prejudices of the past to a contemplation of the majestic future which wise and magnanimous action may bring to the South, in common with the North and with the entire Union.

The old South represents the spirit of the rebellion, cherishes sentiments of sullen discontent, is perpetually re-affirming its faith in the rightfulness of "the Lost Cause," is full of bitter reproaches against those who triumphed in the war for the Union, regards negro suffrage with abhorrence, maintains "the white line" as the proclamation of hostility to the colored race, and is ready to use whatever amount of intimidation or violence may be necessary to preserve its own political and personal mastery in the South. It is unquestionably dominant in all the old slave States, and is in open and avowed affiliation with the Democratic party of the North. It constitutes three-fourths of the electoral strength of the Democratic party in the Nation, and in the event of Democratic triumph would be in absolute and undisputed control of the Government. The struggle of the Republicans is for the amelioration, improvement, and progress of the South, as well as of the North, but they are confronted everywhere and resisted everywhere by the determined and hitherto triumphant Southern Democracy.

The aim of the Democratic party, as I have already said, is to conjoin the Electoral votes of New York and Indiana with the Electoral votes of the sixteen Southern States; and it is for New York and Indiana to consider just what that means, and where it would carry them. New York has a greater stake than any other State of the Union in maintaining sound principles of government, in upholding the National credit, in perpetuating the financial system which embodies the matured wisdom of the last twenty years, in sustaining the Protective policy. Indiana has a stake less than that of New York only as her population and wealth are less. Do the citizens of those two States fully comprehend what it means to trust the national credit, the national finances, the national pensions, the Protective system, and all the great interests which are under the control of the National Government, to the old South, with its bitterness, its unreconciled temper, its narrowness of vision, its hostility to all Northern interests, its constant longing to revive an impossible past, its absolute incapacity to measure the sweep of the present and the magnitude of our future?

The North and the South, under Republican administration of the Government, will ultimately come into harmonious relations. In the last ten years great progress has been made toward that result, and the next ten years may witness the effacement of all prejudices and hostilities and the absolute triumph of just and magnanimous policies. But all prospects of that result would be defeated and destroyed by giving the old South possession of the national power. Among the first of the baleful effects that would follow would be the crushing out of liberal progress in the South, and the practical nullification of all that has been gained by the reconstruction laws which followed the Rebellion. The people of New York and the people of Indiana are now asked to aid in bringing about that deplorable result, to be followed by the abandonment or the reversal of the financial and industrial policies under which the Nation has prospered so marvelously since the close of the war. I cannot believe that you will do it, because such a course is forbidden by every instinct of patriotism, as well as every consideration of enlightened self-interest and self-respect.

[At Milwaukee, Oct. 27, 1884.]

CITIZENS OF WISCONSIN, — The Republican party had its birth in the North-West, and there it has always found steady support. The five great Commonwealths that were formed from the old North-west Territory represent to-day an empire — an empire founded in 1787, but an empire which has had its greatest growth since 1861. The growth of that imperial section of the Union has been most rapid under Republican administration of the National Government, and under the continuous influence of a Protective tariff. In the last twenty-three years its wealth has trebled. In the next twenty-three years, with a Protective tariff in operation, its wealth will increase in even greater ratio. I do not come here at this late day in the National campaign to argue any question. I come merely to recite historic facts, and leave you to draw the inference. The Protective tariff has found its steady friend in the Republican party. It has found its steady foe in the Democratic party. Under the Protective system, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce have flourished in equal degree; and the question now before the voters of Wisconsin, the question before the voters of the Nation, is whether that system shall be abandoned, or whether it shall be continued. The sixteen States of the South will in all probability vote against it. It remains to be seen whether a sufficient re-enforcement can be obtained from the North to hand over the Government to the domination of the Free-trade South.

As the Republican party had its birth in the North-West, we come to you now for a re-baptism in the original faith, and for added strength to the prestige of the party. I do not believe that Wisconsin, I do not believe that Illinois, I do not believe that Michigan, I do not believe that Indiana, I am sure that Ohio, those great component members of the old North-west Territory, — I do not believe that any of them can be induced to undo the work which they began in 1854. I do not believe that the free arms and the free hearts of the great free North-West can be used to turn the Government of this nation over to the men who sought its destruction. In that faith I greet you. In that faith I leave you. In that faith I thank you pro-

foundly for a reception which is proportioned to the grandeur of your empire and the warmth of your hearts.

[A large number of German-Americans waited on Mr. Blaine at the Grand Pacific Hotel, Chicago, and through their Chairman, Professor Kistler, made an address, and Mr. Blaine responded as follows:—]

PROFESSOR AND GERMAN-AMERICAN CITIZENS OF CHICAGO, — Any tender of your friendship and confidence would be welcome and grateful to my feelings. What must I then say of one that is so eloquent and so cordial? I am not unaware in meeting you that there has been an effort made to prejudice the minds of German-American citizens against me, but I never feared that the effort would succeed, because the one great distinction of the German mind is deliberation in coming to a conclusion, thoroughness of investigation, complete and entire justice of final judgment. I recognize the perfect truthfulness of what you say of the devotion of German-Americans to the flag of the country and the nationality they have assumed. I have long been acquainted with the German character. My birth and my rearing in Pennsylvania made me familiar from childhood with the German character, with its steadiness, its industry, its fidelity, its integrity, its truth in friendship, its loyalty to Government. Pennsylvania owes much to her German population, to the Muhlenbergs, the Heisters, the Wolfs, the Snyders, the Markles, the Shunks, who have illustrated her annals and with whom I am connected by ties of good will, of kindly associations inherited through five generations of family friendships that are warm and cordial to-day.

When on my Western tour I reached Ohio, I sought conference with German fellow-citizens, and was assured, and subsequent events have confirmed the assurance, that so far from being hostile to me, they were, as I had a right to expect and as you so eloquently declare, cordially disposed towards me. Thanking you again for the kindly expressions of your address I am glad to take each one of you by the hand in token of friendship and regard.

[At Binghamton, New York, Oct. 28, 1884.]

MY FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS, — I am sure that no man who loves the American Union can ever visit the city of

Binghamton without a reverent remembrance of Daniel S. Dickinson, and no man who was contemporary with the great civil struggle which involved the fate of American nationality can ever forget the strength, the encouragement, and enthusiasm which Mr. Dickinson brought to the loyal cause when he forsook his party for his country. Not precisely in the same phase, but involving like issues, is the contest in which we are engaged to-day. For as we then confronted the South arrayed in war against the Union, so we confront it now in an attempt by a great combination to seize the Government of the United States and control it through the same men who rebelled against it. The reason I refer to that here and now is that that combination will be absolutely ineffective unless aided by the vote of New York, and I am sure that the county of Broome and the valley of the Susquehanna will enter an indignant protest against taking the Empire State from the great cordon of free States, always loyal to the Union, to be joined with the States of the solidified South.

This question, fellow-citizens, is not one of mere sentiment. It is not a mere question of patriotism. It is a question of material interest. The triumph of the South in this contest would mean the triumph of Free Trade and the destruction of the Protective system. In the whole history of that marvelous prosperity which has made New York the most populous and the most wealthy State in the Union, you have never made any progress comparable to that which you have made since 1861. When Mr. Buchanan, the last Democratic President, went out of office the wealth of New York was \$1,800,000,000 as shown by the National census. Twenty years later, under a continuous Protective tariff, the enactment of which was the first work of the Republican party after it gained power, your progress had been so rapid that your wealth had advanced from \$1,800,000,000 to \$6,300,000,000, as shown by the census of 1880. No such progress was ever made before in the history of human government. And there is not an intelligent man of any party who does not know that that progress was in large measure due to the influence of the Protective tariff. New York is not in my opinion ready to give it up. New York is not ready to join the solid South for Free Trade. New York is ready to stand

by the Republican party and Protective tariff. I am sure that you realize your responsibility and need no stimulus from words of mine.

[At a dinner given by prominent Republicans of New York at Delmonico's, Oct. 29, Honorable William M. Evarts presiding.]

MR. PRESIDENT, — It is a great reversal of positions, that makes me hear you ascribe leadership to me. For it has been my duty and my pleasure in these long years to follow you; to learn from you wisdom in public affairs, to join with my countrymen in ascribing to you not merely the great merit of leadership in the noblest of professions, but to yield our admiration for the pre-eminent success which has given you the opportunity to lead in the three most important cases ever pleaded by a member of the American bar. First, in resisting your own party in what you deemed the impolicy, if not the madness, of impeaching a President; second, in maintaining before the greatest international tribunal that has assembled in modern times the rights of your country and obtaining redress for wrongs to her that grew out of the civil war; and third, in perhaps averting civil commotion by pleading before an Electoral Commission a peaceful settlement of the angriest political discussion that ever arose between parties in the United States.

I turn now from your President to thank you, merchants, professional men, leaders in the great and complex society of New York — to thank you for receiving me, not merely at this festal board, but also in that far more impressive reception which the close of this rainy day witnessed in your broad and beautiful avenue. I could not, I am sure, by any possible stretch of vanity take this generous demonstration to myself. It is given to me as the representative for the time of the principles which you and I hold in common touching those great interests which underlie, as we believe, the prosperity of the nation. It is fitting that the commercial metropolis of the continent should lead; it is fitting that the financial centre of the continent should lead; it is fitting that this great city, second only in the world, should give an expression to the continent of its views and its judgment on the important questions to be decided Tuesday next by the American people.

I venture — not that I know it so well as you, but that I am spokesman for the present — I venture to remind you, men of New York, with your wealth and your just influence, that seventy per cent of the entire property of this city has been acquired since Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated on the 4th of March, 1861. I should not mention here a fact of percentage and of statistics if it did not carry with it an argument and a moral. The common apprehension in regard to New York is that it is simply a great commercial city, that its exports and imports represent the major part of all that is exported from or imported into the United States. That we all know. But we are often prone to forget that New York is the largest manufacturing city in the world, with perhaps a single exception; that of the \$6,000,000,000 of manufactures annually produced in the United States, this Empire State furnishes one-fifth — \$1,200,000,000 — of which this Empire City produces \$500,000,000. From these facts comes that great sympathy, that identity of interest which has taken the place of the previously existing conflicts between what have been known as the manufacturing and the commercial interests, and has taught us that there can be no true prosperity in the country unless the three great interests comprehended by agriculture, manufactures and commerce are acting in harmony, the one with the other, and joining together for a common end for the common good.

It is usually thought that a change of Government means but little; that we come together with our votes on a given day and count them as the sun goes down, and one party goes out and another comes in. But, gentlemen, it is worth while to remember that the United States is proceeding to-day upon a given basis of public policy — I might say upon a given series of public policies. We have a financial system; we have a currency system; we have an important national credit; we have a levying of duties, as has been so well described by your distinguished President of the evening, so adjusted that the industries of the country are fostered and encouraged thereby; we have three important Constitutional amendments that grew out of the war, upon which, at this hour, and in the hours, and the days, and the weeks, and the years to follow, great issues hang in this country. Are we — if we should be defeated and

our opponents successful — are we to understand that these policies are to be reversed? Then we should, one and all, prepare for a grand disaster. For a single illustration, let me recall to your minds that the repeal of ten lines in the National Banking Act would restore to vitality and to vigor the old State-bank system from which we had happily escaped, as we thought, for all the remainder of our lives.

If these policies are to be reversed you will have to recast your accounts and review your ledgers and prepare for a new and, I may say, a dangerous departure; and if these policies are not to be reversed they will certainly be better maintained by the party which originated them and has thus far sustained them with energy and success.

As I have already said, we speak of New York as the great exporting and importing city, and from that perhaps we often give an exaggerated importance, relatively speaking, to our foreign trade because this magnificent metropolis never would have attained its grandeur and its wealth upon the foreign trade alone. We should never forget, important as that trade is, representing the enormous sum of \$1,500,000,000 annually, that it sinks into insignificance and is dwarfed out of sight when we think of those vast domestic exchanges of which New York is the admitted centre and which annually exceed \$20,000,000,000.

Our foreign trade naturally brings to our consideration the foreign relations of this country, so well described by my distinguished friend as always simple and sincere. It is the safeguard of republics that they are not adapted to war. I mean aggressive war. And it is the safeguard of this Republic that in a defensive war we can defy the world. This nation to-day is in profound peace with the world. But, in my judgment, it has before it a great duty which will not only make that profound peace permanent, but set such an example as will absolutely abolish war on this continent, and, by a great example and a lofty moral precedent, ultimately abolish it in other continents. I am justified in saying that every one of the seventeen independent Powers of North and South America is not only willing but ready — is not only ready but eager — to enter into a solemn compact in a Congress that may be called in the name of Peace, to agree that if, unhappily, differences shall

arise — as differences will arise between men and between nations — they shall be settled upon the peaceful and Christian basis of arbitration.

As I have often said before, I am glad to repeat in this great centre of civilization and power, that in my judgment no National spectacle, no International spectacle, no Continental spectacle, could be more grand than that presented by the Republics of the Western World meeting and solemnly agreeing that neither the soil of North nor of South America shall ever hereafter be stained by brothers' blood.

The Republican party, gentlemen, cannot be said to be on trial. To be on trial implies something to be tried for. The Republican party in its twenty-three years of rulership has advanced the interests of this country far beyond that of any of its predecessors in power. It has elevated the moral and intellectual standard of America — it has increased its wealth in a ratio never before realized or even dreamed of.

Statistics, I know, are dry, and I have dwelt so much upon them in the last six weeks that they might be supposed to be especially dry to me. Yet I never can forget the eloquence of the figures which tell us that the wealth of this great Empire State when the Republican party took the reins of government was estimated at \$1,800,000,000, and that twenty years afterward, under the influence of an industrial and financial system for which that party is proudly responsible, under the influence of that industrial and financial system, the same tests which gave you \$1,800,000,000 of property in 1860 gave you \$6,300,000,000 in 1880. There has never been in all the history of financial progress — there has never been in all the history of the world — any parallel to this; and I am sure, gentlemen, that the Republican party is not arrogant nor over-confident when it claims to itself the credit of organizing and maintaining the industrial system which gave to you and your associates in enterprise the equal and just laws which enabled you to make this marvelous progress.

As I have said, that party is not on trial. If it has made mistakes, they have been merged and forgotten in the greater success which has corrected them. If it has had internal differences, they are laid aside. If it has had factional strife, I am

sure that has ceased. And I am equally sure that, looking to the history of the past, and looking to that great future which we are justified in prophesying, this imperial State cannot afford to reverse, and therefore *will not* reverse those great policies upon which it has grown and advanced from glory to glory.

I thank you, gentlemen; I thank that larger number with whom I have already had the pleasure of exchanging greetings to-day; I thank the ministers, the merchants, the lawyers, the professional men, the mechanics, the laboring men of New York, for a cordial reception, an over-generous welcome, which in all the mutations of my future life will be to me among the proudest and most precious of my memories.

[In response to a reception from the ladies of Brooklyn in the Academy of Music in that city, Oct. 30, 1884.]

IN the important National contest which now draws to a close, much of the progress of which I have personally witnessed, two things have especially impressed me — the influence exerted by the women of the United States, and that exerted by the young men, and I do not know that I ought to divide these, for I attribute the great interest and activity of the young men largely to the influence of their mothers. The Republican party owes a great debt to the women of the United States. Not a debt now maturing, but one which began at the foundation of the party. The literature which sprang from the pen of woman did much — I was about to say did most — to concentrate that great army of freedom which in the conflict that came upon the country, destroyed the institution of slavery. I am sure that when the news came that I was selected for the important and responsible post in which I now stand, I received no greeting that meant more, or was more grateful to me, than the one which came to me from that lady whose gifted pen imparted spirit and soul to the anti-slavery agitation when she gave to the world “Uncle Tom’s Cabin.”

I do not feel, therefore, that the ladies of Brooklyn are taking any new step in this cordial welcome — to which a grateful heart feels it impossible to make adequate response — I do not feel that they are taking any new step or exerting any other influence than that which has been constantly exerted by women

during the thirty years in the history of the United States in which the Republican party has led the National progress. I know the wide-spread influence that goes out from such a greeting as this. I know that, without suffrage, woman casts often the weightiest vote. I know that the great moral strength, — showing itself constantly in political strength, — with which the Republican party has been inspired in its struggles and its triumphs, has come from the gracious and pure influence of woman. I make, therefore, due and profound acknowledgment, not merely for the great significance of this occasion, but for whatever of personal compliment it may imply. But I should be vain indeed if I should take to myself any large part of that which means only an expression of sympathy and support in the commanding contest in which, for the time, I am called to represent the highest patriotism, the best heart, the loftiest aspiration of the American Republic.

[At the Grand Opera House, Brooklyn, New York, Oct. 30, 1884.]

CITIZENS OF BROOKLYN, — Thirty years of effort, twenty-four years of power, have certainly vindicated the claims of the Republican party to general and to National confidence, and the leading question now to be decided by the popular vote in all the States is, whether that industrial system and that financial system which go hand in hand shall be superseded, and whether the experiment of Free Trade, with a possible change in our currency system, shall be resorted to by the voluntary consent of the American people. Certainly there is no man intelligent enough to reckon up his week's wages on Saturday night who does not know that the only difference between a day's pay for labor in the United States and a day's pay for labor in the British Isles is that which is produced by and results from the Protective tariff. So that the American laborer or mechanic who voluntarily casts his ballot for the elevation to power of a party committed to Free Trade casts his ballot for the reduction of his own wages.

I desire to repeat here what I have said more than once elsewhere ; that all the voluntary associations which laboring men and mechanics resort to in their trades-unions and like co-operative efforts — well enough in themselves, desirable no doubt in

many respects, meeting certainly with no word of criticism from me — are yet entirely ineffectual as a means of upholding the scale of American wages unless behind them there be that protection and support which come from the levying of duties on the scale embodied in the Protective tariff. Here at home the trades-unions may protect you from the exactions of an unjust employer; but how, in an era of Free Trade, can they protect you from the importation of cheap fabrics from the Old World which must necessarily displace your own, or probably compel the abandonment of the rival manufactures in this country? So that what I desire to enforce and impress upon men of enterprise and men of prudence is, that their only safeguard is in upholding that industrial system which prevents ruinous competition in the fabrics they are making, and that financial system which, when a dollar is earned, enables it to be paid with a hundred cents. It is the peculiar merit of the Republican party that, while from its hostility to slave-labor, with the natural consequence, protection to free labor, it has earned the right to the suffrage and support of the industrial class, it has never done it in the demagogic spirit which seeks to arouse the prejudice of labor against the rights of capital. It has continually taught the wise doctrine that capital and labor are friends and not enemies; that in co-operation they can produce prosperity, but that in hostility they can produce only adversity. The Republican party has taken care that capital shall not encroach upon labor, and that labor shall be so protected that it shall have no cause of enmity to capital.

[Mr. Blaine's speech in New Haven, Connecticut, on Nov. 1, 1884.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — Since my arrival in this city, an address from the clergymen of New Haven has been placed in my hands expressing their personal respect and confidence, and, through the person who delivered it, the assurance that on public questions and political issues under the laws and Constitution of the United States they know no sect; they know no Protestant, no Catholic, no Hebrew, but the equality of all. In the city of Hartford this morning, a letter was put into my hands asking me why I charged the Democratic party with being inspired by “rum, Romanism and rebellion.” My answer

is first that an unfortunate and ill-considered expression of another man was falsely attributed to me; and, in the next place, it gives me an opportunity to say, at the close of the National campaign, that in the public speeches which I have made, I have refrained carefully and instinctively from any disrespectful allusion to the Democratic party. I differ from that party widely on matters of principle, but I have too much respect for the millions of my countrymen whom it includes, to assail it with epithets or abuse. I am sure that I am the last man in the United States who would make a disrespectful allusion to another man's religion. The United States guarantees freedom of religious opinion. Before the law and under the Constitution, the Protestant, the Catholic and the Hebrew stand entitled to absolutely the same recognition and the same protection. If disrespectful allusion is to be made against the religion of any man, I repeat that I am the last man to make it, for though Protestant by conviction myself, and connected with a Protestant church, I should esteem myself of all men the most degraded if, under any pressure or under any temptation, I could, in any presence, make a disrespectful allusion to that ancient faith in which my mother lived and died.

The question now before the people of the United States, my fellow-citizens, is not a religious one, is not a question of creeds though it comes home to the fireside of every American citizen. We have enjoyed in this country for the last twenty-three years the numberless advantages of a Protective tariff. There is not a man within the sound of my voice, there is not a man in Connecticut, there is not a man in New England, there is not a man in the United States, who is not directly or indirectly interested in the Protective tariff. I see before me a large assemblage, including, doubtless, many who earn their bread in the sweat of their faces, and to whom the daily wages of labor is a matter of great importance. I beg to remind them that the only agency which secures them higher wages for their labor than a man in the British Isles receives for the same labor, is the Protective tariff. When I look abroad in your State, and when I examine your statistics, I find that Connecticut has doubled its wealth in the last twenty years; and I submit that that rapid ratio of progress is a direct result of the

Protective tariff. Every man in this State, whether he be a capitalist or a laborer, whether he be manufacturer or operative, finds that the question of protecting American industry enters into the warp and woof of his daily life. It is a cardinal doctrine in the creed of the Republican party that a Protective tariff shall be maintained, and it has been the invariable practice of the Democratic party in Congress for more than fifty years past, to oppose the policy of Protection. You choose between the policies of Protection and Free Trade when you choose between the Republican and Democratic parties. The decision, fellow-citizens, rests with you !

The omens in the present contest are to be spoken of by you, not by me ; but there are one or two things connected with the canvass to which I may with propriety call your attention. I beg especially to refer to the fact that, in a larger degree than in any other campaign of which I have personal knowledge, the Republican party has the inestimable advantage of the sympathy and support of the great mass of the young men of the country, and the young men carry with them strength, confidence, the power to bear burdens, and the power to give encouragement to others. The Republican party began its existence thirty years ago, with the support of the young men. Twenty-eight years ago, before many who now hear me knew any thing of political contests, that party entered the field for the first time in a National struggle. It selected a young man for its leader ; it selected a man in his forty-third year — the same age at which Washington was intrusted with the command of the Continental Army — a young man of great zeal, of great intelligence, and of a career so heroic that it partakes largely of romance. Under his leadership the Republican party, in its very first National contest, alarmed, if it did not defeat, its opponents. Since then twenty-eight years have been added to his age, bringing it up to the psalmist's limit — three-score years and ten, but he is still fresh and vigorous in body and in mind, still warm in his support of the Republican principles, and it is my especial pleasure to-day that I can, as I now do, introduce to you General John C. Frémont.

[At Boston the evening before the Presidential election, November 3d, at a dinner tendered to Mr. Blaine by leading Republicans, Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge presiding.]

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN, — For reasons which I need not detail, a reception of this character in the city of Boston at the close of the National campaign is peculiarly grateful to me, and I thank Mr. Lodge for giving me the opportunity to thank you. It is too late to argue, or even to state, the great issues involved in the canvass which closes to-night, but I am sure that those issues constitute a difference between parties so broad and so deep that their decision, one way or the other, will affect for weal or for woe the history of the United States for many years to come. I am sure that the Constitutional amendments which have grown out of the civil struggle and which have in so many respects, I might say, changed the very framework of our Government, have been made under the lead and by the power of the Republican party, and are now in its keeping. I have frequently said elsewhere, and I here now repeat, that to transfer the political power of the country to the Democratic party at this time would by no means be one of those ordinary transfers of the Government from one party to another which the gray-haired men within my view witnessed more than once in the last generation. It would not be merely an instance of one party going out and another coming in. It would be rather a reversal and overturning of the industrial systems of the Government, of the financial systems of the Government, in short a transfer of the sovereignty of the country of far greater consequence than the ordinary changes of dynasty which occur in European Governments of a different form from ours.

I close this canvass, Mr. Chairman, in which I have taken an active part, with a profound conviction that intelligent as the voters of the United States are — and I am certainly addressing some of the most intelligent of them — accustomed as they are to give heed to the weight and tendency of the questions to be decided, the people of the United States have not yet measured, nor, as I believe, yet fully comprehended, what it would mean to transfer this Government to the absolute control of the Southern States of this Union. Nor do I here and now

stop to give my own idea of what such a change would mean. It would be out of place. I should refrain for the additional reason that any thing I might now say would be too late to influence popular judgment in any direction, and for the third reason that in so far as my own voice could reach and influence the just judgment of the people of the United States I have exerted it to the extent of my strength. I have never offered an apology or explanation for taking what some of my closest friends regarded as an extraordinary step in going before the people somewhat more freely than has been the habit of those chosen as the Presidential candidates of great parties. But I will now say that I did it—and I desire to put this on record—because I thought that the peculiar character of the canvass was my personal justification for doing it. I am a profound believer in a popular government, and I know no reason why I should not face the American people. I did it, too, for the more specific reason that I believed there was danger lest the leading question which relates to the Protective system of America should be partially or perhaps wholly excluded from that consideration by the people which its merits deserved, and, intrusted as I was with the function of representing all members of the Republican party, I felt that I would in an especial degree obtain a hearing.

I have returned somewhat weary, somewhat broken in voice, as your ears have already detected, but I have returned with even a more profound trust than I had at the outset in the judgment, in the fairness, in the impartiality, in the generosity of the great mass of American citizens. I go to my home to-morrow not without a strong confidence in the result of the ballot, but with a heart that shall not in the least degree be troubled by any verdict that may be returned by the American people. I have sought in my entire canvass to lose sight of myself and of whatever personal fortune I have at stake, in the far greater, and far grander, and far more enduring issue which for the time I was submitting to popular judgment.

AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1884.

[Mr. Blaine's speech to a large number of Republican friends of the city and county of his residence, who serenaded him on the evening of Nov. 18, 1884.]

FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS, — The National contest is over and by the narrowest of margins we have lost. I thank you for your call, which if not one of joyous congratulation is one, I am sure, of confidence and sanguine hopes for the future. I thank you for the public opportunity you give me to express my sense of obligation not only to you but to all the Republicans of Maine. They responded to my nomination with gratifying enthusiasm and ratified it by a superb vote. I count it as one of the honors and pleasures of my public career that the party in Maine, after struggling hard for the last six years and twice within that period losing the State, has come back in this campaign to an old-fashioned twenty thousand plurality. No other expression of public confidence and esteem could equal that of the people among whom I have lived for thirty years, and to whom I am attached by all the ties that ennoble human nature, and give joy and dignity to life. After Maine, indeed, with Maine, my first thought is always of Pennsylvania. How can I fittingly express my thanks for that unparalleled majority of more than eighty thousand votes? — a popular indorsement which has deeply touched my heart and which has, if possible, increased my affection for the grand old Commonwealth — an affection which I inherited from my ancestry and which I shall transmit to my children.

But I do not limit my thanks to the State of my residence and the State of my birth. I owe much to the true and zealous friends in New England who were nobly steadfast to the Republican party and its candidates, and to the eminent scholars and divines, who, stepping aside from their ordinary vocations,

made my cause their cause, and to loyalty to principle, added the special compliment of standing as my personal representatives in the struggle. But the achievements for the Republican cause in the East are even surpassed by the splendid victories in the West. In that magnificent cordon of States that stretches from the foot-hills of the Alleghenies to the Golden Gate of the Pacific—beginning with Ohio and ending with California—the Republican banner was borne so loftily that but a single State failed to join in the wide acclaim of triumph. Nor should I do justice to my feelings if I failed to thank the Republicans of the Empire State who encountered many discouragements and obstacles, who fought against foes from within and foes from without, and who waged so strong a battle that a change of one vote in every two thousand would have given us the victory in the nation. Indeed a change of little more than five thousand votes would have transferred New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut to the Republican standard, and have made the North as solid as the South. My thanks would still be incomplete if I should fail to recognize with special gratitude that great body of workingmen—both native and foreign born—who gave me their earnest support—breaking from old personal and party ties and finding in the principles which I represented in the canvass the safeguard and protection of their own fireside interests.

The result of the election, my friends, will be regarded in the future, I think, as extraordinary. The Northern States, leaving out of the count the cities of New York and Brooklyn, sustained the Republican cause by a majority of more than four hundred thousand—almost half a million indeed—of the popular vote. The cities of New York and Brooklyn threw their great strength and influence with the solid South, and were the decisive element which gave to that section the control of the National Government. Speaking now, not as a defeated candidate, but simply as a loyal and devoted American, I think the transfer of the political power of the Government to the South is a great National misfortune. It is a misfortune because it introduces an element which cannot insure harmony and prosperity to the people, because it introduces into a Republic the rule of a minority.

The first instinct of an American is equality — equality of right, equality of privilege, equality of political power — that equality which says to every citizen, “Your vote is as good, and as potential as the vote of any other citizen.” That cannot be said to-day in the United States. The course of affairs in the South has crushed out the political power of more than six million American citizens and has transferred it by violence to others. Forty-two Presidential electors are assigned to the South on account of the colored population, and yet the colored population with more than eleven hundred thousand loyal votes have been unable to choose a single elector. Even in States where they have a decided majority of more than a hundred thousand they are deprived of free suffrage, and their rights as citizens scornfully trodden under foot. The eleven States that comprised the Rebel Confederacy had by the census of 1880 seven and a half million white population, and five million three hundred thousand colored population. The colored population almost to a man desire to support the Republican party, but by a system of reckless intimidation, and by violence and murder whenever violence and murder are required, they are absolutely deprived of political power.

If the outrage stopped there it would be bad enough. But it does not stop there, for not only is the negro population disfranchised but the power which rightly and Constitutionally belongs to them is transferred to the white population of the South, enabling them to exert an electoral influence far beyond that exerted by the same number of white people in the North. As an illustration of the extent to which this works destruction of all fair elections, let me present to you five States in the late Confederacy and five loyal States of the North, possessing in each section the same number of electoral votes. In the South the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina have, in the aggregate, forty-eight electoral votes. They have two million eight hundred thousand white people and over three million colored people. In the North the States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas and California have likewise in the aggregate forty-eight electoral votes, and they have a white population of five million six hundred thousand, or just double that of the five Southern States which I have

named. These Northern States have practically no colored population. It is therefore evident that the white men in those Southern States, by usurping and absorbing the rights of the colored men, are exerting just double the political power of the white men in the Northern States. I submit, my friends, that such a condition of affairs is extraordinary, unjust, and derogatory to the manhood of the North. Even those who are vindictively opposed to negro suffrage will not deny that if Presidential electors are assigned to the South by reason of the negro population, that population ought to be permitted free suffrage in the election. To deny that clear proposition is to affirm that a Southern white man in the Gulf States is entitled to double the political power of a Northern white man in the Lake States. It is to affirm that a Confederate soldier shall wield twice the influence in the nation that a Union soldier can wield, and that a perpetual and constantly increasing superiority shall be conceded to the Southern white man in the Government of the National Union. If that be quietly conceded in this generation, it will be hardened into custom, until the badge of inferiority will attach to the Northern white man as odiously as ever Norman noble stamped it upon Saxon churl.

This subject is of deep interest to the laboring men of the North. With the Southern Democracy triumphant in their states and in the Nation, the negro will be compelled to work for just such wages as the whites may decree, — wages which will amount, as did the supplies of the slaves, to a bare subsistence, equated in cash, perhaps at thirty-five cents per day, over the entire South. The white laborer will soon feel the destructive effect of this upon his own wages. The Republican party has clearly seen from the earliest days of reconstruction, that wages in the South must be raised to a just recompense of the laborer, or wages in the North must be ruinously lowered, and it has steadily worked for the former result. The reverse influence will now be set in motion, and that condition of affairs reproduced which, as Mr. Lincoln, years ago, warned the free laboring men of the North, will prove hostile to their independence, and will inevitably lead to a ruinous reduction of wages. A mere difference in the color of the skin will not suffice to maintain an entirely different standard of wages in contiguous

States, and the voluntary will be compelled to yield to the involuntary. So completely have the colored men in the South been already deprived by the Democratic party of their Constitutional and legal rights as citizens of the United States, that they regard the advent of that party to national power as the signal of their re-enslavement, and are affrighted because they think all legal protection for them is gone.

Few persons in the North realize how completely the chiefs of the Rebellion wield the political power which has triumphed in the late election. It is a portentous fact that the Democratic senators who come from the States of the late Confederacy, all, without a single exception, personally participated in the rebellion against the National Government. It is a still more significant fact that in those States no man who was loyal to the Union, however strong a Democrat he may be to-day, has the slightest chance of political promotion. The one great avenue to honor in that section is the record of zealous service in the war against the Government. It is certainly astounding that the section in which friendship for the Union in the day of its trial and agony is still a political disqualification, should be called now to rule over the Union. All this takes place during the lifetime of the generation that fought the war, and elevates into practical command of the American Government the identical men who organized for its destruction and plunged us into the bloodiest contest of modern times.

I have spoken of the South as placed by the late election in possession of the Government. The South furnished nearly three-fourths of the electoral votes that defeated the Republican party, and they will step to the command of the Democratic party as unchallenged and as unrestrained as they held the same position for thirty years before the civil war. Gentlemen, there cannot be political inequality among the citizens of a Free Republic. There cannot be a minority of white men in the South ruling a majority of white men in the North. Patriotism, self-respect, pride, protection for person, safety for the country, all cry out against it. The very thought of it stirs the blood of men who inherit equality from the pilgrims who first landed on Plymouth rocks, and from liberty-loving patriots who came to the Delaware with William Penn. It becomes the primal

question of American manhood. It demands a hearing and a settlement, and that settlement will vindicate the equality of the American citizen in all personal and civil rights. It will at least establish the equality of white men under the National Government and will give to the Northern man who fought to preserve the Union as large a voice in its government as may be exercised by the Southern man who fought to destroy the Union.

The contest just closed utterly dwarfs the fortunes of candidates whether successful or unsuccessful. Purposely, I may say instinctively, I have discussed the issues and consequences of that contest without reference to my own defeat, without the remotest reference to the gentleman who is elevated to the Presidency. Towards him personally I have no cause for the slightest ill will, and with entire cordiality I may express the wish that his official career will prove gratifying to himself and beneficial to the country, and that his administration may overcome the embarrassment which the peculiar source of its power imposes upon it from the hour of its birth.

MEMORIAL SERVICES IN HONOR OF GENERAL GRANT IN AUGUSTA, MAINE, AUG. 8, 1885.

[General Ulysses S. Grant, ex-President of the United States, died at Mount McGregor, New York, on Thursday, July 23, 1885. His funeral was in the City of New York on Saturday, August 8. On the same day and at the same hour memorial services were held in many places throughout the Union. At the service in Augusta, Maine, Mr. Blaine delivered the following address:—]

PUBLIC sensibility and personal sorrow over the death of General Grant are not confined to one continent. Profound admiration for great qualities and still more profound gratitude for great services have touched the hearts of the people with deep sympathy—increased even to tender emotion by the agony of his closing days and the undaunted heroism with which he morally conquered a last cruel fate.

The world in its hero-worship is discriminating and practical, if not indeed selfish. Eminent qualities and rare achievements do not always insure lasting fame. A brilliant orator attracts and enchains his hearers with his inspired and inspiring gift, but if his speech be not successfully used to some great, public, worthy end he passes soon from popular recollection, his only reward being in the fitful applause of his forgetting audience. A victorious general in a war of mere ambition receives the cheers of the multitude and the ceremonial honors of his government, but if he bring no boon to his country his fame will find no abiding-place in the centuries that follow. The hero of the ages is he who has been chief and foremost in his day in contributing to the moral or material progress, to the grandeur and glory, of the succeeding generations. Washington secured the freedom of the Colonies and founded a new Nation. Lincoln was the prophet who warned the people of the evils

that were undermining our Government, and the statesman who was called to leadership in the work of their extirpation. Grant was the soldier who by victory in the field gave vitality and force to the civil policies and philanthropic measures which Lincoln devised in the Cabinet for the regeneration and perpetuity of the Republic.

The monopoly of fame by the few in this world comes from an instinct, perhaps from a deep-seated necessity of human nature. Heroes cannot be multiplied. The gods of mythology lost their sacredness and their power by their numbers. The millions pass into oblivion; only the units survive. Who aided the great leader of Israel to conduct the chosen people over the sands of the desert and through the waters of the sea, unto the Promised Land? Who marched with Alexander from the Bosphorus to India? Who commanded the legions under Cæsar in the conquest of Gaul? Who crossed the Atlantic with Columbus? Who ventured through the winter passes of the Alps with the Conqueror of Italy? Who fought with Wellington at Waterloo? Alas! how soon it may be asked, Who marched with Sherman from the mountain to the sea? Who stood with Meade on the victorious field of Gettysburg? Who shared with Thomas in the glories of Nashville? Who went with Sheridan through the trials and the triumphs of the blood-stained Valley?

General Grant's name will survive because it is indissolubly connected with the greatest military and moral triumph in the history of his country. If the armies of the Union had ultimately failed, the vast and beneficent designs of Mr. Lincoln would have been frustrated. He would have been known in history as a statesman and philanthropist who in the cause of humanity cherished great aims which he could not realize, conceived great ends which he could not attain; — as an unsuccessful ruler whose policies distracted and dissevered his country; while General Grant would have taken his place with that long and always increasing array of able men who are found wanting in the supreme hour of trial.

But a higher power controlled the result. God in his gracious mercy had not raised up these men for works which should come to naught. In the reverent expression of Mr. Lincoln,

"no human counsel devised, nor did any mortal hand work out these great things." In their accomplishment these human agents were sustained by more than human power, and through them great salvation was wrought for the land. As long therefore as the American Union shall abide, with its blessings of Law and Liberty, Grant's name shall be remembered with honor; as long as the slavery of human beings shall be abhorred and the freedom of man cherished, Grant's name shall be recalled with gratitude; and in the cycles of the future the story of Lincoln's life can never be told without associating Grant in the enduring splendor of his own fame.

General Grant's military supremacy was honestly earned, without factitious praise, without extraneous help. He had no influence to urge his promotion, except such as was attracted by his own achievements; he had no potential friends, except those whom his victories won to his support. He rose more rapidly than any other military leader in history. In two and a half years he was advanced from the command of a single regiment to the supreme direction of a million men, divided into many great armies and operating over an area as large as the empires of Germany and Austria combined. He exhibited extraordinary qualities in the field. Bravery among American officers is a rule which has happily had few exceptions, but as an eminent general said, Grant possessed a quality above bravery; he had an insensibility to danger, apparently an unconsciousness of fear.

With this rare quality General Grant combined an evenness of judgment, to be depended upon in sunshine and in storm. Napoleon said, "The rarest attribute among generals is two o'clock in the morning courage." "I mean," he added, "unprepared courage, that which is necessary on an unexpected occasion and which in spite of the most unforeseen events leaves full freedom of judgment and promptness of decision." No better description could be given of the type of courage which distinguished General Grant. His constant readiness to fight was another quality which, according to the same high authority, established his rank as a commander. "Generals," said the exile at St. Helena, "are rarely found eager to give battle; they choose their positions, consider their combina-

tions, and then indecision begins." "Nothing," added this greatest warrior of modern times, "nothing is so difficult as to decide." General Grant in his services in the field never once exhibited indecision, and it was this quality which gave him his crowning characteristic as a military leader; he inspired his men with a sense of their invincibility, and they were thenceforth invincible!

The career of General Grant when he passed from military to civil administration was marked by his strong qualities. His Presidency of eight years was filled with events of magnitude, in which if his judgment was sometimes questioned, his patriotism was always conceded. He entered upon his office after the angry disturbance caused by the unexpected course of Mr. Lincoln's successor, and quietly enforced a policy which had been for four years the source of embittered disputation. His election to the Presidency proved in one important aspect a landmark in the history of the country. For nearly fifty years preceding that event there had been few Presidential elections in which the fate of the Union had not in some degree been agitated either by the threats of political malcontents or in the apprehensions of timid patriots. That day and that danger had passed. The Union was saved by the victory of the army commanded by General Grant. No menace of its destruction has been heard since General Grant's victory at the polls.

Death holds a flag of truce over its own. Under that flag, friend and foe sit peacefully together, passions are stilled, benevolence is restored, wrongs are repaired, justice is done. It was impossible that a career so long, so prominent, so positive as that of General Grant, should not have provoked strife and engendered enmity. For more than twenty years—from the death of Mr. Lincoln to the close of his own life—General Grant was the most conspicuous man in America—one towards whom leaders looked for leadership, upon whom partisans built their hopes of victory, to whom personal friends by tens of thousands offered the incense of sincere devotion. It was according to the weakness and the strength of human nature that counter-movements should ensue, that General Grant's primacy should be challenged, that his party should be resisted,

that his devoted friends should be confronted by jealous men in his own ranks, and by bitter enemies in the ranks of his opponents. But all these passions, all these resentments are buried in the grave which to-day receives his remains. Contention over his rank as a commander ceases, as Unionist and Confederate alike testify to his prowess in battle and his magnanimity in peace. Controversy over his civil Administration closes, as Democrat and Republican unite in pronouncing him to have been in every act and in every aspiration an American patriot.

THE IRISH QUESTION.

[Speech delivered by Mr. Blaine before a public meeting in Portland, Maine, June 1, 1886. The meeting was called to order by His Honor, Charles P. Chapman, Mayor of the city, and His Excellency, Frederic Robie, Governor of the State, presided.]

YOUR EXCELLENCY AND FELLOW-CITIZENS, — Directly after the published notice of this meeting I received a letter from a venerable friend in an adjacent county asking me, as I was announced to speak, to explain if I could, just what the “Irish question” is. I appreciate this request, for on an issue that calls forth so much sympathy and so much sentiment among those devoted to free government, throughout the world, and evokes so much passion among those who are personally concerned in the contest, there may be danger of not giving sufficient attention to the simple, elementary facts which enter into the subject.

What then is Home Rule? It is nothing more and nothing less than that which is enjoyed among us by every State and every Territory of the Union. Negatively it is what the people of Ireland do not enjoy. In a Parliament of 670 members Great Britain has 567 and Ireland has 103. Except with the consent of this Parliament, in which the Irish members are outnumbered by more than five to one, the people of Ireland possess no Legislative power whatever. They cannot incorporate a horse railroad company, or authorize a ferry over a stream, or organize a gas company to light the streets of a city. Apply that to yourselves. Suppose the State of Maine were linked with the State of New York in a joint Legislature in which New York had five members to Maine’s one. Suppose you could not take a step for the improvement of your beautiful city, or this State organize an association of any kind, or

adopt any measure for its own advancement, unless by the permission of the overwhelming majority of the New York members! How long do you think the people of Maine would endure such a condition of affairs? Yet that illustrates the position which Ireland holds with respect to England, except that there is one irritating feature in addition which would not apply to New York and Maine;—the centuries of oppression which have inspired the people of Ireland with a deep sense of wrong on the part of England.

If the Anglo-Celtic contention were left to the people of the United States to adjust, I suppose we should say,—adopt the Federal system! Let Ireland have her legislature, let England have her legislature, let Scotland have her legislature, let Wales have her legislature, and then let the Imperial Parliament legislate for the British Empire. Let questions that are Irish be settled by Irishmen, questions that are English be settled by Englishmen, questions that are Welsh be settled by Welshmen, and questions that are Scotch be settled by Scotchmen. Let questions that affect the whole Empire of Great Britain be settled in a Parliament in which the four great constituent elements shall be impartially represented. That would be our direct, shorthand method of settling the question. Under that system we have lived and grown and prospered for more than two hundred years in the United States, continually expanding and continually strengthening our institutions.

I do not forget that it would be political empiricism to attempt to give the details of any measure that would settle this prolonged strife between Great Britain and Ireland. To prescribe definite measures for a British Parliament would be a presumption on our part as much as for the English people to prescribe definite measures for the American Congress. I have noticed so many errors, even among the leading men of Great Britain, concerning the Congress of the United States, that I have been taught modesty in attempting to criticise the processes and the specific measures of the British Parliament. I well remember that Lord Palmerston on a grave occasion during our Civil war informed the House of Commons that “the President of the United States could not of his own power declare war; that it required the assent of the Senate.” Every

school-boy in America knows that it is the Congress of the United States, both Senate and House, to which the war power is given by the Constitution of the Republic, and not to the President at all. But Lord Palmerston's error was slight compared with another which is said to have occurred in Parliament. A member in an authoritative manner assured the House that no law in the United States was valid until it had received the assent of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States; and a fellow-member corrected him, saying, "You are wrong; the American Congress cannot discuss any measure until two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall have already approved it." Admonished by these and like instances, I refrain from any discussion of the details of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule bill. It may not be perfect. It may not give to Ireland all that she is entitled to. I only know that it is a step in the right direction, and that the long-oppressed people of Ireland hail it as a great and beneficent measure of relief. They and their representatives understand it; and more than all Mr. Gladstone understands it.

On the occasion of Lord John Russell's somewhat famous motion in the House of Commons in 1844 to inquire into the condition of Ireland, Mr. Seward said (I mean Lord Macaulay, but I am sure that the memory of neither will be injured by mistaking one for the other) Lord Macaulay said, in one of his most eloquent speeches, "You admit that you govern Ireland not as you govern England, not as you govern Scotland, but as you govern your new conquests in Scinde; not by means of the respect which the people feel for the law, but by means of bayonets and artillery and intrenched camps." If that were true in 1844 I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say that the long period of forty-two years which has intervened has served to strengthen rather than to diminish the truth of Macaulay's words. And now without in any way denying the facts set forth in Macaulay's extraordinary statement, Lord Salisbury comes forward with a remedy of an extremely harsh character. He says in effect that "the Irish can remain as they are now situated, or they can emigrate." But the Irish have been in Ireland as long as Lord Salisbury's ancestors have been in England and I presume much longer. His Lordship's lineage is not

given in Burke's Peerage beyond the illustrious Burleigh of Queen Elizabeth's day, and possibly his remote ancestry may have been Danish pirates or peasants in Normandy before the Conquest, and centuries after the Irish people were known in Ireland. I repeat, therefore, Lord Salisbury's proposition is extremely harsh. Might we not, indeed, with good reason call it impudent? Would it transgress courtesy if we called it insolent? Should we violate truth if we called it brutal in its cruelty? We have had occasion in this country to know Lord Salisbury too well. He was the bitterest foe that the Government of the United States had in the British Parliament during our civil war. He coldly advocated the destruction of the American Union simply as a measure of increasing the commerce and prosperity of Great Britain. His policy for Ireland and his policy towards the United States are essentially alike in spirit and in temper.

Another objection to Mr. Gladstone's policy comes from the Presbyterians of Ulster in the form of an appeal to the Presbyterians of the United States against granting the boon of Home Rule to Ireland. As a Protestant I deplore this action. I was educated under Presbyterian influences, in a Presbyterian college. I have connections with that church by blood and affinity that began with my life and shall not cease until my life ends. And yet I am free to say that I should be ashamed of the Presbyterian Church of America if it responded to an appeal which demands that five millions of Irish people shall be perpetually deprived of free government because of the remote and fanciful danger that a Dublin Parliament might interfere with the religious liberty of Presbyterians in Ulster. Mr. Chairman, if the Home Rule bill shall pass, the Dublin Parliament will assume power with a greater responsibility to the public opinion of the world, than was ever before imposed upon a Legislative body, because if the Dublin Parliament is formed it will be formed by reason of the pressure of public opinion from the liberty-loving people of the world. If the Irishmen who compose it should take one step against perfect liberty of conscience, or against any Protestant form of worship, they would fall under a condemnation even greater in its intensity than the friendship and sympathy which their own

sufferings have so widely called forth. But I have not the remotest fear that any such result will happen. The Catholics and the Presbyterians of Ireland will live and do just as the Presbyterians and Catholics of the United States live and do. They will accord perfect liberty of conscience each to the other, and will be mutually governed by the greatest of Christian virtues, which is charity.

Mr. Gladstone's policy includes another measure. It proposes to do something to relieve the Irish from the intolerable oppression of absentee landlordism. Let me here quote Lord Macaulay again. Speaking of Ireland whose territory is less than the territory of the State of Maine, less than thirty-three thousand square miles in extent, Lord Macaulay in the same speech from which I have already quoted, says, "In natural fertility Ireland is superior to any area of equal size in Europe, and is far more important to the prosperity, the strength, the dignity of the British Empire than all our distant dependencies together; more important than the Canadas, the West Indies, South Africa, Australasia, Ceylon and the vast dominions of the Moguls." I am sure that if any Irish orator had originally made that declaration in America he would have been laughed at for Celtic exaggeration and imagination.

This extraordinary statement from Lord Macaulay led me to a practical examination of Ireland's resources. I went at it in a direct, farmer-like way, and examined the statistics relating to Ireland's production. I gathered all my information from trustworthy British authority, and I give you the result of my examination, frankly confessing that I was astounded at the magnitude of the figures. In the year 1880 Ireland produced four million bushels of wheat. But wheat has ceased to be the crop of Ireland. She produced eight million bushels of barley. But barley is not one of the great crops of Ireland. She produced seventy million bushels of oats, a very extraordinary yield considering Ireland's small area. The next item I think every one will recognize as peculiarly adapted to Ireland; of potatoes, she produced one hundred and ten millions of bushels—within sixty millions of the whole product of the United States for the same year. In turnips and mangels together she produced one hundred and eighty-five million

bushels — vastly greater in weight than the largest cotton crop of the United States. She produced of flax sixty millions of pounds, and of cabbage eight hundred and fifty millions of pounds. She produced of hay three million eight hundred thousand tons. She had on her thousand hills and in her valleys over four million head of cattle, and in the same pasturage she had three million five hundred thousand head of sheep. She had five hundred and sixty thousand horses, and two hundred and ten thousand asses and mules. During the year 1880 she exported to England over seven hundred thousand cattle, over seven hundred thousand sheep, and nearly half a million swine. Pray remember all these came from a territory not quite so large as the State of Maine, and from an area of cultivation less than twenty millions of acres in extent! But with this magnificent abundance on this fertile land, rivaling the richness of the ancient land of Goshen, there are men in want of food, and appealing to-day to the charity of the stranger — compelled to ask alms through their blood and kindred in America. Why should this sad condition occur in a land that overflows with plenty, and exports millions of produce to other countries? According to the inspired command of the great Lawgiver of Israel, "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn," and St. Paul, in quoting this text in his first epistle to Timothy, added, "The laborer is worthy of his reward." Yet many of the men engaged in producing these wonderful harvests are to-day lacking bread.

Mr. Gladstone believes, and we hope more than half of Great Britain believes with him, that the cause of this distress in Ireland is to be traced in large part to the absentee ownership of the land. Seven hundred and twenty-nine Englishmen own half the land in Ireland. Three thousand other men own the majority of the other half of the agricultural land of Ireland. Counting all the holdings there are but nineteen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight owners of land in Ireland, and this in a population of more than five million souls. Produce that condition of affairs in Maine or in all New England and the distress here in a few years would be as great as the distress in Ireland to-day. Mr. Gladstone, speaking as a statesman and a Christian, says that this intolerable wrong must cease, and that

the men who till the land in Ireland must be permitted to purchase and to hold it.

But the story is not half told. The tenants and the peasantry of this little island, not so large, mind you, as Maine, pay a rental of sixty-five millions of dollars per annum upon the land. Besides this, Ireland pays an imperial tax of thirty-five millions of dollars annually, and a local tax of fifteen millions more. Thus the enormous sum of one hundred and fifteen millions of dollars is annually wrought out of the bone and flesh and spirit of the Irish people! No wonder that under this burden many lie crushed and down-trodden.

I believe the day has dawned for deliverance from these great oppressions; but from the experience of Ireland's past, it is not wise to be too sanguine of a speedy result. For one, therefore, I shall not be disappointed to see Mr. Gladstone's measures defeated in this Parliament. The English members can do it. But there is one thing which the English members cannot do. They cannot permanently defy the public opinion of the lovers of justice and liberty throughout the civilized world. Lord Hartington made a very significant admission when in a complaining tone he accused Mr. Gladstone of having conceded so much in his measure that Irishmen would never take less. I do not know the day, whether it be this year or next year or the year after that, or even years beyond, when a final settlement shall be made; but I have confidence that if Mr. Gladstone's bills are defeated the settlement will never be made on as easy terms for English landlords as the Premier now proposes.

They complain sometimes in England of such meetings as we are now holding. They say we are transcending the just and proper duties of a friendly nation. Even if that were true, the Englishman who remembers 1862-63-64 should maintain a discreet silence. Yet I freely admit that misconduct of Englishmen during our war would by no means justify misconduct on our part now. I do not refer to that as any palliation or as any ground for justification if we were doing wrong. I do not adopt the flippant cry of *tit for tat*, or the illogical taunt of *tu quoque*. Indeed, there has been nothing done in America that is not strictly within the lines of justice and strictly within the limits of international obligation. Nor is

any thing done in the United States with the intention of injuring or with the remotest desire to injure Great Britain. The English people themselves are divided, and the American people sympathize with what they believe to be the liberal and just side of English opinion. We are no more sympathizing with Ireland as against the England of the past than we are sympathizing with Gladstone against Salisbury in the England of the present. Nor must it be forgotten that England herself, apparently not appreciating her own course towards Ireland, has never failed in the last fifty years to extend sympathy and sometimes the helping-hand to nationalities in Europe struggling to be freed from the clutch of tyranny. When Hungary resisted the rule of Austria, Kossuth was as much a hero in England as he was in America. When Lombardy raised the standard of revolt against the House of Hapsburg, the British Ministry could scarcely be held back from open expression of sympathy. When Sicily revolted against the reign of the Neapolitan Bourbons, English sympathy was so active that Lord Palmerston was openly accused of permitting guns from Woolwich Arsenal to be smuggled to the Island of Sicily to aid the insurrection against King Bomba.

The American people are therefore justified by the example of England, and apart from any consideration except the broad one of human fellowship, stand forth as the friends of Ireland in her present distress. They do not stand forth as Democrats. They do not stand forth as Republicans. They do not stand forth as Protestants. They do not stand forth as Catholics. But they stand forth as citizens of a Free Republic, sympathizing with freedom throughout the world.

If I had a word of personal advice to give, or if I were in a position to give authoritative counsel, it would be this: the time is coming that will probably try the patience and the self-control of the Irish people more severely than they have been tried in any other stage in the progress of their long struggle. My advice is that by all means and with every personal and moral influence which can be used, all acts of violence be suppressed. Irishmen have earned the approving opinion of that part of the Christian world which believes in free government. Let them have a care that nothing be done

to divide this opinion. Let no act of imprudence or rashness or personal outrage or public violence produce a re-action. Never has a cause been conducted with a clearer head or with better judgment in its parliamentary relations than that which has been conducted by Mr. Parnell. I regard it as a very fortunate circumstance that Mr. Parnell is a Protestant. It has been the singular, and in many respects the happy fortune of Ireland in every trouble to be so led that generous-minded men the world over might see that it was not sectarian strife, but a struggle for freedom and good government. How often has the leader in Irish agitation been a Protestant:—Dean Swift, Molyneux, Robert Emmet, Theobald Wolf Tone, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Henry Grattan, and I might add many names to the list. These patriots carried the Irish cause high above and beyond all considerations of sectarian difference and founded it on “the rights of human nature,” as Jefferson defined the American cause in our own Revolutionary period. Thus led and thus guarded the Irish cause must prevail. There has never been a contest for liberty by any section of the British Empire composed of white men that was not successful in the end, if the white men were united. By union the Thirteen Colonies gained their independence. By union Canada gained every concession she wished upon the eve of a revolution, and there is nothing to-day which Canada could ask this side of absolute separation that would not be granted for the asking.

I have only one more word to say, and that again is a word of advice. The men of Irish blood in this country should keep this question as it has been kept thus far, out of our own political controversies. They should mark any man as an enemy who seeks to use it for personal or for partisan advancement. To the sacredness of your cause conducted in this spirit, you can in the lofty language of the most eloquent of Irishmen, Edmund Burke—“you can attest the retiring generations, you can attest the advancing generations, between whom we stand as a link in the great chain of eternal order.” Conducted in that spirit you can justify your cause before earthly tribunals, and you can carry it with pure heart and strong faith before the judgment seat of God.

POLITICAL ISSUES IN 1886.

[Speech delivered by Mr. Blaine at a Republican mass meeting held at Sebago Lake, Aug. 24, 1886.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS, — A new Administration of the National Government is usually unvexed in its first year, except by the importunities and the disappointments of its own supporters. The people at large give small heed, for the time, to public affairs, and the discussion of political issues is left as a somewhat perfunctory task to opposing partisans in Congress. This season of apparent indifference is caused in part by the natural ebb of the tide which flowed so high in the preceding national election, and in part also by the American instinct of fair play which demands that the party freshly installed may have free opportunity and full time to lay out its ground and mature its measures. This period of popular inaction is thus not only advantageous for rest, but it prepares those who are the ultimate arbiters in all matters of public concern to give patient hearing to fair argument when the time arrives for popular discussion.

The approaching election of a governor, of four representatives to a new Congress, and of a legislature that shall choose a senator of the United States, revives the interest in political topics in Maine, and subjects to inquiry the various issues which separate our people into distinct political parties. Have the old differences between the Republican and Democratic organizations been adjusted, or have they grown more palpable and more pronounced? Are the questions, over which the Republicans and the Democrats have waged a long contest, to be now abandoned? Is litigation in the court of public opinion to be discontinued, and a settlement effected by entering "neither party" on the People's docket? Or, on the other

hand, do the American people just now begin to see with clearer vision the aims and intentions, the methods and the measures of each party, and are they waking to a new and more earnest struggle over policies that are irreconcilable, over measures that are inherently and inevitably in conflict? Let us inquire concerning these things in a spirit of candor!

It is in the first place especially worthy of observation that in the history of industrial questions no party in time of peace has ever been more united in support of a policy than is the Republican party in support of a Protective Tariff to-day. At the late session of Congress a measure known as the Morrison Tariff Bill, designed first to weaken and ultimately to destroy the Protective policy, was resisted by so compact an organization of the Republican members that a single vote from New York and two or three votes from Minnesota were all that broke the absolute unanimity of the party. This was rendered still more striking by the fact that the organs of Republican opinion in New York and Minnesota declare that these exceptional votes were adverse to the wishes of a large majority of those who elected the dissenting members.

On the other hand, the majority of the Democratic members supported the Free Trade side of the question; but a small minority, uniting with the Republicans, found themselves able to defeat the measure. Thereupon the Democratic papers quite generally throughout the country denounced the recusants as unfaithful to the creed of their party, and the journal in New York which is said to reflect the views of the National Administration, gave formal notice to all Democrats, North and South, who lean towards the policy of Protection, that they must revise their opinions or leave the party, because with their views they can find no sympathy in Democratic ranks and no standing-room on Democratic platforms.

These leading facts indicate that the policy of Protection *versus* Free Trade, is an issue shaped and determined no longer by sectional preference — but has become general and National — affording a distinct, well-marked line of division between the Republican and Democratic parties. I do not recall these facts as preparatory to an analytic discussion of the Protective sys-

tem, but with the view of applying them to certain current movements and current events.

The hostility of the Democratic party to Protection has entailed upon the country a vast loss and has in many ways obstructed the progress and development of certain sections. Since the financial panic of 1873 and the contemporaneous solidification of the Southern vote, the Democratic party has, with the exception of a single Congress, held control of the House of Representatives. The power to originate revenue bills has been exclusively in their hands, and they have used it to the confusion, the detriment, in many instances to the destruction of new enterprises throughout the Union. Confidence once shaken is hard to restore, and the schemes of improvement which have been abandoned within the past ten years on account of the uncertainty of our revenue laws, constantly menaced by the Democratic party in Congress, would have caused prosperity and happiness in many communities that have felt the discouraging influence of dull times.

The Democratic party is continually referring to the comparative dullness in business, largely developed by their own course in Congress, as an argument against the policy of Protection. But it is worth while to contrast the condition of the country in this year of grace with its condition the year before the Republicans succeeded in enacting their first Protective Tariff; to contrast the financial condition at the beginning of 1861 and at the beginning of 1886 of the nine States which still do the larger amount of manufacturing for the country, and which did nearly all of it a quarter of a century ago — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the six States of New England. In 1861 the country had been for nearly a generation under Free Trade, and the amount which the people had accumulated in their savings banks during that long period was less than one hundred and sixty millions of dollars. In the same States on the first day of January, 1886, the aggregate amount in the savings banks was over one thousand and twenty millions of dollars. The difference in the amount of savings in Maine for the two periods show that in January, 1861, the people had less than a million and a half in bank, while in January, 1886, the people had over thirty-six millions in bank.

During this period it must be remembered that the increase of population in the nine States has been about thirty-five per cent, while the increase of deposits in savings banks has been at the rate of eight hundred per cent.

It must be remembered that seventy-five per cent of this vast sum belongs to the wage-workers. The vast number of depositors may be inferred from the fact that in Maine, where the aggregate population is less than seven hundred thousand, the thirty-six millions of deposits are divided between 110,000 persons, showing that about one in six of the total population is a depositor and that the average to each is about three hundred and twenty dollars.

The figures with which we are dealing have been confined to the nine States named, because in 1861 the manufacturing of this country was mainly confined to those States. But the economic fact that a thousand millions of dollars had been saved by the workers within their borders becomes still more significant when we remember that since 1861 the great body of North-western States under the inspiring influence of a Protective Tariff have in turn developed an enormous aggregation of manufacturing industries. Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, are no longer devoted to agriculture solely, but have a mass of manufacturing industries larger in value than all the manufactures in all the States of the Union on the day Mr. Lincoln was first inaugurated.

Still another comparison may be made even more embarrassing to the Free Trade *doctrinaires*. While the American workmen in nine States, working under a protective tariff, have over a thousand millions of dollars in savings banks, the vastly greater mass of workingmen in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, the whole United Kingdom, all working under free trade have less than four hundred millions of dollars in both savings banks and postal banks. These figures and these dollars are the most persuasive of arguments and the conclusion they teach is so plain that the running man may read.

The leading feature in the industrial field of 1885 and 1886 is the discontent among the men who earn their bread by skilled and by unskilled labor. Uneasiness and uncertainty are

found on all sides; there are wise aims among many and among not a few there is aimlessness, with its inevitable result of disappointment and discouragement. The man who could by any prescription remove this discontent and at once restore harmony and happiness would be philosopher, patriot and statesman. The man who professes to be able to do it will generally prove to be a compound of empiricism and ignorance. But in the end, perhaps by toilsome paths, with many blunders and some wrongs, no one need doubt that sound, just and righteous conclusions will be reached. Perfect freedom to test the virtues and secure the advantage of organization, to exert strong power through combination, are certainly among the common rights of all men under a Republican government. Labor associations have the same sanction and the same rights that any form of incorporation may assume—subject, as all must be, to the condition that the persons and property of others shall be respected. It is well for every citizen of a free government to keep before his eyes and in his thoughts the honored maxim that “the liberty of one man must always end where the rights of another man begin.”

I have no new nostrums to offer for the cure of labor troubles. I have no quack remedies to propose. I am a firm believer in the efficacy of the Protective Tariff, and I can look back with satisfaction to my record in Congress as never blotted by a single vote that was not friendly to the interests of American Labor. I never promised any thing when I was a candidate for a public office, and now as a private citizen I have no temptation to flatter any man or state any thing else than the simple truth as I see the truth. It is in this spirit that I offer some suggestions which seem to me worthy of attention under the present aspect of the Labor question.

In what may be termed the political creed of the various Labor organizations I have observed an apparent reluctance to recognize some pertinent and, as I think, controlling facts,—facts which in a spirit of friendship and candor I beg to point out. I read, a few days since, in a creed put forth by an association of Knights of Labor, in another State, a recital of eighteen distinct ends which they desired to secure or maintain by national legislation. Among these there was not the

slightest mention of a protective tariff. That might have been accidental; or it might have implied a perfect sense of safety in regard to the continuance of the tariff; or it might have meant that those who proclaimed the creed are indifferent to the fate of protection.

In any event it would be well for the Labor organizations diligently to inquire and ascertain how the wages of labor in the United States can be kept above the rate of wages in England, Germany and France on the same articles of manufacture without the intervention of protective duties? With the present cheap modes of interchange and transportation of all commodities, I inquire of these gentlemen how, under the rule of free trade, can wages in the United States be kept above the general standard of European wages? I do not stop for the detail of argument, I only desire to lodge the question in the minds of the millions of American laborers who have it in their power to maintain protection or to inaugurate free trade; who have it in their power to uphold the party of protection, or the party of free trade.

Another portentous fact has been omitted — so far as I have observed — from the consideration and judgment of the Labor organizations. They seem to have taken little or no heed of the existence of a million and a half of able-bodied laborers in the South with dark skins, but with expanding intellect, increasing intelligence and growing ambition. While these men were slaves, working in the corn and cotton fields, in the rice swamps and on the sugar plantations of the South, the skilled labor of the Northern States felt no competition from them. But since they became freemen there has been a great change in the variety and skill of the labor performed by colored men in the South. The great mass are, of course, still engaged in agricultural work, but thousands and tens of thousands, and in fact hundreds of thousands, have entered and are entering the mechanical and semi-mechanical field. They are making pig and bar iron in Tennessee and Alabama. They are manufacturing cotton in Georgia and the Carolinas. They are brick-layers and plasterers everywhere; they are carpenters and painters; they are blacksmiths; they make wagons and carts; they make cigars; they tan leather and make harness;

they are firemen and pilots on river boats; they calk vessels in Southern ports; they lay railroad track; they are switchmen and section men on the line, and firemen on locomotives. In fact, they are generally entering all the avenues and channels of skilled labor. Of course they are underpaid. They receive far less than has been paid in years past to Northern mechanics for similar work. They are not able to take part in making laws for their own protection, and they are consequently and inevitably unable to maintain a fair standard of wages or to receive a fair proportion of their proper earnings.

I do not dwell on this subject at length, though it could easily be presented in exasperating detail. I mention it only to place it before the Labor organizations of the North, with this question: Do you suppose that you can permanently maintain in the Northern States one scale of prices when just beyond an imaginary line on the south of us a far different scale of prices is paid for labor? The colored mechanic of the South is not so skillful a workman nor so intelligent a man as you are, but if he will lay brick in a new cotton factory in South Carolina at half the price you are paid, if he will paint and plaster it at the same low rate, he is inevitably building up an industry which, if the same rate of wages be maintained throughout, will drive you out of business or lead you to the gates of his own poverty.

The situation is therefore plainly demonstrable:—first, if the Democratic party shall succeed in what they have been annually attempting for twelve years past, destroying the Protective Tariff, the artisans of the United States will be thrown into direct competition with the highly skilled and miserably paid labor of Europe. Second, If the Democratic party shall be able to hold control of the Government, the colored laborer in the South will remain where the Southern Democrats have placed him politically, subject to the will of the white man, and unable to fix the price or command the value of his labor. The colored man will, therefore, under those conditions remain a constant quantity in the labor market, receiving inadequate compensation for his own toil, and steadily crowding down the compensation of white labor, if not to his own level yet far below its just and adequate standard.

At every turn, therefore, whether it be in exposing the white American laborer to the danger of European competition by destroying the Protective Tariff, or whether it be in reducing the wages of the white man by unfairly making the colored laborer his fatal competitor in all the fields of toil, the Democratic party North and South appears as the enemy of every interest of the American workman. With that party placed in full power and with all its measures achieved, the wages of the American laborer will fall as certainly as effect follows cause.

The Fishery dispute between the United States and Great Britain has passed through many singular phases in the last seventy years but never before, I think, were the circumstances of the controversy so extraordinary as we find existing at this moment. Before discussing the merits of the American case it may be interesting to recall the process by which the question has been placed in its present attitude.

On the thirty-first day of January, 1885, several months before the fishing season of that year began, President Arthur notified the people by public proclamation that the fishery articles of the Treaty of Washington (1871) had, according to the conditions of the treaty, been formally terminated. The President made plain and unmistakable the results that would flow from this action by warning all citizens of the United States that "none of the privileges secured to them by these articles will exist after July 1st, 1885." This termination of the treaty had been decreed by an overwhelming vote of both branches of Congress and was now made final and effective by the President's proclamation. This course had been earnestly desired by the American fishermen, was fully understood by them and was completed without protest from a single citizen of the United States.

Five weeks after President Arthur's proclamation was issued, his term closed, and with the new Administration Mr. Bayard became Secretary of State. In three or four days after he had been installed in office the British minister, Honorable Sackville West, submitted a proposal to continue the reciprocal fishing arrangements until Jan. 1, 1886. After a brief corre-

spondence Mr. Bayard accepted the offer. In other words, Mr. West and Mr. Bayard made a treaty of their own by which American fishermen were to be allowed to fish in British waters six months longer, and British fishermen should freely fish in American waters for the same period. When Mr. West first proposed this extension of time, in his note of March 12, he based his suggestion solely upon the generous ground that as the treaty would terminate during the fishing season "considerable hardship might be occasioned to American fishermen if they were compelled to desist from fishing at that time." This exact point had been foreseen, had been carefully considered by Congress, by the President, by the State Department, and by the American fishermen themselves. In popular parlance, they had "discounted it" and were fully prepared for it, when to their exceeding surprise the British minister seemed to be moved with compassion for their possible sufferings. Apparently without other motive than disinterested benevolence, Mr. West was anxious to allow them six months more of that precious time which the Halifax Commission had declared to be worth to American fishermen a half million dollars per annum.

But reading a little farther in this remarkable diplomatic correspondence, we find that Mr. West instead of acting from motives of pure generosity towards American fishermen was really paving the way for a shrewd trade and a new treaty. A formal understanding between himself and Mr. Bayard was reduced to writing, showing that he received a large consideration for leaving the British waters open to American fishermen six months longer. The consideration was a pledge from Mr. Bayard under date of June 19, 1885, that the President would at the next session of Congress "recommend the appointment of a Commission in which the Governments of the United States and Great Britain shall be respectively represented, charged with the consideration and settlement upon a just, equitable and honorable basis of the entire questions of the fishing rights of the two Governments and of their respective citizens on the coasts of the United States and British North America." The stipulation was definite and reduced to writing that "*in view and in consideration of such promised recommenda-*

tions by the President" the British would for the ensuing six months enforce no restrictive regulations against American fishermen. In addition to all this, Mr. Bayard gave significant intimation to Mr. West that the refunding of duties meanwhile collected under our custom laws upon Canadian fish might be brought before the Commission thus promised.

Accordingly, in the following December, six and a half months after Mr. Bayard's memorandum pledge that the President would make the recommendation to Congress, the President actually did incorporate it in his annual message and gave it in language which was a transcript *verbatim* of the words which Mr. Bayard gave to Mr. West. It would certainly be apart from my desire to pass any personal criticism upon the President, of whom I wish at all times to speak in terms of respect, but viewing this as a public question and speaking only with the freedom of a private citizen, I must express my belief that this transaction was throughout extraordinary and unprecedented. It was extraordinary and unprecedented and altogether beyond the proper power of a Secretary of State in the recess of Congress to revive any part of a treaty which Congress had expressly terminated; it was extraordinary for a Secretary of State to begin negotiations for the renewal of a treaty which every department of Government had just united in annulling; it was extraordinary for a Secretary of State to enter into a trade with a foreign Minister for a present benefit to be paid for by the future action of the Government; and most of all was it extraordinary that a pledge should be given to a foreign Government that the President of the United States should in the future — more than a half-year distant — make a specific recommendation, on a specific subject, in specific words to the Congress of the United States. That pledge was given and was held in the British foreign office in London, and it took from the President all the power of reconsideration which the lapse of time and the change of circumstances might suggest and impose. It robbed the President *pro hac vice* of his liberty as an executive. He was no longer free to insert in his annual message of December what might then seem expedient on the question of the fisheries, but was under personal obligations to insert word for word, letter for letter, the exact

recommendation which the Secretary of State in the preceding month of June had promised and pledged to the British Ministry. The matter presents a curious speculation in regard to the working of our Government. What, for instance, could or should the President have done; if before the date of his annual message he had become convinced, as a large majority of the Senate were convinced, that it was not expedient to organize an International Commission on the Fisheries. He would then have found himself embarrassed between this pledge given to a foreign Government in June and his convictions of duty to the citizens of the United States in the ensuing December.

Congress could not be induced to concur in the President's recommendation for an International Commission on the Fisheries, and so the scheme for which Mr. Bayard and Mr. West had made their extraordinary preparations came to naught. It would have been strange indeed if any other result had been reached. Congress had for several years been diligently endeavoring to free the country from the burden of the treaty provisions respecting the fisheries, and it could not be expected that they would willingly initiate measures for a new treaty that would probably in the end be filled with provisions as odious and burdensome to the American fishing interest as those from which they had just escaped.

As soon as it became evident that Congress would not accept the proposal for a new commission, the Government of the Dominion of Canada, with the presumed approval of the Imperial Government, began a series of outrages upon American fishing-vessels and fishing-crews, — seeking in every way to destroy their business and to deprive them of their fishing-rights. That course continues to this day, and is adopted by the Canadian Government with the deliberate intention and obvious expectation of forcing concessions from this Government. A few facts in the long controversy over the fishery question may be pertinently recalled as bearing on the present situation.

Let us frankly admit at the outset that we are governed in this matter by the terms of the treaty of 1818. Of the injustice of which this country was made the victim before that treaty was ratified, we need not here and now speak. We

accepted the treaty of 1818 in good faith; and though it largely curtailed privileges which were the birthright of American fishermen, those hardy men went to work under it, and by their enterprise largely expanded their business, — increasing in an amazing ratio the number of vessels, their aggregate tonnage, and the number of men engaged in the hazardous calling. This rapid progress alarmed the Canadians, and with the view of repressing rivalry and crippling American fishermen, a new construction was applied to the treaty nearly a quarter of a century after it had been in peaceful operation.

From 1841 to 1845 it was for the first time contended by Great Britain that the American right to fish within three miles from shore, meant three miles from the headlands which marked the entrance to bays. On this new and strained construction of the treaty, they sought to exclude American fishermen even from the Bay of Fundy, which is sixty miles wide at its mouth. After a long diplomatic discussion, maintained with signal ability by Edward Everett, our Minister at London, Lord Aberdeen — a name identified with justice and magnanimity in more than one generation — then at the head of the British Foreign Office, acknowledged that the ground taken by England in regard to the Bay of Fundy was indefensible, the Canadian position was reversed, and the bay was re-opened to American fishermen.

But the design of coercing the United States into opening her markets to Canadian fishermen was not abandoned. In 1852 a fresh and determined series of hostilities was begun against American fishermen. A naval force was sent out from England, and the whole coast of Nova Scotia was guarded by the guns of the Royal Navy — thirteen war-vessels patrolling the fishing-grounds. It was again proclaimed that the three-mile limit of the treaty of 1818 was not three miles from the shore, but three miles outside of a line from headland to headland of bays. This construction of the treaty would place the American fishermen in many places thirty miles from shore, instead of three, as provided by treaty. Mr. Everett had pertinently reminded the British Government that by this construction "the waters which wash the entire south-eastern coast of Nova Scotia from Cape Sable to Cape Canso — a distance of

nearly three hundred miles — might constitute a bay from which the United States fishermen would be excluded.” In other words, the argument of Mr. Everett showed that the British construction, if admitted, would destroy all American rights intended to be guarded and guaranteed under the provisions of the treaty.

When the attempt of 1852 was made to enforce the “head-land” construction of the treaty, Mr. Webster was Secretary of State, in the Administration of Mr. Fillmore. In an official paper over his own signature, Mr. Webster recorded his opinion that the British construction of the treaty “*is not conformable to the intentions of the contracting parties.*” Those are weighty words, and spoken by Mr. Webster, they give an almost authoritative construction to the treaty. It is certainly not discourteous or invidious to say that in legal ability, especially on points both of Constitutional and International Law, Mr. Webster’s opinion is entitled to more serious consideration than that of any British official who was then dealing or who has since dealt with the fishery question.

Mr. Webster’s official proclamation, from which I have quoted, was issued on the 6th of July, 1852. A fortnight later he addressed a large audience from the front door of his house at Marshfield, and then he spoke with entire freedom. “The treaty of 1818,” said Mr. Webster, “was made with the Crown of England. If an American fishing-vessel is captured by one of her vessels of war, the Crown of England is answerable; but it is not to be expected that the United States will submit their rights to be adjudicated in the petty tribunals of the Provinces, or that we shall allow our own vessels to be seized by constables and other petty officers, and condemned by the municipal courts of Quebec, Newfoundland, New Brunswick or Canada. . . . In the mean time be assured that the fishing interest will not be neglected by this Administration under any circumstances. The fishermen shall be protected in all their rights of property and in all their rights of occupation. To use a Marblehead phrase, they shall be protected ‘hook and line, bob and sinker.’”

Mr. Webster fell ill very soon after these vigorous expressions, and the negotiations passed into other hands and were adjusted

finally by the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The operation of that treaty was highly injurious to American fishermen. Before its termination in 1866, our Government refused to renew it and our fishing interest immediately began to revive, and immediately the Canadians began to agitate for another treaty by which they could reach the markets of the United States. Their wishes were gratified, and by the strangest of all diplomatic juggles the United States paid five and a half millions of dollars for a treaty which it did not want and which the other party earnestly desired. Time has passed and the treaty of 1871 has expired. The Canadians again come back to their old tactics of harassing and worrying and outraging American fishermen until by sheer weariness, after the manner of the unjust judge in Scripture, our Government shall give them what they want, even to the injury of our own people.

The humiliation of our situation has been gratuitously increased by the vote of a majority of the Democratic party in the House of Representatives to throw open the markets of the United States to British and Canadian fishermen, without duty or charge, and without securing to American fishermen the right to fish in British and Canadian waters. This is an act of hostility to the fishing interest of New England, the motive of which it is difficult even to comprehend. John Randolph so hated the wool tariff that he "felt like walking a mile to kick a sheep." Do Northern Democrats feel so rancorous a hostility to the fishermen of New England that they would sacrifice a great national interest in order to inflict a blow upon them?

It would certainly be refreshing if we could hear Mr. Webster's words repeated from official sources to-day. It would be refreshing if it could once more be asserted with the strength and dignity of Webster that "the United States will not submit their rights to be adjudicated in the petty tribunals of the Provinces," that "American fishermen shall be protected in all their rights of property, and in all their rights of occupation." Mr. Webster did not expect and did not intend that his position would lead to war. He simply expected that a firm, decided tone would bring English officials to their senses, and make them feel the responsibility and danger of transgressing the rights and touching the sensibilities of a proud and power-

ful people. Mr. Webster knew, as those who learned from him have since known, that England could even less than the United States afford to go to war about the fisheries. Mr. Webster knew, as those who have learned in his school have since known, that England and the United States can never go to war except on some point that touches the imperial integrity of the one or the other; and even an offense of that magnitude we agreed in 1871 to settle by arbitration and not by gage of battle. But the country is weary of hearing in Mr. Webster's phrase that Canadian constables are arresting American crews, and that Canadian gun-boats are capturing vessels on the high seas floating the American flag, — and doing all this on the assumption of a treaty power which the United States denies, and upon a technical construction put forward a quarter of a century after the treaty went into operation, and after it had received a peaceful and fair construction. We await the publication of Mr. Bayard's correspondence with Great Britain on the subject of the seizure of American fishing-vessels with deep interest — and with the hope, if not the expectation, that he will leave his country in a better position at the close of the negotiation than he has thus far maintained.

Another international trouble has increased our sense of chagrin and humiliation. In contrast with our patient endurance of Canadian outrage towards American fishermen, we have made an unnecessary and undignified display of insolence and bravado towards Mexico. There is no adequate cause for the demonstration. I do not stop at this point to narrate the precise facts attending the imprisonment of Mr. Cutting. I know that we cannot without loss of character for honor and chivalry begin our negotiations with threats of war. I maintain that when the United States agreed to accept arbitration as the means of adjusting our grave difficulties with England, we came under bonds to the public opinion of the world to offer arbitration to any weaker power as the means of settling difficulties in all cases where we cannot adjust them by direct negotiation. If we are not willing to accept that conclusion, we place ourselves in the disreputable attitude of accepting arbitration with a strong power, and resorting to force with a

weak power. I am sure no American citizen of self-respect desires to see his country subjected to that degradation. For the United States to attack Mexico without giving her an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal of arbitration would be for a nation of unlimited power to put herself to open shame before the world.

There could not, fellow-citizens, in my judgment, be a more deplorable event than a war between the United States and any other Republic of America. The United States must be regarded as the elder sister in that family of commonwealths. Even in the day of our weakness, we gave aid and comfort to them in their struggle for independence; let us not fail now to cultivate friendly and intimate relations with them. Refraining from war ourselves we shall gain the influence that will enable us to prevent war among them — so that peace shall be assured and perpetual on this continent. If I recall any part of my own participation in public affairs with special satisfaction it is that I endeavored to assemble the American Republics in a Peace Congress to the end that war between nations on this continent should be made forever impossible. War in any direction would be calamity to the United States — but war forced on Mexico would be a crime.

The pending contest is marked by the presence of a third party, organized as its leaders say, to enforce the prohibition of the liquor traffic in Maine. Some singular features characterize this movement. The Republican party in Maine from the day of its organization has been pledged to prohibition — enacting in 1857-58 the principal statute now in force, and amending it from year to year as leading temperance men requested. The amendments have averaged nearly one for every year since the original law was passed.

The third party, in their convention, testify that prohibition has been so well enforced by the Republicans, that in their judgment Maine is a quarter of a century ahead of the license States in all that pertains to the temperance reform. The Republicans have this year with special emphasis in their State Convention re-affirmed their faith in prohibition and nominated for Governor a pronounced supporter of the law. But

all this does not suit the Third Party Prohibitionists. They desire a party of their own just small enough to have no effect at all, or, if possible, just large enough to throw the State into the hands of the Democratic party, which has been as constant in its hostility to prohibition as the Republican party of Maine has been constant in its fidelity to prohibition.

The position and platform of the third party might in fact be thus abbreviated: Whereas the Republican party of Maine enacted a prohibitory law thirty years ago and has since amended it as a majority of the friends of temperance demanded, and has in consequence advanced Maine in all matters of temperance a quarter of a century ahead of the license States; therefore, be it resolved that we, members of a third party of Prohibitionists, will so vote as to defeat the Republican party and turn the Government of Maine over to the Democrats, who have opposed prohibition by every instrumentality in their power.

Democrats of course, with scarcely an attempt at concealment, regard the third party as their especial ally, and the coalition is so evident that I am sure no man can be deceived in regard to the result except him who desires to be deceived. Every voter knows that he must choose between the Republican and Democratic parties—and every voter knows that in joining the third party he indirectly but effectually throws his political and moral influence in favor of the Democracy.

The supporters of the third party adopt as their shibboleth that "the Republican party must be killed," and they have secured the co-operation of the Democrat, of the Free-Trader, of the saloon proprietor, of all men who wish to keep six millions of colored people in the South disfranchised and oppressed. It is an insincere coalition, an unhallowed partnership, an unholy alliance. Against it the Republican party of Maine presents its uniform support of prohibition, its unbroken record of devotion to the protection of American labor, its steadfast effort in behalf of those who are down-trodden and deprived of natural rights. The Republican party has always fought its battles single-handed, against great odds, and now with principle untarnished and courage undaunted it will again triumph over the combined force of all its foes.



James A. Garfield

MEMORIAL ADDRESS.

ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JAMES A. GARFIELD.

[Delivered Feb. 27, 1882, in response to an invitation from the two Houses of Congress.]

FOR the second time in this generation the great departments of the Government of the United States are assembled in the Hall of Representatives to do honor to the memory of a murdered President. Lincoln fell at the close of a mighty struggle in which the passions of men had been deeply stirred. The tragical termination of his great life added but another to the lengthened succession of horrors which had marked so many lintels with the blood of the first-born. Garfield was slain in a day of peace, when brother had been reconciled to brother, and when anger and hate had been banished from the land. "Whoever shall hereafter draw the portrait of murder, if he will show it as it has been exhibited where such example was last to have been looked for, let him not give it the grim visage of Moloch, the brow knitted by revenge, the face black with settled hate. Let him draw, rather, a decorous, smooth-faced, bloodless demon; not so much an example of human nature in its depravity and in its paroxysms of crime, as an infernal being, a fiend in the ordinary display and development of his character."

From the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth till the uprising against Charles I., about twenty thousand emigrants came from Old England to New England. As they came in pursuit of intellectual freedom and ecclesiastical independence rather than for worldly honor and profit, the emigration naturally ceased when the contest for religious liberty began in earnest at home. The man who struck his most effective blow for freedom of conscience by sailing for the Colonies in 1620 would have been accounted a deserter if he had left after 1640. The

opportunity had then come on the soil of England for that great contest which established the authority of Parliament, gave religious freedom to the people, sent Charles to the block, and committed to the hands of Oliver Cromwell the supreme executive power of England. The emigration was never renewed, and from these twenty thousand men, and from a small emigration from Scotland, from Ireland, and from France, are descended the vast numbers who have New England blood in their veins.

In 1685 the revocation of the edict of Nantes by Louis XIV. scattered to other countries four hundred thousand Protestants, who were among the most intelligent and enterprising of French subjects — merchants of capital, skilled manufacturers, and handicraftsmen, superior at the time to all others in Europe. A considerable number of these Huguenot French came to America ; a few landed in New England and became prominent in its history. Their names have in large part become anglicized, or have disappeared, but their blood is traceable in many of the most reputable families, and their fame is perpetuated in honorable memorials and useful institutions.

From these two sources, the Puritan and the Huguenot, came the late President — his father, Abram Garfield, being descended from the one, his mother, Eliza Ballou, from the other. It was good stock on both sides — none better, none braver, none truer. There was in it an inheritance of courage, of manliness, of imperishable love of liberty, of undying adherence to principle. Garfield was proud of his blood ; and, with as much satisfaction as if he were a British nobleman reading his stately ancestral record in Burke's Peerage, he spoke of himself as ninth in descent from those who would not endure the oppression of the Stuarts, and seventh in descent from the brave French Protestants who refused to submit to tyranny even from Louis the Great.

General Garfield delighted to dwell on these traits, and, during his only visit to England, he busied himself in searching out every trace of his forefathers in parish registries and on ancient army rolls. Sitting with a friend in the gallery of the House of Commons, one night, after a long day's labor in this field of research, he said, with evident elation, that in every

war in which for three centuries patriots of English blood had struck sturdy blows for constitutional government and human liberty, his family had been represented. They were at Marston Moor, at Naseby, and at Preston; they were at Bunker Hill, at Saratoga, and at Monmouth; and in his own person had battled for the same great cause in the war which preserved the Union of the States.

His father dying before he was two years old, Garfield's early life was one of privation, but its poverty has been made indelicately and unjustly prominent. Thousands of readers have imagined him as the ragged, starving child, whose reality too often greets the eye in the squalid sections of our large cities. General Garfield's infancy and youth had none of this destitution, none of these pitiful features appealing to the tender heart, and to the open hand of charity. He was a poor boy in the same sense in which Henry Clay was a poor boy; in which Andrew Jackson was a poor boy; in which Daniel Webster was a poor boy; in the sense in which a large majority of the eminent men of America in all generations have been poor boys. Before a great multitude, in a public speech, Mr. Webster bore this testimony:—

"It did not happen to me to be born in a log cabin, but my elder brothers and sisters were born in a log cabin raised amid the snow-drifts of New Hampshire, at a period so early that when the smoke rose first from its rude chimney and curled over the frozen hills, there was no similar evidence of a white man's habitation between it and the settlements on the rivers of Canada. Its remains still exist. I make to it an annual visit. I carry my children to it to teach them the hardships endured by the generations which have gone before them. I love to dwell on the tender recollections, the kindred ties, the early affections, and the touching narratives and incidents which mingle with all I know of this primitive family abode."

With the requisite change of scene the same words would aptly portray the early days of Garfield. The poverty of the frontier, where all are engaged in a common struggle and where a common sympathy and hearty co-operation lighten the burdens of each, is a very different poverty, different in kind, different in influence and effect, from that conscious and humiliating indigence which is every day forced to contrast itself with neighboring wealth on which it feels a sense of grinding depend-

ence. The poverty of the frontier is indeed no poverty. It is but the beginning of wealth, and the boundless possibilities of the future are always opening before it. No man ever grew up in the agricultural regions of the West, where a house-raising, or even a corn-husking, is matter of common interest and helpfulness, with any other feeling than that of broad-minded, generous independence. This honorable independence marked the youth of Garfield, as it marks the youth of millions of the best blood and brain now training for the future citizenship and future government of the Republic. He was born heir to land, to the title of freeholder, which has been the patent and passport of self-respect with the Anglo-Saxon race ever since Hengist and Horsa landed on the shores of England. His adventure on the canal—an alternative between that and the deck of a Lake Erie schooner—was a farmer boy's device for earning money, just as the New England lad begins a possibly great career by sailing before the mast on a coasting vessel, or on a merchantman bound to the farther India or to the China seas.

No manly man feels any thing of shame in looking back to early struggles with adverse circumstances, and no man feels a worthier pride than when he has conquered the obstacles to his progress. But no one of noble mould desires to be looked upon as having occupied a menial position, as having been repressed by a feeling of inferiority, or as having suffered the evils of poverty until relief was found at the hand of charity. General Garfield's youth presented no hardships which family love and family energy did not overcome, subjected him to no privations which he did not cheerfully accept, and left no memories save those which were recalled with delight, and transmitted with profit and with pride.

His early opportunities for securing an education were extremely limited, and yet were sufficient to develop in him an intense desire to learn. He could read at three years of age, and each winter he had the advantage of the district school. He read all the books to be found within the circle of his acquaintance; some of them he learned by heart. While yet in childhood he was a constant student of the Bible, and became familiar with its literature. The dignity and earnestness of

his speech in mature life gave evidence of this early training. At eighteen years of age he was able to teach school, and thenceforward his ambition was to obtain a college education. To this end he bent all his efforts, working in the harvest field, at the carpenter's bench, and, in the winter season, teaching the common schools of the neighborhood. While thus laboriously occupied he found time to prosecute his studies, and was so successful that at twenty-two years of age he was able to enter the junior class at Williams College, then under the Presidency of the venerable and honored Mark Hopkins, who, in the fullness of his powers, survives the eminent pupil to whom he was of inestimable service.

The history of Garfield's life to this period presents no novel features. He had undoubtedly shown perseverance, self-reliance, self-sacrifice and ambition — qualities which, be it said for the honor of our country, are everywhere to be found among the young men of America. But from his graduation at Williams onward, to the hour of his tragical death, his career was eminent and exceptional. Slowly working through his educational period, receiving his diploma when twenty-four years of age, he seemed at one bound to spring into conspicuous and brilliant success. Within six years he was successively President of a College, State Senator of Ohio, Major-General of the Army of the United States, and Representative-elect to the National Congress. A combination of honors so varied, so elevated, within a period so brief and to a man so young, is without parallel in the history of the country.

His army life was begun with no other military knowledge than such as he had hastily gained from books in the few months preceding his march to the field. Stepping from civil life to the head of a regiment, the first order he received when ready to cross the Ohio was to assume command of a brigade, and to operate as an independent force in Eastern Kentucky. His immediate duty was to check the advance of Humphrey Marshall, who was marching down the Big Sandy with the intention of occupying, in connection with other Confederate forces, the entire territory of Kentucky, and of precipitating the State into secession. This was at the close of the year 1861. Seldom, if ever, has a young college professor been thrown into

a more embarrassing and discouraging position. He knew just enough of military science, as he expressed it himself, to measure the extent of his ignorance, and with a handful of men he was marching, in rough winter weather, into a strange country, among a hostile population, to confront a largely superior force under the command of a distinguished graduate of West Point, who had seen active and important service in two preceding wars.

The result of the campaign is matter of history. The skill, the endurance, the extraordinary energy shown by Garfield, the courage he imparted to his men, raw and untried as himself, the measures he adopted to increase his force and to create in the enemy's mind exaggerated estimates of his numbers, bore perfect fruit in the rout of Marshall, the capture of his camp, the dispersion of his force, and the emancipation of an important territory from the control of the rebellion. Coming at the close of a long series of disasters to the Union arms, this victory had an unusual and extraneous importance, and in the popular judgment elevated the young commander to the rank of a military hero. With less than two thousand men in his entire command, with a mobilized force of only eleven hundred, without cannon, he had met an army of five thousand and defeated them — driving Marshall's forces successively from two strongholds of their own selection, fortified with abundant artillery. Major-General Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio, an experienced and able soldier of the regular army, published an order of thanks and congratulation on the brilliant result of the Big Sandy campaign, which would have turned the head of a less cool and sensible man than Garfield. Buell declared that his services had called into action the highest qualities of a soldier, and President Lincoln supplemented these words of praise by the more substantial reward of a Brigadier-General's commission, to bear date from the day of his decisive victory over Marshall.

The subsequent military career of Garfield fully sustained its brilliant beginning. With his new commission he was assigned to the command of a brigade in the Army of the Ohio, and took part in the second and decisive day's fight on the bloody field of Shiloh. The remainder of the year 1862 was not

especially eventful to him, as it was not to the armies with which he was serving. His practical sense was called into exercise in completing the task, assigned him by General Buell, of reconstructing bridges and re-establishing lines of railway communication for the Army. His occupation in this useful but not brilliant field was varied by service on courts-martial of importance, in which department of duty he won a valuable reputation, attracting the notice and securing the approval of the able and eminent Judge Advocate General of the Army. This of itself was warrant to honorable fame; for among the great men who in those trying days gave themselves, with entire devotion, to the service of their country, one who brought to that service the ripest learning, the most fervid eloquence, the most varied attainments, who labored with modesty and shunned applause, who in the day of triumph sat reserved and silent and grateful — as Francis Deak in the hour of Hungary's deliverance — was Joseph Holt of Kentucky, who in his honorable retirement enjoys the respect and veneration of all who love the Union of the States.

Early in 1863 Garfield was assigned to the highly important and responsible post of Chief of Staff to General Rosecrans, then at the head of the Army of the Cumberland. Perhaps in a great military campaign no subordinate officer requires sounder judgment and quicker knowledge of men than the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General. An indiscreet man in such a position can sow more discord, breed more jealousy and disseminate more strife than any other officer in the entire organization. When General Garfield assumed his new duties he found various troubles already well developed and seriously affecting the value and efficiency of the Army of the Cumberland. The energy, the impartiality, and the tact with which he sought to allay these dissensions, and to discharge the duties of his new and trying position, will always remain one of the most striking proofs of his great versatility. His military duties closed on the memorable field of Chickamauga, a field which, however disastrous to the Union arms, gave to him the occasion of winning imperishable laurels. The very rare distinction was accorded him of a great promotion for bravery on a field that was lost. President Lincoln appointed him a Major-

General in the Army of the United States for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of Chickamauga.

The Army of the Cumberland was re-organized under the command of General Thomas, who promptly offered Garfield one of its divisions. He was extremely desirous to accept the position, but was embarrassed by the fact that he had, a year before, been elected to Congress, and the time when he must take his seat was drawing near. He preferred to remain in the military service, and had within his own breast the largest confidence of success in the wider field which his new rank opened to him. Balancing the arguments on the one side and the other, anxious to determine what was for the best, desirous above all things to do his patriotic duty, he was decisively influenced by the advice of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, both of whom assured him that he could, at that time, be of especial value in the House of Representatives. He resigned his commission of Major-General on the fifth day of December, 1863, and took his seat in the House of Representatives on the seventh. He had served two years and four months in the Army, and had just completed his thirty-second year.

The Thirty-eighth Congress is pre-eminently entitled in history to the designation of the War Congress. It was elected while the war was flagrant, and every member was chosen upon the issues involved in the continuance of the struggle. The Thirty-seventh Congress had, indeed, legislated to a large extent on war measures, but it was chosen before any one believed that secession of the States would be actually attempted. The magnitude of the work which fell upon its successor was unprecedented, both in respect to the vast sums of money raised for the support of the Army and Navy, and of the new and extraordinary powers of legislation which it was forced to exercise. Only twenty-four States were represented, and one hundred and eighty-two members were upon its roll. Among these were many distinguished party-leaders on both sides, veterans in the public service, with established reputations for ability, and with that skill which comes only from parliamentary experience. Into this assemblage of men Garfield entered without special preparation, and, it might almost be said, unexpectedly. The question of taking command of a division

of troops under General Thomas, or taking his seat in Congress, was kept open till the last moment, so late, indeed, that the resignation of his military commission and his appearance in the House were almost contemporaneous. He wore the uniform of a Major-General of the United States Army on Saturday, and on Monday, in civilian's dress, he answered to the roll-call as a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio.

He was especially fortunate in the constituency which elected him. Descended almost entirely from New England stock, the men of the Ashtabula district were intensely radical on all questions relating to human rights. Well educated, thrifty, thoroughly intelligent in affairs, acutely discerning of character, not quick to bestow confidence, and slow to withdraw it, they were at once the most helpful and most exacting of supporters. Their tenacious trust in men in whom they have once confided is illustrated by the unparalleled fact that Elisha Whittlesey, Joshua R. Giddings, and James A. Garfield represented the district for fifty-four years.

There is no test of a man's ability in any department of public life more severe than service in the House of Representatives; there is no place where so little deference is paid to reputation previously acquired, or to eminence won outside; no place where so little consideration is shown for the feelings or the failures of beginners. What a man gains in the House he gains by sheer force of his own character, and if he loses and falls back he must expect no mercy, and will receive no sympathy. It is a field in which the survival of the strongest is the recognized rule, and where no pretense can deceive and no glamour can mislead. The real man is discovered, his worth is impartially weighed, his rank is irreversibly decreed.

With possibly a single exception, Garfield was the youngest member in the House when he entered, and was but seven years from his college graduation. But he had not been in his seat sixty days before his ability was recognized and his place conceded. He stepped to the front with the confidence of one who belonged there. The House contained an unusual number of strong men of both parties; nineteen of them have since been transferred to the Senate; many of them have served with distinction in the gubernatorial chairs of their respective States,

and on foreign missions of great consequence. But among them all none grew so rapidly, none so firmly, as Garfield. As is said by Trevelyan of his Parliamentary hero, Garfield succeeded "because all the world in concert could not have kept him in the background, and because when once in the front he played his part with a prompt intrepidity and a commanding ease that were but the outward symptoms of the immense reserves of energy on which it was in his power to draw." Indeed, the apparently reserved force which he possessed was one of his great characteristics. He never did so well but that it seemed he could easily have done better. He never expended so much strength but that he appeared to be holding additional power at command. This is one of the happiest and rarest distinctions of an effective debater, and often counts for as much, in persuading an assembly, as the eloquent and elaborate argument.

The great measure of Garfield's fame was filled by his service in the House of Representatives. His military life, illustrated by honorable performance, and rich in promise, was, as he himself felt, prematurely terminated, and necessarily incomplete. Speculation as to what he might have done in a field where the great prizes are so few, cannot be profitable. It is sufficient to say that as a soldier he did his duty bravely; he did it intelligently; he won an enviable fame, and he retired from the service without blot or breath against him. As a lawyer, though admirably equipped for the profession, he can scarcely be said to have entered on its practice. The few efforts he made at the bar were distinguished by the same high order of ability which he exhibited on every field where he was put to the test; and, if a man may be accepted as a competent judge of his own capacities and adaptations, the law was the profession to which Garfield should have devoted himself. But fate ordained otherwise, and his reputation in history will rest largely upon his service in the House of Representatives. That service was exceptionally long. He was nine times consecutively chosen to the House, an honor enjoyed probably by not twenty other Representatives of the more than five thousand who have been elected from the organization of the Government to this hour.

As a parliamentary orator, as a debater on an issue squarely joined, where the position had been chosen and the ground laid out, Garfield must be assigned a very high rank. More, perhaps, than any man with whom he was associated in public life, he gave careful and systematic study to public questions, and he came to every discussion in which he took part, with elaborate and complete preparation. He was a steady and indefatigable worker. Those who imagine that talent or genius can supply the place or achieve the results of labor will find no encouragement in Garfield's life. In preliminary work he was apt, rapid, and skillful. He possessed in a high degree the power of readily absorbing ideas and facts, and, like Dr. Johnson, had the art of getting from a book all that was of value in it by a reading apparently so quick and cursory that it seemed like a mere glance at the table of contents. He was a pre-eminently fair and candid man in debate, took no petty advantage, stooped to no unworthy methods, avoided personal allusions, rarely appealed to prejudice, did not seek to inflame passion. He had a quicker eye for the strong point of his adversary than for his weak point, and on his own side he so marshaled his weighty arguments as to make his hearers forget any possible lack in the complete strength of his position. He had a habit of stating his opponent's side with such amplitude of fairness and such liberality of concession that his followers often complained that he was giving his case away. But never in his prolonged participation in the proceedings of the House did he give his case away, or fail in the judgment of competent and impartial listeners to gain the mastery.

These characteristics, which marked Garfield as a great debater, did not, however, make him a great parliamentary leader. A parliamentary leader, as that term is understood wherever free representative government exists, is necessarily and very strictly the organ of his party. An ardent American defined the instinctive warmth of patriotism when he offered the toast, "Our country, always right; but right or wrong, our country." The parliamentary leader who has a body of followers that will do and dare and die for the cause, is one who believes his party always right, but right or wrong, is for his party. No more important or exacting duty devolves upon him than the selec-

tion of the field and the time for contest. He must know not merely how to strike, but where to strike and when to strike. He often skillfully avoids the strength of his opponent's position and scatters confusion in his ranks by attacking an exposed point when really the righteousness of the cause and the strength of logical intrenchment are against him. He conquers often both against the right and the heavy battalions; as when young Charles Fox, in the days of his Toryism, carried the House of Commons against justice, against its immemorial rights, against his own convictions, if, indeed, at that period Fox had convictions, and, in the interest of a corrupt administration, in obedience to a tyrannical sovereign, drove Wilkes from the seat to which the electors of Middlesex had chosen him, and installed Luttrell, in defiance not merely of law but of public decency. For an achievement of that kind Garfield was disqualified — disqualified by the texture of his mind, by the honesty of his heart, by his conscience, and by every instinct and aspiration of his nature.

The three most distinguished parliamentary leaders hitherto developed in this country are Mr. Clay, Mr. Douglas, and Mr. Thaddeus Stevens. They were all men of consummate ability, of great earnestness, of intense personality, differing widely each from the others, and yet with a signal trait in common — the power to command. In the give-and-take of daily discussion, in the art of controlling and consolidating reluctant and refractory followers, in the skill to overcome all forms of opposition, and to meet with competency and courage the varying phases of unlooked-for assault or unsuspected defection, it would be difficult to rank with these a fourth name in all our Congressional history. But of these Mr. Clay was the greatest. It would, perhaps, be impossible to find in the parliamentary annals of the world a parallel to Mr. Clay, in 1841, when at sixty-four years of age he took the control of the Whig party from the President who had received their suffrages, against the power of Webster in the Cabinet, against the eloquence of Choate in the Senate, against the herculean efforts of Caleb Cushing and Henry A. Wise in the House. In unshared leadership, in the pride and plenitude of power, he hurled against John Tyler with deepest scorn the mass of that conquering

column which had swept over the land in 1840, and drove his administration to seek shelter behind the lines of its political foes. Mr. Douglas achieved a victory scarcely less notable when, in 1854, against the secret desires of a strong administration, against the wise counsel of the older chiefs, against the conservative instincts and even the moral sense of the country, he forced a reluctant Congress to repeal the Missouri Compromise. Mr. Thaddeus Stevens in his contests from 1865 to 1868 actually advanced his parliamentary leadership until Congress tied the hands of the President and governed the country by its own will, leaving only perfunctory duties to be discharged by the Executive. With two hundred millions of patronage in his hands at the opening of the contest, aided by the active force of Seward in the Cabinet and the moral power of Chase on the bench, Andrew Johnson could not command the support of one-third in either House against the parliamentary uprising of which Thaddeus Stevens was the animating spirit and the unquestioned leader.

From these three great men Garfield differed radically, differed in the quality of his mind, in temperament, in the form and phase of ambition. He could not do what they did, but he could do what they could not, and in the breadth of his Congressional work he left that which will longer exert a potential influence among men, and which, measured by the severe test of posthumous criticism, will secure a more enduring and more enviable fame.

Those unfamiliar with Garfield's industry, and ignorant of the details of his work, may, in some degree, measure them by the annals of Congress. No one of the generation of public men to which he belonged has contributed so much that will prove valuable for future reference. His speeches are numerous, many of them brilliant, all of them well studied, carefully phrased, and exhaustive of the subject under consideration. Collected from the scattered pages of ninety royal octavo volumes of Congressional record, they would present an invaluable compendium of the political events of the most important era through which the National Government has ever passed. When the history of this period shall be impartially written, when war legislation, measures of reconstruction, protection of

human rights, amendments to the Constitution, maintenance of public credit, steps toward specie resumption, true theories of revenue, may all be reviewed, unsurrounded by prejudice and disconnected from partisanship, the speeches of Garfield will be estimated at their true value, and will be found to comprise a vast magazine of fact and argument, of clear analysis and sound conclusion. Indeed, if no other authority were accessible, his speeches in the House of Representatives from December, 1863, to June, 1880, would give a well-connected history and complete defense of the important legislation of the seventeen eventful years that constitute his parliamentary life. Far beyond that, his speeches would be found to forecast many great measures yet to be completed — measures which he knew were beyond the public opinion of the hour, but which he confidently believed would secure popular approval within the period of his own lifetime and by the aid of his own efforts.

Differing, as Garfield does, from the brilliant parliamentary leaders, it is not easy to find his counterpart anywhere in the record of American public life. He, perhaps, more nearly resembles Mr. Seward in his supreme faith in the all-conquering power of a principle. He had the love of learning, and the patient industry of investigation, to which John Quincy Adams owes his prominence and his Presidency. He had some of those ponderous elements of mind which distinguished Mr. Webster, and which, indeed, in all our public life have left the great Massachusetts Senator without an intellectual peer.

In English parliamentary history, as in our own, the leaders in the House of Commons present points of essential difference from Garfield. But some of his methods recall the best features in the strong, independent course of Sir Robert Peel, to whom he had striking resemblances in the type of his mind and in the habit of his speech. He had all of Burke's love for the Sublime and the Beautiful, with, possibly, something of his superabundance. In his faith and his magnanimity, in his power of statement, in his subtle analysis, in his faultless logic, in his love of literature, in his wealth and world of illustration, one is reminded of that great English statesman of to-day, who, confronted with obstacles that would daunt any but the dauntless, reviled as bitterly by those whom he would relieve as by those

whose supposed rights he is forced to invade, still labors with serene courage for the amelioration of Ireland and for the honor of the English name.

Garfield's nomination to the Presidency, while not anticipated, was not a surprise to the country. His prominence in Congress, his solid qualities, his wide reputation, strengthened by his then recent election as Senator, kept him before the public as a man occupying the highest rank among those entitled to be called statesmen. It was not mere chance that brought him this high honor. "We must," says Mr. Emerson, "reckon success a constitutional trait. If Eric is in robust health and has slept well and is at the top of his condition, and thirty years old at his departure from Greenland, he will steer west and his ships will reach Newfoundland. But take Eric out and put in a stronger and bolder man, and the ships will sail six hundred, one thousand, fifteen hundred miles farther and reach Labrador and New England. There is no chance in results."

As a candidate, Garfield steadily grew in popular favor. He was met with a storm of detraction at the very hour of his nomination, and it continued with increasing volume and momentum until the close of his victorious campaign:

"No might nor greatness in mortality
Can censure 'scape; backwounding calumny
The whitest virtue strikes. What king so strong
Can tie the gall up in the slanderous tongue?"

Under it all he was calm, and strong, and confident; never lost his self-possession; did no unwise act, spoke no hasty or ill-considered word. Indeed, nothing in his whole life is more remarkable or more creditable than his bearing through those five full months of vituperation—a prolonged agony of trial to a sensitive man, a constant and cruel draft upon the powers of moral endurance. The great mass of these unjust imputations passed unnoticed, and with the general *débris* of the campaign fell into oblivion. But in a few instances the iron entered his soul, and he died with the injury unforgotten if not unforgiven.

One aspect of Garfield's candidacy was unprecedented. Never before, in the history of partisan contests in this country,

had a successful Presidential candidate spoken freely on passing events and current issues. To attempt any thing of the kind seemed novel, rash, and even desperate. The older class of voters recalled the unfortunate Alabama letter, in which Mr. Clay was supposed to have signed his political death-warrant. They remembered also the hot-tempered effusion by which General Scott lost a large share of popularity before his nomination, and the unfortunate speeches which rapidly consumed the remainder. The younger voters had seen Mr. Greeley, in a series of vigorous and original addresses, preparing the pathway for his own defeat. Unmindful of these warnings, unheeding the advice of friends, Garfield spoke to large crowds as he journeyed to and from New York in August, to a great multitude in that city, to delegations and deputations of every kind that called at Mentor during the summer and autumn. With innumerable critics, watchful and eager to catch a phrase that might be turned into odium or ridicule, or a sentence that might be distorted to his own or his party's injury, Garfield did not trip or halt in any one of his seventy speeches. This seems all the more remarkable when it is remembered that he did not write what he was to say, and yet spoke with such consecutiveness of thought and such precision of phrase as to defy the accident of misreport and the malignity of misrepresentation.

In the beginning of his Presidential life Garfield's experience did not yield him pleasure or satisfaction. The duties that engross so large a portion of the President's time were distasteful to him, and were unfavorably contrasted with his legislative work. "I have been dealing all these years with ideas," he impatiently exclaimed one day, "and here I am dealing only with persons! I have been heretofore treating of the fundamental principles of government, and here I am considering all day whether A or B shall be appointed to this or that office." He was earnestly seeking some practical way of correcting the evils arising from the distribution of overgrown and unwieldy patronage — evils always appreciated and often discussed by him, but whose magnitude had been more deeply impressed upon his mind since his accession to the Presidency. Had he lived, a comprehensive improvement in the mode of appoint-

ment and in the tenure of office would have been proposed by him, and, with the aid of Congress, no doubt perfected.

But, while many of the executive duties were not grateful to him, he was assiduous and conscientious in their discharge. From the very outset he exhibited administrative talent of a high order. He grasped the helm of office with the hand of a master. Indeed, he constantly surprised many who were intimately associated with him in the Government, and especially those who had feared that he might be lacking in the executive faculty. His disposition of business was orderly and rapid. His power of analysis, and his skill in classification, enabled him to dispatch a mass of detail with promptness and ease. His Cabinet meetings were admirably conducted. His clear presentation of official subjects, his well-considered suggestion of topics for discussion, his quick decision when all had been heard, combined to show a thoroughness of mental training as rare as his natural ability and his facile adaptation to a new and enlarged field of labor.

With perfect comprehension of all the inheritances of the war, with a cool calculation of the obstacles in his way, impelled always by a generous enthusiasm, he conceived that much might be done by his Administration towards restoring harmony between the different sections of the Union. He was anxious to go South and speak to the people. As early as April he had ineffectually endeavored to arrange for a trip to Nashville, whither he had been cordially invited, and he was again disappointed a few weeks later to find that he could not go to South Carolina to attend the centennial celebration of the victory of the Cowpens. But for the autumn he definitely counted on being present at three memorable assemblies in the South; the celebration at Yorktown, the opening of the Cotton Exposition at Atlanta, and the meeting of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga. He was already turning over in his mind his address for each occasion, and the three taken together, he said to a friend, gave him the exact scope and verge which he needed. At Yorktown he would have before him the associations of a hundred years that bound the South and the North in the sacred memory of a common danger and a common victory. At Atlanta he would present

the material interests and the industrial development which appealed to the thrift and independence of every household, and which should unite the two sections by the instinct of self-interest and self-defense. At Chattanooga he would revive memories of the war only to show that after all its disaster and suffering, the country was stronger and greater, the Union rendered indissoluble, and the future, through the agony and blood of one generation, made brighter and better for all.

His ambition for the success of his Administration was high. With strong caution and conservatism in his nature, he was in no danger of attempting rash experiments or of resorting to the empiricism of statesmanship. But he believed that renewed and closer attention should be given to questions affecting the material interests and commercial prospects of fifty millions of people. He believed that our continental relations extensive and undeveloped as they are, involved responsibility, and could be cultivated into profitable friendship or be abandoned to harmful indifference or lasting enmity. He believed with equal confidence that an essential forerunner to a new era of National progress must be a feeling of contentment in every section of the Union, and a generous belief that the benefits and burdens of government would be common to all. Himself a conspicuous illustration of what ability and ambition may do under Republican institutions, he loved his country with a passion of patriotic devotion, and every waking thought was given to her advancement. He was an American in all his aspirations, and he looked to the destiny and influence of the United States with the philosophic composure of Jefferson and the demonstrative confidence of John Adams.

The political events which disturbed the President's serenity for many weeks before that fateful day in July form an important chapter in his career, and, in his own judgment, involved questions of principle and of right which are vital to the constitutional administration of the Federal Government. It would be out of place here to speak the language of controversy; but the events referred to, however they may continue to be a source of contention with others, have become, so far as the name of Garfield is involved, as much a matter of history as his heroism at Chickamauga or his illustrious service

in the House. Detail is not needful, and personal antagonism shall not be rekindled by any word uttered to-day. The motives of those opposing him are not now to be adversely interpreted or their course harshly characterized. But of the dead President this is to be said, and said because his own speech is forever silenced and he can be no more heard except through the fidelity and love of surviving friends:— from the beginning to the end of the controversy he so much deplored, the President was never for one moment actuated by any motive of gain to himself or of loss to others. Least of all men did he harbor revenge, rarely did he even show resentment, and malice was not in his nature. He was congenially employed only in the exchange of good offices and the doing of kindly deeds.

There was not an hour, from the beginning of the trouble till the fatal shot entered his body, when the President would not gladly for the sake of restoring harmony, have retraced any step he had taken, if such retracing had merely involved consequences personal to himself. The pride of consistency, or any supposed sense of humiliation that might result from surrendering his position, had not a feather's weight with him. No man was ever less subject to such influences from within or from without. But after most anxious deliberation and the coolest survey of all the circumstances, he solemnly believed that the true prerogatives of the Executive were involved in the issue which had been raised, and that he would be unfaithful to his supreme obligation if he failed to maintain, in all their vigor, the constitutional rights and dignities of his great office. He believed this in all the convictions of conscience when in sound and vigorous health, and he believed it in his suffering and prostration in the last conscious thought which his wearied mind bestowed on the transitory struggles of life.

More than this need not be said. Less than this could not be said. Justice to the dead, the highest obligation that devolves upon the living, demands the declaration that in all the bearings of the subject, actual or possible, the President was content in his mind, justified in his conscience, immovable in his conclusions.

The religious element in Garfield's character was deep and

earnest. In his early youth he espoused the faith of the Disciples, a sect of the great Baptist Communion. But the broadening tendency of his mind and his spirit of inquiry were early apparent, and carried him beyond the dogmas of sect and the restraints of association. In selecting his college he rejected Bethany, though presided over by Alexander Campbell, the greatest preacher of his church. His reasons were characteristic: first, that Bethany leaned too heavily towards slavery; and, second, that being himself a Disciple and the son of Disciple parents, he had little acquaintance with people of other beliefs, and he thought it would make him more liberal, quoting his own words, both in his religious and general views, to go into a new circle and be under new influences.

The liberal tendency which he anticipated as the result of wider culture was fully realized. He was emancipated from mere sectarian belief, and with eager interest pushed his investigations in the direction of modern progressive thought. He followed with quickening step in the paths of exploration and speculation fearlessly trodden by Darwin, by Huxley, by Tyn-dall, and by other eminent scientists. His own church, binding its disciples by no formulated creed, but accepting the Old and New Testaments as the word of God, with unbiased liberality of private interpretation, favored, if it did not stimulate, the spirit of investigation.

But however high Garfield reasoned of "fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute," he was never separated from the Church of the Disciples in his affections and in his associations. For him it held the Ark of the Covenant. To him it was the gate of Heaven. The world of religious belief is full of solecisms and contradictions. A philosophic observer declares that men by the thousand will die in defense of a creed whose doctrines they do not comprehend and whose tenets they habitually violate. It is equally true that men by the thousand will cling to church organizations with instinctive and undying fidelity, when their belief in maturer years is radically different from that which inspired them as neophytes.

But after this range of speculation, and this latitude of doubt, Garfield came back always with freshness and delight to the simpler instincts of religious faith, which, earliest im-

planted, longest survive. Not many weeks before his assassination, walking on the banks of the Potomac with a friend, and conversing on those topics of personal religion, concerning which noble natures have an unconquerable reserve, he said that he found the Lord's Prayer and the simple petitions learned in infancy infinitely restful to him, not merely in their stated repetition, but in their casual and frequent recall as he went about the daily duties of life. Certain texts of Scripture had a strong hold on his memory and his heart. He heard, while in Edinburgh some years ago, an eminent Scotch preacher who prefaced his sermon with reading the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which book had been the subject of careful study with Garfield during all his religious life. He was greatly impressed by the elocution of the preacher and declared that it had imparted a new and deeper meaning to the majestic utterance of St. Paul. He referred often in after years to that memorable service, and dwelt with exaltation of feeling upon the radiant promise and the assured hope with which the great apostle of the Gentiles was "persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

The crowning characteristic of General Garfield's religious opinions, as, indeed, of all his opinions, was his liberality. In all things he had charity. Tolerance was of his nature. He respected in others the qualities which he possessed himself—sincerity of conviction and frankness of expression. With him the inquiry was not so much what a man believes, but does he believe it? The lines of his friendship and his confidence encircled men of every creed, and men of no creed, and to the end of his life, on his ever-lengthening list of friends, were to be found the names of a pious Catholic priest and of an honest-minded and generous-hearted free-thinker.

On the morning of Saturday, July 2, the President was a contented and happy man—not in an ordinary degree, but joyfully, almost boyishly happy. On his way to the railroad station, to which he drove slowly, in conscious enjoyment of the beautiful morning, with an unwonted sense of leisure and

a keen anticipation of pleasure, his talk was all in the grateful and gratulatory vein. He felt that after four months of trial his Administration was strong in its grasp of affairs, strong in popular favor, and destined to grow stronger; that grave difficulties confronting him at his inauguration had been safely passed; that trouble lay behind him and not before him; that he was soon to meet the wife whom he loved, now recovering from an illness which had but lately disquieted and at times almost unnerved him; that he was going to his *Alma Mater* to renew the most cherished associations of his young manhood, and to exchange greetings with those whose deepening interest had followed every step of his upward progress from the day he entered upon his college course until he had attained the loftiest elevation in the gift of his countrymen.

Surely if happiness can ever come from the honors or triumphs of this world, on that quiet July morning Garfield may well have been a happy man. No foreboding of evil haunted him; no premonition of danger clouded his sky. His terrible fate was upon him in an instant. One moment he stood erect, strong, confident in the years stretching peacefully out before him. The next he lay wounded, bleeding, helpless, doomed to weary weeks of torture, to silence, and the grave.

Great in life, he was surpassingly great in death. For no cause, in the very frenzy of wantonness and wickedness, by the red hand of murder, he was thrust from the full tide of this world's interest, from its hopes, its aspirations, its victories, into the visible presence of death—and he did not quail. Not alone for the one short moment in which, stunned and dazed he could give up life, hardly aware of its relinquishment, but through days of deadly languor, through weeks of agony, that was not less agony because silently borne, with clear sight and calm courage, he looked into his open grave. What blight and ruin met his anguished eyes, whose lips may tell—what brilliant, broken plans, what baffled, high ambitions, what sundering of strong, warm, manhood's friendships, what bitter rending of sweet household ties! Behind him a proud, expectant nation, a great host of sustaining friends, a cherished and happy mother, wearing the full, rich honors of her early toil and tears; the wife of his youth, whose whole life lay in his; the little boys

not yet emerged from childhood's day of frolic; the fair young daughter; the sturdy sons just springing into closest companionship, claiming every day and every day rewarding a father's love and care; and in his heart the eager, rejoicing power to meet all demand. Before him, desolation and great darkness! And his soul was not shaken.

His countrymen were thrilled with instant, profound, and universal sympathy. Masterful in his mortal weakness, he became the centre of a nation's love; he was enshrined in the prayers of a world. But all the love and all the sympathy could not share with him his suffering. He trod the wine-press alone. With unfaltering front he faced death. With unfailing tenderness he took leave of life. Above the demoniac hiss of the assassin's bullet he heard the voice of God. In simple resignation he bowed to the divine decree.

As the end drew near, his early craving for the sea returned. The stately mansion of power had been to him the wearisome hospital of pain, and he begged to be taken from its prison walls, from its oppressive, stifling air, from its homelessness and its hopelessness. Gently, silently, the love of a great people bore the pale sufferer to the longed-for healing of the sea, to live or to die, as God should will, within sight of its heaving billows, within sound of its manifold voices. With wan, fevered face tenderly lifted to the cooling breeze, he looked out wistfully upon the ocean's changing wonders; on its far sails, whitening in the morning light; on its restless waves, rolling shoreward to break and die beneath the noonday sun; on the red clouds of evening, arching low to the horizon; on the serene and shining pathway of the stars. Let us think that his dying eyes read a mystic meaning which only the rapt and parting soul may know. Let us believe that in the silence of the receding world he heard the great waves breaking on a farther shore, and felt already upon his wasted brow the breath of the eternal morning.

